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Twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology introduces a paradigm for Christian 
ethics that engenders significant divergence among Christian ethicists in the way its 
application influences moral theory. These divergences indicate the need to clarify the 
issues revolving around its methodological application in order to bring credible structure 
for applying the eschatological paradigm in Christian ethics.
A set of analytical distinctions and procedural suggestions in this study provide an 
extensive framework for comparatively observing where ethicists begin, move, and end
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in terms of using eschatology as paradigm in their moral theory: (1) role and function of
t
paradigms, (2) levels o f paradigm operation (macro, meso, micro), (3) levels in ethical 
structure (philosophical/theological bases, principles, area rules), (4) three principles of 
verification (role o f Scripture, community, and the nature of social involvement), and (5) 
three conceptually interwoven and complementary components o f the paradigm 
{already/not yet, reign o f  God, horizon o f  future). A correspondence is proposed between 
the levels of paradigm operation and the ingredients in ethical structure. A complex 
interplay is indicated between the paradigm’s components and the principles of 
verification which highlight the methodological nuances the paradigm elicits.
Mott and Ogletree were selected because they represent the latter phase of 
twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology and its application toward moral theory. 
Their projects elucidate the complex nature and subtle interplay between the various 
ingredients involved in using eschatology as paradigm and the ever-present 
presuppositions of those seeking to apply it—illustrating what happens if you take the 
eschatological paradigm and apply it this way or that way. Their diversity suggests that 
the question of the use o f eschatology in Christian moral theory remains open. Their 
respective orientation to Scripture shows considerable contrasts with respect to 
consistency, specificity, and relevancy of eschatological paradigm application. Their 
projects suggest that the question of the role of Scripture alone gives promise of bringing 
stability to the use o f the eschatological paradigm in Christian ethics. The paradigm 
functions best when expressing biblical ethics rather than moral philosophy.
Perspectives for using eschatology as paradigm are proposed along with its 
relation to other paradigms in Christian moral theory and directions for further study.
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Twentieth-century theology has generated a significant “re-interpretation of 
eschatology,”1 and the implications for Christian ethics have been momentous.2 
Traditional theology had generally defined eschatology as “the study of last things,”3 but 
developing insights from the ongoing debate over the theme of the kingdom of God have 
significantly broadened theological understanding of eschatology.
The metamorphose taking place in eschatology since Ritschl persuasively 
identified eschatology with ethics in the Kingdom of God and made it central to his
'See Millard J. Erikson’s “Introduction to Eschatology,” in Christian Theology 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 1149-1165; and Somen Das, “A Theology o f 
the Future and Christian Ethics,” Bangalore Theological Forum 15 (May-August 1983): 
63-86.
2Brian V. Johnstone, “Eschatology and Social Ethics: A Critical Survey of the 
Development of Social Ethics in the Ecumenical Discussion," Bijdragen 37 (1976): 47- 
85; Das, 63-86; Carl E. Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics: Essays on the Theology and 
Ethics o f the Kingdom of God (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1974), 7-25.
3Douglas Ezell, “Eschatology and Ethics in the New Testament,” Southwestern 
Journal o f  Theology 22 (Spring 1980): 75. Traditional views included a sterile 
dogmaticism, a focus on apocalyptic calculations, narrow hopes of salvation for one’s 
own soul, and a marked contrast between this world and the age to come, between time 
and eternity.
1
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systematic theology has resulted in the forging o f an eschatological approach to theology1 
and the spawning of a number of eschatological schools.2 In the process, the theological 
trend o f this century in both systematics and biblical studies has de-historicized 
eschatology (where eschatology has a timeless ahistorical character and becomes in effect 
“eschatology sans eschaton")3 and de-eschatologicalized history (where the meaning o f 
history lies always in the present and the eschaton is viewed as a post-temporal reality).4 
Thus, for some, history and time came to have no real meaning for eschatology and 
ultimately for ethics. This de-historicized approach to eschatology has turned full circle, 
however. A radically eschatologicalized understanding of history and a radically 
historicized understanding of eschatology have emerged where the future is seen as 
ontologically prior to the present and the past, and where the horizon of universal history
‘See Braaten’s chapter “A Future-oriented Method in Theology," in Eschatology 
and Ethics. 26-42, as well as his thoughts on “doing theology as eschatology," idem, The 
Future of God: The Revolutionary Dynamics of Hope (New York: Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1969), 17-32; Erickson, 1150-1151; and James M. Childs, “The Imago Dei 
and Eschatology: The Ethical Implications of a Reconsideration of the Image of God in 
Man within the Framework of Eschatological Theology" (Th.D. diss., Lutheran School of 
Theology at Chicago, 1974), 294.
2These include Schweitzer’s “thorough-going (consistent) eschatology," C. H. 
Dodd’s “realized eschatology," John A. T. Robinson’s “fully inaugurated eschatology," 
William Manson’s “spiritualized apocalyptic eschatology,” Rudolph Bultmann’s 
“existential eschatology," and Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jurgen Moltmann’s “proleptic 
eschatology.”
3Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 8-12.
4Childs, 347-357,259-295. See also Braaten’s chapter, “The Quest for the 
Meaning o f Eschatology,” in Eschatology and Ethics. 7-25; Erickson, 1154; and Rudolf 
Bultmann, History and Eschatology: The Presence o f Eternity (New York and Evanston: 
Harper and Row, 1962), 155.
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is fused by a historical reality that is prior to its present. Some are finding a new 
temporal view of reality.1 History and time again have profound significance for 
eschatology and ethics.
Within these broad developments, eschatology has been restricted to existential 
categories. Eschatology has been politicized and secularized. It has been articulated as 
encompassing the whole history of Jesus Christ. And it has been restricted exclusively to 
the person o f Jesus Himself.2 For some, eschatology has become the whole of theology. 
Or, more correctly, the whole of theology has become eschatology.3
This re-interpretation of eschatology has been propelled by the historio- 
philosophical and socially pragmatic strength of Marxism and dialectical materialism, 
which has literally forced Christian theologians to focus upon the future.4 In particular, 
Ernst Bloch’s Das Prinzip Hoffnung ("The Principle of Hopei, which represents Marxism 
and dialectical materialism as the world’s hope for a better future, has had an evocative
‘Childs, 259-295. Moltmann and Pannenberg are foremost in articulating this 
eschatological vision of reality (ibid., 288, 282). For both, reality is perceived as 
historical thus bringing profound potential for the ethical relevance of eschatology.
2Erickson, 1149-1165; Adrio Konig, The Eclipse o f Christ in Eschatology:
Toward a Christ-Centered Approach (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1989), 32-47; and Das, 63-86.
3Karl Barth says, “If Christianity be not altogether thoroughgoing eschatology, 
there remains in it no relationship whatever with Christ” fEpistle to the Romans [London: 
Oxford University Press, 1950], 314). And Jurgen Moltmann writes, “From first to last, 
and not merely in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology" (Theology of Hope: On the 
Grounds and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology [New York: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1991], 16). For Moltmann, theology begins with eschatology, so 
that everything is thought out from that future.
4Erickson, 1151.
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impact on twentieth-century Christian theologians who have felt challenged to set forth 
an alternative, superior basis for hope.1 The geopolitical upheavals through two world 
wars, together with the rise of the Third World, the apparent lack of solutions for 
escalating social exigencies, exacerbating environmental problems, unparalleled 
technological advances, and the rapid increase in human knowledge have influenced the 
focused attention on eschatology and the quest for its meaning.2 Likewise, issues of 
revelation together with higher-critical methods in biblical studies have provided a 
theological context for both the rediscovery and re-shaping of eschatology in this 
century.3
Eschatology as Paradigm for Ethics
Through it all, eschatology has become a very morally “pregnant word1'—relating 
to the cross event, pointing to the future, and shaping the present.4 As a result, the 
pendulum has swung from eschatology as being disjunctive, and even opposed to
'Unfortunately, though, not without being significantly influenced by Marxism 
and dialectical materialism’s view of history and social philosophies. See Ernst Bloch, 
Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959).
2Erickson, 1150-1152. It was the sense of hopelessness and helplessness in post­
war Europe that propelled Moltmann’s passionate views in his Theology of Hope. See 
Braaten’s discussion of "The Phenomenon of Hope-Man” in The Future of God. 33-57.
3Johnstone, 52; Norman R. Gulley, “The Battle for Biblical Eschatology in the 
End Time,” Journal o f the Adventist Theological Society 1, no. 2 (1990): 22-36.
4Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 12-14; Nils A. Dahl, “New Testament 
Eschatology and Christian Social Action," The Lutheran Quarterly 22 (November 1970): 
375; Ezell, 75.
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Christian ethics,1 to the place where eschatology is now seen by some as even providing 
the “key" to Christian ethics.2 Where once most Christian theologians and ethicists 
generally ignored the connection between eschatology and ethics,3 some are now 
intentionally seeking to place the roots of Christian ethics into the ground of biblical 
eschatology where they supposedly belong.4
'After all, it has been implied, eschatology deals with “last things" of history and 
an other-worldly future, whereas ethics deals with moral problems of life in a this- 
worldly present. They do not seem to fit together nicely. This has been especially true in 
the arena of Christian social ethics, for social ethics is glaringly this-worldly present, 
dealing with structures and patterns of the here and now, whereas eschatology has 
traditionally been concerned with the final things o f history and an apparently other­
worldly future. The fact that the future kingdom appears more unlike than like the 
present order has tended to create a regression from the social and political opportunities 
to create a better future for all mankind now and a withdrawal into the personal space o f 
religious other-worldliness and emotionalism. See Ray C. Petry, “Christian Eschatology 
and Social Thought," Theology Today 5 (July 1948): 184; Das, 69; Braaten, Eschatology 
and Ethics. 8,106.
2Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 105-122; C. R. H. Preston, “From the Bible to 
the Modem World: A Problem of Ecumenical Ethics," Bulletin of the John Rvlands 
University Library 59 (1976-77): 174-180.
3Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 106. This theological disconnection between 
eschatology and ethics has been true for both liberal and conservative 
theologians/ethicists.
4Ibid., 105. Key examples include: Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the 
Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), idem, Ethics (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1981); Moltmann, Theology of Hope: idem, The Wav of Jesus Christ: 
Christologv in Messianic Dimensions (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990); Braaten, 
Eschatology and Ethics: idem, The Future of God: George Eldon Ladd, A Theology o f 
the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975); 
Wolfgang Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1988); Stephen Charles Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982); Thomas W. Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983); and John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972), idem, The Priestly 
Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, IN: University o f Notre Dame Press,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In effect, eschatology has emerged as a “new paradigm” in contemporary 
Christian moral thought. As a paradigm, it is influencing both foundational and applied 
ethics.1 And, not surprisingly, it is indicating new directions for social ethics as well.2 
The word “paradigm” is used here as an organizing idea or thought structure around 
which an approach to ethics is shaped and articulated. Christian moral thought has 
always been forcefully shaped by paradigms. H. Richard Niebuhr used “the responsible 
self1 paradigm as an integrating and persistent theme in his ethical thought and teaching.3 
The “rationality of divine command" paradigmatically integrates C. F. H. Henry’s 
Christian personal ethics.4 Barth’s paradigm for theological ethics (also divine 
command) is “the immediacy of the Word of God."5 And “Aya7rr|" provides the
1984). See selected bibliography for journals and other notable projects.
'See my selected bibliography for works on eschatology and ethics.
2It appears that the “re-interpretation of eschatology” has taken place against the 
backdrop of the debate over Christian social action, with the latter being the greatest 
beneficiary (or victim) of particular explications of the eschatological paradigm (see 
Johnstone, 47-85; Dahl, 375; Das, 63-86). While the eschatological paradigm has been 
developed primarily with social ethics in view, it should, in principle, provide a single 
point of departure for both personal and social ethics (see Braaten, Eschatology and 
Ethics. 120). The implications o f the twentieth-century reinterpretation of eschatology 
has included political, social, personalistic, and universal characteristics (see Paul Tillich, 
Systematic Theology, vol. 3 [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963], 358-359.
3H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essav in Christian Moral 
Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), 6.
4Carl F. H. Henry, Christian Personal Ethics (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 1957). See also, Gagriel Fackre, “Carl F. H. Henry,” in A Handbook of 
Christian Theologians, ed. Dean G. Peerman and Martin E. Marty (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1989), 601.
5KarI Barth, Ethics (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 3-61.
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integrating thematic for Ramsey’s biblical deontology.1
Paradigms are “a way of looking at something.”2 They serve as “interpretive 
models," “explanatory models," “models for understanding.”3 But they are more than 
mere “conceptual systems.” Paradigms also act as “molds" or “clamps” which shape and 
direct thinking in clearly defined directions.4 They inform methods and the principles of 
solution. They are an important part o f the “theory-praxis discussion."5 When new 
scientific, theological, or moral hypotheses and theories emerge, they often do so as new
'James M. Gustafson, “Christian Ethics,” The Westminster Dictionary of Christian 
Ethics (1986), 87-91. Other significant paradigms molding Christian ethics and ethical 
method include: Lehmann’s “What is God doing in history?” (Paul L. Lehmann, Ethics in 
a Christian Context [New York: Harper & Row, 1963], 74-101); Schweitzer’s “interim 
ethics” (John Macquarrie, “Interim Ethic," The Westminster Dictionary of Christian 
Ethics [1986], 307); Rauschenbusch’s “kingdom of God" (Walter Rauschenbusch, A 
Theology for the Social Gospel [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1987], 131); Birch & 
Rasmussen’s “Kotvovia" or “community” ethics (Bruce C. Birch and Larry L.
Rasmussen. Bible & Ethics in Christian Life [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989], 17-34); 
Brunner’s “biblical personalism” (Paul G. Schrotenboer, “Emil Brunner,” in Creative 
Minds in Contemporary Theology, ed. Philip Hughes [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 1969], 119-120. See also, Walter G. Muelder, “Personalism,” The 
Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (1986), 469-470; Moltmann’s “theology of 
hope" (Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 8-11); and J. A. T. Robinson’s “centrality of 
situation” (J. A. T. Robinson, Christian Morals Today [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1964]).
2Peter A. Angeles, “Paradigm,” Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Bames and 
Noble Books, 1981), 203.
3Hans Kting and David Tracy, Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for 
the Future (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 7.
4Ibid., 8.
sIbid., 9.
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models o f interpretation or “paradigms” which replace previously accepted ones.1 They 
arise from a ''paradigm change’ (rather than a sudden ‘paradigm switch’), as part of an 
extended process that is often more revolutionary than evolutionary, and which does not 
always appear the most rational.2
For Christian ethics, paradigms provide a moral “frame of reference” from which 
moral thinking is organized or articulated. The emergence, then, o f eschatology as a new 
paradigm in Christian ethics represents a significant shift in conceptualizing and 
articulating Christian moral responsibility. This conceptual shift comes because, 
theologically, the characteristic o f re-interpreted eschatology (as expressed in gospel 
proclamation) is that of dialectic between present and future.3 There is an “eschatological 
in-the-meantime” and “eschatological endtime.”4 This dialectic generates an 




4John E. Alsup, “Eschatology and Ethics in Paul,” Austin Seminary Bulletin: 
Faculty Edition 94 (November 1978): 50.
5As opposed to an “interim ethics," “emergency ethics,” “apocalyptic ethics,” 
"ethics of parousia-delay,” or a “counter-parousiacal ethics.” See Amos N. Wilder, 
Kervgma- Eschatology and Social Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 20; 
Schrage, 30-37; and Graydon F. Snyder, “Apocalyptic and Didactic Elements in 1 
Thessalonians,” The Society o f Biblical Literature: Book of Seminar Papers 1 (1972): 
233-234. One’s ethic rides on how the reality of the kingdom o f  God is interpreted 
(Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 116), and the kind of eschatology chosen as a model 
(Robin Scroggs, “The New Testament and Ethics: How Do We Get from There to Here?” 
Perspectives in Religious Studies 11 [Winter 1984]: 85). The basic outline of the 
overlapping of the two ages and the proleptic presence of the future in Jesus’ person and
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is at work in the present where people hear, believe, and live—accomplishing His end- 
time will and word of promise.1 The eschatology articulated has roots in “present 
reality.”2 It brings present requirement in view o f the future. This is the genius of 
eschatological ethics. As a present reality, it has profound moral implications and 
contemporary force for ethics. The new paradigm claims to allow for the dynamic 
merging of the other-worldly and future with the this-worldly and present in a way that 
permits real connection between requirement and action.
Numerous Christian ethicists have been inspired by three highly suggestive 
models within this eschatological paradigm: (1) the reign o f God,3 (2) the already/not yet 
dialectic,4 and (3) the horizon o f  the future.5 The eschatological perspective o f these three 
models has given rise to creative ethical reflection. Each of these models is in fact a 
component part o f the eschatological paradigm. Each is highly paradigmatic in itself. 
Each has been used by theologians or ethicists as “the” paradigm for expressing
work is key. See also. Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 122: Ronald Russell, 
“Eschatology and Ethics in 1 Peter.” The Evangelical Quarterly 47 (April-June 1975): 84. 
Braaten asserts that the eschatological kingdom of God determines the “goal,” the “norm,” 
the “motive," and the “context” of ethical decision. These are determined by the reality of 
the kingdom o f  God being proleptically present in a definitive way in the person and 
activity of Jesus (Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 110).
'Alsup, 50.
2Scroggs, 91.
3Ladd, 57-69; Mott, 82-106.
4Ladd, 50-69; Schrage, 19, 20.
5Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 14-25; Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom 
of God. 51-71, 103-143; Ogletree, 177-180.
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twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology. For purposes o f clarification, this study will 
be referring to these three models ( the reign o f  God, already/not yet, and horizon o f  the 
future) as “components” of the eschatological paradigm which help express and interpret 
the “eschatological paradigm” itself.1 Together, like a three-stranded cord, they form a 
comprehensive eschatological paradigm for contemporary Christian ethics. In addition, 
the “eschatological paradigm" is understood here as being the overall integrating theme 
generated by the New Testament eschatological Kingdom of God.
Of these three paradigm components, the already/not yet dialectic appears to be 
the primary point o f reference around which both the reality and religious/moral impact 
of the eschatological Kingdom of God find expression.2 The reign o f God and horizon o f  
the future components are closely nuanced dimensions (or issues) integrated within this 
already/not yet dialectic. This dialectic gives rise to the question of the moral 
implications evident from the horizon of the coming future, as well as to those moral 
implications highlighted by the reality of the reign o f  God, which has already broken into 
the present. Viewed oppositely, the reign o f  God and horizon o f  the future components 
explicate the crucial realms where the moral implications of the already/not yet dialectic 
are both indicated and need to be worked out for everyday life. Together, these three
'For an interesting discussion on “dominant paradigms" and “quasi-paradigms,” 
see Karl Erik Rosengren, “Paradigms Lost and Regained,” in Rethinking Communication. 
vol. 1 Paradigm Issues, ed. Brenda Dervin et al. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications,
1989), 21-39. See also, Kiing and Tracy, 9 passim for discussion on “macromodels,” 
“mesomodels,” and “micromodels."
2Schrage, 19.
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components form primary points of reference for Christian ethicists working within an 
overarching eschatological paradigm for moral reflection and application.
The Problem of Eschatological Paradigm  
in Christian Moral Theory
While there is general agreement among Christian ethicists as to the broad 
implications that the eschatological paradigm brings to Christian moral thought, an 
investigation of contemporary Christian ethics reveals significant divergence in the way 
application of the new paradigm appears to influence moral theory and to nuance ethical 
method.1 For example, while a number of Christian ethicists heartedly assume that 
eschatology provides a  foundation for Christian ethics, some will suggest that it in no 
way provides any actual or specific content for Christian ethics, while others will hold 
that specific content is in fact furnished.2 For some ethicists, eschatology evokes only 
broad ultimate Christian norms of love and justice.3 Others find in eschatology “middle 
axioms” that are neither too general nor too particular.4 Then there is the proleptic nature 
of the eschatological vision, which is seen as affirming an ethic o f change over that of
'For a survey o f the divergences of impact the eschatological paradigm appears to 
have on moral theory and ethical method, see Johnstone, 47-85; Dahl, 374-379; Das, 63- 
86; E. Clinton Gardner, “Eschatological Ethics," The Westminster Dictionary of Christian 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
order—thus placing strong emphasis on social and political action.1 The ties between 
eschatology and social action are viewed either as indirect and subtle, manifold and 
complex, making it necessary to draw analogies and to make inferences, or articulating 
very concrete direct application to specific contemporary social issues.2 There is 
divergence, too, over whom the moral implications of the eschatological vision speak to. 
Are they meant exclusively for the Christian community? Is there any application for the 
world at large? Or is relevance for the world found only as inferences/extensions from 
the paradigm’s consequences within the Christian community?3
These divergences in the way the eschatological paradigm appears to impact
'Johnstone, 48, 56.
2Dahl, 375-376.
3Further divergences include models of eschatology reflecting revelation “from 
above” or “from below," as well as those that link an immanent understanding of the 
Kingdom with a progressive, evolutionary view of history and those that stress the 
transcendent quality of the Kingdom as above all history. For some, the reign o f God is 
the primary paradigm for eschatological ethics (e.g., Mott, 82-106; idem, A Christian 
Perspective on Political Thought [New York; Oxford University Press, 1993], 109-112.). 
For others it is the dialectical dynamic of the horizon o f the future , or ontological priority 
o f the future (e.g., Ogletree, 175-205; Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God: 
idem, Ethics: Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics: idem, The Future o f God: Moltmann, 
Theology o f Hope: idem, The Wav of Jesus Christ: idem, The Crucified God: and Yoder, 
The Politics o f Jesus: idem, The Priestly Kingdom: idem, “Ethics and Eschatology," Ex 
Auditu 6 [1990]: 119-128). The distinction needs to be noted here between futurists who 
see the kingdom of God as a purely future phenomenon, not yet manifested in the world 
o f ongoing history, and dialectic eschatology, while still partly futurist, is represented by 
those thinkers who claim that the future is emerging into the present (see discussion by 
Ogletree, 177 passim). Those named here fall into the latter category and appear to press 
the ontological priority of the future, the horizon of the future, or an open future, with its 
moral implications for the present over the other nuances of the eschatological kingdom. 
Finally, others work from the more generalized dialectical already/not yet perspective 
(e.g., Schrage, 18-40; Ladd, 57-134).
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moral theory imply that the issue of its methodological application still needs exploring.1 
The question remains open as to precisely how the eschatological paradigm impacts (or is 
adjusted by) the process of moral reflection in the task of doing Christian ethics.
Stephen Charles Mott2 and Thomas W. Ogletree3 are two contemporary Christian 
ethicists who illustrate this critical question of divergence implicit in the impact that the 
eschatological paradigm is eliciting on moral theory. Sharing a common Wesleyan 
tradition, both Mott and Ogletree are concerned about the gap between the disciplines of 
biblical studies and Christian ethics. They both undertake the task of bridge building.4 
They both articulate the importance of community in moral reflection. And they both 
consciously work within the new eschatological paradigm in order to accomplish their
'Johnstone, 55. The issue of the impact of eschatology on ethical method has 
been an important one throughout the “re-interpretation of eschatology" process. This is 
expressed in the works of major theologians/ethicists and doctoral dissertations, i.e., 
Amos N. Wilder, “Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus" (Ph.D. diss., Yale 
University, 1933); Theron M. Chastain, “The Relations of Eschatology and Ethics in 
Christianity” (Ph.D. diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1939); Max Lynn 
Stackhouse, “Eschatology and Ethical Method: A Structural Analysis of Contemporary 
Christian Social Ethics in America with Primary Reference to Walter Rauschenbush and 
Reinhold Niebuhr” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1965); and Norman Paul Jacob 
Metzler, “The Ethics of the Kingdom” (Ph.D. diss., University of Munich [Germany], 
1971).
2Mott has been Professor of Christian Social Ethics at Gordon-Conwell 
Theological Seminary, is currently pastor of the Cochesett United Methodist Church in 
West Bridgewater, Massachusetts, and a member of the General Board o f Church and 
Society o f The United Methodist Church.
3Ogletree is Dean and Professor o f Theological Ethics at the Divinity School at 
Yale University.
4AIlen Verhey, “On Using Scripture in Ethics,” The Reformed Journal 34, no. 10 
(October 1984): 24.
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bridge-building task.1
The problem is that, even as Mott and Ogletree are building from a common 
theological heritage, a common concern for bridging the disciplines of biblical studies 
and Christian ethics, a common sense of the importance of community in moral 
reflection, and a common eschatological paradigm, they produce different interpretations 
with respect to moral theory.2 This can be observed particularly in the way that 
methodological issues like the role of Scripture, the role o f Christian community, and the 
nature o f social involvement factor in their eschatological ethics. Mott’s methodology 
exhibits an evident topical approach to moral theory where Scripture is asked 
contemporary ethical questions, and where he creates direct and specific application from 
Scripture to contemporary social exigencies.3 Ogletree’s methodology, however, 
articulates evocative deontological themes and brings into focus the reflective 
imaginative Christian community as pragmatically authoritative in ethical methodology 
and through which social issues become addressed.4
The eschatological paradigm has clearly impacted differently their moral theory.
'Ogletree is recognized as “standing in a developing tradition of reflection on the 
importance of eschatology for ethics" (Peter Sedgwick, “Recent Christian Ethics,” 
Scottish Journal o f Theology 41 [August 1988]: 398), and actively uses eschatological 
themes in his Yale class lectures in “Basic Christian Ethics” as well as his published 
works. Mott, too, has actively used eschatological themes in his Gordon-Conwell 
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So we are pressed with questions. Do they approach the question of eschatology and 
ethics differently? Is the eschatological paradigm sufficient in itself, or does it require or 
assume something broader as an ultimate statement of an ethical system? Do Mott and 
Ogletree perceive differently the ways in which issues significantly related to moral 
theory (the role o f Scripture and community, and the nature of social involvement) find 
expression within, are formed by, or influence the eschatological paradigm? Is the 
eschatological paradigm generating mutually incompatible or rather complementary 
attitudes towards these important issues in moral theory? Additionally, there is the 
question of foundations and presuppositions: Is the eschatological paradigm (or their 
orientation to it) rooted in philosophy, philosophical ethics, moral agenda, biblical 
theology, or the community (tradition)?
Purpose of the Study
This dissertation seeks to address the problem of the role eschatology plays as 
paradigm in approaching Christian ethics (i.e., the impact that the eschatological 
paradigm has on shaping moral theory). Specific within this context, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to explore and evaluate the methodological application of eschatology as 
paradigm for developing and/or articulating Christian moral theory. It focuses on the 
interplay of eschatology as a methodological tool and the ethical system that results from 
it. It analyzes the eschatological paradigm’s presuppositional structure on the basis of 
which some contemporary Christian ethicists have developed their moral theory. It 
assesses the reasons for the variety of applications and conclusions the eschatological
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paradigm seems to bring as a proposed foundation for Christian moral theory.
The ultimate purpose is to determine whether the eschatological paradigm, in 
spite of the various ways in which it has been understood and applied, still holds promise 
as the starting point for a comprehensive approach to moral theory. This study explores 
whether the eschatological paradigm can produce a methodological integration.1 Is it 
focused and coherent enough to produce an ethical system? Is it broad enough to include 
the significant contemporary issues in Christian moral life? Since every paradigm has 
limits, what does it leave out, or what does it not facilitate in moral theory?
‘Several dissertations have examined the links between eschatology and ethics in 
the projects of key theologians. Especially important are: Philip LeMasters, “The Import 
of Eschatology in John Howard Yoder’s Critique o f Constantinianism” (Ph.D. diss., Duke 
University, 1990); Lynn Evans Mitchell, Jr., “Two Ages and Two Communities: The 
Implications of an Eschatological Duality for Development of a Social Ethic" (Ph.D. 
diss., Rice University, 1979); Ramesh Paul Richard, "Hermeneutical Prolegomena to 
Premillennial Social Ethics” (Th.D. diss., Dallas Theological Seminary, 1982); Douglas J. 
Schuurman, “Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics: The Ethical Significance of the Creation- 
Eschaton Relation in the Thought of Emil Brunner and Jurgen Moltmann" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Chicago, 1988); Stackhouse, “Eschatology and Ethical Method: A 
Structural Analysis of Contemporary Christian Social Ethics in America with Primary 
Reference to Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr”; and Robert Gary Watts, 
“Realistic Hope: The Influence of Eschatology on the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr 
and Jurgen Moltmann” (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, Montreal, 1981). Even though 
there have been dissertations on various aspects o f  the impact of eschatology for 
Christian ethics, only Max Lynn Stackhouse’s “Eschatology and Ethical Method: A 
Structural Analysis o f Contemporary Christian Social Ethics in America with Primary 
Reference to Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr” is focused primarily on the 
impact of the methodological application of eschatology on moral theory per se as 
envisioned in this dissertation. This work was done nearly thirty years ago while the re­
interpretation of eschatology was still in process (though nearing completion). While 
laying an important base for this project, it does not relate to what has been taking place 
since the 1970s, or how an eschatologically influenced moral theory and ethical 
methodology have more fully developed or plateaued.
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Research Methodology and Limitations
To accomplish this objective, this dissertation approaches the problem of the 
methodological application of eschatology as paradigm in Christian moral theory through 
a  case study of Stephen Charles Mott and Thomas W. Ogletree. It describes and analyzes 
their contrasting moral theories, and evaluates them by the results of their application of 
the eschatological paradigm. That they come to the application o f  the paradigm with 
different presuppositions, methodology, and concerns in moral theory is assumed. The 
purpose of this study is to see how eschatology as paradigm either adjusts or mediates 
these differences in resulting moral theory.
These two representative ethicists have been chosen because they explicitly 
develop their moral theory in the context of the eschatological paradigm, and because 
they are recognized as creative and original in their application o f the paradigm in ethical 
method. Their projects are shaping the use of eschatology as paradigm in contemporary 
Christian ethics.1 In addition, Mott and Ogletree are in open dialogue with other scholars
'Writing in the early 1970s, Carl Braaten noted the fact that “the eschatological 
approach in theology today is represented by a small, but hopefully not insignificant, 
minority o f professional theologians. That viewpoint broke into the headlines in the 
middle sixties under the title o f ‘theology of hope.’ And like every fad it took its brief 
turn at being advertised as the wave of the future. Now a decade later we know that the 
magic spell of catchwords like 'hope’ and 'future’ has been broken. The cultural wave on 
which the theology o f hope was allegedly riding has already crashed on the reefs of 
‘future shock’ and Taw and order’" (Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 7). What Braaten 
said about the eschatological approach in theology in the seventies could be said about 
the eschatological approach in ethics as well, although with different periods of time in 
view. The ethical implications o f eschatology have naturally followed the theological. 
The heightened interest (a fad?) in eschatology and ethics of earlier years has likewise 
plateaued or become more measured or assumed, but a minority o f professional ethicists, 
including Mott and Ogletree, have consciously continued to develop the eschatological
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in their field, and show an interest in ethical issues beyond the borders of their particular 
tradition.1
Since Mott and Ogletree clearly belong to the eschatological movement in 
Christian ethics, it will be assumed that theirs is a paradigmatic approach to moral theory. 
This assumption implies that the eschatological paradigm (as with any paradigm which 
identifies, structures, and determines methodology) has become for Mott and Ogletree 
their ethical method.2
With reference to methodological procedure in this dissertation, several angles 
have been adopted from which to approach this study. First, there is a description of 
Mott’s and Ogletree’s concept of eschatology as paradigm for developing and/or
thematic in/for Christian ethics. Braaten himself is an example of someone (in the 
seventies) doing serious ethical reflection with the implications of eschatology (basically 
Americanizing the Pannenbergian view and being foundational or theoretical in 
perspective). A decade later, Mott and Ogletree both demonstrate their interest in the 
eschatological paradigm for Christian ethics, and in the process begin to reveal more 
precisely the impact that the application o f eschatology as paradigm has on moral theory 
and ethical method. That they have included the eschatological paradigm in their 
projects, suggests they are consciously extending a discussion some may have assumed 
was adequately cared for in another period o f time. This is significant for this 
investigation of the methodological application of eschatology as paradigm for 
developing and/or articulating moral theory. The ability for the new paradigm to prevail 
in Christian ethics is proportional to the adequacy of its practical explication in terms of 
moral theory.
'Numerous books, articles, and reviews by (on) Mott and Ogletree are available as 
primary resources for this dissertation. See selected bibliography for Mott and Ogletree. 
At this point, no in-depth treatment of the methodological application of eschatology as 
paradigm for the development and/or articulation of moral theory exists for either Mott or 
Ogletree.
2See above, p. 7, for discussion o f how paradigms, according to Kiing and Tracy, 
work methodologically (e.g., how they inform methods and the principles o f solution).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
articulating Christian moral theory, as well as how they go on to apply the paradigm 
methodologically in their projects. This description also includes how Mott and Ogletree 
interplay the ethical nuances of the three components o f the paradigm (reign o f  God, 
already-not yet, horizon o f  the future), and which component becomes for them the basic 
expression for the paradigm itself.
Second, there is analysis of the implications o f Mott’s and Ogletree’s application 
of the paradigm by considering their use of Scripture and Christian community, as well as 
the nature that social involvement assumes in their moral theory. This is done for three 
reasons:
I. Scripture and the Christian community are used most widely as sources in 
Christian ethics (i.e., they focus the question of authority in ethical method),1 while the 
nature of social involvement has become a defining consequence or application of ethical 
method/systems (i.e., a contemporary indicator of the validity and relevance of an ethical 
system).2
'Sources o f authority for traditional Christian ethical foundations include 
Scripture, Christian community (church), conscience, and personal experience. Only the 
first two are applicable for the purpose of this study. See Robert McAfee Brown’s 
chapter “Authority: The Achilles’ Heel of Protestantism" in his The Spirit of 
Protestantism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 171-185; John Brunt and 
Gerald Winslow, “The Bible’s Role in Christian Ethics,” Andrews University Seminary 
Studies 20 (Spring 1982): 3-21; Miroslav M. Kis>, “The Word of God in Christian Ethics," 
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 4. no. 2 (1993): 199-20; idem, “Biblical 
Interpretation and Moral Authority,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 6, no. 2 
(1995): 52-62; James M. Gustafson, “The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics: A 
Methodological Study," Interpretation 24, no. 4 (October 1970): 430-455.
2The nature of social involvement has been selected as a defining consequence of 
ethical method because it has been an integral part o f the twentieth Century “re-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
2. There has been a “crisis o f authority” in Christian ethics with regard to the 
role that Scripture and community play in developing and/or articulating moral theory.1 
Running parallel to this “crisis o f authority” has been a “crisis of relevance” with respect 
to the nature of Christian social involvement. Marxism has consistently pressed the 
validity of Christian moral theory on this one issue.2 Eschatology as paradigm in 
Christian moral theory appears to answer both these crises in Christian ethics. Thus the 
issues o f Scripture, community, and social involvement are significant in determining the 
soundness of eschatology as paradigm for Christian moral reflection.3
3. Various approaches exist for establishing the relationship of Scripture4 or the
interpretation of eschatology” process/dialogue, and remains a significant contemporary 
issue o f  "eschatopraxis” in Christian ethics (see Johnstone, 47-85; Dahl, 375; Das, 63-86).
'Brown, 171-185; and Brunt and Winslow, 3-21.
2See Geoffrey W. Bromiley, “Eschatology: The Meaning of the End,” in God and 
Culture: Essavs in Honor of Carl F. H. Henrv. ed. D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993), 73; Hans Schwarz, 
"Eschatology," in Christian Dogmatics, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 545 passim; Helmut Thielicke, The Evangelical 
Faith (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1982), 3:379 passim; Herbert 
Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).
3Issues of Scripture, Christian community, and the nature of social involvement 
are significant components of Christian ethical method. They should also play significant 
roles as components of a Christian eschatological paradigm’s influence on ethical 
method.
“Typologies for Scripture’s role in Christian ethics include: providing revealed 
morality (where Scripture is absolute authority and biblical ethics equals Christian 
ethics); a witness about God or His will (where Scripture becomes the Word o f God via 
personal encounter through witness); a source of moral images (where one is confronted 
with relative impressions of moral facts and values); a shaper of moral identity (where the 
character o f the moral actor is shaped, and the Christian mind is formed for moral 
decision making); a resource for normative reflection (where the Bible as the Word of
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believing community1 to Christian ethics. Various viewpoints exist as well for defining 
the appropriate nature of Christian social involvement.2 These very divergences provide
God is ultimate authority through which norms are provided either as specific rules or as 
general principles or presuppositions); etc. See Walter C. Kaiser, “The Use of the Bible 
in Establishing Ethical Norms,” in his Toward Old Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 39-56; Kis, “The Word of God in Christian Ethics,” 
199-208 and “Biblical Interpretation and Moral Authority,” 52-62; Gustafson, 430-455; 
Brunt and Winslow, 3-21; David K. Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw, eds., “The Use of 
the Bible in Ethical Judgments,” in Readings in Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Books, 1994), 179-182; John Frame, “The Word of God and Christian Ethics,” in 
Readings in Christian Ethics, ed. David K. Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Books, 1994), 183-184; and Richard N. Longenecker, New Testament 
Social Ethics for Today (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1984), 1-9.
'The role that the Christian community plays in moral formation has been 
seriously explored ever since the Reformers subordinated both the individual’s 
conscience and ecclesial authority to Scripture. The emergence o f approaches to 
Scripture that divest it of its authority has elicited increasing emphasis on the importance 
of the Christian community as the proper context for ethical decision. Various 
perspectives have been articulated including: (1) Christian ethics is community ethics 
(where Scripture shapes the perspectives, dispositions, and intentions of the faith 
community as the moral reference point and the ongoing socializing agent for the moral 
life; here ethics is always in process in the context of community, and while the Bible is 
not ruled out in the decision making process, it is not the sole source of norms); and (2) 
the reflective imaginative Christian community as pragmatically authoritative in ethical 
methodology (where deontological themes from Scripture have provisional and qualified 
status while the community articulates them anew with full sensitivity to the concrete 
understandings and meanings at play within the community). See Birch and Rasmussen, 
17-34; and Ogletree, 182-205.
2The nature of Christian social involvement in Christian ethics runs the gamut 
from total non-involvement to that o f revolution. For some, Christian ethics is purely 
personal ethics, and Christian involvement in the world is primarily evangelistic. For 
others, Christian ethics assumes social activism. Some find direct application from the 
moral themes of Scripture to contemporary social exigencies in the world at large, while 
others find Christian ethics speaking to the world only by analogy to developments 
within the early Christian communities themselves. For a discussion of the issues see 
Carl F. H. Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1947).
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a rich context for exploring the impact that eschatology as paradigm has on the 
development of Christian moral theory. They enable one to determine more specifically 
how the eschatological paradigm influences (or is influenced by) presuppositions 
regarding Scripture, community, and social involvement.
For these reasons, these three significant issues evident within contemporary 
Christian moral dialogue are excellent tools for this inquiry and, accordingly, become for 
this study’s analysis “principles of verification." While they are not the only principles 
current in the developments within Christian ethical method,1 they are basic, significant, 
and recurring concerns. Because of their significance within contemporary Christian 
moral dialogue, they provide the necessary limitations this study must delineate.
The third angle in this methodological procedure is evaluation. Since evaluation 
needs criteria in order to assess strengths and weaknesses, the evaluation o f Mott’s and 
Ogletree’s application of eschatology as paradigm includes the following points of 
reference:
1. There is the “level” o f moral reflection and application on which eschatology 
as paradigm operates (or is perceived to operate) in their projects (i.e., the macro, meso,
'Other methodological principles in contemporary Christian ethics include the 
nature of man, christology, the integration of or correspondence with traditional 
philosophical ethical categories (deontology, teleology, perfectionist [the implications of 
self in action]), the role of the sciences (psychology, sociology, anthropology), etc. This 
study will be limited to the principles of the role of Scripture, the role o f Christian 
community, and the nature of social involvement because they are basic to both Christian 
ethics in general, and to Mott and Ogletree’s projects in particular.
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or micro level).1 The question of “level" enables one to clarify how concretely the 
paradigm (or its components) is able to:
a. speak to contemporary ethical exigencies
b. nuance Mott’s and Ogletree’s use of Scripture and community, and the 
nature that social involvement assumes in their projects, and
c. influence the interplay of the ethical nuances o f the paradigm’s 
components (or predilection of one component as the basic expression for the 
paradigm itself).
2. There are the implications of the data from this analysis of the role Scripture, 
community, and social involvement play in the application o f eschatology as paradigm in 
their projects. The “principles of verification" allow evaluation of:
a. how effectively eschatology as paradigm answers the crisis of “authority" 
and “relevance" in Christian ethics, and
b. whether the paradigm influences, or is influenced by, presuppositions 
regarding Scripture, community, and social involvement. They enable one to ask
'Kiing and Tracy suggests that paradigms (models) can serve on a macro, meso, or 
micro level, bringing solutions to broad global theological or philosophical issues, 
problems in intermediate areas, as well as detailed specific situations (Kiing and Tracy, 9, 
10). Ethicists distinguish between four ingredients when structuring an ethic, i.e., 
theological or philosophical bases, underlying principles that can be applied to various 
areas o f activity, directive moral rules that apply to various areas o f life, and particular 
concrete cases (see, Arthur F. Holmes, Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions [Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984], 50-51). This study is suggesting here that, in the 
order given, there can be correspondence between an eschatological paradigm operating 
on the macro, meso, or micro levels, and the bases, underlying principles, and area rules it 
informs respectively, in structuring an eschatological ethic.
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the question of foundations and presuppositions: Is the eschatological paradigm 
(or one’s orientation to it) rooted in philosophy, philosophical ethics, moral 
agenda, biblical theology, or the community (tradition)?
3. There is the consistency with which the “principles of verification,” the 
paradigm’s “level" of operation, and the ethical nuances of the paradigm’s components 
are used, interrelated, and nuanced in methodological application and in its resulting 
contemporary moral theory.
The above outlined methodology for accomplishing the objectives o f this study 
thus proposes the presence of a complex set o f interacting variables in the application of 
the eschatological paradigm toward Christian moral theory. A diagrammatic overview of 
these interacting variables is provided in figure 1. Here is shown the subtle interplay that 
this study suggests exists between the eschatological paradigm and each o f the areas 
impacting the question of its application to moral theory, i.e., principles o f verification, 
levels o f  reflection, components in relation to the primary model o f the Kingdom of God, 
etc. It also shows the important role that the biblical materials should play in the equation 
in terms of (1) bringing shape to the reality o f the Kingdom of God as the primary model 
for the eschatological paradigm, (2) providing the key theological images (components) 
that give rise to the moral implications o f the Kingdom of God, and thus the 
eschatological paradigm, (3) shaping one’s presuppositions regarding the principles of 
verification, and (4) how the biblical materials operate at all three levels o f ethical and 
paradigm reflection.
This study is concerned primarily with the methodological application of
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Figure 1. Diagrammatic overview of interacting variables 
in the application of eschatology to moral theory.
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eschatology as paradigm for the development and/or expression of Christian moral 
theory, and not with ethical methodology per se. Mott’s and Ogletree’s projects are 
analyzed and evaluated only as they provide clear cases that illustrate the issues 
concerning eschatology as paradigm which this study explores. While this study 
discusses the role and practical function of Scripture and the Christian community as well 
as the nature of social involvement within the eschatological paradigm, it does not deal 
with issues of inspiration and revelation, nor the question of the authority o f Scripture per 
se. Nor is this study concerned with ecclesiology or specific ethical issues o f social 
involvement.
Definitions
The proposed interacting variables in the application o f eschatology to moral 
theory require an understanding of their respective meaning in the equation. For this 
reason, the following terms are defined as used in this study. They are listed 
alphabetically.
Area Rules: Moral rules that apply to various areas of life; one of the ingredients 
in the structure of ethical theory.
Bases: The most fundamental level of philosophical or theological 
presuppositions which outline the basis for structure in ethical theory; one of the 
ingredients in the structure o f ethical theory.
Components: The three theological images which the Kingdom of God (primary 
model), together with its other supporting models, project within the eschatological
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paradigm, i.e., already/not yet, reign o f God, horizon o f  the future. They are conceptually 
interwoven and complementary. They provide a framework that, at least in theory, can 
embrace the range o f possible conceptions of the Kingdom o f God. Like a three-stranded 
cord, they form a comprehensive eschatological paradigm for contemporary Christian 
ethics.
Eschatological-Oriented Ethics: An ethics that takes shape under the themes and 
presuppositions of eschatology, where eschatology has priority and determines the 
contours and nature o f ethics.
Eschatological Paradigm: The overall integrating theme generated by the New 
Testament eschatological Kingdom of God and its three components, already/not yet, 
reign o f  God, and horizon o f  the future.
Eschatology sans Ethics: An eschatology that no longer has sufficient form or 
content to evoke sustained, meaningful ethical reflection or does not transparently 
explicate implications for moral life.
Ethical-Oriented Eschatology: An eschatology that takes shape because o f the 
presuppositions, agendas, and needs of ethics, where ethics has priority over eschatology 
and uses eschatology for its purposes.
Ethical Structure: Structuring ethical theory includes four ingredients or levels of 
moral reasoning, i.e., cases, area rules, principles, and bases.
Ethics sans Eschatology: Christian ethical systems that either surrender the vital 
connection between ethics and biblical eschatology, or whose foundations eclipse 
eschatology as a substantial resource.
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Kingdom of God: The primary biblical model linking eschatology as paradigm 
and the array of biblical models that elucidate it.
Levels of Paradigm Operation: The conceptual levels on which paradigms can 
operate, i.e., macro, meso, micro.
Macro Level: The conceptual level of paradigm operation which brings solutions 
to broad, global, theological and philosophical issues.
Meso Level: The conceptual level of paradigm operation which brings solutions 
to problems in intermediate areas of theological and philosophical concerns.
Micro Level: The conceptual level of paradigm operation which brings solutions 
to detailed specific situations or areas.
Model: A sustained and systematic metaphor or organizing image which gives a 
particular emphasis and which enables one to notice and interpret certain aspects of some 
reality not fully understood. Well-constructed models are simple and clear enough to be 
grasped more or less intuitively; yet they have a logical or, better, an analogical relation 
to some larger reality. The emphasis here is towards “disclosure” rather than “picturing,” 
toward “mental models” o f systems rather than “scale models” or “working models.”
Paradigm: A way of looking at something, an interpretive model that informs 
methods and principles of solution. Paradigms provide an interpretive framework, a basic 
metaphorical strategy in which a given discipline does its work. While models and 
paradigms together share the essential quality of being “ways o f looking at things,” a 
paradigm encompasses and interprets a larger, more comprehensive conceptual picture 
and uses models to explicate aspects of that larger picture or envision that larger picture
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as a whole. Paradigms set limits on the range of acceptable models. Paradigms are more 
comprehensive than models. While all paradigms are models, not all models are 
paradigms.
Paradigm Role and Function: Paradigms can be viewed from two broad 
perspectives: (1) as facilitating specific moral principles which then need to be translated 
and applied towards new situations, or (2) as facilitating inner moral formation which 
shapes people ethically. The first is primarily conceptual while the second is 
motivational.
Primary Model: Models that are clearly primary in terms of structural 
relationships within a given range of images and which have the ability to both engender 
and organize a network of models, assemble subordinate images together, and scatter 
concepts on a higher level. Paradigms can rise or fall or shift according to primary 
models and the subordinate models which support and enrich them. For New Testament 
eschatology, the Kingdom of God is the primary model linking eschatology as a 
paradigm and the array of models that would elucidate it.
Principles: The most inclusive and ultimate ethical concepts which are universal 
and exceptionless, and which can never give way to something more inclusive or 
expedient; one of the ingredients in the structure of ethical theory.
Principles of Verification: This study’s tools for evaluating how effectively the 
eschatological paradigm answers the crisis of authority and relevance in Christian ethics 
during this century, and the presuppositions on which the eschatological paradigm is 
framed by given ethicists. These principles of verification include the role of Scripture,
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the role of community, and the nature of social involvement.
Outline of the Study
In the context o f  the methodological and procedural steps delineated above, it is 
important for this study to present, first, an understanding o f the main theological 
perspectives and broad ethical implications of the twentieth-century re-interpreted 
eschatology. Thus, chapter 2 explores the historical-philosophical background to the 
current eschatological paradigm in Christian ethics. It also identifies and explicates the 
broad ethical nuances o f the paradigm’s components. Its purpose is the discovery of 
basic perspectives and trends in the interpretation and application of eschatology as 
paradigm for developing and/or expressing moral theory in Christian ethics that have 
crystallized through the 1970s. From this vantage point one is able to understand what 
Mott and Ogletree are doing as participants in the developing tradition of the 
eschatological movement in Christian ethics. The chapter looks to the 1970s for the basic 
crystallized eschatological paradigm, and to the 1980s and 1990s for clearer 
methodological application of the paradigm in moral theory.
Chapters 3 and 4, then, describe and analyze the impact that the eschatological 
paradigm has had (is having) on the projects of Mott and Ogletree. These chapters focus 
particularly on how the paradigm is working in terms of their use o f Scripture, 
community, and social involvement. They examine how Mott and Ogletree nuance the 
three ethically evocative components of the eschatological paradigm. They thus analyze 
the theoretical interpretation of the role and function of eschatology in their respective
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approaches to moral theory.1
Chapter 5 consists of a comparison, evaluation, and critique of Mott’s and 
Ogletree’s projects. It explores the basic structures and components o f their 
interpretation in order to explicate the paradigmatic role that eschatology plays when 
applied to Christian moral theory. It also evaluates the methodological implications 
which demonstrate that “this is what happens if  you take the eschatological paradigm and 
apply it this way or that way.” Finally, chapter 5 concludes with implications and brief 
suggestions arising from this study for the application of the eschatological paradigm in 
Christian moral theory.
'To accomplish this, this study needs to deal with the salient aspects of Mott and 
Ogletree’s eschatology; the relationship of the eschatological paradigm to their ethical 
method as a whole; their presuppositional approach to and use of Scripture and how this 
integrates into or is adjusted by the eschatological paradigm; the relationship they 
perceive between eschatology and ecclesiology; and the practical/theoretical shape their 
project brings to personal and social ethics, e.g., how implications from their 
methodology come into play in representative contemporary ethical situations—thus 
validating, calling into question, or elucidating where the eschatological paradigm 
concretely leads.
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CHAPTER 2
TWENTIETH-CENTURY RE-INTERPRETATION OF ESCHATOLOGY 
AS PARADIGM FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS
Understanding the application of eschatology as paradigm for Christian ethics 
begins first with the question of “what" —What eschatology is in view? Thus, the 
purpose of this chapter is to set forth the principal theological and philosophical 
characteristics—insofar as they illumine the ethical perspectives—o f twentieth-century re­
interpreted eschatology. This outline of the principal characteristics of re-interpreted 
eschatology includes a summary and critical survey of the development of eschatology as 
a new paradigm for Christian ethics in twentieth-century theology. It also includes an 
evaluative description of the paradigm’s implications for Christian moral theory as it 
crystallized through the 1970s. Special attention is paid as well to: (1) the perceived 
moral nuances of the paradigm’s components; (2) the theoretical level on which the 
paradigm appears to operate; and (3) the general preliminary implications with respect to 
the “principles of verification." This chapter’s review of the principal characteristics and 
ethical perspectives of twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology enables one to 
analyze and evaluate Mott’s and Ogletree’s application of the paradigm as participants in 
the eschatological movement in Christian ethics.
32
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It should be noted that the historical survey in this chapter is purposely brief and 
somewhat generalizing in scope. Nevertheless, it provides an accurate picture of the 
broad issues and trends apparent in the eschatology/ethics relation throughout Christian 
history leading up to the 1970s. Since the scope o f this study does not lend itself to 
detailed analysis through each period, or for each theologian named, the reader is 
encouraged to refer to the bibliographic material cited for the fuller picture.
Eschatology and Ethics Before the 
Twentieth Century
Eschatology has experienced varying degrees of theological interest and relevance 
during the history of Christianity. Unlike other Christian doctrines that became defined 
and refined through theological controversy because they were assumed as being 
conspicuously central to Christian faith and experience, major debates over eschatology 
were few in number.1 There has never been a period of Church history in which
'Erickson, 1149-50. McKim, however, writes that “eschatological controversies 
have been numerous and protracted in the history of Christianity" and that “some church 
groups have come into existence solely because o f their own eschatological 
understanding and their time table of specific future events" (Donald K. McKim, 
Theological Turning Points: Major Issues in Christian Thought [Atlanta: John Knox 
Press, 1988], 152). What is being suggested here is not the frequency or protraction of 
eschatological controversies, but the overall theological weight and relevance they have 
carried in comparison to the other major issues which the Church has debated through the 
centuries (e.g., the Trinity, Christology, Ecclesiology, the nature o f  man, Soteriology, 
sources of authority [Scripture & Tradition], and the sacraments & the nature o f the 
Lord’s supper). Pelikan suggests that, during the post-apostolic era, differing 
eschatological views, such as millenarianism, were seen as neither orthodox nor heretical, 
but permissible opinions among others within the range of permissible opinions (Jaroslav 
Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition [100-600]. vol. 1 The Christian 
Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine [Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1971], 125, 129).
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eschatology was “the center" of Christian thought.1 The broad periods that can be 
distinguished in the history of eschatological thought yield modest, generalized 
developments at best.2 Only since the nineteenth century has eschatology received the 
kind o f attention that denotes its relevance as a principal, formative thematic in Christian 
theology and ethics.
It is understandable then, that one looks in vain for a solid, sustained discussion of 
the relationship between eschatology and ethics before the twentieth century.3 The
'L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 
1972), 662.
2This statement should not depreciate, however, the importance of what is referred 
to here as “modest generalized developments" in eschatological thought. Developments 
in eschatological thought dovetailed significantly with other spiritual and moral issues 
within Christian history. McKim outlines developments in eschatological thought in four 
broad periods: eschatology in the New Testament, early eschatology, Reformation 
eschatology, and later or modem developments. For McKim, Augustine becomes the 
focal point around which pre- and post-developments in early eschatological thought are 
measured. Luther and Calvin become key for measuring developments within 
Reformation eschatology (McKim, 151-165).
3An exception, however, may be found in Augustine’s City of God fNPNF 2:1-
511), and in a lesser degree Calvin’s Institutes (LC£ 20:3.6-7). Holwerda suggests that 
Calvin’s eschatological vision is articulated more clearly and forcefully in the appropriate 
Biblical commentaries than it is in his Institutes, and that the positions developed in the 
Institutes need the light of the commentaries to be fully appreciated. Together, they 
articulate a  complementary “pull view” of history to that of his “push view” (i.e., the 
theological taproot o f the sovereignty of God and His predetermining will). See David E. 
Holwerda, “Eschatology and History: A Look at Calvin’s Eschatological Vision,” in 
Readings in Calvin’s Theology, ed. Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids: Baker Book 
House, 1984), 340. Likewise, Luther’s recurring thematic o f “two kingdoms” articulates 
a consistent eschatological vision with clearly defined moral implications. See Luther’s 
introductory argument to his Lectures on Galatians. LW 26:4-12; idem, Temporal 
Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed. LW 45:81-129: idem, The Sermon on 
the Mount. 21:3-294; idem. LW 13:194-195; idem, LW 42:38: idem. LW 45:91-93: 
idem, LW 46:69-99; and Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther (Philadelphia:
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traditional pattern has been to view eschatology as dealing with the “last things” of 
history and an other-worldly future, and to view ethics as dealing with moral problems of 
life in a this-worldly present. Their organic tie has been either overlooked or ignored. 
This has produced, in effect, an “eschatology sans ethics” and an “ethics sans 
eschatology.” The term “eschatology sans ethics” is used here to designate an 
eschatology that no longer has sufficient form or content to evoke sustained, meaningful 
ethical reflection, or does not transparently explicate implications for moral life.1 The 
term “ethics sans eschatology” is used to refer to Christian ethical systems that either 
surrender the vital connection between ethics and biblical eschatology, or whose 
foundations eclipse eschatology as a substantial resource.2 Both concepts are broad 
paradigms used here to display trends in the eschatology and ethics dialogue throughout
Fortress Press, 1972), 43-82. See also, Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 106.
‘Eschatology is never really free of ethics, however. Eschatology as a “world­
view" always generates an ethic to go along with it (see Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 
20; Steven Charles Mott, “The Use of the Bible in Social Ethics II: The Use o f the New 
Testament: Part II, Objections to the Enterprise,” Transformation [July/September 1984]: 
20-21; and Alan Geyer, “Toward an Ecumenical Political Ethics: A Marginal American 
View," in Perspectives on Political Ethics, ed. Koson Srisang [Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 1983], 135). A survey of the transformations that have 
taken place within eschatological thought through the history of the Christian church 
shows ample evidence that Christian ethics has always been influenced or changed 
accordingly, and that, more by default than by intent.
2It should be noted here that many ethicists have a functional eschatological vision 
even if they do not call it by that name—even if  it is not a biblical eschatological vision. 
To the degree that they attempt to construct a model of “the good" based on the 
fragmentary ethical possibilities in history or attempt to find a trans-historical point of 
reference from which judgments of good and evil in history can be made, they are being 
influenced by a larger ethical view of reality that can be loosely termed eschatological 
(Stackhouse, 282).
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Christian history. Eschatology is never really free o f ethics. Nor is ethics really ever free 
of an eschatology.
The biblical witness concerning Christian eschatology exhibits an essential bi­
polarity. The End has come! The End has not come!1 In other words, eschatology is 
fulfilled and yet it is not fulfilled. This bi-polarity is articulated primarily through the 
biblical imagery of the “kingdom of God” which is both present and future in the person 
and work o f Jesus Christ,2 and whose dimensions of present and future create a tension 
between the “already” and the “not yet.” Thus, the New Testament Christian community 
felt that it lived in a crucial “meanwhile,” or “interim period." This vivid eschatology 
inevitably influenced Christian ethical thought and conduct.3
The early Christian Church continued to express this eschatology in its literature4
'1 Pet 1:3-5,20; Acts 3:20-21; Matt 12:28; Mark 14:62; 1 Cor 1:4-9; Heb 6:4, 5; 
10:36-39; 9:28; Gal 1:4; etc. William Manson, “Eschatology in the New Testament,” in 
Eschatology . Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers No. 2 (London: Oliver and 
Boyd, 1957), 7.
2Mark 1:15; Matt 6:10; 12:28; Luke 19:11; etc.
3Acts 2:14-47; 4:32-37; 1 Pet 1:3-21; Titus 2:11-14; Col 3:1-4:6; Rom 13:11-14;
1 Thess 3:11-4:12; etc. See also, Waldo Beach and H. Richard Niebuhr, Christian Ethics: 
Sources o f the Living Tradition (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), 50.
4Apocalyptic imagery and eschatological motivation are expressed in the popular 
literature o f the early Christian centuries: Hennas, The Shepherd “Commandments” 2 
(ANF. 2:20); idem. “Similitudes” 7-10 (ANF. 2:38-55); Epistle of Barnabas 15 (ANF. 
1:146); Trenaeus Against Heresies 2.22.2.5.25-36 (ANF. 1:390,553-567); Clement 
Epistle to the Corinthians 23-30 (ANF. 1:11-13); Polvcarp Epistle to the Philippians 2 
(ANF. 1:33): Justin Martyr Dialogue With Trvpho 52. 110 (ANF. 1:221,253,254); 
Tertullian Against Marcion 4.39 (ANF. 3:414-417).
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and creeds.1 Early Christian thought and conduct continued to be carried on in this 
awareness of the power which had changed, was changing, and would change the world- 
order.2
While this eschatological fervor and corresponding moral seriousness were not
'The “Apostles’ Creed," “Nicene Creed,” and “Creed of Chalcedon" each affirm 
the reality of Christ’s second advent, moral reckoning, and the life of the world to come. 
“And he shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead: whose 
kingdom shall have no en d . . .  and we look for the resurrection of the dead; and the life 
o f the world to come” (Philip Schaff, The Creeds o f Christendom [New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1919], 28). The “rule of faith" (the oldest term used by the ante-Nicene fathers, 
Irenaeus, Tertullian, etc.) was a vibrant dynamic in early Christian moral thought and 
action. See Irenaeus Against Heresies 1.10.1-3 fANF. 1:330-332); Tertullian Against 
Heretics 13,14,20-22 fANF. 3:249-250, 252-253); Ignatius To the Magnesians 11 fANF. 
1:63-64). The creeds continued to speak o f the coming of Christ in both the past and 
future tense and served to counterbalance any oversimplified resolution o f the already/not 
yet in either direction (Pelikan, 127). The Christian ordinances of baptism and the Lord’s 
supper likewise affirmed eschatological perspectives (Pelikan, 126-127; W. H. Lampe, 
“Early Patristic Eschatology," in Eschatology. Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional 
Papers No. 2 [London: Oliver and Boyd, 1957], 21-23).
2The other-worldly “world view” of early Christian eschatology produced a  high 
indifference to present-worldly values and external structures and forged the Church’s 
ethical spirit of a self-conscious community and fellowship of believers, over against the 
world. Orientation to a positive goal of divine consummation, as expressed in the return 
o f Jesus and the promised future of the re-created earth, dispelled the pessimistic fatalism 
and excessive hedonism that affected much of the pagan world. A higher estimation of 
the bodily life and its significance, as expressed in the hope of the resurrection, ran 
counter to both excessive asceticism and bodily abuse. Resurrection hope gave dignity 
and moral worth to temporal behavior—deeds done in time and history and body. 
Awareness of the approaching judgment curbed to some degree both materialistic 
indulgence on the one hand and irresponsible cruelty on the other. The promise o f eternal 
life prevented shortsighted concentration on the achievements, pleasures, and rewards of 
this life. It cast a new light on death—which included a  readiness for martyrdom rather 
than moral or spiritual compromise. See, Beach and Niebuhr, 47, 50; Bromiley, 69-71.
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sustained throughout the history of the Christian Church,1 their broad themes and 
implications for ethics were nevertheless picked up and nuanced by several of the 
Church’s prominent thinkers and movements. For example, Augustine’s ethical theory 
was set within the eschatological worldview and philosophy of history that he spells out 
in his influential Citv o f God.2 Luther’s intense eschatological consciousness was a 
rediscovery of the tension that had been lost between our present state and our hope for 
the future along with the implications that that tension had for personal and social ethics.3 
Puritan eschatological emphasis, which was rooted in a historicist hermeneutic of Daniel 
and Revelation, taught that hope was an essential element in Christian faith which, in
'Pelikan puts it succinctly when he writes, “What the texts do suggest is a shift 
within the polarity o f already/not yet and a great variety of solutions to the exegetical and 
theological difficulties caused by such a shift. These included the reinterpretation of 
biblical passages that had carried an eschatological connotation, the reorientation of 
ethical imperatives toward a more complex description of the life of faith and love within 
the forms of the present world, and the reconsideration and eventual rejection of certain 
types of apocalyptic expectation that could claim ancient sanction but were no longer 
suited to the new stage in the development of Christian eschatology. Here too, it is 
important to see the elements o f continuity as well as the elements of change" (Pelikan, 
124, emphasis supplied; see also, Beach and Niebuhr, 50-51).
2Augustine Citv o f God. 4.1-34: 12.5-8; 14.1-4, 13,28; 19.12-17; 20.7-9. See 
Beach and Niebuhr, 110.
3"The world runs and hastens so diligently to its end that it often occurs to me 
forcibly that the last day will break before we can completely turn the Holy Scriptures 
into German” (Martin Luther to Melanchton, on June 2, 1530, Briefe. 5.35, as cited in T. 
F. Torrance, “The Eschatology of Faith: Martin Luther," in Kingdom and Church: A 
Study in the Theology of the Reformation [Fair Lawn, NJ: Essential Books, 1956], 20). 
See Luther’s introduction to his Lectures on Galatians. LW 28:4-12; idem, LW 49:216; 
idem, LW 50:220, 245; V. Norskov Olsen, “The Christian Hope in the Reformation of 
the Sixteenth Century," in The Advent Hope in Scripture and History, ed. V. Norskov 
Olsen (Washington, DC: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1987), 115-118; 
Schwarz, 505; and Torrance, 7-72.
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turn, encouraged the believer along the path of sanctification.1 And the hermeneutic of 
nineteenth-century Millerite premillenialism (historicist) and Dispensational 
premillenialism (futurist) again resisted the dismissal of biblical eschatology and its 
import for ethics by reviving the New Testament tension of living between the now/not 
yet.2
Eschatology Sans Ethics 
A reversal of eschatology and ethics began with the deep epochal shift in the 
relation between the church and the world for which Constantine has become symbol.3 
The vivid eschatology and corresponding moral seriousness of the early Church had 
already become blurred as the influence from Hellenistic philosophies and thought 
categories began structuring the focus and language of Christian theology.4 With 
Constantine, not only is there a new meaning for the word “Christian,” but a radically new
'See Bryan W. Ball, “Eschatological Hope in Puritan England,” in The Advent 
Hope in Scripture and History, ed. V. Norskov Olsen (Washington, DC: Review and 
Herald Publishing Association, 1987), 144,146; Peter Toon, Puritans. The Millennium 
and the Future of Israel: Puritan Eschatology 1600 to 1660 (London: James Clarke & Co., 
1970), 23-41.
2The precision of Millerite hermeneutics, while producing a significant and 
specific moral response, effectively made it difficult for people to live normal lives. And 
while Dispensational hermeneutics tended to fortify slipping behavioral standards, its 
theoretical possibilities produced an ambiguity that did not initially produce a new clearly 
articulated Christian lifestyle. See Timothy P. Weber, Living in the Shadow of the 
Second Coming: American Premillennialism 1875-1982 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
1983), 43,46, 51,48; Henry, Christian Personal Ethics. 550.
3Yoder. The Priestly Kingdom. 135-137.
4Schwarz, 503; Bromiley, 77.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
eschatology, and a new ethics as well.1 The distinction between the Church and the 
Kingdom of God now blurs, because the “millennium” runs its course with secular events, 
and cultural change involves eschatological change.2 Distortions and reconstructions of 
eschatology inevitably followed,3 until by the sixteenth century only some pietistic and 
Radical Reformation circles continued to maintain the vivid eschatological hope of 
Scripture.4 The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought a general spiritualizing of
‘Yoder. The Priestly Kingdom. 135-137.
2A virtual post-millennial understanding of Christ’s reign elicited a Christian 
culturalization o f every sphere of life and society. The assumed gradual progress o f the 
Kingdom/Church on earth pushed thought o f  the final consummation and visible return of 
Jesus into a hazy background (Bromiley, 77-78; Schwarz, 504; Yoder, The Priestly 
Kingdom. 137-139).
3 Apocalyptic imagery became useful as threats of judgment to prod Christians to 
repent and lead lives devoted to good. Through the sacrament of penance, and an 
increasingly elaborated system of purgatory, the cosmic dimension of eschatology 
receded and an existential component gained. Salvation as the end of history was 
replaced by salvation at the end of individual history. Sharing this attitude, mysticism 
urged union with the divine through immediate communion. This eschatological 
individualism met a forceful challenge in Reformation realism which brought focus again 
to the hope of the “last day" when Jesus would come. A century later, however, this 
revived intense hope was again diminished or abandoned with emphasis returning 
to the personal certitude of salvation. See, Bromiley, 77-79; Richard K. Emmerson, “The 
Advent Hope in the Middle Ages,” in The Advent Hope in Scripture and History, ed. V. 
Norskov Olsen (Washington, DC: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1987), 
106-110; Schwarz, 504-506; Olsen, 115-131.
“Friedmann writes that, “There was simply no room left for a meaningful 
eschatology within the late Lutheran and post-Lutheran theology. The only place such 
ideas were kept alive and had a legitimate function was the left way of the Reformation, 
or, as we all now call it, the Radical Reformation; Anabaptism and related movements” 
(Robert Friedmann, The Theology of Anabaptism (Scottdale, PA: 1973), 102; see also, 
Schwarz, 506.
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eschatology which either eliminated it as a relic o f  a past world view1 or made it to 
provide a frame for sociopolitical transformation o f  the world.2
Left stripped of its metaphysical aspect, liberal and speculative eschatology no 
longer engendered a meaningful ethic. Eschatology was seen as non-essential to the 
biblical structure of theology and ethics.3 This neutralization of eschatology through the
‘Schleiermacher brought eschatology to a  new low point by not ascribing to it the 
same importance or “value” as his discussion of other dogmatic themes which he 
considered relevant for the human consciousness (Friedrich Scleiermacher, The Christian 
Faith [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1948], 703-707). Kant posited the eschaton as the 
organization o f the human race according to the laws of virtue (Immanuel Kant, The 
Critique of Judgment [New York: Hafiier Press. 1951], 286, 292-298, 327-339). The 
Ritschlian school saw in the Kingdom of God an immanent goal of history (i.e., a 
religious/moral end which would mean the spiritual government of the world) (Albrecht 
Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation: The Positive 
Development o f the Doctrine [Clifton, NJ: Reference Book Publishers, 1966]). 
Schweitzer’s teachings that Jesus’ death was the despairing renunciation of the 
eschatological future, not only stripped away the eschatological as unacceptable and 
unrealistic, but drove a formidable wedge between eschatology and modem ethics as well 
(Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus [New York: Macmillan Company, 
1948], 223-270; Frederick F. Bruce, “Eschatology." Baker’s Dictionary of Theology, ed. 
Everett F. Harrison [Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1960], 191-192; Henry, Christian 
Personal Ethics. 550). See also Thielicke, 3:379-382; Schwarz, 506.
2Humanistic beliefs in progress (the theory of evolution, and Hegelian and 
Marxist concepts of dialectical and linear progress) further engendered a secularized 
eschatology and an eschatologized secularism (Bromiley, 80, 82; Thielicke, 3:380, 381). 
As noted above, the Ritschlian school saw in the kingdom of God an immanent goal o f 
history, a religious and moral end which would mean the spiritual government o f the 
world (Schwarz, 506).
3At the same time, while holding to both eschatology and ethics, Dispensational 
theology initially erected a cleavage between eschatology and ethics by pushing them 
both into the future. Here Christ’s kingdom ethics would become dramatically relevant 
only in the future eschatological era, thus dampening the need for present social action 
and changes in fallen social structures (Henry, Christian Personal Ethics. 551; Weber, 65- 
104). Likewise, failed Millerism played into the hands of liberal and secular cynicism 
regarding a literal historical eschaton and any ethics that it might engender.
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history o f the Christian church produced an “eschatology sans ethics.” Braaten capsules it 
succinctly, “We can hardly expect ethics to bear fruit where no seeds of the kind have 
been sown by the systems of theology which they presuppose.”1
Ethics Sans Eschatology 
The imminence of the parousia was an unchallenged article o f early Christian 
belief, but it coexisted in Christian minds with many other convictions and teachings.2 A 
host o f theological themes, normal interests of life, moral apologetics, and Hellenistic 
influences together vied as focus for Christian moral reflection. As the fervor of 
eschatological expectation diminished and the Church experienced unprecedented moral 
exigencies.3 Along with these real life moral situations, a  tendency towards both 
moralism4 and asceticism arose.5 The eschatological dualism of the apostolic Church
'Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 106.
2Herbert Hensley Henson, Christian Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936),
43.
3E.g., dealing with apostasy and combating worldliness in its own midst along 
with the compromises and laxity which were inevitable as the Church made its way into a 
pagan culture. In addition there was the need to discover the mind of Christ upon 
unexplored issues (e.g., wealth, slavery, Church and Society, Church and State, military 
service, capital punishment, etc.). See R. E. 0 . White, Christian Ethics: The Historical 
Development (Atlanta: John Knox Press. 1981), 13-80.
4The preoccupation of the first Christian centuries with ethics finds expression in 
literature addressed to those outside the church as moral apologetic, and to those inside 
the Church, as moral training for Church membership fDidache. in The Apostolic 
Fathers, ed. Michael W. Holmes [Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1989], 145-158; 
Clement Epistle to the Corinthians [ANF 1:1-21]; Epistle of Mathetes to Diogenetus
[ANF 1:23-30]; Clement o f Alexandria, Elucidations. Exhortation to the Heathen, and 
The Instructor [ANF 2:163-298]). The readiest way for the Church to preserve itself from 
contamination was to try to codify the Christian ethic. See, White, 26-51; Beach and
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(living between two ages) gave place to the metaphysical dualism of the ascetics (living 
between two worlds), which in turn gave place again to the social dualism of monasticism 
(living between two types of society—religious and secular).1 In the process, eschatology 
no longer vitally conditioned the content or form of Christian ethics. Rather, moral 
philosophy (Augustine),2 moral theology (Aquinas),3 theories of atonement (Abelard),4 
Humanist criticism (Erasmus),5 soteriology (Luther),6 the sovereign majesty of God
Niebuhr, 50-57.
5White, 81-92; Beach and Niebuhr, 55.
'White, 87.
2Augustine On the Morals o f the Catholic Church fNPNF 4:41-63); idem, 
Enchiridion fNPNF 3:237-276); idem, Citv of God fNPNF 2:1-511). See White, 93-113; 
Frederick S. Carney, “The Structure of Augustine’s Ethic," in The Ethics of St.
Augustine, ed. William S. Babcock (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 11-37.
3Thomas Aquinas, “Virtue,” S I  23: la2ae.55-67; idem, On Law. Morality, and 
Politics (selections from ST), ed. William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan 
(Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 1988), 1-276; White, 124-135.
4Peter Abelard, Sic et Non (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); D. E. 
Luscombe, Peter Abelard’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); White, 114- 
123; Paul L. Williams, The Moral Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Lanham, MD: University 
Press o f America, 1980).
5Desiderius Erasmus, The Colloquies of Erasmus (Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press, 1965); idem, The Praise of Folly (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913); idem, Christian 
Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writings of Erasmus, ed. John C. Olin (New 
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965); Ernst F. Winter, ed., Erasmus-Luther: 
Discourses on Free Will (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961); White, 136- 
152.
6Luther, Treatise on Good Works. LW 44:21-114; idem, LW 35:10; Althaus, 3-
24.
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(Calvin),1 conscience and reason (Kant),2 subjectivism (Edwards),3 practical Christianity 
and social concern (Wesley),4 etc., now nuanced Christian ethics.
One looks in vain for a solid sustained discussion of eschatology and ethics in any 
of the prominent minds in pre-twentieth-century Christian ethics.5 In fact, by the end of 
the nineteenth century, Christian ethics for the most part had been secularized by 
Liberalism.6 While still accommodating a certain “eschatology,” it tended 
philosophically to divorce ethics from biblical eschatology.7
'Calvin, Institutes. LCC 3:7.1; White, 184-211; John Hesselink, “Christ, the Law, 
and the Christian: An Unexplored Aspect o f the Third Use of the Law in Calvin’s 
Theology,” in Readings in Calvin’s Theology, ed. Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 1984), 179-191.
2Immanuel Kant, The Critique o f Practical Reason (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 
1956); idem, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 
1959).
Jonathan Edwards, “A Treatise Concerning Religious Affection,” in The Works 
of Jonathan Edwards, ed. John E. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), vol. 
2, part i, section 2, 99-124; White, 256-265.
4John Wesley, “The Use of Money,” in The Works of the Rev. John Weslev. vol. 
6, Sermons (London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room, 1831), 124-136; White, 269-275.
5See White’s survey of the development of Christian ethics, and Beach and 
Niebuhr’s development of major themes in Christian thought. While Forell includes 
eschatology as a major thematic in his description of New Testament ethics, there is 
hardly any mention of it in his description of Christian ethics from the Early Christian 
Fathers through Augustine (George Wolfgang Forell, History of Christian Ethics 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1979).
6Henry, Christian Personal Ethics. 551.
Tbid., 549.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
Twentieth-Century Re-interpretation 
of Eschatology as the New Paradigm 
for Christian Ethics
“Biblical eschatology however, has dominated twentieth-century theology more 
than any other topic."1 The irony is that some of the very dynamics which brought virtual 
destruction of eschatology in the nineteenth century became the theological and ethical 
catalyst for placing the eschatological thematic back into the center of modem theological 
interest and inquiry.2 Ritschl’s pioneering emphasis o f understanding theology in an 
ethical mode found commanding expression through his aggressive Kingdom of God 
theology.3 His thoroughly ethical-oriented theology necessitated that his Kingdom of 
God accordingly be an ethical kingdom.4 Influenced by Kant and Schleiermacher’s 
dualistic conception of the Kingdom of God as the highest good, Ritschl forged a new 
conceptual bond between eschatology and ethics.5 The kingdom of God is both a divine
■Schwarz, 513.
2Thielicke, 3:379-384.
3Ritschl, 10-14, 511-513, 609-670. Ritschl insisted that all elements o f Christian 
doctrine be doubly related, both to spiritual redemption and moral teleology (Diane M. 
Yeager, “Focus on the Social Gospel: An Introduction,” Journal of Religious Ethics 18, 
no. 1 [Spring 1990]: 3). It is a historical fact that Ritschl’s doctrine of the Kingdom of 
God continues to be influential even in the present. See Das, 66.
4Ritschl himself uses the terminology “the ethical Kingdom of God” (Ritschl, 511-
512). See Metzler, 2.
5Ritschl, 11; Metzler, 2,13, 14,41-42, 71-74. Ritschl gave consummate 
expression to a framework of dualistic understanding o f the kingdom of God by 
combining the two ideas of the Kingdom o f God as religious highest good to be 
established by God himself and as ethical highest good gradually being realized in the 
self-realizing activity of men. Here eschatology was no longer simply equated with the 
eschaton as solely the work of God, but was intimately bound up with Christian ethical
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gift and ethical task.1 It is the goal and motive of human ethical action. Therefore, ethics 
is led by the eschatological thematic.2
Through this process of ethicizing the Kingdom of God, the Kingdom of God in 
effect became uneschatological. It completely lost its futuristic dimension.3 Moreover, 
Ritschal’s dualistic understanding of history and the kingdom of God contained an 
inherent contradiction which posed definite problems for theology. How could man 
realize through ethical action the eschatological Kingdom which would be established by 
God alone? This inherent contradiction seemed to affirm that traditional theology was 
correct in totally dissociating eschatology and ethics.4
Yet there was positive value to be seen in Ritschl’s bond of eschatology and 
ethics.5 There was apparent, fundamental truth involved in his proposed organic bond.6 
And since Ritschl so forcefully thrust the idea of the Kingdom of God upon the 
theological world, eschatology could never again be viewed as an illegitimate offspring 
of primitive Christianity or an appendage to dogmatics. The relationship of eschatology
action in present human history as well.
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and ethics became thereby an inescapable issue for systematic theology.1 In response, 
several waves of eschatological thought have ensued throughout this century as serious 
attempts have been made to further refine and/or articulate the relationship between 
eschatology and ethics.2 These waves of thought have been expressed within either of 
two contrasting approaches to the eschatology/ethics question, i.e., ethical-oriented 
eschatology and eschatological- oriented ethics.
Ethical-Oriented Eschatology
Some of this century’s waves of eschatological thought have been to make ethics 
the determining factor in eschatology, i.e., ethical-oriented eschatology. Here 
eschatology takes shape because of the presuppositions, agendas, and needs of ethics.3 
Eschatology is understood in an ethical mode. It is seen as the normative dimension of 
the ethical task.4 Rauschenbush, Bultmann, and Reinhold Niebuhr illustrate this approach 
to the eschatology/ethics question.
'Ibid., 204.
2Yeager, 5.
3See James M. Gustafson, “Theology in the Service o f Ethics: An Interpretation of 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s Theological Ethics," in Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues of Our 
Times, ed. Richard Harries (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1986), 24- 
45. Chastain rightly suggests that we cannot always determine nicely whether ethics 
determines eschatology or vice versa. Ethics and eschatology often develop along side of 
one another in a way that they take their character from the basic philosophy of life which 
underlies their given discipline. Their interrelation however, can be explored in order to 
understand more fully the implications of their respective presuppositions and the 
apparent priority they might receive in moral theory (Theron M. Chastain, “Eschatology 
and Ethics," Review and Expositor 41. no. 3 [April 1944]: 237).
4Stackhouse, 2.
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While Ritschl engendered the ethics-oriented approach to eschatology, it was 
Rauschenbusch who brought it into blatant, vivid focus. “We have a social gospel," he 
declared. “We need a systematic theology large enough to match it and vital enough to 
back it."1 “The social gospel needs theology to make it effective; but theology needs the 
social gospel to vitalize it.”2 Theology needs periodical rejuvenation.3 Eschatology in 
particular needs a thorough rejuvenation.4 The social gospel has the moral earnestness 
and faith which exerts constructive influence on the doctrine of eschatology.5
The priority o f ethics over eschatology for Rauschenbusch is obvious. 
Eschatology becomes, in effect, a hermeneutical device.5 The Kingdom o f God functions 
as an interpretive device in that it represents first and foremost an ethical ideal which is 
essentially a social ideal where sin becomes a social phenomenon ingrained in the super- 
personal forces which pattern our lives in society.7 This Kingdom-ideal guides toward a 
specific social ethical praxis and at the same time represents its utopian results.






5Reinhard L. Hutter, “The Church: Midwife of History or Witness o f the 
Eschaton?" Journal o f Religious Ethics 18, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 28-31.
Tbid., 30,31.
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eschatology. His approach includes de-mythologizing the eschatological thematic and 
linking existentialist philosophy with New Testament interpretation.' His 
demythologizing simply discloses the existential meaning to the eschatological myths, 
which in effect opens the way for ethics.2 While he sees an intrinsic connection between 
eschatology and ethical demand, Bultmann implies that “Jesus was first an existentialist, 
and only afterward an eschatologist."3 Here the priority of ethics is explicitly asserted in 
the existential preceding that of eschatology in importance. This is further affirmed in 
his statement that “the only true interpretation of eschatology is one which makes it a real 
experience of human life.”4 Bultmann’s approach thus virtually absorbs eschatology into 
ethics whereby eschatology becomes the whole of ethics.s The eschatological thematic 
simply serves his existential, ethical purposes.
Reinhold Niebuhr’s moral theory likewise advances an ethical-oriented
'Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1958).
2Richard H. Hiers, Jesus and Ethics: Four Interpretations (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1968), 93.
3Bultmann affirms a unity between eschatology and ethics whereby each is 
incomplete without the other in calling man to radical obedience in terms of his Now  as 
the hour of decision for God. See Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 52, 122, 129-131; idem, Theology of the New Testament, 
vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 15, 21; Hiers, 94, 99.
4Hans Wemer Bartsch, ed., Kervgma and Mvth: A Theological Debate (London: 
S.P.C.K, 1957), 106.
sHenry, Christian Personal Ethics. 551-552. Das asserts that for Bultmann, ethics 
essentially "becomes eschatology" (Das, 71).
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eschatology.1 For Niebuhr, theology (and thus eschatology) was always in the service of 
ethics.2 He states that "[faith] illumines experience and is in turn validated by 
experience.”3 This maxim about life was morally, socially, and politically relevant.4 
And while theology and ethics for him were dialectically related, weight was clearly on 
ethics. The basic eschatological themes o f Scripture were seen by Niebuhr as “symbols.”5 
While he gives a very straightforward explanation of these so-called eschatological 
“symbols," it is important to realize that not all of Niebuhr’s eschatology is as obviously 
presented. In other theological writings, and certainly in his political writings for a 
secular audience, Niebuhr seldom makes mention o f eschatology per se. In his ethical 
writings, Christian eschatology is often implicit.6 Furthermore, the “symbol” of
'R. Niebuhr was always careful to point out that he was an ethicist concerned with 
problems of action in history, and not a theologian interested in ideation (Stackhouse, 
245).
2Gustafson, “Theology in the Service of Ethics,” 44. Niebuhr drew on Christian 
doctrine insofar as it illumined the human ethical predicament, otherwise it had no a 
priori value (Stackhouse, 244-245).
3Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, 
vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 63.
4Gustafson, “Theology in the Service of Ethics,” 36.
s"The symbol of the second coming of Jesus can neither be taken literally nor 
dismissed as unimportant.” They (the return of Christ, the last judgment, and the 
resurrection) serve as pointers to the character o f the eternal which finite minds cannot 
comprehend. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. 2:289-301 passim; Watts, 5-7.
6This is seen in his phrase “impossible possibility” and the development of his 
psychological metaphor o f self within an overarching moral frame of reference in terms 
o f a tension between the ideal and the actual. Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of 
Christian Ethics (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 37; idem, The Self and the Dramas of 
History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955); Watts, 7; Stackhouse, 2, 27, 238-
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eschatology enabled Niebuhr to express an ethical realism which takes into full account 
the immoral nature of social interaction, and at the same time articulate how the 
“eschaton" brings ethical meaning to present social action.1 In so doing, Niebuhr uses the 
eschatological thematic in a way that theologically coheres with his ethical and political 
thought.2
Eschatological-Oriented Ethics
Weiss’s radical opposition to Ritschl’s bonding o f eschatology and ethics in an 
evolutionistic, immanent, and cultural-ethical interpretation of the Kingdom of God 
served to bring renewed focus toward biblical eschatology and attempts to explicate it 
theologically.3 This renewed biblical theological focus engendered waves of 
eschatological thought that made eschatology the determining factor in ethics, i.e., 
eschatological-oriented ethics. Ethics would now take shape under the themes and 
presuppositions o f eschatology. Ethics would be understood in an eschatological mode. 
This approach can be seen in the works of Barth, Thielicke, Pannenberg, Moitmann, and 
Braaten.
Barth drew the first broad (but clear) stokes towards eschatological-oriented ethics
247; Gustafson, “Theology in the Service of Ethics," 34.
'Watts, 203.
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. ix, 47-52, 289-301; Gustafson, 
“Theology in the Service of Ethics," 38.
3Johannes Weiss, Jesus’s Proclamation of the Kingdom of God (Chico, CA: 
Scholar’s Press, 1985); G. C. Berkouwer, The Return o f Christ (Grand Rapids: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1972), 25, 26; Metzler, 205-295.
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in his now classic Epistle to the Romans. “If Christianity be not altogether thoroughgoing 
eschatology,” he wrote, “there remains in it no relationship whatever with Christ.”1 While 
his eschatological reaction to liberal excesses had been too strong (and existentialist), it 
nevertheless raised eschatology to an unparalleled prominent position in systematic 
theology.2 Theology would now be approached through eschatology. Ethics would 
follow suit. “Human possibilities become ethical," Barth pressed, “only in the shadow of 
the final eschatological possibility.”3 And “when . . .  they [human possibilities] do stand 
there [in the shadow of the final eschatological possibility], they become at once the only 
possibility, for they are an urgent, compelling necessity.”4 Accordingly, “the way of 
theological ethics” for Barth is through the eschatological thematic.5 While not yet a 
fully developed eschatological-oriented ethics, it is nevertheless seminal.
Thielicke’s motto, “Theological ethics is eschatological or it is nothing,"6 clearly 
expressed the maturing understanding of the meaning of the Kingdom of God and the
'Barth. Epistle to the Romans. 314.
2Barth’s existential eschatology lost sight of the telos, the goal and end of history. 
He later admits, however, to his own excesses and begins to bring adjustments to his 
perspective. See the comparison of his exegesis of Rom 13:11 in Karl Barth, Church 




5For ethics Barth’s eschatological thematic is expressed under the rubric of God as 
Redeemer, where the divine command is heard. Barth, Ethics. 52-61.
6Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1, Foundations (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1966), 47.
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importance of eschatology for the foundations o f Christian ethics. While following the 
broad path outlined by Barth,1 Thielicke went on to focus eschatology more clearly with 
respect to its formative influence on ethics. In keeping with the New Testament witness, 
He placed Christian ethics in the field of tension between the old and the new aeons— 
with its resultant continuity and discontinuity—and the question of how they intersect 
within the individual moral agent.2 The theme of ethics became “walking between two 
worlds,” a paradoxical "impossible possibility.”3
The most far-reaching proposals to recover the significance of eschatology for 
Christian ethics have been advanced by Pannenberg, Moltmann, and Braaten.4 For them, 
a complete reconstruction of the foundations of ethics follows from the supposed “return" 
to the fundamental categories of “hope" and "future" in eschatological thought.5 Here the 
influence o f Bloch’s neo-Marxist philosophical hermeneutic of the ontological priority of
‘Ibid., 98-116; Geoffrey Bromiley, “Helmut Thielicke,” in A Handbook of 
Christian Theologians, ed. Dean G. Peerman and Martin E. Marty (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1989), 550. While Thielicke followed Barth’s (and the dialectical school’s) strong 
emphasis on the eschatological character o f  the New Testament, and likewise placed 
Christian ethics within that eschatological thematic, he disagreed with the dissipating of 
eschatological expectation and non-historicity.
2Thielicke, Theological Ethics. 43-44.
3Ibid., 44,47.
4Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God: idem, Ethics. 175-197; 
Moltmann, Theology of Hope: Braaten, The Future of God: idem, Eschatology and 
Ethics. Pannenberg and Moltmann are the key visionaries here. Braaten essentially 
Americanizes Pannenbergian eschatological thought. See also Das, 74-86; Braaten, 
Eschatology and Ethics. 108; Gardner, 204.
sBraaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 108, 12.
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the future— “the real genesis is not at the beginning, but at the end” — is worked over into 
a broad theological metaphysics that posits reality as eschatological.1 “Christianity is 
eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also 
revolutionizing and transforming the present.”2 Eschatology, then, is seen as determining 
the goal, the norm, the motive, and the context o f Christian ethics.3 The result has been 
termed “eschatological ethics,” “proleptic ethics,” or “eschatopraxis.”4 It is doing the 
future now, ahead of time.5
Emerging Imagery for Eschatology and Ethics
Within the context of the above two paths that the bonding of eschatology and 
ethics have taken in our century, three significant models of the Kingdom o f God have 
likewise emerged: (1) the already/not yet dialectic; (2) the reign of God motif; and (3) the 
horizon of the future perspective.6 These three models have come to serve as conceptual 
bridges to interpret the meaning of the Kingdom of God, and to resolve several tensions
‘Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 9; Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 34, 37, 45,
46; Bloch, 1628.
2Moltmann. Theology of Hope. 16.
3Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 122.
“Ibid., 6,110-111, 116-122.
5Ibid., 121-122.
6The reader should be reminded here that, at bottom, the eschatology/ethics 
question within Christianity in our century has revolved primarily around the biblical 
imagery of the Kingdom of God.
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and problems that are recognized as fundamental to the eschatology/ethics discussion.1 
This study has further defined these three models as “components” of the eschatological 
paradigm. The purpose for defining these three models as “components" has to do with 
the interrelation of models, primary models, and paradigms in conceptual theory. This is 
developed and explained under coming segments of this chapter, i.e., “Eschatology as 
Paradigm” and “Components of Eschatological Paradigm.”
Tensions and Problems
The tensions and problems that the eschatology/ethics question raises with 
respect to the Kingdom of God include the following fundamental concerns: 
immanence/transcendence, Kingdom/history, future/hope, church/world, 
principles/content, philosophical categories, and Christology. Together these tensions
'Numerous images have emerged through Christian history as conceptual bridges 
to explicate the meaning of the Kingdom of God. Theoretically, the possibility of an 
infinite number of models exists. Just eight of those possible images have been 
insightfully outlined by Howard A. Snyder /Models o f the Kingdom [Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1991]). These include the Kingdom as: future hope, inner spiritual 
experience, mystical communion, institutional church, countersystem, political state, 
Christianized society, and earthly utopia. Snyder, however, correctly asks the question, 
“Are all these really models of the Kingdom, or are some o f them rather models of 
spirituality or o f the Christian life, unrelated to the question o f the Kingdom? For in 
some of the proposed models, kingdom language is scarcely found” (ibid., 18-19). The 
point at issue for this study here is an important one. While all possible images of the 
Kingdom may in one way or another provide an open window into the meaning of the 
Kingdom of God, all may not provide a sustained and systematic metaphor for a 
comprehensive understanding with respect to application in moral theory. Furthermore, 
they all may not operate on the same level hermeneutically. Some images are evidently 
primary in that they open the way for other images to operate or provide supplementary 
imagery. This study takes the position that the images selected herein are of that primary 
nature. They operate from the level of exegesis and theological foundations.
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and problems have comprised the major relevant concerns which a comprehensive 
eschatological paradigm for ethics would need to satisfactorily balance and resolve.1 
These tensions and problems are briefly explored before outlining the three models which 
have emerged, in part, towards their resolution.
Immanence/transcendence
Eschatology and ethics are set between the two levels of immanence and 
transcendence.2 The sphere of eschatology for immanence is this-worldly present and is 
realized by (or with the help of) human activity. It is evolutionary, cultural-ethical, and 
marked by continuity. The opposite extreme o f  transcendence focuses on an other­
worldly future that is achieved by God and not man. It is cataclysmic, individual- 
soteriological, and marked by discontinuity.3 Eschatology as paradigm obviously would
'Snyder presents six fundamental tension points or polarities as central to the 
mystery o f God’s reign, i.e., present versus future, individual versus social, spirit versus 
matter, gradual versus climactic, divine \action versus human action, and the church’s 
relation to the world (ibid., 16-18). The outline of tensions and problems which this 
study proposes encompass those of Snyder and go beyond to include important issues 
relevant to our concerns with regards to ethics (e.g., principles/content, philosophical 
categories, and Christology).
2Johnstone, 50.
3This century’s renewed emphasis on eschatology as an integral part of the whole 
of Christian theology brought with it a critical reaction to the immanent evolutionary 
views o f  the nineteenth century. This re-assertion of transcendence, however, tended to 
again strain (or separate) the two lines of eschatology and ethics. Within the theological 
current that emphasized transcendence, however, intentional effort was made to relate the 
transcendent eschatological dimension to the world of man, ethical experience, and 
political reality (ibid., 51). A “return” to nuanced immanental patterns would continue 
to be an attraction for those focusing on a strong and direct social concern (ibid., 48).
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need to articulate theological/ethical balance between these two perspectives. 
Kingdom/history
Closely linked to the problem of immanence/transcendence is the relation 
between the Kingdom and history. In other words, how does eschatology relate to 
historical movement and the passage of time? Is the Kingdom here but not now 
—historical and future? Or is it here and now—historical and present? Or not here but 
now—above history and present? Or not here and not now—above history and future?1 
The sphere and time of eschatology—whether it is in history or outside o f history, past, 
present, or future—has significant implications for ethics.2
Future/hope
The Kingdom/history dialogue has led toward the question of the future o f the
'Chastain, “Eschatology and Ethics,” 238.
2Ibid., 239. The issue revolves around the notion that ethics is concerned with the 
“this-worldly and present” and not the “other-worldly and future" — that there is no ethics 
beyond the here and now, beyond history and time. It follows that an eschatologically 
founded ethic would in essence be an unreal ethic. For Christian ethics to be possible, 
then, the Kingdom must in some way be here and now, historical. A theological 
interpretation o f  history or the Kingdom, then, is called for in order to link the 
eschatological vision with the concrete history lived by men in a world of change and 
social exigencies (Johnstone, 73). But while eschatology would need to affirm the reality 
of the Kingdom of God in history, it would need to do so in a way that would not equate 
the Kingdom with the process of history or deny its (the Kingdom’s) future dynamic 
(Johnstone, 63). An important methodological concern here is whether a specific concept 
of history predetermines the eschatological outlook or whether the eschatological 
perspective determines the view of history (Hutter, 28).
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Kingdom and the future of the world. At issue is an adequate hermeneutical bridge 
spanning the eschatological horizon of the biblical message and the orientation of modem 
secular culture toward an open future.1 The Blochian neo-Marxist-influenced return to 
the fundamental categories of “hope” and “future” in eschatological thought pressed the 
need for a merging of these respective horizons.2 The issue here is also the significance 
of present ethical action in the light of the coming future. In what way does the reality of 
the future enter the present and exert moral influence?3
Church/world
The field o f operation for the moral implications of the eschatological Kingdom 
are set within the dualities between the Church and world, and between the social and
‘Braaten, The Future of God. 18, 23,32.
2Ibid., 17-32; Pannenberg. Ethics. 175-197; idem. Theology and the Kingdom of 
God. 51-71; Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 15-36.
3Peters writes that one of the abiding questions being directed towards any 
eschatological theory which takes temporal movement seriously is the issue of 
disjunction and conjunction. Will the ultimate future be so radically different from the 
present that there will be little or no continuity, i.e., disjunctive? Or will actions in the 
present have significance for the reality yet to come, i.e., conjunctive? The former 
(disjunction), it is proposed, would make present ethical actions irrelevant to God’s 
future. Thus eschatology could not function as a sanction for intrahistorical ethics. On 
the other hand, it is asserted that conjunction would allow present ethical actions to have 
a determining impact on what will ultimately come. But this would come at the risk of 
collapsing eschatology into history, and losing the divinely consummated Kingdom. It 
follows, then, that an ethic based on eschatology must affirm both disjunction and 
conjunction. And it must do so in a way that the future exerts moral influence on the 
present. See Ted F. Peters, “Pannenberg’s Eschatological Ethics,” in The Theology of 
Wolfhart Pannenberg. ed. Carl E. Braaten and Philip Clayton (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Publishing House, 1988), 246.
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personal.1 Overcoming these dualities presents a challenge for eschatology and ethics. 
The issues revolve around the relationship between evangelism and social responsibility, 
and whether Kingdom ethics is focused toward the Church or toward the future of the 
whole world.2 Can eschatology articulate a worldview and life-view that embraces world 
questions and societal needs, and do so in a way that all the spheres of human life and 
action are included within the range of Christian responsibility? Is eschatology able to 
merge the future o f the church and the future o f the world into a common moral horizon?3
Philosophical categories
The ability to find conceptual bridges between what the biblical texts say about 
the moral life and the presumptions and questions o f philosophical ethics has been a 
integral part o f the eschatology/ethics dialogue. This comes from the fact that dominant 
philosophical conceptions of moral life have consistently influenced directions (or
'Chastain, “Eschatology and Ethics," 238-239; Johnstone, 54, 56.
2Does eschatology produce a pessimism that sets the Church against the world and 
its fallen structures with evangelism of the individual as focus rather than social moral 
renewal? Or is there an optimism that finds the Church as a community for the world, a 
transforming agent of the world? If the Church exists to serve the Kingdom in history, 
how is it to be pointed toward the world? See Arthur P. Johnston, “The Kingdom in 
Relation to the Church and the World,” in In Word and Deed, ed. Bruce Nicholls (Exeter: 
The Paternoster Press, 1985), 109-132; Wolfhart Pannenberg, “The Kingdom of God and 
the Church,” Una Sancta (Christmas 1967): 3-27; Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of 
Modem Fundamentalism.
3These questions revolve around the need for an eschatological perspective which 
both denies the ultimate value of the present (thus opening it up to criticism and change) 
and affirms the value of the present as a valid field for Christian action. See Braaten, The 
Future o f God. 23-32, 109-116; Pannenberg, “The Kingdom of God and the Church," 5; 
and Johnstone, 57.
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response) in Christian ethics.1 The concern is whether an eschatologically informed 
ethics can be reciprocally related to philosophical ethics in a way that it can: (1) 
appropriate the categories which appear in the light o f philosophical analysis, and, at the 
same time; (2) offer a comprehensive viewpoint which can overcome the contradictions 
that classically cling to the various types of philosophical ethics?2 Furthermore, there is 
the question as to what kind of ethic eschatology generates.3 Within this context o f 
bridging eschatological ethics toward philosophical modes of moral thought, there is also 
the question of the highest good (summum bonum) and what is right morally.4 Finally, 
eschatology is being challenged to articulate an ontological foundation for ethics which 
locates the point of convergence between the source of the good and the source of being.5
'I.e., teleology (consequentialism), deontology, perfectionism (virtue ethics), 
situationalism (contextualism), etc.
2Das, 79, 65, 83; Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 105, 113,115-116.
3More specifically, is it a mixture of philosophical perspectives or does it provide 
a dynamic perspective and methodology which is distinct from them? Or viewed 
oppositely, what kind of eschatology does Christian ethics need in order to adequately 
resolve the various concerns raised by philosophical ethics? See Ezell, 81-87; Braaten, 
Eschatology and Ethics. 105, 113,115-116.
4The summum bonum has to do with moral value and the ultimate worthwhile end 
or goal o f living. In ethics, goodness has two main senses, i.e., moral goodness and 
teleological goodness (which overlaps with eschatology). The question of “what is right” 
has to do with moral obligation and refers to actions or conduct that is ethically correct.
It deals with behavior rather than overall ideals o f life. Eschatology is being challenged 
with bringing unity to these questions whereas philosophical ethics has tended to set them 
in competition. See Burton F. Porter, Reasons for Living: A Basic Ethics (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing, 1988), vii, viii; Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 114; Peters, 
241,245.
5In metaphysics the summum bonum (highest good) is the highest value or good in 
a hierarchy of values or goods, where the subordinate values or goods are related
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Principles/content
The bridging o f eschatology toward the concerns and categories o f philosophical 
ethics, as well as contemporary social exigencies, naturally raises the question o f 
specificity and precision. How concrete is its ethical content?1 Can eschatology provide 
a blueprint for social action or ethical behavior in the world? Or will it merely provide 
moral imagery from which one draws analogies and makes inferences?2 How much of 
the eschatological vision is moral content, and how much is inspiration and motivation 
toward vision-defined action?3 The answer to these questions is basic to ethical method 
and application.
Christology
Finally, an understanding of the relationship between eschatology and ethics is 
linked inexorably with an understanding of the person and work of Jesus. The New 
Testament locates the Kingdom in Jesus’ person and ministry,4 thus forging a direct link
ontologically and derive their value accordingly. The point of such convergence for 
Christian ethics is God. God determines both what is and also what is good, and Who 
ultimately frames the nuances of the eschatological paradigm that will define more 
specifically the good and the right. Peters, 241.
'If  eschatology generates deontological or teleological themes, or articulates the 
summum bonum and what is right, how precise can it be?
2Johnstone, 56; Dahl, 375, 376.
3The questions here include, too, whether or not eschatology leaves us with 
middle-axioms (which are neither too general nor too particular), proximate norms and 
principles, or only horizontal ultimate Christian norms? Johnstone, 63; Das, 86.
4George Eldon Ladd, The Presence of the Future: The Eschatology o f Biblical 
Realism (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1974), 138-148 passim.
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between Jesus and eschatology.1 It is a link where, some would say, eschatology includes 
the entire history of Jesus,2 and which sees eschatology as having proleptic presence in 
Christ.3 The questions here revolve around the function of Christology in eschatological 
ethics. Does Christology provide a paradigm for the good and the right within the 
eschatological thematic? Does it provide a proleptic sample of eschatological fulfillment 
in human existence? Can it bring some precision to determining what goals in life are 
worth seeking and by what means?4
Already/Not Yet Dialectic
The “eschatological-oriented ethic" approach to the ethics question initially 
opened the way toward greater biblical/theological precision with regard to the meaning 
of the Kingdom of God and the interpretation o f New Testament eschatology. The most 
characteristic feature of this precision was found in the temporal tension between the 




4Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 115.
5This study is outlining here just one developing and, subsequently, generally 
accepted view within Protestant systematic theology. It is understood that the imagery 
outlined here is not the only or unique way to see the Kingdom of God as expressed in 
New Testament eschatology. However, it is this study’s position that Mott and Ogletree 
assume it and worked within this viewpoint, and that Ladd, Schrage, and the other NT 
theologians cited represent “givens” with regard to this important New Testament 
eschatology imagery. Ladd, The Presence o f the Future: idem, A Theology of the New 
Testament: Schrage, 19.
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simultaneity o f present and future is characteristic o f Jesus whose person and work brings 
the effectual presence of the Kingdom into the realm o f historical reality.1 Since Jesus 
proclaimed the coming of the Kingdom as a future event and at the same time anticipated 
it in His person in a proleptic way,2 the Kingdom o f God has already come into history in 
advance of its apocalyptic manifestation.3 In a unique and dynamic way then, the 
Kingdom is and is not here. It is both present and future.4 Because of this, there is an 
overlapping of the two ages—this present age and the age to come—where believers live 
“between the times.” The present old age goes on, but the powers of the new age have 
erupted into the old age.5 Eschatology, then, has been inaugurated but not consummated.6
This already/not yet component recaptures the essential bi-polarity of the biblical 
witness.7 Furthermore, it enables the required conceptual balance between the
'Schrage, 19, 20. Jesus did more than announce the advent of the Kingdom (Mark 
1:15), He embodied it! Through His miracles, death, resurrection, and bringing of the 
Holy Spirit, He made God’s reign present in the world (H. P. Owen, “Eschatology and 
Ethics in the New Testament,” Scottish Journal of Theology 15 [1962]: 369).
2 A key term for some working within this imagery is “proleptic." Jesus is the sign 
of the proleptic presence of the future (Schrage, 19). There is a proleptic presence of the 
eschatological kingdom in the person and work of Jesus (Braaten, Eschatology and 
Ethics. 110; Schwarz, 515).
3Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 93.
4Ibid., 63. See Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 53.
5Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 69.
6Ibid., 93.
7See above discussion, 33-39.
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immanental and transcendental realities o f the Kingdom.1 It facilitates clarification with 
regard to the relation between the Kingdom and history. It also affirms that eschatology 
cannot be isolated from Christology.2 The already/not yet must still be articulated more 
precisely: (1) in what sense the Kingdom is here; (2) in what sense it is to be further 
realized before the second coming o f Christ; and (3) in what sense it will be fully realized 
at the second coming.3 Nevertheless, the already/not yet component presents broad 
imagery for structuring theological and ethical implications of New Testament 
eschatology.
Reign of God
Another characteristic feature of the growing biblical/theological precision in 
New Testament eschatology came with the reign o f  God component. The biblical 
witness expresses diverse contexts in which the Kingdom of God theme appears. The 
Kingdom is presented in: (1) an abstract meaning of reign or rule; (2) as the apocalyptic 
future order; (3) as something present among men; and (4) as a present realm or sphere 
into which men are now entering.4 Furthermore, there is the distinction between the
'Furthermore, the “already" and the "not yet” depend on each other and 
presuppose each other. Assertions about the present point toward the coming fulfillment, 
while claims concerning the future are grounded in their present anticipation and 
initiation. Schwarz, 515.
2Ezell, 80.
3Henry, The Uneasv Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 53.
4Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 123.
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Kingdom as the reign of God and the Kingdom as the realm over which He reigns.1 The 
reign o f  God component is understood as defining the Kingdom primarily in its abstract 
or dynamic idea o f reign, rather than the concrete idea o f the realm over which God 
rules.2 It also posits God’s dynamic reign as the integrating concept for the diverse 
nuances of the Kingdom found in the biblical witness.
The reign o f  God component has made it possible to understand how the 
Kingdom can be both present and future, both inward and outward, both spiritual and 
apocalyptic.3 It has made it possible, as well, to understand how the Kingdom can 
manifest itself in two different ways (reign/realm), at two different times (present/future), 
to accomplish the same ultimate redemptive end.4 Furthermore, this component is seen 
as opening the way toward overcoming the dualities between the Church and the world, 
and between the social and the personal.5 It reaches out over all spheres o f human life 
and action so that the world, too, is clearly affirmed as the subject of God’s dominion.6 
Yet this dynamic reign o f  God invades the present age without transforming it into the
'Ibid., 124.
2Ibid., 128, 130; Johnston, 128.
3Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 42.
4Ibid., 139.
5Johnstone, 54.
6Ibid., 54, 67. See also William Adolf Visser ‘t Hooft, The Kingship of Christ:
An Interpretation o f Recent European Theology (New York: Harper, 1948), 11, 59.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
age to come.1 God’s "reign” still stands in total opposition to the world, its sin, and its 
oppressive systems and materialism.2 While the full implications of the reign o f  God 
compoment must still be articulated, it nevertheless provides useful imagery for 
structuring the theological and ethical ramifications o f New Testament eschatology.
Horizon of the Future
The third component model that has emerged in conceptualizing the bond 
between eschatology and ethics is the horizon o f  the future imagery. Biblical eschatology 
by nature is future-oriented. It points beyond this life to something that is more ultimate 
and complete—not mere spiritual survival only, but a final cosmic reconciliation which 
encompasses a “new heaven and a new earth in which righteousness dwells.”3 Here the 
Kingdom of God is the Christian’s future hope. This hope naturally elicits a forward- 
looking stance, a peering into the future, an imagining of what will be.4 The practical 
result for Christian ethics is that this gazing towards the horizon of “what is about to 
come" inevitably influences present moral life.5
‘Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 149.
2At bottom, God’s reign in the world is one in which He rules not only 
providentially in history to call a people to Himself from out o f the world, but where He 
rules also in the church and through the lives o f believers for the world (Johnston, 127, 
125).
32 Pet 3:13; Rev 21:1-8.
4Rom 8:18-25; Heb 11:8-16.
51 John 3:1-3; 2 Pet 3:11-13; Col 3:lf.; Heb 12:18-28; Titus 2:11-14; Matt 24:45- 
51; 25:31-46.
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The horizon o f  the future component is seen as facilitating this leaping forward in 
imagination toward what lies ahead—until that “not yet” evokes powerful images which 
bring moral value and meaning back to the present. Furthermore, it is a component that, 
for some, represents the future’s potential for bringing hermeneutical, epistemological, 
and motivational value into the present.1 It affirms the reality that Christian hope leads to 
Christian practice. And it is an invitation to Christian ethical consciousness in the light of 
what lies ahead in the coming Kingdom.2
While the horizon o f  the future component emerges naturally from the biblical 
witness of the moral reality o f the eschatological Kingdom of God, it has been nuanced 
significantly by futuristic eschatology which posits that the essence of things lies in their 
future.3 According to this view, since the essence of things lies in their future, the
'Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 52.
2See Douglas J. Schuurman, Creation. Eschaton. and Ethics: The Ethical 
Significance of the Creation-Eschaton Relation in the Thought of Emil Brunner and 
Jurgen Moltmann (New York: Peter Lang, 1991); 1-12, 149-174; Childs, 347-360.
3Peter Kuzmic, “History and Eschatology: Evangelical Views,” in In Word and 
Deed, ed. Bruce Nicholls (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1985), 149. Its philosophical 
backdrop is the Blochian neo-Marxist-influenced hermeneutic of the ontological priority 
of the future—“the real genesis is not at the beginning, but at the end”—which is worked 
over into a broad theological metaphysics that posits reality as eschatological (Braaten, 
Eschatology and Ethics. 34, 37,45,46; Bloch, 16-28; and Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 
9). The intent, of course, is not to imitate or baptize Bloch’s messianic philosophy, but to 
build a theology of hope and future (eschatology) on presuppositions of Christian 
theology, where the God of promise and exodus—who is a God with future as His 
essential nature—reigns unconditionally in the present because of and through the power 
of the resurrection of Jesus. Within this theology of hope, God is in Himself the power of 
the future. He is the ultimate future. There is no future beyond God Himself. God in His 
very being is the future of the world. God has been the future of all past events. See 
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God. 61-63, 133; idem, Ethics. 190-193;
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ultimate future becomes the new paradigm of transcendence whose power transforms and 
brings about alteration in the conditions of history itself.1 Within this thinking, the notion 
of the horizon o f  the future supposedly encapsules that sought-for hermeneutical bridge 
that can help span the eschatological horizon of the biblical message and the orientation 
of modem secular culture toward an open future.2 It is a component whose imagery is 
consciously aimed more directly at the secular world rather than being limited to the 
church alone.3 The bottom line here is that the Kingdom is seen as the future of the entire 
world and, as such, it defines the ultimate horizon for all ethical statements.4 
Unfortunately the bipolarity o f the biblical teaching has been lost in much o f this 
evangelical futuristic eschatology.5
The horizon o f the future component, however, remains a powerful figure for
Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 9,15-36.
'Das, 78.
2Modem secular culture’s orientation toward an open future assumes an 
anthropology of hope, and stresses the newness of that which lies in the future. Braaten, 
The Future o f God. 25; Pannenberg, Ethics. 176.
3It seeks to find a common horizon between the biblical worlds of meaning and 
those which make up our sense of reality. It facilitates the significance of present ethical 
action in the light of the coming future in a way which avoids the disjunction/conjunction 
dilemma. Peters, 241; Braaten, The Future of God. 23-32.
4This is predicated on the fact that, ultimately, it is God who determines the good. 
He is the ultimate good when He is understood as relating Himself to our world in the 
coming of His rule (kingdom). Peters, 241; Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of 
God. 74. 111.
5 At bottom it has become a philosophy of hope more than a biblical apocalyptic 
eschatology. Kuzmic, 149.
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structuring the theological and ethical implications of New Testament eschatology.1 And 
like the already/not yet and reign o f  God components, its full implications for our 
eschatology/ethics question still need articulating.
Paradigm Synthesis Through the 1970s 
The relationship between eschatology and ethics essentially remained problematic 
through the first half of the twentieth century.2 And while solutions to the tension and 
problems were emerging, no final clarification of their relationship could be given even 
by the 1970s.3 Yet, by the 1970s a twofold pattern had emerged with respect to the 
eschatology/ethics question.4 First, eschatology was becoming increasingly recognized 
for its potential as a paradigm for Christian ethics. Second, eschatology was being 
viewed/articulated primarily through the three component models which have been 
outlined above, i.e., already/not yet, reign o f  God, and the horizon o f the future.
'The reader should remember that “it is not the future, only the futuristic, that 
conflicts with the meaning of eschatology” (Berkouwer, 31). And so there must be care 
to articulate the nuances of the horizon of the future within the sphere of biblical 
eschatology rather than philosophical categories o f hope. In addition, this nuancing of 
eschatology must be kept in balance with protology, as any ontological dynamics of 
future cannot be divorced from those of creation (see Schuurman, Creation. Eschaton. and 
Ethics. 1-12, 149-174; Childs, 347-360).
2Johnstone, 73; Henry, Christian Personal Ethics. 550. “A bias against the full 
significance for ethics of the Christian doctrine of last things . . .  continues to be a major 
problem o f ethics in the mid-twentieth century,” says Henry (ibid.).
3Johnstone, 85.
4The resources for developing this section on “Paradigm Synthesis Through the 
1970s” and the following section on “Implications for Moral Theory” are drawn, for the 
most part, from theologians/ethicists representative of this synthesis period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
Eschatology as Paradigm
The emergence of eschatology as a paradigm for Christian moral thought 
followed the cultural wave on which the theology of hope was riding following World 
War II.1 It developed as part of the concern towards how to get beyond the general 
existentialism of the post-war era and how to acquire future perspectives for building a 
more just, more peaceable and more humane world.2 Hope took the place of apathy. The 
1960s in particular were seen as years of hope, a new beginning and a turn to the future.
It included, too, the emergence of a post-holocaust theology, i.e., asking the question if 
one’s theology could remain unchanged before and after Auschwitz (If this is the case, be 
on your guard.), the need to do theology in conversation with the Jews, and a linkage with 
other forms of oppression.3
The emergence of eschatology as a paradigm for Christian moral thought also 
coincided with the discussion and development o f the use o f models and paradigms in 
theology—specifically in discussing the Kingdom of God. Considerable literature on
'Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 7.
2Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 8.
3See Clark M. Williamson, A Guest in the House of Israel: Post-Holocaust Church 
Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), vii-viii, 3-14, 252-254; 
Emil L. Fackenheim, God’s Presence in History: Jewish Affirmations and Philosophical 
Reflections (New York: New York University Press, 1970); Darrel J. Fasching, The 
Ethical Challenge o f Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia? (Albany, NY: 
State University o f New York Press, 1993); Eliezer Berkovits, Faith after the Holocaust 
(New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1973); and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Holocaust 
Theology (London: Lamp Press, 1989).
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using models and paradigms in theology has developed since the early 1960s.1 And 
models are increasingly employed today as a method of theological exploration.2 
Historically, this focus on models and paradigms in theology has mirrored the discussion 
and changing place of models in mathematics and the natural and social sciences.3 As 
with math and the sciences, the model method represents attempts in theology to describe 
or to explore some biblical/theological reality not fully understood.4 Given this historical
'On the use of models in theology see Ian T. Ramsey, Religious Language: An 
Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963); idem, 
Models and Mvsterv (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Frederick Ferre, 
“Mapping the Logic of Models in Science and Theology,” The Christian Scholar 46 
(Spring 1963): 9-39; William H. Austin, “Models, Mystery, and Paradox in Ian Ramsey,” 
Journal o f the Scientific Study of Religion 7 (Spring 1968): 41-55; Ewert H. Cousins, 
“Models and the Future of Theology," Continuum 7 (Winter-Spring 1969): 78-91; Ian G. 
Barbour, Myths. Models and Paradigms (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974); 
Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).
2E.g., Avery Dulles, Models o f the Church (New York: Doubleday, 1987); idem, 
Models of Revelation (New York: Orbis Books, 1992); Paul S. Minear, Images of the 
Church in the New Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960); Snyder, Models 
o f the Kingdom: John F. 0 . Grady, Models of Jesus (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1981); Christian Duquoc and Casiano Floristan, eds., Models o f Holiness (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1979); Raymond F. Collins, Models of Theological Reflection (Lanham, 
NJ: University Press of America, 1984); Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for 
an Ecological Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); Stephen B. Bevans, 
Models of Contextual Theology (New York: Orbis Books, 1992).
3The widespread use o f  the model method was not a matter o f chance. It grew, 
rather, out of a historical situation that called for methodology that was both open and 
flexible, but which at the same time allowed for precision and clarity. It was based on the 
assumption that reality is multi-dimensional and that there is a need for a variety of forms 
to reflect it. See Cousins, 81; Barbour, 3-10 passim; Ramsey, Models and Mvsterv. 1-21 
passim; Ferre, 9.
4The emphasis has been towards “disclosure” rather than “picturing," toward 
“mental models" of systems rather than “scale models” or “working models.” See, 
Ramsey, Models and Mvsterv. 1-21; Barbour, 6, 30-34,49-70.
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situation in theological method, it is only natural that eschatology would become nuanced 
accordingly.
It will be helpful at this point to note some important distinctions between the 
nature and role of models and that of paradigms. “A model is, in essence, a sustained and 
systematic metaphor,”1 an “organizing image” which gives particular emphasis, enabling 
one to notice and interpret certain aspects of some reality not fully understood.2 “Well- 
constructed models are simple and clear enough to be grasped more or less intuitively; yet 
they have a logical or, better, an analogical relation to the larger reality being 
investigated."3 A paradigm, on the other hand, is comprehensive. It is an “interpretive 
framework,” a “basic metaphorical strategy” in which a given discipline does its work.4 
While models and paradigms together share the essential quality of being “ways of 
looking at things” or "conceptual systems,” a paradigm encompasses and interprets a 
larger, more comprehensive conceptual picture and uses models to explicate aspects of 
that larger picture or envision that larger picture as a whole.5 Furthermore, a paradigm
‘McFague, Metaphorical Theology. 67.
2Barbour, 6-8, 29-70.
3Snyder, 20.
4McFague, Metaphorical Theology. 79-80. Kuhn asserts that a paradigm 
embodies a set of conceptual, methodological, and metaphysical assumptions (Thomas S. 
Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962]).
5While all paradigms are models, not all models are paradigms. McFague, 
Metaphorical Theology. 80; Barbour, 8-11; 92-146.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
sets the limits on the range of acceptable models.1
Given this distinction between models and paradigms, it can be suggested that the 
inherent metaphysical nature of eschatology predisposes its performing a paradigmatic 
role in theology and moral theory rather than that of a modeling role. In addition, the 
inherent metaphysical nature of eschatology necessitates supporting models for 
elucidation. This is true not only for explication of particular aspects of the 
eschatological reality, but for envisioning it as a whole as well.
In the context of the discussion and development o f the model method in 
theology, together with the broader re-interpretation of eschatology in this century, 
eschatology thus became recognized for its potential as a paradigm for theology and 
moral theory. Eschatology became, for many, an “interpretive framework,” a 
“metaphorical strategy" for doing theology and ethics. This is seen in the literature 
developing during this time, and is expressed most clearly in the convergence of ideas 
regarding the role of eschatology in theology and ethics through the mid-1970s.2
'Barbour, 124; McFague. Metaphorical Theology. 109.
Significant examples include: Moltmann, Theology of Hope ( 1965i: 
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom o f  God (1969); idem, Ethics (1977); Braaten, 
The Future o f God (1969); idem, Eschatology and Ethics (1974); Vemard Eller, The 
Promise: Ethics in the Kingdom of God (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970); Ladd, A 
Theology and the Kingdom of God f19741: idem. The Presence of the Future ('1974'): 
Herman Ridderbos, The Coming of the Kingdom (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and 
Reformed Publishing, 1976); Wilder, Kervgma. Eschatology and Ethics (1966); Yoder, 
The Politics o f Jesus (1972); Thielicke, Theological Ethics (1966); Dahl, "New 
Testament Eschatology and Christian Social Action," 374-379 (1970); Johnstone, 
“Eschatology and Social Ethics,” 47-85 (1976); Owen, “Eschatology and Ethics in the 
New Testament," 369-382; Childs, “The Imago Dei and Eschatology” (1974); Metzler, 
“The Ethics o f the Kingdom” (1971); Stackhouse, “Eschatology and Ethical Method"
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Components of Eschatological Paradigm
By the 1970s eschatology was commonly being viewed/articulated through the 
three significant models outlined thus far, i.e., already/not yet, reign o f  God, and the 
horizon o f  the future .' As we have already noted, these three models have come to serve 
as conceptual bridges to interpret the meaning o f the Kingdom of God, and to resolve the
(1965); Henry McKeating, God and the Future (London: SCM Press, 1974); Franklin 
Sherman, ed., Christian Hope and the Future of Humanity (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Publishing House, 1969); and Ewert H. Cousins, Hope and the Future of Man 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972).
This study assumes that the surge of eschatology/ethics-oriented literature through the 
1980s affirms the synthesis of eschatology as a paradigm in the 1970s. Space does not 
allow a full review here, but significant examples include: Bruce Chilton and J. I. H. 
McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics of the Kingdom (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 
1987); Webber, Living in the Shadow of the Second Coming (1983); Yoder, The Priestly 
Kingdom (1984); Das, “Theology of the Future and Christian Ethics,” 63-86 (1983);
Ezell, “Eschatology and Ethics in the New Testament," 72-95 (1980); Wilber B. Wallis, 
“Eschatology and Social Concern," Journal of Evangelical Theological Society 24 (March 
1981): 3-9; Christopher J. H. Wright, “The Use o f the Bible in Social Ethics: Paradigms, 
Types and Eschatology,” Transformation 1, no. 1 (January/March, 1984): 11-20; Howard 
A. Snyder, A Kingdom Manifesto: Calling the Church to Live Under God’s Reign 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1985); Schrage, The Ethics o f the New 
Testament (1988); Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change (1982); Ogletree, The Use of 
the Bible in Christian Ethics (1983); Philip J. Rossi, Together Toward Hope: A Joumev 
to Moral Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
'Not every theologian or ethicist has represented these component models with the 
same language or wording. The theological nuances of the horizon o f  the future , for 
instance, have been expressed through such varied language as “theology of hope," “the 
future o f God," “theology of promise," etc. Likewise, the reign o f God has been termed 
as "divine kingship," “kingship of God,” “kingship of Christ,” etc., and the already/not yet 
as “between the times,” “between two aeons,” “the presence of the future,” “prolepsis,” etc. 
It is important, too, to note that, since by this time the fundamental nuances o f each of 
these component models were assumed as givens, they may not always play an equally 
explicit role in a given theologian’s or ethicist’s project. That is why one component 
model might be stressed significantly in a given project while the other two are hardly 
mentioned at all.
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tensions and problems that are acknowledged as fundamental to the eschatology/ethics 
discussion. Here, it is suggested, that these three models are in effect “models elucidating 
the eschatological paradigm.” Models, as has been noted above, are “organizing images” 
which give particular emphasis, enabling one to notice and interpret certain aspects of 
some reality not fully understood. The models of the already/not yet, reign o f God, and 
the horizon o f  the future provide just that. They each give a particular emphasis, and 
enable one to notice and interpret certain aspects of the larger eschatological paradigm.
It would be helpful at this point, however, to note the relationship that models 
may have towards one another within an overarching paradigm. After all, the three 
models we are focusing on here are not the only models that theologians or ethicists have 
found useful in understanding the Kingdom of God and eschatology. In addition, 
Scripture itself gives numerous models for the eschatological Kingdom. Why, then, have 
these three models become commonly accepted points o f  reference for viewing or 
articulating Christian eschatology?
First, not all models are o f equal scope or status.1 While all models may 
contribute important insight toward a larger picture, they may do so at different levels of 
application or importance. They may manifest differing potential for bringing 
hermeneutical, epistemological, or motivational value to the question at hand. Second, 
some models are clearly primary in terms of structural relationships within a given range 
of images. These primary models are capable of both engendering and organizing a
‘Ferre maps the logic o f models in terms of their type (degree of concreteness), 
scope (degree of inclusiveness), and status (degree of importance) (Ferre, 13-23).
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network of models. They both assemble and scatter. They assemble subordinate images 
together and they scatter concepts on a higher level.1 Paradigms can rise or fall or shift 
according to primary models and the subordinate models which support and enrich them. 
For New Testament eschatology, the Kingdom of God is the primary model linking 
eschatology as paradigm and the array of models that would elucidate it.2 As indicated in 
the introduction to this study, the “eschatological paradigm” is understood as being the 
overall integrating worldview generated by the New Testament Kingdom of God.
With these distinctions in mind, it is further suggested that the already/not yet, 
reign o f God, and horizon o f  the future models most closely explicate the fundamental
‘Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourses and the Surplus of Meaning 
(Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 64; McFague, Metaphorical 
Theology. 108-111; Dulles, Models of Revelation. 33-34; Snyder, 20.
2That is why any discussion of eschatology within a Christian context will 
inevitably revolve around the notion of the Kingdom o f God. This century’s re­
interpretation of eschatology has been fueled by its sustained biblical/theological focus on 
the eschatological Kingdom of God. See Snyder, 22-24.
While this study affirms the broad differentiations and relationships that are being 
made between models, primary models, and paradigms in interpretation theory, there is 
reluctance to include either metaphorical language or metaphorical interpretation. Both 
Ricoeur’s and McFague’s projects highlight metaphorical language and metaphorical 
interpretation in their interpretation theory. In particular, McFague defines the Kingdom 
of God as the “root-metaphor" bridging the overarching eschatological paradigm and all 
its supporting models (McFague, Metaphorical Theology. 109-111). Metaphors by 
nature imply a double meaning where the relation between the literal meaning and the 
figurative meaning is elusive, relative, and open to interpretation. Because of this, the 
reality towards which the metaphor supposedly points becomes equivocal or even 
paradoxical. Models and paradigms, however, assume a direct, clearly defined relation to 
the reality which they express or interpret. Models and paradigms assume that reality as 
truth or fact so that their agency likewise expresses reality, whereas metaphors always 
leave that reality in question and open to interpretation. That is why this study prefers the 
term “primary model” when referring to the Kingdom o f God. It assumes the Kingdom of 
God as a divine reality that can communicate objective truth about our human reality.
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meaning o f the Kingdom of God as expressed by the array of models it (the Kingdom of 
God) assembles and scatters as a primary model. In other words, these three models 
provide the key theological images which the Kingdom of God, together with its other 
supporting models, projects within the eschatological paradigm.1 Furthermore, these 
three models are conceptually interwoven and complementary. They amount to a 
framework that, at least in theory, can embrace the range of possible conceptions of the 
Kingdom o f God. As such, they have potential for bringing hermeneutical, 
epistemological, and motivational value to Christian eschatology as a paradigm for 
theology and moral theory.
This study suggests, then, that like a three-stranded cord, these three models form
■Some might correctly ask, “What about the concepts of the ‘kingdom of grace,’ 
or the ‘kingdom of glory’?” And “Where is the traditional theological/ethical emphasis 
on the ‘indicative’ and ‘imperative’?” Furthermore, it might be asked, “Where are the 
concepts o f judgment, reward, justification, and condemnation in the discussion here of 
eschatology and ethics?” “In what way," it may be asked, “do the three component 
models encapsule ‘key’ theological images over that of other important concepts which 
we have traditionally found important?” First, this study is dealing with foundational, 
methodological concerns with respect to moral theory. It is not outlining all the possible 
themes apparent within Christian eschatology, nor does it need to. It is looking for those 
foundational concepts which contemporary Christian ethicists have found useful in 
opening eschatology most fully towards ethics. Second, these ethicists do not work in a 
theological or biblical vacuum. To assert that these three component models are primary 
in the context o f this century’s re-interpretation of eschatology does not imply that other 
concepts are not apparent or important or even useful, but rather that their expression has 
found focus through these components. Third, these three models simply come to the 
overall eschatological picture from a different angle that, in reality, is being expressed 
through these other concepts. For instance, why and how does one make the distinction 
between the “kingdom of grace" and the “kingdom of glory,” or determine that one is 
present and the other is still coming? Is it not because of and through the reality of the 
already/not ye ti  And what of the indicative and the imperative? Do not both the reign o f  
God and the horizon o f  the future evoke the context for us to use this traditional ethical 
terminology?
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the “components” o f a comprehensive eschatological paradigm for Christian ethics.1 
They give rise to what has become termed by some as “eschatological ethics.” With these 
distinctions and interrelation between models, primary models, and paradigms clearly in 
mind, this study from now on refers to these three models as “components" of the 
eschatological paradigm rather than mere “models” o f the paradigm.
Implications for Moral Theory 
With the paradigm of twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology in view, the 
question can naturally be asked as to its implications for Christian ethics. Answers to this 
question are explored from three perspectives: (I) the specific ethical nuances that each of 
the paradigm’s components imply; (2) the methodological nuances that the paradigm 
evokes/expresses with regard to the three principles o f verification (role of Scripture, role 
of comm unity, and the nature of social involvement); and (3) the theoretical level o f 
moral reflection on which the paradigm appears to operate. Obviously, the perceived
'Dulles suggests that when working with types or models it is best to employ “a 
relatively small number of types, all of which can be kept simultaneously in mind. The 
typology will be more successful if the types are sharply delineated, so that their 
differences are evident, and if each is capable o f being characterized by a single 
orientation or metaphor that gives the key to the positions taken on a large number of 
questions” (Dulles, Models of Revelation. 26). These three component models most 
closely explicate the fundamental meaning of the Kingdom of God as expressed by the 
array of models it assembles and scatters as a primary model. Whether they be biblical 
models (as expressed in Christ’s parables of four soils, tares, mustard seed, leaven, 
treasure and pearl, etc.) or contemporary models constructed by theologians and ethicists 
(as expressed by Snyder’s future hope, inner spiritual experience, mystical communion, 
countersystem, political state, etc.) they are interpreted and/or facilitated within the 
context o f these three fundamental images and what they express in relation to the 
Kingdom of God. Furthermore, these three images provide the theological and 
hermeneutical context that leads us toward Mott’s and Ogletree’s projects.
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moral implications of the paradigm may vary according to the unique perspectives of 
differing theological traditions. For the purposes of this study, discussion is limited here 
to that branch of Protestant theology which has facilitated the paradigm’s synthesis, and 
which has congealed the basic concepts assumed by Mott and Ogletree that are central to 
most Protestant Christians.
Nuances of Paradigm’s Components
By way of introduction, it might be helpful to note that each of the paradigm’s 
components generates specific ethical nuances. Within the paradigm, the already/not yet 
dialectic appears as the primary point of reference around which the reality and the 
religious/moral impact of the eschatological Kingdom o f  God find expression.1 The 
reign o f  God and horizon o f  the future, then, are closely nuanced dimensions (issues) of 
the Kingdom of God that are integrated within this already/not yet dialectic. The 
already/not yet gives rise to the question of the moral implications evident from the 
horizon o f the coming future. In addition, it gives rise to the question o f the moral 
implications highlighted by the reality of the reign of God which has already broken into 
the present. Viewed oppositely, the reign o f God and horizon o f  the future motifs 
explicate the crucial realms where the moral implications o f the already/not yet dialectic 
are both indicated and need to be worked out for everyday life.2
'Schrage, 19.
2Moltmann and Pannenberg, however, appear to find their primary point of 
reference for theology and ethics in the horizon o f  the future  component, while Ladd, 
Hooft, and others find it in the reign o f  God. One could conclude here that their works
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Already/Not yet
According to Ladd, the characteristic feature which the already/not yet brings to 
Christian ethics is that ethics, like the Kingdom itself, stands in tension between present 
realization and future eschatological perfection.1 It evokes an analogy between the 
manifestation of the Kingdom itself and the attainment of the moral righteousness of the 
Kingdom. Perfect human righteousness, like the Kingdom itself, awaits the 
eschatological consummation.2 In some sense it is attainable; in another unattainable. It 
can be attained, but not in full measure.3 It is attainable qualitatively if  not 
quantitatively.4 In its essence, righteousness can be realized here and now, in this age, 
because at bottom it is an ethics of the inner life and assumes a radical, unqualified
actually illustrate the position being articulated in this study. Ladd, for instance, develops 
very effectively the already/not yet motif before moving on toward the reign o f  God. The 
former leads towards the latter. Moltmann’s and Pannenberg’s focus on the future 
essentially presupposes the already/not yet, and while not articulating it as such, assumes 
it. Their position would not have contemporary relevance or clarity without it. In 
addition, one should be reminded that Christian eschatology’s primary model is the 
Kingdom of God. Our orientation to either that o f reign or future comes because of the 
biblical witness that the Kingdom is here and yet it is not here.
'Ladd, A Theology and the Kingdom of God. 129. Ladd has congealed the basic 
concepts regarding the already/not yet as has commonly been accepted by most 
Protestant Christians as central to New Testament eschatology.
2Ibid. Perfect righteousness has been realized and revealed in the person and life 
of Jesus Christ, however. Justification brings His perfect righteousness to the believer, 
now, in this age.
3Ibid., 131.
4Ibid., 130.
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decision for the Kingdom and Jesus Christ who embodies it.1
Braaten will add that the key concepts regarding the already/not yet are prolepsis
and approximation, participation and provisionality. Ethical actions are seen as real,
although never more than provisional representations and approximations of the
Kingdom’s ultimate qualities.2 In the overlapping of the ages then, ethical actions will
always be a paradox and in some way bring ambiguity in every act. This tension between
the ages for ethics is considered significant:
The proleptic structure of eschatological ethics has a twofold edge. On the one 
side, the futurity of the kingdom maintains a critical distance over against the 
present, so that every human effort and every social form are revealed to be 
imperfect and tentative approximations o f the future kingdom, giving no one any 
ground for boasting before the Lord who judges all things. On the other side, the 
presence of the future kingdom in proleptic form offers a real participation in its 
life, generating a vision of hope and the courage of action to change the present in 
the direction o f ever more adequate approximations of the eschatological 
kingdom.3
Furthermore, the already/not yet is regarded as bringing definitive imagery 
through its perspective of the overlapping of the two ages.
1. The overlapping of the ages is seen as affirming the continued reality of the 
this-worldly present evil age.4 There is no hint that the present social order is to be
•Ibid., 129-133.
2Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 111.
3Ibid.
4The present evil age is seen as a self-contained life-context that is out o f sync 
with and in opposition to the moral patterns of the age to come which has broken in. It is 
an age whose evil social order calls for the reign o f God. It is an age that has its own god. 
See Herman Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975), 91-93.
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changed by the application of Kingdom ethics.1 Rather, the Kingdom has entered history, 
but without transforming history. It has come into human society, but without purifying 
society.2 The geography of this evil age is in "this world,” and is seen as including the 
evil in the heart, the evil in social order, the evil in worldly powers, and the evil spiritual 
powers that work through political and social bodies.3
2. The overlapping of the ages is seen as affirming that Christian ethics is based 
not on some future coming, but on the current presence of the Kingdom.4 The moral 
perspective o f such ethics would be, then, not other-worldly, but this-worldly. According 
to Schrage, it suggests a contemporary alternative ethic from that of the sinful praxis of
'Owen, 378.
2I.arfd- A Theology of the New Testament. 129. These are significant statements 
about the presence of the Kingdom. They guard against turning eschatology into an 
ideology o f Christian social action, where the social present is under the demands of the 
social future in a one-to-one correspondence. They raise, too, the issue o f methodology 
in terms o f how the eschatological Kingdom expresses its values in a fallen world. While 
revolutionary in moral principle, it is not revolutionary in process. Finally, it safeguards 
against inadequate ends and goals for Christian social ethics. The all-inclusive 
redemptive context is maintained. In essence then, while the two ages overlap, "between 
the times,” the things of Caesar and the things o f God remain fundamentally independent 
of each other (Owen, 379). Furthermore, the eschatological Kingdom will always stand 
in judgment upon all non-Christian solutions to the present moral order (Henry, The 
Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 42).
3Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology. 91-93.
4Schrage, 29.
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the world.1 The point is that the future enters the present and exerts influence.2
3. The overlapping of the ages is viewed as affirming that the powers o f evil have 
been attacked and defeated. The Kingdom has entered into dynamic conflict with the 
realm of Satan, and God’s reign is manifesting its powers in history and through the 
church. The world, then, will feel the influence o f the Kingdom.3 This is seen as 
legitimatizing and encouraging human moral effort and social action as authentic 
approximations of the coming Kingdom. According to Henry, any implied futility of 
trying to win all (the world) does not mean that it is futile to win some areas o f influence 
and life.4
4. The already/not yet is perceived as calling Christians toward a conscious 
“thinking between the times.” The fact that the individual moral agent or the Christian 
Church finds itself in the moral tension and ambiguity that the already/not yet elicits 
suggests there is need for a level of moral reflection where Christians are consciously 
engaged in sorting through the implications of that tension for everyday life.5
'Ibid., 46.
2Peters, 248. It is suggested that, when found, the Kingdom evokes participation, 
with contemporary conduct appropriate to the coming age. The crucial point is seen as 
the transformation of the individual—a new heart, not a way of acting but a way o f being, 
not works but character (Schrage, 43; Ladd, The Presence o f the Future. 292-294).
3Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 303.
4Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 77.
5On the surface, the already/not yet appears to bring a mere broad outline for 
moral theory and practice. And yet that seemingly inexplicit profile is considered 
poignant and evocative with respect to Christian moral life. Like New Testament ethics 
generally, the already/not yet appears more prescriptive and motivational than analytical
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Reign o f  God
Defining the Kingdom through the dynamic idea of “rule" rather than the concrete 
idea of “realm” yields, for many, significant implications for moral theory (i.e., Christian 
ethics is seen as the ethics of the reign of God).1
1. The reign o f  God says something about the field of Christian moral 
responsibility. Is has already been noted how the reign o f  God motif is viewed as proving 
valuable in overcoming the dualities between the Church and the world, and between the 
social and the personal. It has been noted, too, how the reign o f  God is perceived as 
reaching over all spheres o f human life and action so that the world, too, is clearly 
affirmed as the subject of God’s dominion.2 This is understood as suggesting that the 
present will o f God is made dynamically relevant to all men and all areas of human 
existence, and that man and human existence everywhere is placed under the ethical 
demand of the reign o f  God.3 Furthermore, the reign o f  God is understood as providing a 
single point o f departure for Christian personal and social ethics. It suggests that there
and descriptive with respect to practice (Schrage, 3,4). Yet there are clear points of 
reference and guidelines within the New Testament witness that affirm that the 
already/not yet implies specific content and criteria rather than abstract formal principles 
(Schrage, 11).
‘Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 128.
2Johnstone, 54.
3Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 132,290; Johnstone, 54, 55.
Correspondingly, in principle at least, all spheres of human life and action are seen as 
included within the range of Christian moral responsibility-including society and 
politics. The phrase “in principle” is used because practically and functionally the ethics 
of the reign o f  God may be actually relevant only for those who have experienced the 
reign o f  God by submitting themselves to His rule.
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are not two strictly heterogeneous ethics (i.e., one for the realm of personal relations, and 
another for the secular realm of social relations, structures and institutions).1
2. The reign o f  God is thought to reveal the essential nature and content of 
Christian ethics. This is seen as coming through two perspectives: (1) the character of 
God’s reign; and (2) the preaching and life of Jesus Christ. With respect to the former, if 
the Kingdom is the reign o f  God, then every aspect of the Kingdom must be derived from 
the character and the action of God.2 More specifically, as Ezell states, it is the character 
of the God who reigns that will determine the context of our eschatology and the 
character o f our ethic.3 Here, it is suggested, lies the essential link between ethics and 
eschatology—the nature, character, and action of God.4 The Kingdom as God’s rule will 
be an expression of His will and values. His character and actions will have moral 
authority and influence. Within this horizon o f God’s character, reign, and eschatological 
activity in the present age, the essential nature of eschatological ethics comes into focus. 
This focus comes because the reign o f  God provides the answer to the question of what is 
good—ultimately.5 Braaten asserts that the reign o f  God presents us with the heart of a
'Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 120.
2Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 81. It is basilea tou theou. The 
emphasis is recognized as falling on the third word, not the first. It is God’s kingly rule 
that is in view.
3Ezell, 86.
“Ibid.
sBraaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 114. Jesus said, “But seek first His kingdom 
even His righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well" (Matt 6:33). Whether 
one translates the kai here as adjunctive (also) or ascensive (even), God’s righteousness is
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theory o f moral value which orients us toward ethical activity.1
The essential nature and content o f  Christian ethics is further revealed through the 
preaching and life of Jesus Christ. Ladd asserts the impossibility of detaching the ethics 
of the reign o f  God from the context of what Jesus preached and practiced.2 God’s 
character, reign, and eschatological activity in the present age find concrete expression in 
and through Jesus. One way of defining eschatology, then, is by picturing the ultimate 
fulfillment of the values of God revealed in Jesus Christ.3 In this connection, 
eschatological ethics can be defined as the way in which the values revealed in Jesus 
Christ are to be lived out in the present age.4 Jesus brings a proleptic sample of their 
fulfillment in human existence.5
seen as a clear expression of His reign. To seek the one is to seek the other.
‘Ibid. It can be further asserted that the reign of God provides us with specific and 
concrete expressions of God’s righteous reign, e.g., mercy, love, justice, holiness, etc. 
These concrete expressions of God’s character and eschatological activity bring more 
than just paradigm and principle for the Christian moral agent to imitate and apply. They 
both imply and exhibit specific moral behavior. As such they are expressions o f the 
unconditional will of God. Matt5:48; Eph4:32-5:2; 1 John 2:6; John 13:14, 15.
2Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 128.
3Ezell, 86.
4Ibid., 86-87. As with the expressions of the character and eschatological 
activity of God, the person and life of Jesus bring both paradigm and principle for the 
Christian moral agent to imitate and apply (Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 115).
5This sample is tangible enough to bring concrete shape to the nature o f Christian 
ethics between the times. As with the implications of the character and action of God, it 
can be further asserted that the paradigm and principles expressed through the life of 
Jesus are far from moral abstractions. They are realities that draw one towards clearly 
defined moral responsibilities. See Ezell, 85-87.
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The preaching of Jesus brings further concreteness to the shape o f eschatological 
ethics. Here one is moved beyond somewhat generalized paradigm and principles 
towards more clearly defined prescriptions, pronouncements, and commands. The 
specific words o f Jesus are fundamental to living between the times. They express the 
fact that we are not left to our human imagination as to how the reign o f  God is to shape 
Christian moral reflection or find practical expression in Christian moral behavior. They 
determine whether or not the reign o f  God is a reality in our own life.1 The reign o f  God 
which Jesus both preached and practiced is thus seen as providing the normative starting 
point for Christian ethics.2
In summary, the characteristic feature o f eschatological ethics is viewed as the 
ethics o f the reign o f  God,3 and as such, according to Ladd, it will be an absolute ethics.4 
It embodies the standard of righteousness which God demands of men in any age.s Here 
is sufficient, specific content to bring concreteness in both visualizing and applying its 
implications. In principle, then, this component o f the eschatological paradigm lends 
both content and precision to Christian moral theory.
'Luke 8:4-15; John. 8:31; Matt 7:21-27.
2Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 105.
3Ladd. A Theology of the New Testament. 128.
4Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 290.
5Ibid., 291.
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Horizon o f  the future
As noted above, the Kingdom o f God, as the Christian’s future hope, naturally 
elicits a forward-looking stance, a peering into the future, an imagining o f “what will 
be.”1 The practical results for Christian ethics is that this gazing towards the horizon of 
“what is about to come” inevitably influences present moral life.2 This moral image of 
what “will be” is seen as bringing contemporary definition to the “ought.”3 This view 
from the future is seen as normatively determining the way we live in the present.4 The 
present is seen as uniquely qualified by God’s own end-time purposes.5 Furthermore, the 
image of the good which appears on the “horizon”6 of the future Kingdom of God is
'It is suggested that the dynamic language of the eschatological Kingdom of God 
has the unique power to split our perceptions in two, so that in seeing what already exists 
we can leap forward in imagination to perceive the fuller state which has not yet come 
into being. This is further seen as the characteristic feature that the horizon of the future 
brings to Christian ethics—leaping forward in imagination to what lies ahead until that 
“not yet" evokes powerful images which bring moral value and meaning back to the 
present. See Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 19.
21 John 3:1-3; 2 Pet 3:11-13; Col 3:lf; Heb 12:18-28; Titus. 2:11-14; Matt 24:45- 
51; 25:31-46.
3In this way the horizon of the future is perceived as bringing an essential 
ingredient to Christian moral theory. For “ethics is not simply an argument about what 
ought to be,” but “an almost uninterrupted argument about what is, what has been, and 
what will be” (Geyer, 135).
4Kuzmic, 157.
5Alsup, 50.
6The term “horizon” is used because the proleptic presence of the Kingdom in 
Jesus Christ together with the promises o f God and the coming of Holy Spirit is seen as 
creating a larger vista of meaning with respect to the future. While the future has not yet 
come, nor been grasped in its fullness, it is nevertheless present and can be seen as though 
it were from a distance on the horizon. There is a horizon of meaning stemming from the
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understood as defining the ultimate horizon for all ethical statements.1
In the context of the already/not yet, the horizon o f  the future is, therefore, seen 
as a call to “being alive to God’s endtime work in the present.”2 Here ethics is identified 
by its most important valuation: God is at work in you!3 Here ethics is seen as the “arena 
where the God of the endtime is at work to accomplish endtime goals in the present."4 
This component of the eschatological paradigm then, in its most basic biblical 
orientation, is understood as an invitation to ethical consciousness and the discovery of 
God’s end-time purposes for one’s life, the church, and society.s
coming future.
'Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God. 111.
2Alsup, 50.
3Ibid., 49.
4Ibid., 44. This would suggest for some that fundamentally eschatological ethics 
is not an ethic of morality based either deontologically, teleologically, or situationally. 
Rather it is a relational ethic where we hear, believe, surrender to, and live God’s end- 
time will and word of promise through His presence in our lives. It is an ethic of the 
realities o f God’s presence and reign (see Ezell, 85). There is a tendency, however, 
towards identifying only general or ultimate Christian values and norms, rather than 
specific concrete moral directions. It can be asserted that the biblical imagery of moral 
states in the final consummation, together with the life and Word o f Jesus and the New 
Testament picture of Christian lifestyle “between the times,” can bring substantial 
normative specificity to what God’s end-time purposes are. Since the eschatological 
consummation is in reality the restoration of all things, the biblical perspective of 
creation, imago dei, fall, and redemption can likewise facilitate meaning and specificity 
to these purposes (Schuurman, Creation. Eschaton. and Ethics. 1-12, 149-174; Childs, 
347-360). In this way Christian hope leads to Christian practice for which we are not left 
to our imagination as to what it should include.
5Schuurman. Creation. Eschaton. and Ethics. 1-12, 149-174; Childs, 347-360. 
What God is ultimately against we must stand against in His power. What God is 
ultimately for we must stand for in His strength (Ezell, 95).
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These principal implications o f the horizon o f  the future have been pushed further, 
however, toward perspectives that see our view of the future as a call to participation on 
the journey toward the future.1 Here Christians are called to anticipatory living that 
produces proleptic lifestyle.2 This future-oriented ethics becomes essentially 
“eschatopraxis" (i.e., doing the future now ahead o f time).3 At bottom this means: (1) a 
fundamental openness to the future o f new things;4 (2) that man is free towards 
experiencing and facilitating that open future;5 (3) that Christian ethics should be an 




4Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 52.
5Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom o f God. 69.
6Kuzmic, 157, 158. This focus on change and an open future, which the horizon 
o f  the future is inferred to have, appears to open the way toward relativism. Gustafson 
correctly noted the problem when he said: “The current celebration of the openness 
toward the future is proper insofar as it recognizes that the God whose will one seeks to 
discern for the future is the God who has willed in the past. Much of this celebration 
refers primarily to human attitude in any case, and as such is insufficient to determine 
what men ought to be doing in a particular instant. Attitude alone does not determine act. 
To be open to the future is not to discern what one ought to do in it” (James M.
Gustafson, Theology and Christian Ethics [Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1974], 
118). Gustafson also noted that “it is a theological interpretation o f ‘the world’ from 
which a basic orientation toward life can be derived but which provides no significant 
bases theologically, historically, or naturally for the guidance of human action” (James 
M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective: Theology and Ethics, vol. I 
[Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981], 48). Rendtorff states that “serious 
reservations must be voiced against. . .  attempts to form a normative eschatological 
ethics, because the distinction between ethical criteria for human life and action and 
religious goals that transcend human action could not and cannot be defined” (Trutz
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and (4 ) that future realities should motivate us to work toward their greater realization on 
earth.1 The point is that, belief in the absolute future which God brings will not make one 
indifferent to the present reality, but such an eschatological perspective enables and 
empowers one to work in the world with seriousness and particularity.2 Christians surely 
can initiate some significant changes in the world as they proclaim and live out the values 
visualized on the horizon o f  the future?
The intent in all this is to enable responsible Christian social action as well as
Rendtorff. Ethics vol. 1 [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986], 186).
This criticism of specificity and concreteness has been vigorously debated. It is 
asserted that the eschatological perspective stemming from the horizon o f  the future does 
not provide proximate norms and principles, but rather ultimate Christian norms o f love 
and justice (Das, 86). The rubric of the ontological priority of the future is asserted as 
obviating strict relativism both inside and outside theological ethics because it provides 
“essential” evidence o f “the good” in the structures o f existence and as proleptically 
present in Christ (Childs, 409-414). There has been discussion, too, about it providing 
“middle axioms” which are neither too general nor too particular, but which provide a 
conceptual bridge between the ultimate and proximate, and allow interplay between that 
which is absolute and relative (Childs, 414-423; Das, 86). Some assert, though, that the 
open-endedness that the “horizon of the future" is pressed towards cannot provide even 
“middle axioms” (Das, 86). We need to appreciate, however, what this nuanced 
perspective of the horizon o f  the future can provide us for ethical thinking and doing in 
terms of attitude and orientation. The challenge comes in keeping it in balance by the 
specificity and concreteness which the biblical picture provides.
'Kuzmic, 158. On balance, this perspective of eschatological ethics is not 
understood as the means of producing the future Kingdom of God, but only as an 
annunciation, anticipation, and approximation. Eschatological ethics becomes the “signs 
of the coming Kingdom.” The coming of the Kingdom in its priority and power is simply 
seen as the possibility and invitation of doing God’s will on earth today (see Braaten, 
Eschatology and Ethics. 110-111). The ambiguity of language used, however, can lead 
toward confusion, and the views expressed have in fact blurred the distinction between 
human and divine effort with regard to the coming of the Kingdom.
2Das, 83.
3Kuzmic, 158.
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evangelism. Yet, it has often been pushed beyond this broad orientation towards 
philosophical and sociological perspectives which include liberation theologies' and other 
revolutionary perceptions o f change.2 Here moral action in the light of the future is 
social/political action which will bring about justice.3 Significant concerns naturally arise 
in the context of this subtle shift from biblical specificity, priorities, and spiritual 
dynamics of Christian moral theory towards a more secular, philosophical moral theory 
which works within a Christian context and uses Christian verbiage.
Principles of Verification
The methodological nuances that the paradigm evokes/expresses with regard to 
the earlier stated three principles of verification—role o f Scripture, role of community, 
and the nature of social involvement—lend further insight into the implications that it has 
for moral theory.4 Here one gets a sense for how effectively the paradigm answers the
'Peters, 263.
2Braaten, The Future of God. 141-166; Moltmann, Theology of Hope. 32-36, 304- 
338. See also. Jurgen Moltmann. Religion. Revolution and the Future (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969), 129-147, where he speaks of a revolutionary 
consciousness.
3Das, 82. We work for political changes (however aggressively) in the light o f the 
future because it involves the future of the essence of humanity. The Kingdom is seen as 
“pointedly political” (Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God. 80) and hope for 
the future as necessarily including “political hope" (McKeating, 62). See also 
Pannenberg, Ethics. 133, 191; Robert W. Jenson, “Eschatological Politics and Political 
Eschatology,” Dialog 8 (Autumn 1969): 272-278. This fusing of the biblical 
eschatological horizon with the philosophical horizon of modem secular futurity 
expresses the desire to directly aim Christian moral theory towards the secular world and 
not toward the Church alone (Peters, 241; Braaten, The Future of God. 23-32 passim).
4See above, 18-24.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
crisis of “authority” and “relevance" in Christian ethics. They can explore, too, whether 
the paradigm influences or is influenced by presuppositions regarding these significant 
issues within contemporary Christian moral dialogue. In addition, one is able to raise 
questions of foundations and presuppositions. In other words, is the eschatological 
paradigm, or one’s orientation to it, rooted in philosophy, philosophical ethics, social 
moral agenda, biblical theology, the community (tradition), or some hybrid of these?
Role o f  Scripture
Issues of revelation and the use of Scripture have been at the very heart of the 
eschatology/ethics dialogue. They have played an important part in both the re-discovery 
and re-shaping of eschatology in this century.1 This can be observed from two 
interrelated perspectives: (1) how Scripture and/or presuppositions regarding Scripture
'Johnstone, 52; Gulley, 22-36. The role of Scripture in the eschatology/ethics 
question has been a checkered one throughout Christian history. Some readers may 
wonder why this study has not made mention of either the Old Testament or Divine Law, 
or made an issue of divine revelation much earlier in my account of the history of 
theological ethics in relation to eschatology. By default, they may be saying, it is 
conceding to an ethics that is searching for its ground outside the law and explicit 
revelation of God. The fact of the matter is that that has been true for some involved in 
the eschatology/ethics question. This survey, however, for the most part is merely stating 
where others are. The majority of those working with Christian eschatology, however, 
have perceived themselves as working in the context of God’s revelation in Scripture. 
Furthermore, the question of revelation or theological foundations is not the point of 
question at this point in this study. It is dealing mainly with background issues here. 
Questions of biblical and theological foundations are discussed in the evaluation in 
chapter 5. At this point, however, it would be helpful to be aware that these issues exist 
and perhaps ask the question as to which ideology stands behind the use of Scripture both 
in the formation and application of eschatology as paradigm; liberal theology (Bultmann), 
neo-Marxism (Bloch), a hybrid of liberal/Marxist (Troeltsch), or conservative 
Evangelical (Henry, Ladd), Catholic, etc.? The paradigm as conceived through the 1970s 
has been influenced in part or whole by each.
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have influenced the paradigm’s development and subsequent ethical implications; and (2) 
how the paradigm itself nuances the role Scripture and/or presuppositions regarding 
Scripture in developing and/or articulating Christian moral theory. For the purposes of 
this study, we will be exploring patterns and directions so as to understand the broad 
picture regarding these issues through the 1970s. The terms Scripture/Paradigm and 
Paradigm/Scripture are used respectively for the above two perspectives, both for 
purposes of differentiation and brevity.
The Scripture/Paradigm relation has paralleled closely the “eschatological- 
oriented ethics7”ethical-oriented eschatology” approaches I have outlined above.1 
Ethical-oriented eschatology has generally employed Scripture in a subordinated role 
with respect to its development and in outlining issues, solutions, and praxis. It has 
interpreted eschatology through a theology of revelation “from below" in the function of a 
theology of experience in history.2 It has tended to be an inductive method which 
proceeds from the context o f concrete ethical exigencies.3 Scripture in ethical-oriented 
eschatology has often been merely a source of moral images or a shaper of moral identity 
rather than an ultimate authority through which norms are provided either as specific 
rules or as general principles or presuppositions. Here, too, Scripture has been employed 
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On the other hand, eschatological-oriented ethics has generally kept Scripture in a 
prominent role with respect to its development and outlining issues, solutions, and praxis. 
On a functional level, however, this prominence reflects multifarious views o f revelation 
and disparate perceptions with regard to the actual role Scripture should/does play. The 
dominant backdrop in the re-discovery and re-shaping of eschatology in this century with 
respect to Scripture has been historical-critical theology.1 The most basic underlying 
presuppositions informing this methodology evoke a practical “remoteness to the Bible"2 
even while bringing apparent focus and illumination toward specified biblical texts or 
themes.3
'Gulley, 22-30; Carl F. H. Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, vol. 2 (Waco, 
TX: Word Books, Publisher, 1976), 283-305; idem, Christian Personal Ethics. 549-572; 
Hutter, 36; Hiers, Jesus and Ethics: Dahl, 374-375; Paul S. Minear, “Christian 
Eschatology and Historical Methodology,” in Neutestamentliche Studien fur Rudolf 
Bultmann. ed. W. Eltester (Berlin: Alfred Topelmann, 1957), 15-23.
2Eta Linnemann, “Historical-Critical and Evangelical Theology,” Journal of 
Adventist Theological Society 5, no. 2 (1994): 23.
3It is not within the scope of this dissertation to discuss in depth the pros and cons 
of historical-critical theology or methodology, but to simply outline broadly its link and 
implications with respect to the Scripture/Paradigm question at hand. In addition, it is not 
maintaining that historical-critical methodology has no positive results whatsoever to 
show for its labors. Certainly many useful, detailed investigations have been produced. 
The recognition of the importance o f eschatology in the New Testament is one such 
example, as well as the huge strides toward understanding biblical thought in its own 
terms (Linnemann, 29; Minear, 16). Nevertheless, those positive contributions are 
usually impaired because they are closely connected with underlying presuppositions 
which in effect subordinate Scripture and faith to reason and science.
For instance, its principles o f correlation, analogy, and criticism tend towards 
disunity of Scripture with a “culturally-conditioned" nature and which contains, but does 
not equal, the Word o f God (see Richard M. Davidson, “Revelation/Inspiration in the Old 
Testament: A Critique of Alden Thompson’s Tncamational’ Model,” in Adventist 
Theological Society Occasional Papers, ed Frank Holbrook and Leo Van Dolson,
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The impact o f historical-critical theology can be seen in the “one-sided 
eschatologies”1 which either focus primarily on the past,2 the present,3 or the future.4 
This one-sidedness can be seen as well in the eschatological Christologies that have 
developed.5 Each of these eschatologies and eschatological Christologies projects images 
of the history and the eschaton different from the one the Bible foresees. This century’s 
revelation-and-history debate illustrates, too, the marginal way Scripture often actually 
factors into the development of the eschatological paradigm.6
[Berrien Springs, MI: Adventist Theological Society Publications, 1992], 106-110; and 
Gerhard F. Hasel, Biblical Interpretation Today [Lincoln, NE: College View Press, 1985], 
73-99). This approach essentially relativizes Scripture and influences the way Scripture 
is actually handled (see Eta Linnemann, Historical Criticism of the Bible [Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 1990], 84-85). Furthermore, it views Scripture as “text” which 
requires interpretation and allows critical reason to decide what is reality in the Bible and 
what cannot be reality (see Linnemann, Historical Criticism of the Bible. 87-88; and 
Gulley, 23-29).
‘See Gulley, 29.
2E.g., Dodd’s “realized eschatology.”
3E.g., Bultmann’s “existential eschatology.”
4E.g., Pannenberg/Moltmann’s “proleptic eschatology."
sE.g., Schweitzer and Barth, both who ultimately ended without eschatologies 
themselves (see Gully, 26, 30).
6Henry, God. Revelation and Authority. 281-334. Some suggest, however, that 
the paradigm New Testament eschatology brings to theology and ethics has actually 
brought about some limits to the operation of historical-critical reasoning (Minear, 17). 
Responsible studies of New Testament eschatology are said to have produced great strain 
on its presuppositions and methodology. Biblical attitudes toward time and history have 
been outlined which not only claim to be true, but which also commend themselves with 
increasing power. The entire historical-critical hermeneutical system, it has been said, 
has thus been placed in question (Minear, 19-20). However, while Scripture appears to 
be bringing supposed limits, these limits have not yet been satisfactorily delineated, nor
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Eschatological-oriented ethics, however, has also included some serious 
exegetical and theological studies where Scripture has played a significant, formative role 
in the paradigm’s development. This is reflected in this century’s revival of “biblical 
theology” which sets forth the message of Scripture in its historical setting and which 
seeks to expound its meaning in its own historical setting, and its own terms, categories, 
and thought.1 Here the themes of the already/not yet and the reign o f God have been 
worked out with an exegetical and theological precision that has kept Scripture in the 
forefront.2 In fact, these two paradigm components have proven invaluable in both 
orienting and nuancing the developing eschatological paradigm. Their own biblical focus 
as components of the overarching paradigm has provided an important base for the 
priority of Scripture in the paradigm as a whole.3
With respect to Paradigm/Scripture—-how the paradigm nuances the role of 
Scripture in developing and/or articulating Christian moral theory—some broad patterns 
can likewise be noted.
have they produced sufficient reexamination of the historical-critical method itself 
(Minear, 17). We would suggest that the literature during this period affirms the reality 
that the Scripture/paradigm question remains in an unpredictable transition.
‘Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 19-33.
2This is represented most clearly in Ladd’s A Theology of the New Testament as 
well as in the works of Thielicke, Berkouwer, and Ridderbos.
3It has already been noted, however, how the horizon o f  the future, while 
reflecting an important biblical thematic, has been nuanced predominately by neo- 
Marxist philosophy and hermeneutics. Because of this, its potential for bringing a strong 
Scriptural influence in the formation of the paradigm has been threatened and undermined 
significantly.
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1. It can generally be asserted that an eschatological-oriented ethics will tend to 
be more Scriptural than an ethical-oriented eschatology. The paradigm where Scripture 
has been used only marginally, subordinate^, or pragmatically as sanction with respect to 
its development, will naturally display marginal, subordinate, or pragmatic nuances with 
respect to Scripture in its practical application for moral theory.
2. Just as the eschatological-oriented ethics approach shows diversity with respect 
to the actual functional role of Scripture in the development of the eschatological 
paradigm, one would expect that that same diversity be apparent in their respective 
practical application of Scripture for moral theory. This is just the case. The paradigm as 
conceived and articulated from the standpoint of historical-critical theology appears to 
use Scripture or influence the use of Scripture in ways similar to those of the ethical- 
oriented eschatology approach. Scripture is relativized and used as a source o f  ultimate 
Christian norms, rather than an ultimate authority which can bring proximate norms and 
principles.1 But where the paradigm has been conceived and articulated from the 
standpoint of biblical theology and exegesis, it appears to use Scripture or influence the 
use o f Scripture in a way in which Scripture maintains an authoritative, assertive role in 
the process of application. With respect to concreteness and specificity, historical-critical 
theology and methodology evokes an approach which “wholly relativizes the past and the 
present" and, hence, is “remarkably thin” when compared with the wealth of biblical
'Das, 86.
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specifics.1 The biblical theology and exegetical approach, however, appears to elicit a 
clearer intentional dialogue with Scripture with respect to given social issues, solutions, 
and praxis.
The role Scripture has played in the eschatology/ethics question—both in the 
formation and application of eschatology as a paradigm for theology and ethics—has been 
a checkered one. Its role has been significantly influenced by various and often opposing 
theological and ideological perspectives.2 As implied above, the Scripture/Paradigm and 
Paradigm/Scripture questions during this time were seen as remaining in an 
unpredictable transition.3 For some, the direction of this transition was clearly seen as a 
move away again from Scripture as being the fundamental frame of reference for both 
doing ethics and reflecting on eschatology.4
Role o f Christian community
The Church sits conceptually at the very core o f the eschatology/ethics question.5 
The role which it assumes in eschatological ethics has revolved around three fundamental 
issues: (1) as a source of moral authority; (2) the field of moral operation; and (3) its
'Henry, God. Revelation and Authority. 283-305.
2E.g., liberal theology (Bultmann), neo-Marxism (Bloch), hybrid liberal/Marxist 
views (Troeltsch), conservative Evangelical (Henry, Ladd), Catholic, etc.
3Minear, 20.
4See Johnstone, 52.
5This is observable in the theologies of the principle participants in the 
eschatology/ethics dialogue.
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linkage with the ethical needs/agenda of the larger human society. Related issues include 
the dualities of Christian social and personal ethics, and the relationship between 
evangelism and social responsibility in terms of mission.1 The role of the Christian 
community is organically linked, too, with the question of the nature of social 
involvement.
1. As with Scripture, the role of the Christian community has both influenced, 
and been influenced by, this century’s emerging eschatological paradigm.
Rauschenbusch recognized early on that the most decisive fact in transforming the 
substance of primitive New Testament eschatology has been the Church itself.2 Decades 
later, Dulles affirmed this fact by tracing more clearly how one’s ecclesioiogy clearly 
influences one’s eschatology.3 During this century the paradigm’s implied ecclesioiogy 
has often served as a barometer of the adequacy o f the paradigm itself. In this respect, 
too, presuppositions with regard to the Church’s authority (tradition and/or living 
community) in relation to Scripture have had defining roles for the paradigm as well.4
'The discussion here o f ecclesioiogy has been intentionally limited to those areas 
which illuminate most obviously the ethical perspectives o f  the eschatological paradigm.
2Rauschenbusch, 222. See above, “Eschatology and Ethics before the Twentieth- 
Century,” 33-44.
3See Avery Dulles’ discussion of “Church and Eschatology” in Models of the 
Church. 103-122. There are as many ecclesiologies in currency as there are 
eschatologies, and the possible relationships are numerous. Dulles suggests the different 
ways eschatology is influenced by the institutional, mystical communion, sacramental, 
herald, and servant models o f the church.
4It appears that the issue of the role of the Christian community as authority in the 
eschatological paradigm has followed (mirrored) this century’s theological trends in both 
ecclesioiogy and revelation/inspiration. See Avery Dulles, “The Church: Bearer of
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Correspondingly, how the Church’s “ethical nature” has been understood has 
naturally depended on one’s own understanding of history, eschatology, and the 
Kingdom.1 For some, the eschatological paradigm, in principle at least, is said to project 
the doctrine o f the Church as beginning with the Kingdom of God, rather than with the 
Church.2 In this way the eschatological Kingdom is seen as markedly imprinting its 
implications on the moral reality and the role of community.3 The result has been that 
ecclesioiogy has become the servant o f  eschatology. Ecclesioiogy has become a crucial 
factor in articulating and expressing the moral implications evoked through the 
eschatological paradigm.
Furthermore, the general trend in eschatology/ethics through this century has been
Revelation” and “Revelation and Eschatology," in Models of Revelation. 211-227, 228- 
245. In these chapters Dulles outlines the complex relationship between the various 
models o f  the church (institutional, mystical communion, sacramental, herald, and 
servant) and the various models of revelation (doctrine, history, inner experience, 
dialectical presence, and new awareness) together with their implications for eschatology.
'Hutter, 28.
2Pannenberg, “The Kingdom o f  God and the Church," 8.
3See Ladd, “The Kingdom and the Church,” in A Theology of the New Testament. 
105-119; Braaten, "The Prolepsis of a New World-Church, in The Future o f God. 109- 
MO. Ladd makes five basic points concerning the relationship between the Kingdom and 
the Church: (1) the Church is not the Kingdom; (2) the Kingdom creates the Church; (3) 
the Church witnesses to the Kingdom; (4) the Church is the instrument o f the Kingdom; 
and (5) the Church is the custodian o f the Kingdom. Braaten suggests that the 
eschatological character of the message which the Church transmits relativizes all its 
structures, doctrines, or traditions. Nothing in and of the Church can be exempt from the 
criticism that emanates from the eschatological word of God’s Kingdom.
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to fuse the theological and ethical within the practice of the Church.' The result has been 
that, functionally, the Church community has played an increasingly significant and 
authoritative role. This has been true both in the frame of reference with which the 
eschatological perspective is being interpreted, and in the development of moral theory as 
the application o f the paradigm.2 In fact, the Christian community has emerged as a 
principal source o f authority with respect to the praxis o f the paradigm for contemporary 
ethical exigencies. The Christian community has become the norminative, creative 
sphere where issues o f specificity and praxis with regard to the paradigm’s ultimate 
Christian norms are both shaped and worked out conceptually.
2. Organically linked with the above question of authority, the eschatological 
paradigm is viewed as projecting the Christian community as its fundamental field of 
moral operation.3 Whether this is so exclusively, principally, or initially has been 
vigorously debated. For some, the proleptic impact of the Kingdom belongs strictly to 
the Church. For others, it belongs to the Church, for sure, but to the world as well.4 
Nevertheless, the Christian community has been seen as the “product o f the powers o f the
'Johnstone, 84, 85,48. This locating of theological reflection within ethical 
consciousness supposedly frees the Church from the limitations of pregiven, supposedly 
normative for all, theological patterns. It also supposedly enables creative Christian 
solutions to concrete questions of moral responsibility.
2Ibid., 85.
3The “ekklesia” is the eschatological community called out from the “world.”
“The Church is not only a place where the great eschatological realities are announced. It 
is itself an eschatological fact” (Visser ‘t Hooft, 96).
4Yoder and Pannenberg respectively (see Peters, 251-252).
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Age to Come,1 and as a society of men under the dynamic reign or kingly rule of God.2 It 
has been viewed as the community of the Kingdom—those who enter it, live under it, and 
are governed by it3 — and as such display in an empirical way the moral reality of God’s 
invisible Kingdom.4
Furthermore, some have concluded that, if  it is true that there can be no Kingdom 
without a Church, then a “concrete social context" is intrinsic to the purposes o f the 
Kingdom.5 Only as being somehow set apart from society as a kind of “counter-society" 
of its own can the Church be the Church. Only thus can she act appropriately to her 
ethical nature.6 For some this means that the Church is the heuristic location from 
whence God’s acting in the world can be perceived.7 It also means that the Church 
represents in its own social life (as a paradigmatic social-ethical reality) a prefiguration o f
'Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 542.
2Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 262.
3Ibid.
4Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 112.
Tbid., 119.
6John Howard Yoder, “The Otherness o f  the Church," The Mennonite Quarterly 
Review (October 1961): 286-296. “The Church’s responsibility to and for the world is 
first and always to be the Church" (ibid., 293). “The visible distinctness of Church and 
world . . .  was a  particular, structurally appropriate way, and the most effective way, to be 
responsible" (ibid., 287). See also Hutter, 33, on Rauschenbusch’s “socializing of the 
soul” (Rauschenbusch, 99).
7Yoder. The Politics of Jesus. 159.
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the Kingdom.1 Furthermore, it is implied, through its common life, the Christian 
community is guided in discerning what the Christian moral life entails.2 The Church is 
enabled with regard to “practical moral reasoning” whereby particular moral choices are 
worked through by means of here-and-now thought processes. The ecclesiological 
dynamics o f the eschatological paradigm have also been interpreted as having significant 
ecumenical potential and imperative.3
3. There is the question of the community’s linkage with the ethical needs/agenda 
of the larger human society. While it is generally accepted that the eschatological 
community {ekklesia) is set apart as a distinct social organization, that fact has not been 
seen as necessarily implying that the horizon of the Church’s moral perception and action 
is coextensive with that of its organizational limits. On the contrary, the inherent nature 
of the Church in relation to the Kingdom is regarded as implying "the imperative o f 
having as a limited organization a universal impact.”4 The essential nature of this 
“universal impact,” however, is still an open discussion. For sure it includes that of
'Hutter, 45.
2LeMasters, 267. See also John Howard Yoder, “The Hermeneutics of 
Peoplehood,” Journal o f Religious Ethics 10 (Spring 1982): 40-67, reprinted in The 
Priestly Kingdom (Notre Dame, IN: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1984), 15-45.
3Johnstone, 48; Pannenberg, Ethics. 17. “From the beginning of the Ecumenical 
Movement until our own day, this [eschatology] is the underlying theme to which we are 
forced back again and again” (Visser ‘t Hooft, as quoted by Johnstone, 47).
4Hutter, 33. The truth is that the Church can only be understood completely in its 
relation to the World (Pannenberg, “The Kingdom and the Church,” 3).
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prophetic witness and critic over against that of the world o f  the secular community.1 But 
some would go beyond and see the Church as having a shared moral experience and task 
with the world of man outside its formal structures.2 They view eschatology as 
delineating the Christian community as the transforming agent of the secular community. 
They assert that there can be little doubt but that the eschatological Kingdom 
unequivocally demands social responsibility.3
'Yoder affirms that the paradigm asserts that the Church is to speak to the World 
in God’s name, not only in evangelism but in ethical judgment as well (Yoder, "The 
Otherness of the Church,” 287). See Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem 
Fundamentalism. 76, 79; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1968), 374-377; idem, Human Nature. Election, and History 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 31,37, 67, 81.
2Johnstone, 84. It is maintained that while the Church and the World remain two 
visible realities, they nevertheless have one and the same Lord (Yoder, “The Otherness of 
the Church,” 287, 288). Visser ‘t Hooft asserts that “the Lord of the Church is the Lord of 
the World” (Visser‘t Hooft, 59). He further states that the “Church and world have . . .  a 
great deal in common. Both have the same Lord. Both live in the light o f the same
victory of Christ over the powers o f sin and death The Church is the inner circle, the
world the outer circle, but both together are the realm over which Christ is King” (ibid., 
119, 120); as well as, “the ‘Lord rules already outside as well as inside the Church and . . .  
he uses the worldly powers for his purpose’" (ibid., 122). Pannenberg writes that the 
Kingdom (through the Church) is as leaven in the world, and that because of this, there is 
a shared future on the horizon. He sees the Kingdom of God as the future of the whole 
world” (Pannenberg, “The Kingdom of God and the Church,” 4).
3The nature of that social responsibility, however, remains ambiguous. At this 
point in this study, however, it can be noted that, for many, the paradigm definitely 
evokes social responsibility. It can also be noted here that, for those who understand the 
Church’s nature as essentially ethical, and its relation to the Kingdom as exclusively 
functional, there is a tendency towards blurring the spiritual/moral dynamics of the 
eschatological Kingdom with the social ethical needs/agenda of the world at large 
(Hutter, 27-35). Additionally, it can be noted that there is danger that the man-centered 
quality o f earlier Liberal theology—which had focused on humanity as a whole—may find 
renewed expression through an eschatologically nuanced ecclesioiogy. If so, 
ecclesioiogy in essence would be secularized! See Johnstone, 61.
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The components of the paradigm appear to bring varied but complementary 
nuances with respect to the role of the Christian community. The already/not yet has 
been recognized as affirming the reality that the Church has a dual character (i.e., that she 
belongs to two ages).1 In doing so, this component asserts both the Christian 
community’s moral uniqueness and moral distinctiveness over that of the larger secular 
community. It does so in a way, however, that does not isolate the Church from the 
world. This component is understood as well as affirming the Christian community as 
the principal field o f operation for the outworking o f the moral implications o f the 
Kingdom of God.
The reign o f  God is thought to conceptually extend the moral parameters o f the 
believing community more clearly toward that of the larger world community. It does so, 
however, with important qualification. (1) The supposed de facto reign exists in this age 
only when men submit themselves to the divine rule.2 This would again affirm the 
community of faith as the principal field for the outworking of the moral implications of 
the divine reign. (2) God’s dynamic reign invades the present age without transforming 
it into the age to come.3 This implies that there are fundamental limitations or parameters 
with regard to the actual moral role/impact the Christian community is to/will have in the 
world as a socio-ethical entity. Nevertheless, God’s invading reign is understood as
'Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 115.
2Ladd. The Presence of the Future. 132, 137, 138.
Tbid., 149.
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concerned with the total man and with the conquest o f evil in whatever form it manifests 
itself. This includes the evils that bring misery and suffering on the physical and social 
level.1 Here the paradigm presents for the community an incipient theology which needs 
closer study and attention.2
The horizon o f  the future has been perceived as providing vision and motivational 
value for both the moral reasoning and praxis o f the community. It is seen as a call to 
ethical consciousness and application. In a sense, it is claimed, “everything in the Church 
of Christ is dominated by the ‘not yet.’"3 To be in the Christian community is to be 
oriented toward that final goal. The Church aims at that which comes afterwards.4 And 
as this “horizon of the future" is proleptically realized within the community—as a 
paradigmatic social-ethical reality—it is both mirrored and illustrated through the 
Christian community for the secular community. Thus the secular community is seen as 
confronted with the moral dynamics of the horizon o f  the future. Where the horizon o f  
the future is perceived as encompassing both that of biblical eschatology and secular 
futurology, the Christian community is challenged to take up, criticize, and advance the 
futurological tendencies of the modem world within the horizon of an eschatological 
concept o f the future.5
'Ibid., 303, 304.
2Ibid., 304.
3Visser ‘t Hooft, 98.
“Ibid., 99.
5Braaten, The Future of God. 27.
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Nature o f  social involvement
The issue of social involvement has likewise been an integral part o f this 
century’s re-interpretation of eschatology. It has been recognized as a significant 
contemporary issue of “eschatopraxis” in Christian ethics.1 During this century, there has 
been a persistent inclination to find a this-age significance in the New Testament 
eschatology and, therewith, the justification for a substantial social ethic.2 The problem 
has been that, traditionally, the obligation of the Church to the world was seen as limited 
to evangelism, intercession, and exemplification o f the true society as a model for 
unregenerate society. Only the eschaton, it was thought, would deal with social ills, 
structures, and patterns.3 Furthermore, there appeared to be little explicit teaching on 
social ethics in the Gospels.4 Additionally, Christianity in the early part of this century 
had essentially left eschatology behind as it entered the field of social ethics.5 In the
‘Johnstone, 47-85; Dahl, 375; Das, 63-86.
2Amos N. Wilder, “Biblical Hermeneutic and American Scholarship," in 
Neutestamentliche Studien fur Rudolf Bultmann. ed. W. Eltester (Berlin: Alfred 
Topelmann, 1957), 25.
3Wilder, Kervema. Eschatology and Ethics. 9.
4Ladd, The Presence of the Future. 303. Ladd suggests that this may be due to the 
fact that social ethics must be an outworking of a properly grounded personal ethics. See 
Pannenberg’s discussion of the individual in relation to the community, “Social 
Predicament and Human Responsibility," in Human Nature. Election, and History. 28-41.
5Writing in 1953, Heinz-Dietrich Endland wrote, “Thirty years ago, if someone 
had asked what the relevance of eschatology was for social ethics, he would have 
received a rather knowing smile and the retort that Christianity had fortunately gone 
beyond eschatology into the field o f ethics." Eschatology was essentially left out of the 
horizon for Christian social ethics. See Heinz-Dietrich Wendland, “The Relevance of 
Eschatology for Social Ethics,” The Ecumenical Review 5, no. 4 (July 1953): 364.
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process it secularized both the Gospel and the Church. There came, then, a recognized 
need to have Christian social ethics both validated and balanced by a proper eschatology.1 
But what shape or form should Christian social involvement thus take?
The moral implications of the eschatological paradigm have seen three broad 
models with respect to this question o f the Christian social involvement.
1. There is what has been termed the soft revolution. This is the more quiet 
ministry o f practical mercy (e.g., child care centers, orphanages, nursing and health-care 
establishments, schools, prison ministries, food kitchens, community services and welfare 
programming, etc.).2 These ministries are seen as legitimate expressions of Christian 
social concern and responsibility. They are part of the caring function of the Church.
Here social responsibility exhibits direct and visible involvement in the social concerns of 
this present age. These quiet ministries o f mercy are viewed as serving the important role 
of a subsidiary, temporary substitute for the social-political community that is either 
inadequate or uninterested in certain social needs and concerns.3
2. There is what has been termed the hard revolution. This includes a radical 
activism where the Church aggressively engages the existing establishment.4 The goal is
"'Today we need to move in the opposite direction, away from a social ethic 
which had its roots in a secular, autonomous, idealistic or humanistic outlook, away even 
from a ‘Christian sociology’ back into the realm of eschatology” (ibid.).
2Braaten. Eschatology and Ethics. 153.
3Ibid., 153,154.
4This model includes the Christian community using power politics, public 
protests, and revolutionary methodology against the existing establishment which either 
creates or maintains social ills.
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political and social liberation.1 This hard revolution presses for transformation in the 
foundations o f the social system—whether economical, political, moral, or religious.2 It is 
driven by the perception that the social present is under the demands o f the social future.3 
It is to be achieved as the eschatological community provides the new social pattern to 
the present. Thus, eschatology becomes an aggressive transforming agent o f the world 
through the eschatological community.
A gentler form of the hard revolution consists in taking up, criticizing, and 
advancing the futurological tendencies in the modem world within an eschatological 
concept of the future.4 This includes a “theology of revolution" which posits the Church 
as the agent ultimately responsible for the revolutionary consciousness that is emerging 
around the world.s The Christian community is seen as the mediator who plays a creative 
and healing role in the often tragic tension between the old and the new.6 This model 
presents the Christian community with a choice. It can join the often wrenching forces of
'Peters, 256-264.
2Moltmann, Religion. Revolution and the Future. 131.
3I.e., “The society of the existing order must be patterned, now, after the 
community of ‘that other’ order.” See Petty, 185.
4Braaten, The Future of God. 27.
sIbid., 142-145. This responsibility for revolutionary consciousness is viewed as 
coming through its gospel preaching. This theology of revolution seeks to help the 
Church understand revolution, not to win a political contest as such, but because it cannot 
escape responsibility for the outcome. It sees our century as a century of revolutions, 
which the Church has both indirectly sponsored and is in need of guiding.
6Ibid.
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moral/social/political inertia and reaction, or it can cooperate with, encourage, and lead 
those in society who hope and act for a better future for mankind on earth.1
3. There is the model of social responsibility. Here, in addition to the caring 
functions of the soft revolution model, the eschatological community is called to express 
its total opposition to all moral evils, whether societal or personal, both within its own 
community and within the larger society.2 By dealing with moral issues rather than 
political issues, this protest can be expressed in a fundamentally positive way.3 In 
addition to this moral protest, there is the active involvement and personal influence of 
individuals in the social arena itself.4 Both these means—moral protest and personal 
influence—have the potential to affect significantly some areas of influence and life
‘Ibid., 161. There are obvious problems with both the soft and hard revolution 
models. The former, while appropriate and significant, does not deal adequately with the 
root moral and social evils of which the problems it ministers toward are merely 
symptomatic. The latter is delusive, and often expresses a radical theory that tends 
toward secularizing Christian eschatology. It is often merely sanctioning the actions of 
radicals and revolutionaries. This hard revolution model likewise pollutes social action 
by giving it an apologetic twist, i.e., using Christian social action to prove the relevance 
of Christianity (Dahl, 375). In addition, inadequate non-Christian ends and non- 
redemptive methodology are often uncritically accepted for pragmatic reasons (Henry, 
The Uneasv Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 30-34.). Finally, radical social 
movements influenced by this model often oppose any emphasis on personal salvation 
(Chastain, “Eschatology and Ethics," 238).
2Henry, The Uneasv Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 76, 79.
3Ibid., 76-81. This includes speaking out against moral evil rather than against the 
existing political social order. It is affirming the importance of the social issues politics 
takes on, but not the political system itself. It means raising moral concerns regarding the 
process and methodology society and/or politicians use in addressing social concerns.
“Carl F. H. Henry, Evangelicals at the Brink of Crisis: Significance o f the World 
Congress on Evanelism (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1967), 75,76.
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within the world.1 According to this model, Christians can surely initiate, share in, and 
provide leadership over some significant changes in the world. They can effectively do 
this only as they at the same time, both personally and as a community of faith, live the 
values of the Kingdom.2 These anticipated changes in social relationships and societal 
structures are seen as nurtured through non-violent, non-revolutionary methods.3
Fundamental to this social responsibility model is the reality o f the Christian 
community itself. Here is where the social moral implications of the Kingdom are seen 
as first experienced and lived.4 The actions and decision of the Church in the secular 
realm are seen as simply expressing by analogy what the Church is and what it 
confesses.5 In this way the believing community is seen as “the primary social structure 
through which the eschatological Kingdom works to change other structures.”6 For some,
'As Henry correctly states, “The futility o f trying to win all does not mean that it 
is futile to try to win some areas of influence and life” (Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of 
Modem Fundamentalism. 77).
2Kuzmic, 157-158; Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism.
76-79.
3Yoder, The Politics of Jesus. 190,152. Yoder infers that, since the “new 
humanity" o f  the community was created by the cross and not the sword, the Church will 
have a radical attitude towards society which will be free from violent and revolutionary 
methodology. Visser ‘t Hooft affirms this when he states, “Christ rules through his Word 
. . .  His victories are spiritual victories. The Church has no right to claim any other power 
or to use any other means of persuasion” (V isser‘t Hooft, 131).
4Yoder. The Politics of Jesus. 153-157.
5Visser ‘t Hooft, 146.
6 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus. 157. Pannenberg writes that “human beings cannot 
force the coming of the Kingdom; they can only respond themselves to the call o f God’s 
future and symbolize it in the present world." The Church as an effective sign o f the
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this social responsibility model is further predicated upon an all-inclusive redemptive 
context for the Church’s assault upon global ills. This redemptive context offers not only 
a higher ethical standard than any other system of thought, it provides also in Christ a 
dynamic to lift humanity to its highest level of moral achievement.1
Given the diversity o f views expressed in these three models o f social 
involvement, it is apparent that the relationship between eschatological hope and social 
ethics during the 1970s remained problematic.2 Application of the paradigm for social 
moral theory still needed refinement. The paradigm’s potential for providing both 
content and specificity with regard to Christian social responsibility still needed 
clarification.3 There was no doubt, though, that eschatology had a productive 
significance for social ethics,4 or that Christian social ethics must be constantly related to 
eschatology.5 The problem lay with perceived ties between New Testament eschatology
Kingdom constitutes the alternative to the devious attempt to establish the Kingdom by 
political action. The social moral integrity of the community has profound moral 
influence before the world. See Pannenberg, Human Nature. Election, and History. 30- 
31.
'Henry, The Uneasv Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 76.
2Johnstone, 73.
3Generally speaking the already/not yet component of the eschatological paradigm 
tends to mediate the kind o f balance which is found in the social responsibility model. In 
principle the reign o f  God and horizon o f  the future components mediate this kind of 
balance as well, but they have often been nuanced energetically towards evoking more 
aggressive and unacceptable forms of social responsibility.
4Wendland, 365.
5Ibid„ 368.
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and social action. For some, those apparent ties were seen as indirect and subtle, 
manifold and complex.1 For others, they were explicit and prominent, few in number and 
straightforward.
The Level of Moral Reflection
At this point in the discussion, it will be helpful to briefly outline some related 
issues with regard to the application of eschatology as paradigm in contemporary 
Christian ethics. These related issues include: (1) the theoretical level o f moral reflection 
which the paradigm appears to elicit; (2) the meaning and function of paradigm in moral 
theory; and (3) the relation of the eschatological paradigm to philosophical ethics.
Level o f  moral reflection
On the one hand, ethicists distinguish between four ingredients when structuring 
ethics: (1) theological or philosophical bases; (2) underlying principles that can be 
applied to various areas of activity; (3) directive moral rules that apply to various areas of 
life; and (4) particular concrete cases.2 On the other hand, paradigms can serve on a 
macro, meso, or micro level. Paradigms can bring solutions to: (1) broad, global 
theological or philosophical issues; (2) problems in intermediate areas, as well as (3) 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
correspondence exists, in that order, between the eschatological paradigm operating on 
the macro, meso, or micro level, and the ingredients in the structure o f ethics. This 
correlation can provide important insights toward clarifying issues o f application and 
consistency of methodology for the eschatological paradigm in moral theory. The 
question o f “theoretical level” enables one to clarify how concretely the paradigm might 
legitimately speak to contemporary ethical exigencies and/or influence the interplay of 
the ethical nuances of its components.
First, ethics always assumes a metaphysics.1 One’s perception of reality, one’s 
worldview, significantly affects moral attitudes and determines moral behavior. Through 
the primary model of the Kingdom of God, our eschatological paradigm frames a world­
view, a perception of reality. As such, it is grounded in metaphysics.2 That is the 
foundation on which it is possible to say that "eschatology generates an ethic to go along 
with it,”3 that eschatology “in effect determines ethics.”4 Thus eschatology is seen as 
confronting moral theory with a perceptual challenge of great importance.5 And because 
each of the eschatological paradigm’s components express an assumed metaphysics, it
'This is particularly true in Hebrew-Christian thought, which “historically, has 
stood as a closely-knit world and life view. Metaphysics and ethics went everywhere 
together, in biblical intent” (Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism. 
38).
2This is true with any eschatology.
3Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 20.
4Owen, 370. Obviously, “everything depends upon the kind of eschatology 
chosen as the model” ( Scroggs, 85).
5Scroggs, 83.
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seems reasonable to consider these component models as belonging to the macro level of 
paradigm operation.1
But what about the meso and the micro levels of paradigm that in ethics would 
correspond to principles and rules? Is there sufficient specificity within the components 
of the eschatological paradigm to include in itself also these levels o f moral reflection?
Or are the meso and micro levels left open to creative application on the part of the 
community or Christian ethicist? Generally speaking, it is the metaphysical level (macro, 
bases) toward which most theologians and ethicists have approached the eschatological 
paradigm with respect to nuancing their application for moral theory. Its implicit 
generality leaves ample room for constructing moral theory at the theoretical level of 
ultimate Christian norms and creative open-endedness.2 Yet, some appear to read the 
components o f the eschatological paradigm as tending additionally toward the “meso” 
level of moral reflection as well. They read the paradigm’s components as opening the 
way toward identifiable content and reasonable specificity with respect to application for 
moral theory (i.e., “area rules”).3
'This would be so in view of the role that biblical concept of the Kingdom of God 
plays in creating a worldview. This would also correspond, then, to the 
theological/philosophical base or presupposition level within the structure of ethics.
2Das, 86; Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective. 45,48.
3That is because the eschatological paradigm is being read within the larger 
context o f  Scripture, and the opinion that Scripture has a great deal more to say on the 
basic elements of our common life from an eschatological perspective than we might at 
first think. This obviously overlaps with the question of the role of Scripture in the 
eschatological paradigm, and whether or not the specific, concrete moral application of 
the Kingdom—on the micro or rule level—by Jesus’ life and preaching (as well as that of
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No doubt, this question of the theoretical level of moral reflection is an important 
issue. It determines the ultimate practicality o f the paradigm for moral theory. For 
ultimately, to be practical, the eschatological paradigm must not only motivate, but 
adequately direct (to some degree, at least) human activity.1 The moral agent must be 
able to move beyond mere orientation to the arena of action.2
The meaning and function o f  paradigm
Closely related to the question of the theoretical level of moral reflection is the 
meaning and function of paradigm. Paradigm has already been generally defined in this 
study as an organizing idea, or structure around which an approach to ethics is shaped and 
articulated. Paradigms are “a way of looking at something.”3 They provide a moral 
“frame of reference" from which moral thinking is organized and articulated. More 
precisely, a paradigm can be viewed from two broad perspectives: (1) that of an abstract 
basic principle; and (2) that of an imprinted inner gripping image.
1. For the first, a paradigm is “a particular case used to illustrate a general
the New Testament writers) —constitutes normative examples of how both eschatological 
bases and principles are to be articulated in everyday life. Some working with the 
paradigm sense a challenge toward serious reflection on and conversation with the 
biblical witness in order to understand the comprehensiveness with which the 
eschatological paradigm speaks to contemporary moral theory. It is a challenge that has 
been felt by a growing number of ethicists as the paradigm’s general profile has 
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principle.”1 It functions “as a model or example for other cases where a basic principle 
remains unchanged, though details differ."2 Furthermore, it “is not so much imitated as 
applied.”3 Here a “basic principle” that remains unchanged forms the link between 
paradigm and the new situation to which it is applied.4
2. The second perspective posits paradigm as a “personally and holistically 
conceived image of a model. . .  that imprints itself immediately and nonconceptually on 
the characters and action of those who hold it."5 The point here is that paradigms can 
become effective in shaping people ethically through their complete and direct impact on 
the inner moral eye. A paradigm need not be reduced first to a set o f abstract principles 
that must first be retranslated into life.6 This perspective sees a dynamic relationship 
between paradigm and principles and law, where paradigm is in certain ways o f prior 
ethical importance to those of law and principle.7 The point is not that the latter are 
secondary, but that a paradigm by nature encompasses them, elicits them, affirms them, 
mediates them, but not through reductionistic abstraction.
‘Wright, 16.
2Christopher J. H. Wright, An Eve for An Eve: The Place of Old Testament Ethics 
Today (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983), 43.
3Ibid.
4Waldemar Janzen, Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach (Louisville, 
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These distinctions are helpful as we explore the way the eschatological paradigm 
has been applied toward moral theory.1 Those approaching the paradigm from the first 
perspective—that a paradigm is an abstract illustrating principle—have tended towards a 
larger, sweeping, reductionistic process that results in considerable loss with respect to 
actual biblical ethical yield.2 The macro/bases level often predominates. Content and 
specificity are ambiguous and left to creative open-ended moral reflection. On the other 
hand, those approaching the paradigm from the second perspective—that a paradigm 
elicits an imprinted moral image—have tended to focus on the biblical reality of the 
invading Kingdom. Here the person and message of Jesus, together with the experienced 
life of the New Testament Church and apostolic instruction, yield significant moral 
imagery.3 A comprehensive moral picture is projected, one which evokes both principle 
and law—but in a nonreductionistic way.
Finally, one would expect that a paradigm created or composed of components 
will find its moral specificity or abstraction through or from the moral clarity of those 
components. By extension, the moral specificity or abstraction of a given component is 
likewise determined by the moral clarity of the biblical witness with which it is defined. 
If the eschatological paradigm is seen as built on only broad principles or generalized
'No doubt, individual theologians/ethicists have instinctively gravitated toward 
one model or the other as a result of their own presuppositions and purposes. It is likely, 
though, that this instinctive gravitation, and the distinctions in how paradigm affects 
moral reflection, may not have been consciously apparent to them in the process.
2Janzen, Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach. 29.
3Here the biblical witness includes that of stories and written instruction.
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abstractions from Scripture, it will not be able to either produce moral specificity or bring 
sustained focus toward Scripture in the context of its application in moral theory. On the 
other hand, if the eschatological paradigm is seen as reflecting comprehensive 
Scriptural/moral focus through the structuring of its components, it will tend toward 
greater specificity/content in the moral images it evokes. In addition, it will elicit 
sustained focus toward Scripture in the context of its application in moral theory. 
Obviously, the meaning and function of paradigm in the mind of the theologian or ethicist 
will significantly influence his perceptions of the potential application of the 
eschatological paradigm.
Relation to philosophical ethics
The discussion of the relation of the eschatological paradigm to the categories o f 
philosophical ethics has been held until now. It fits appropriately with this discussion of 
the theoretical level and the meaning and function o f paradigm. The question has been 
whether an eschatologically informed ethic can be reciprocally related to philosophical 
ethics in a way that it can: (1) appropriate the categories which appear in the light o f 
philosophical analysis—teleological (consequentialist), deontological, virtue 
(perfectionist), situational (contextual), etc.; and (2) at the same time offer a 
comprehensive viewpoint which can overcome the contradictions that classically cling to 
the various types of philosophical ethics.1
No definitive answer to these questions has yet emerged with the eschatological
'Das, 79, 65, 83; Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 105, 113,115-116.
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paradigm except the "messy conclusion that eschatological ethics does not fit into either 
of the philosophical modes."1 At best, the eschatological paradigm is seen as providing a 
dynamic perspective and methodology which is distinctive,2 or as a hybrid that 
encompasses balancing elements o f each.3 For some, the underlying question is whether 
the eschatological paradigm evokes an ethics that is oriented around morality or around 
revelation.4 Parallel to this question—and nuancing it strongly—is the concern for a wide 
moral frame of reference which is both transcendent and objective.5 In addition, there is 
the desire for Christian moral theory which avoids any connotation of rule and external 
authority.6 For some this has to do with how the moral agent is gripped personally. For 
others, it has to do with maintaining an open orientation toward future moral exigencies.
Summary Orientation
The principle theological and philosophical characteristics—as they illumine the 
ethical perspectives—of twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology have now been 
reviewed. This outline of the principal characteristics of re-interpreted eschatology has 
entailed a summary, critical survey of the development of eschatology as a new paradigm
‘Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 115.
2Das, 79.
3Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 116.
4Ezell, 83, 85. It should be noted that a revelation-oriented ethic does not 
necessarily imply Scriptural priority in moral theory.
5Das, 83, 64,65.
6Ezell, 81-87.
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for Christian ethics. It has included, as well, an evaluative description of the paradigm’s 
implications for Christian moral theory as it crystallized in the 1970s. In the process, it 
has explored briefly the checkered history of the eschatology/ethics relationship before 
the twentieth century. Here was found the development of an “eschatology sans ethics" 
and an “ethics sans eschatology.” These anomalies express the essential blurring of the 
vivid eschatology and corresponding moral consciousness of the early Church. Not only 
has there not been a solid or sustained discussion of eschatology and ethics in any of the 
prominent minds in pre-twentieth-century Christian ethics, but the dawn o f the twentieth 
century found both Christian ethics and eschatology secularized by Liberalism and a 
philosophical rift between the two.
The twentieth century, however, has witnessed a radical renewed interest in both 
eschatology and the eschatology/ethics dialogue. So much so, that eschatology has 
become a dominating theme in twentieth-century theology. In the process, overlapping 
waves of eschatological thought have generated varying shades of ethical-oriented 
eschatologies and eschatological-oriented ethics. The search to adequately bond 
eschatology and ethics came to revolve around several critical problems and tensions 
which needed satisfactory synthesis. These included problems and tensions as viewed 
from the perspectives of immanence/transcendence, kingdom/history, future/hope, 
Church/world, philosophical categories, principle/content, and Christology.
By the 1970s three significant images had emerged as commonly accepted 
conceptual bridges to explicate the fundamental meaning of the Kingdom of God, and to 
resolve the tensions and problems that were seen as fundamental to the eschatology/ethics
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discussion. It has been suggested that these three images—already/not yet, reign o f  God, 
and horizon o f  the future—sue in effect component models elucidating the eschatological 
paradigm in relation to its biblical primary model, the Kingdom of God. It is further 
suggested that these images are like a three-stranded cord forming the components o f a 
commonly accepted comprehensive eschatological paradigm for Christian ethics.
With this paradigm of twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology in view, its 
implications for Christian moral theory were then briefly explored. This chapter 
surveyed: (1) the specific ethical nuances that each of the paradigm’s components appear 
to imply; (2) the methodological nuances that the paradigm evokes/expresses with regard 
to my three principles o f verification; and (3) the theoretical level of moral reflection on 
which the paradigm appears to operate. In doing so, these implications have been 
outlined as seen through the eyes of the principle participants in the eschatology/ethics 
dialogue through the 1970s. This survey has been limited to that branch of Protestant 
theology which has facilitated the paradigm’s synthesis and which has congealed the 
basic concepts believed to be assumed by Mott and Ogletree and central to most 
Protestant Christians.
It has been found that each of the paradigm’s components generate forceful and 
specific ethical nuances which are rich for application toward moral theory. It has been 
also learned, however, that a challenge remains in determining how these moral nuances 
are actually elicited and/or have themselves been cast with respect to moral theory. This 
has become evident when viewed against the designated principles of verification and the 
varied ways we have seen that theologians/ethicists have perceived them in relation to the
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divergent moral nuances projected through the paradigm. As we have seen, the possible 
combinations of implications for moral theory are both numerous and complex. 
Furthermore, we have noted that adequately applying eschatology as paradigm toward 
moral theory demands an understanding of the subtle dynamics of paradigm in relation to 
models, primary models, and principles and laws.
This chapter’s survey has found that, while a commonly accepted comprehensive 
eschatological paradigm had both emerged and crystallized through the 1970s, no final 
clarification of the relationship of eschatology and Christian ethics could yet be given.1 
The eschatology/ethics question was still problematic in actual application. This is 
especially true with respect to the implications regarding the principles of verification. In 
fact, for some, eschatology remained one of those “slippery words” with a "multiplicity of 
meanings” which at best is “ambiguous and makes for looseness o f expression and 
thought.”2 This survey has revealed how the complex and subtle nuances of the paradigm 
—both in itself and in relation to our principles of verification—can, indeed, evoke a 
“slipperiness” in meaning. There is clearly the need for further refinement and 
development of the eschatological paradigm in relation to Christian ethics.3 Clearer 
principles need to be outlined with respect to the carefulness in its use and consistency
'This is particularly true for the Christian social ethics as expressed in the 
principle of verification—the nature of social involvement.
2I. Howard Marshall, “Slippery Words: I. Eschatology,” The Expository Times 89 
(June 1978): 264-269.
3Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics. 7; Johnstone, 85.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
with respect to its application.
This chapter is suggesting that this need for further refinement and development 
does not lay in the paradigm per se, but in its application for moral theory. There is need 
for further refinement and development in how its application for moral theory facilitates 
and is facilitated by the role of Scripture, the role of community, and the nature of social 
involvement.1 Thus this study turns to Stephen Charles Mott and Thomas W. Ogletree. 
As two ethicists standing in the tradition of this eschatological paradigm, they have 
consciously incorporated and further developed the role o f the eschatological paradigm in 
their moral theory. In doing so, they have been expressing greater refinement with 
respect to application of the paradigm to moral theory. In the process, they can reveal 
more precisely the impact that the application of the paradigm has had in contemporary 
Christian moral theory and ethical method. In addition, this study looks over their 
shoulders, as it were, and observes how they work their way through the subtle and 
complex nuances expressed between the paradigm’s components and in relation to the 
principles o f verification.
Before moving on to Mott and Ogletree, however, one more point for reference 
should be suggested. I believe that this chapter’s review of the principal characteristics 
of the eschatological paradigm in relation to its application to moral theory has shown the 
important role that Scripture has played (or not played) in the discussion. It is my
'This chapter’s summary critical review of the eschatological paradigm has 
affirmed the validity of the principles of verification. They are crucial areas of concern 
and determine directions with regard to the paradigm and its application.
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opinion that the role of Scripture continues to be the most critical issue in the 
eschatology/ethics discussion. Its importance has become obvious as ethicists make the 
important transition from either formulating or understanding the eschatological 
paradigm itself, to that of its actual application for moral theory. Mott and Ogletree 
demonstrate that focus on Scripture, I believe, in that both their well-known works have 
revolved around the question o f Scripture, eschatology, and ethics, i.e., Mott, Biblical 
Ethics and Social Change, and Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics.
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CHAPTER 3
STEPHEN CHARLES MOTT’S USE OF ESCHATOLOGY 
IN MORAL THEORY
Stephen Charles Mott’s use of eschatology in moral theory is set in the context o f 
the conviction that “a vivid view of the future and o f the imminence of the endtime, 
including Christ’s return can be, has been, and should be a stimulus for social activism.”1 
While the path from eschatology to social activism is obviously a direct one for Mott, he 
has recognized that the “not so easy" hermeneutical problem of actual, responsible 
application o f that link demands methodological precision.2 Thus his project is more than
‘Stephen Charles Mott, South Hamilton, MA, to Larry L. Lichtenwalter, March 
30, 1993, 2.
2The question of hermeneutics is a fundamental concern for Mott. His positions 
have been critiqued as weak because they neglect particular hermeneutical problems or 
because o f perceived faulty hermeneutics, e.g., Richard B. Hays, “Recent Books on New 
Testament Ethics,” Quarterly Review 6, no. 4 (Winter 1986): 26; Dale Goldsmith,
Review o f Biblical Ethics and Social Change, by Stephen Charles Mott, Journal o f the 
American Academy of Religion 51 (September 1983): 520; Allen Verhey, 24-27; Udo 
Middlemann, “A Response to Stephen Mott,” Transformation 4, nos. 3 and 4 (June- 
Sept./Oct.-Dec. 1987): 36-40). In addition, Mott himself has directly approached the 
question o f hermeneutics in major ways, e.g., “The Use of the New Testament for Social 
Ethics,” Journal of Religious Ethics 15, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 225-260—an edited reprint o f a 
1984 two-part series in Transformation 1, no. 2 (April/June 1984): 21-26 and 1, no. 3 
(July/September 1984): 19-25, which has also appeared as a Grove Booklet on Ethics 
with the title Jesus and Social Ethics (Bramcote: Grove Books, Grove Booklet on Ethics 
55, 1984); idem, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible? A Study in
127
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a mere outline of the contours of an eschatology-inspired “social activism.” It is a 
comprehensive “critique of easy solutions.”1 It is a reaction “in general to liberal 
optimism regarding history particularly under [Reinhold] Niebuhr’s influence and to the 
neglect o f social content and implications of eschatology by conservative Christians."2 It 
is an attempt to provide a biblical and theological framework through which, in part, the 
eschatological paradigm can be responsibly applied to the diverse issues confronting 
contemporary moral theory.
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to explore Mott’s use of eschatology in moral 
theory particularly as it concerns methodology toward application. In doing so I will: (1) 
describe the way in which Mott both perceives and nuances the eschatological paradigm, 
including his leitmotif with regard to the paradigm’s components; (2) outline the 
methodological nuances that his application evokes/expresses with regard to my three 
principles of verification (Scripture, Community, and nature of social involvement), 
including a broad contour of his view o f the nature of social involvement; and (3) survey
Hermeneutics.” Bulletin of the Association o f Christian Economists 13 (Spring 1989):7- 
19. In addition, his preface to Biblical Ethics and Social Change and introduction to A 
Christian Perspective on Political Thought articulate hermeneutical issues. Both his 
books divide into two sections, with the first providing theological and methodological 
focus which becomes the framework for application towards specific issues in the second. 
It is evident that the question of hermeneutics has become more focused for Mott 
following reviews upon the publication of his Biblical Ethics and Social Change.
'Mott to Lichtenwalter, 2. Examples o f his critique of “easy solutions” can be 
found in “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 225-260; idem, “Social 
Ethics in America and the Possibilities o f History,” paper presented for Professor Harvey 
Cox, April 10, 1967; idem, “The Politics o f Time” in A Christian Perspective on Political 
Thought. 97-112.
2Mott to Lichtenwalter, 2.
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his application of the paradigm’s ethical implications with respect to level of moral 
reflection (paradigm— macro, meso, micro; and ethics— bases, underlying principles, area 
rules) and social content. In the process it should become apparent what Mott means by 
his evocative phrase, “social activism.”
Eschatological Paradigm and Ethics
Perceiving the Paradigm 
Mott’s understanding of eschatology fits the general contours of the 
eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined as being commonly accepted in 
contemporary theology by the 1970s.1 Each of the components o f the paradigm 
{already/not yet, reign o f  God, horizon o f  the future) is thus evident in his thinking, 
though not with equal explicit reference or precise terminology in his writings.
Already/Not Yet
For Mott the “breaking in" of the reign o f God brings a “partial fulfillment” which 
“will be characteristic of history until the second coming of Christ.”2 There is thus a
‘His focused discussions of eschatology are found in “The Long March of God” in 
Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 82-106; idem, “The Politics o f Time” in A Christian 
Perspective on Political Thought. 97-112; idem, “How Should Christian Economists Use 
the Bible? A Study of Hermeneutics,” 15-16. Mott indicates that, personally, he early 
moved from a dispensational, pre-tribulation position on eschatology, and although he has 
not moved sharply away from a premillennial position, the millennium does not factor 
sharply in his thinking. He attributes A. Berkeley Mickelsen’s views of the reign o f  God, 
which according to Mott are similar to George Ladd’s, as being a significant influence 
during his transitional and formative thinking on eschatology (Mott to Lichtenwalter, 1).
2"Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible? A Study of 
Hermeneutics,” 15.
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“tension of the new and the old,”1 a “between the times” reality in which the people of 
God find the “dual challenge” of having a “normative glimpse of a perfect society.”
Along with this normative glimpse we have the “ongoing responsibilities in a world in the 
midst of which Christ has left us (John 17:18) — a society which is unable to live on that 
renewed basis."2 “By faith we live in Christ’s victory, yet we must continue to struggle."3 
In the context o f this already/not yet, Mott calls for a “realism” that captures “a deep 
sense of the depths and permanence of human sin,” and which brings a “continual 
reminder of the imperfection of all human efforts."4 But this “awareness that we cannot 
build a perfect society in history must not deflect us from the obligation to work for a 
better society.”5 According to Mott, “God is not asking us to build eternal structures but 
to accept our responsibility for God’s creation."6
'Ibid.
2Ibid.; Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 106.
3Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 18.
4Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 16; idem, A Christian 
Perspective o f Political Thought. 26-41; idem, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 3-21.
Mott asserts that “despite the introduction o f the Reign of God into history with 
Christ, not only God’s reign but also evil increase to the time of Christ’s return” and that 
“the basic solution to history lies in the atonement of Jesus Christ. Only at the end of 
history is this work brought to completion in the reconciliation of all things with the 
second coming of Christ” (Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 99).
5Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 91.
6Ibid. In this context Mott states that “we would not think of postponing personal 
righteousness— sexual purity, for example— on the grounds that perfection will not come 
until after the Second Coming.” He makes a similar comparison with respect to 
evangelism, i.e., “Our task is to bring the message of his love to every person, even if 
only a remnant will be believers at the Second Coming” (ibid., 91).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
131
Reign of God
Mott views the reign o f God as “a technical phrase for the idea of the rule of God 
over history.”1 It is the “universal rule of the eternal God” with “transcendent demand” 
which challenges present life in a comprehensive way and which includes every sphere of 
life—personal, social, political, physical (the body), spiritual, and the material world 
(creation).2 The point is that the Kingdom of God is seen as impinging upon present 
Christian conduct, and that the reign of God “provides a context for God’s universal 
ethical concerns.”3 Thus we are confronted, “not with an ethics of preparation or of 
waiting for the Reign," but with the “ethics of the present Reign of God."4 Furthermore,
‘Ibid., 83. In keeping with the eschatological paradigm, Mott writes that “the 
Greek word basileia, which is used for reign or kingdom, means primarily the act o f 
reigning rather than the place of reigning, thus in most cases should be translated as 
reign, rule, kingship, or sovereignty, rather than its usual English rendering, kingdom” 
(ibid.).
2Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 109-111; idem, Biblical 
Ethics and Social Change. 99-105. Referring to James Gustafson, Mott writes that 
“attention to the Reign of the sovereign God creates moral responsibility for all spheres of 
life. We cannot do everything ‘but we cannot arbitrarily decide that something is outside 
the scope of Christian moral responsibility’” (Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 
104).
While agreeing with Ladd’s balance of the present and future aspects of the reign 
o f  God, Mott is critical of the apparent individualism of his position regarding the 
breaking in o f the reign, particularly the lack o f social emphasis and the lack of emphasis 
on its relationship to all of creation (Mott to Lichtenwalter, 1; idem, “How Should 
Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 15-16).
3Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 231; idem, “How 
Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 15.
4Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 89.
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"the demand o f God upon us now is intensified by anticipation of the future.”1 The 
nearness o f the full manifestation of God’s reign gives urgency to the present. It “reveals 
today as the day of decision and action.”2
Horizon of the Future
While Mott does not use the terminology horizon o f  the future, the nuances o f this 
paradigm component are nevertheless significant to his thinking. The inbreaking reign o f  
God includes a corresponding “eschatological vision” which brings “a normative glimpse 
of a perfect society," and which “presents a continuing critique of all that falls short of 
it.”3 Here one is confronted with a “broad horizon of what is intended for humanity and 
indeed of what is possible by God’s grace.”4 This “view of the future provides new 
reasons for decisive action in the present.”5 The reality of promise “draws the mind to the 
future in creative and obedient expectation."6 “Such expectation produces a conduct of 
life that conforms to the imminent hope.”7 When the future reign o f  God is taken 
seriously as a reality confronting the present, “human energies are stimulated for efforts
‘Ibid., 91.
2Ibid., 88.
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 15.
4Ibid., 16.
5Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 107.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 110.
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to bring about change in the certainty o f the abiding meaning of such labor.”1 We can 
either open ourselves up to this “new and updated force in history”—which is seen as the 
“force o f the future”—or cling to the increasingly outmoded past in selfish fear.2 For 
Mott, “the coming of the Reign gives fresh substance, motivation, and power to the 
political task of changing the world in the direction o f God’s promises."3 However, 
“along with the power of the future, there is also an eschatological reserve."4
This outline of Mott’s use o f eschatology reveals how each of the components o f 
the eschatological paradigm are evident in his thinking, though not with equal explicit 
reference or precise terminology. His understanding of eschatology fits the general 
contours of the eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined as being commonly 
accepted in contemporary theology by the 1970s. It is significant that Mott spends no 
time laboring over whether or how eschatology is to be construed as normative for ethics. 





4Ibid. Mott acknowledges that he has drawn heavily upon the Christian realists, 
especially Reinhold Niebuhr, but also Paul Tillich and Eduard Heimann. Niebuhr had 
a formative influence upon his own development that has continued (Mott, A Christian 
Perspective on Political Thought, see “Acknowledgments”). It was Niebuhr who 
increased his “appreciation of the eschatological reserve which the more pessimistic side 
o f  eschatology gives.” For Mott then, “the solutions o f history do not lie in history; 
eschatology puts in question illusions about human achievement and progress” (Mott to 
Lichtenwalter, 2-3).




While Mott works within the general contours of the eschatological paradigm, he 
clearly nuances the reign o f  God component part over that o f the already/not yet and 
horizon o f  the future. Nearly every reference to eschatological themes falls within the 
context of this paradigm component. While, as we have seen, the already/not yet and 
horizon o f  the future perspectives are evident in his thinking, eschatology for Mott is both 
viewed from and applied through the perspective of the reign o f  God. The reign o f  God 
is Mott’s leitmotif for nuancing the eschatological paradigm.
Hermeneutical Nuances
As Mott’s leitmotif for nuancing the moral implications of the eschatological 
paradigm, the reign o f  God yields significant hermeneutical value:
Context fo r universal ethical concerns
The reign o f  God “provides a context for God’s universal ethical concerns.”1 In 
response to Christians in the Fundamentalist, liberal, and existential traditions who have 
argued that the New Testament does not provide instruction for the ordering of social 
relations,2 Mott posits an essential organic relationship between the Old and New 
Testaments. It is a relationship which reveals God’s enduring ethical concerns for all of
'Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 231.
2Ibid., 226.
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human life and history and which is set within the horizon of the reign o f  God.1 The 
reign o f  God provides a context for “God’s universal ethical concerns” in that “divine 
actions are interrelated and God’s purpose in history has a unity."2 For Mott, “the Bible 
does not teach independent ethical universals. God is the universal, and God’s acts 
supply means and power for the ethics."3 What God does is significant. God’s reign 
through history is paradigmatic. The various ethical materials o f the Bible are placed 
within the history of creation, fall, redemption, and restoration of creation—each 
representing an aspect of God’s restorative concerns.4 Using the rubric “The Long March 
o f God,”5 Mott posits the reign o f  God as one extended, relentless reassertion of God’s 
sovereignty to overcome the fall and to realize His purposes in history. It has been a long 
march through the history of people, and powers, and institutions,6 but it has one goal. 
God’s ethical concerns are universal. “The ethic of the Reign of God is an ethic of the 
restoration of God’s purposes for the creation.”7
’Ibid., 227-234; idem, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 7-19.
2Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 102.
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11-12.
4Ibid., 8.
s"The Long March of God” is Mott’s title for his chapter on the reign o f  God in 
his Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 82-106.
6Ibid., 106.
7Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 16.
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Integrating concept o f  history
The reign o f  God “furnishes a concept o f history into which other New Testament 
themes can be placed.”1 Some of the New Testament themes Mott has in mind include 
the place o f  status in society, the reality of social evil in the structures of the human 
community as a whole, grace, love, justice, human nature, power, time, etc. The ability 
to place diverse themes against a common backdrop can lend both coherence and 
comprehensiveness to one’s moral theory. Given the right backdrop, diverse themes can 
converge with compelling potency. While Mott indicates that he presents “a social 
activism inspired in part by the present aspects o f the Reign,"2 the reign o f  God 
nevertheless provides the hermeneutical strategy which both holds his theory of social 
activism together and gives it compelling potency. Organizationally, the reign o f  God 
thematic appears at key positions in Mott’s developing thought. He concludes the 
theological orientation sections of his major works Biblical Ethics and Social Change and 
A Christian Perspective on Political Thought with extended discussions o f the reign o f  
God. In doing so, he consciously links each of the preceding themes to the dynamic 
reality o f the reign o f  God. Likewise, his discussion of hermeneutics with regard to the 
normative character of biblical economic materials inserts the reign o f  God thematic at
'Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 231. In viewing Mott’s 
writings I would add, not just New Testament themes, but other significant biblical 
themes which need integration in an overall moral theory.
2Mott to Lichtenwalter, 2 (italics supplied).
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key transition points in his developing thought.1 The reign o f  God is not merely one of 
the several emerging themes in Mott’s writings,2 it is a determinant ingredient in his 
hermeneutic.
Elucidates centrality o f  biblical justice
The reign o f  God elucidates the centrality of biblical justice as “an attribute of 
God and a major mandate of Scripture."3 If the reign of God is Mott’s leitmotif in 
eschatology, biblical justice is his leitmotif for social ethics.4 Finding the Bible full of the
'Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 7-11, 15-16; idem, 
“The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 227-247.
2A s Stephen N. Williams seems to imply in “The Limits of Hope and the Logic of 
Love on the Basis o f Christian Social Responsibility,” Tvndale Bulletin 40, no. 2 
(November 1989): 262.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 82-106; idem, A Christian Perspective 
on Political Thought. 74, 112.
4In addition to major discussions on justice in both his Biblical Ethics and Social 
Change and A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. Mott develops this theme in a 
wide spectrum o f writing. See Stephen Charles Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 
Transformation 10, no. 1 (January/April 1993): 23-29; idem, “Egalitarian Aspects of the 
Biblical Theory of Justice,” The American Society o f Christian Ethics 1978: Selected 
Papers from the Nineteenth Annual Meeting, ed. Max L. Stackhouse (Newton, MA: 
American Society o f Christian Ethics, 1978), 8-26; idem, “Human Rights and Christian 
Thought,” The Reformed Journal 39, no. 6 (June 1989): 9-11; idem, “Lethal Force in the 
Context of a Theological Understanding of Power,” Comprendre 47 and 48 (1981): 61- 
68; idem, “Justice,” Holman Bible Dictionary, ed. Trent C. Butler (Nashville: Holman 
Bible Publishers, 1991): 827-829; idem, “The Contribution of the Bible to Economic 
Thought,” Transformation 4, nos. 3 and 4 (June-Sept./Oct.-Dec. 1987): 25-34; idem, 
“Doing Justice Because Christ Is Coming Again,” Christian Social Action 7, no. 4 (April 
1994): 35; idem, “Violence and Social Justice,” Christian Social Action 7, no. 5 (May
1994): 39; idem, “Limiting Personal Enforcement of the Law.” Christian Social Action 8. 
no. 1 (January 1995): 37; idem, “Hospitality to the Immigrant” Christian Social Action 8, 
no. 2 (February 1995): 36; idem, “The People of God and the Social Justice o f the 
Ancient Near East,” Christian Social Action 8, no. 6 (June 1995): 16; idem, “Roots of
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language of justice,1 and justice a chief attribute o f God,2 Mott affirms that “justice is very 
important in the Biblical order of values . . .  a central duty of the child of God.”3 God’s 
justice is paradigmatic.4 We Ieam justice from God.5 “Our justice corresponds to God’s 
justice just as our grace corresponds to God’s grace and our love to God’s love."6 As 
individuals or groups we can be channels of God’s justice.7
Mott further asserts that “it is methodologically necessary to look at the biblical 
materials describing God’s social justice to develop the understanding of human 
responsibilities injustice."8 This is where the reign o f  God comes forcefully into play— 
justice characterizes God’s reign,9 is an expression of God’s reign,10 and the proclamation
Equality in Early Israel.” Christian Social Action 8, no. 8 (September 1995): 38; idem, 
“Lazarus, Dives, and Affirmative Action,” Christian Social Action 8, no. 10 (November
1995): 37; idem, “The Pair of Social Justice and Welfare Reform,” Christian Social 
Action 9, no. 1 (January 1996): 38; Esther Byle Bruland and Stephen Charles Mott, A 
Passion for Jesus: A Passion for Justice fVallev Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1983).
'Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59.
2Mott, “Egalitarian Aspects of the Biblical Theory of Justice,” 9.
3Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 78.
4Ibid., 79.
sIbid., 80.
6Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59.
7Mott, “Egalitarian Aspects o f the Biblical Theory of Justice,” 12.
8Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 80.
9Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 85.
10Mott writes that “the dynamic character o f  justice . . .  reflects the philosophy of 
history in which justice is an expression of God’s reign overcoming the rebellion of the
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of the reign o f  God brings with it an imperative for justice.1 Hence, we are to seek not
only the Reign, but also the justice that belongs to it.2 The “long march of God,” then,
elucidates the centrality of biblical justice:
Rather than merely an ethical principle, justice is made part of the story of God’s 
provision—the fall of humanity, the coming o f Christ, and the final reconciliation 
of all things under the sovereign rule of God. We can then understand social 
righteousness [justice] in the context of God’s patient toil to win back God’s lost 
creation.3
By thus interpreting the reign o f  God primarily through the category of biblical justice, 
Mott facilitates his leitmotif for social ethics.
Incorporates social responsibility imperative
The reign o f  God is “a central biblical concept which incorporates the imperative 
for social responsibility into God’s goals in history.”4 This is a natural corollary o f 
interpreting the reign o f  God through the category o f biblical justice. Christian social
creation and finally emerging triumphant at the end o f history” (Stephen Charles Mott, 
“The Contribution o f the Bible to Human Rights,” in Human Rights and the Global 
Mission of the Church, ed. A. Dyck (Cambridge, MA: Boston Theological Institute, 
1985), 32.
'Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 97, 100.
2Interpreting Matt. 6:33 Mott writes, “First o f all seek the Reign and its justice” 
(Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 104).
3Ibid., 82.
4Ibid. Mott indicates that Walter Rauschenbush and Herman Ridderbos proved 
helpful in developing the social aspects of his interpretation of the reign o f  God and the 
continuity of the reign o f  God with the Old Testament. They are seen however, as 
enforcing certain directions in his thinking rather than originating them (Mott to 
Lichtenwalter, 1).
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responsibility becomes an imperative because “justice presupposes God’s intention for 
people to be in community."1 The concept of justice is part o f the way the Bible 
understands the nature of society.2 It is something which concerns other persons. It is 
“the basic norm for social behavior,"3 “a social norm, regulating the conduct of people in 
association with one another,”4 “a socially active principle demanding responsibility on 
the part of the people of God."5 The promise of the reign o f  God is that of God’s 
lordship, justice, and peace. As such “it is a public hope, not merely personal.”6 The 
reign o f  God breaking into history brings a new form of social existence and a demand 
for justice,7 hence the imperative for social responsibility. The reign o f  God, however, “is 
not a social program, but faithfulness to its demands for justice necessitates social 
programs and social struggle.”8 Mott is deeply interested in social ethics and social
'Mott, “Justice,” 828. “In Scriptures, to be human is to live in community”
(Mott, “Human Rights and Christian Thought,” 10).
2Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 242.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 77.
4Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 74.
5Mott, “Egalitarian Aspects of the Biblical Theory of Justice,” 22.
6Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 110.
7Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 100; idem, “How Should Christian 
Economists Use the Bible?” 15; idem, “The Use of the New Testament for Social 
Ethics,” 231.
8Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 106. Mott further writes, “The people 
of God as a whole share responsibility for justice in society, including the political 
sphere” (ibid., 74).
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change. For Him Scripture yields rich social content towards facilitating those interests.1 
By interpreting the reign o f  God through the category o f biblical justice, Mott opens the 
way for a Christian social responsibility that is rich both in content and motivation.2
Christology
In addition to these nuances within Mott’s use o f the eschatological paradigm, 
there is the question of Christology. Christology does not play largely in Mott’s 
eschatology except to communicate that Jesus is the way in which the reign o f God is 
inaugurated and empowered in human history, e.g., through His life, death, and 
resurrection.3 Jesus’ ministry and teachings, however, are viewed as paradigmatic.4 His 
counsels are not wisdom maxims or legal commentary for a static society, but rather the 
principles of conduct of God’s reign emerging in concrete form.5 His actual deeds of 
compassion for physical suffering are the evidence that He is “the agent of God’s Reign.”6
‘Mott, “The Use o f the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 227-231,241-243.
“The Bible contributes substantial content to the following structural components of a 
social ethic, among others: justice, the nature of humanity, the concept of history, the 
nature of society and groups, the understanding of power and property, and the purpose of 
government” (ibid., 241).
2For Mott, “justice is a powerful motivator” (Mott, A Christian Perspective on 
Political Thought. 74).
3There are only brief, but helpful, exposes of Christology by Mott: Biblical Ethics 
and Social Change. 88-100; and “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 228- 
238.
4Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 245.
5Ibid., 233.
6Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 92.
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His healing ministry,1 the way He treated people,2 His sensitivity and partiality for the 
weak, and His serving physical and social needs, together express the normative values of 
the reign o f  God.
It is significant for Mott that New Testament writers have interpreted new life in 
Christ in continuity with the Old Testament social hopes and concerns.3 Jesus came to, 
and was received by, humble people of the land who were looking for the manifestation 
of divine power to reverse the roles of possessors and the dispossessed by bringing in 
social and economic justice. Mott suggests that, for Jesus, the Old Testament was an 
important component of His culture. Its writings supplied an anthropology and social 
perception that was expressed in the meaning of His ministry and teaching.4 When Jesus’ 
social tradition is thus recognized, the concept of justice (which is rooted in the Old 
Testament) can be more clearly identified with His life and ethic.5
Functionally, the role of Christology in Mott’s eschatological leitmotif—reign o f  
God— largely facilitates his leitmotif for social ethics (justice).6
'Ibid., 91-94.




6While treating the canon as a vast theological unity, Mott has been critiqued as 
offering no extended sketches of the ethics of the different New Testament writers (Hays, 
25). The weight of Mott’s focus is clearly toward Old Testament theological and moral 
reflection in an anthropological and sociological context. One does not read Mott long 
without being impressed with the fact that he/she is becoming immersed in the culture
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Summary
While Mott works within the general contours of the eschatological paradigm, he 
clearly nuances the reign o f  God component part over that o f the already/not yet and 
horizon o f  the future. The reign o f God thus becomes his leitmotif for nuancing the 
moral implications of the eschatological paradigm. These hermeneutical nuances include 
(1) providing a  context for God’s universal ethical concerns; (2) furnishing a concept of 
history into which other New Testament themes can be placed; (3) elucidating the 
centrality of biblical justice as an attribute o f God and a major mandate o f Scripture; and 
(4) incorporating the imperative for social responsibility into God’s goals in history. 
Finally, Christology does not factor largely in his view of eschatology except to facilitate 
his leitmotif for social ethics, i.e., justice.
Paradigm and Principles of Verification
The methodological nuances which Mott’s application of the eschatological 
paradigm to moral theory evokes/expresses with regard to my three principles of 
verification (Scripture, Community, and nature o f social involvement) are now explored.
and world of Old Testament thought and life. For Mott, of course, all this is for sensitive 
background understanding in order to open fully the normative nuances o f both the reign 
o f  God and New Testament social content for contemporary moral theory. Because of 
this, some important issues to eschatology—like Christology—may receive what appears 
to be cursory or only functional attention in relation to other themes that are important to 
Mott’s social analysis of Scripture and the culture of biblical times. His “The Use of the 
New Testament for Social Ethics” is illustrative o f his sensitivity toward New Testament 
themes. His discussion o f the place of status in society and in the message of the New 
Testament demonstrates a similarity of approach towards the social context of both 
testaments (Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 234-237).
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In doing so, a broad contour o f Mott’s view of the nature of social involvement is 
included.
Role of Scripture
That Mott undertakes the task o f constructing a “biblical basis for implementing 
social change”1 is indicative of the assumed role Scripture has in his moral theory. He 
spends no time laboring over whether or how the Bible is to be construed as authoritative, 
but simply assumes that it is authoritative for the community of faith and proceeds to 
show how it can be applied toward the problems of society.2
Mott is very deliberate, however, in explaining his approach to the social or 
political application of the Bible. It is a fourfold methodology which he calls “a 
dialogical approach to biblical hermeneutics."3 The process includes the interplay of 
Scripture, reason, Christian tradition, and experience.4 Mott does not profess the 
sufficiency of the Bible for ethics. Christian ethics is not synonymous with biblical 
ethics. The necessary foundation o f Scriptural understanding requires corroborating and 
expanding insights from political theory, sociology, anthropology, economics,
*Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, vii.
2Hays, 25.
3Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Though t  7.
4Ibid.; Stephen Charles Mott, “Avoiding the Capture o f the Gospel,” Christian 
Social Action 6, no. 5 (May 1993): 38; idem, “When the Bible Seems Silent,” Christian 
Social Action 4. no. I (January 1991): 39; idem, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, vii- 
ix.
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psychology, secular history, as well as theology and church history.1
But the process begins with a fundamental commitment to the primacy and 
ultimate authority of Scripture.2 Practically this means that “the text itself is the 
revelation of God,”3 and that “the authority of the Scriptures lies within the intentionality 
o f the passage.”4 It also affirms the essential theological and ethical unity o f the Bible,s 
and it assumes the primary orientation of Scripture as historical.6 Each of the other
'Mott, “When the Bible Seems Silent,” 39; idem, A Christian Perspective on 
Political Thought. 7.
2Mott, “Avoiding the Capture of the Gospel,” 38; idem, A Christian Perspective 
on Political Thought. 7. Mott writes, “We identify the ultimate authority o f the Bible on 
the issues that it addresses and the crucial nature of those issues. The Bible is necessary 
for both faith and ethics. We do not, however, profess the sufficiency o f the Bible for 
ethics” (Mott, “When the Bible Seems Silent,” 39). But even where the Bible does not 
address a given issue, “we are not left without biblical guidance and motivation.”
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11. Mott rejects neo­
orthodox and feminist hermeneutics which posit the text as a divinely provided context 
for encountering the revelation behind the community which produced it, as well as 
Barthian hermeneutics which finds revelation occurring as the Spirit speaks from the text 
to the modem reader. We find him engaging, as well, fundamentalist, liberal, and 
existentialist approaches to the authority of Scripture.
4E.g., what concerns are meant to be addressed by the text, not what is incidental 
to them (ibid., 17).
5Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 227-234. Mott treats 
the canon as a vast theological unity (Hays, 25). Practically this means that, “if one views 
the whole canon as itself the revelation of God, then one must reflect upon the full 
biblical data on a particular issue” (Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the 
Bible?” 14).
6Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 7. The historical 
dimension of Scripture is the perspective which opens up the social context of Scripture 
for Mott, as well as the need for anthropological and sociological understanding of 
culture consonant with biblical times. While discussing appropriate and inappropriate 
questions for the biblical text, Mott gives two examples of what he refers to as
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aspects o f  the dialogue—careful use o f reason, how other Christians have interpreted the 
Bible, and personal experience of society and of God’s Spirit in our lives—guides the 
process or confirms one’s interpretations.1 Mott’s apparent respect for and command of 
historical-critical methodology in all this is balanced with his respect for the plenary 
inspiration of the biblical text and thoughtful exegesis. He is well aware of the value and 
dangers o f  the historical-critical method in relation to the authority o f  Scripture.2
O f particular interest is Mott’s concept o f “biblically formed understanding’’3 
where the open reading of Scripture both initiates and deepens one’s understanding of our 
social world. In the context of this new experience, relevant biblical materials that
“anthropological insensitivity.” “The failures in interpretation labeled as literalism come 
not from taking seriously the concreteness o f the text but often from lacking an 
anthropological sensitivity in detecting how to translate legitimately the meaning of a 
practice from one cultural system to another.. . .  Another form of anthropological 
insensitivity to the concreteness of Scripture is to force it to answer questions brought to 
the text which are culturally foreign to it” (Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use 
the Bible?” 16). It is in this context of using anthropology and sociology that Mott states, 
“The best methods of biblical exegesis must be used to understand what a particular 
injunction means within the text and within biblical culture. The authority of the 
Scriptures lies within the intentionality of the passage, what concerns are meant to be 
addressed by the text, not what is incidental to them” (ibid., 17).
'Mott, “Avoiding the Capture of the Gospel,” 38; idem, A Christian Perspective 
on Political Thought. 7.
2"The historical-critical method has value in putting the text at a distance from the 
interpreter so that the text can speak to him or her on its own terms. The danger o f the 
method is that passages that have the potential of threatening one’s ideology can be 
assigned to sources regarded as less authoritative” (Stephen Charles Mott, review of 
Slavery. Sabbath. War and Women: Case Issues in Biblical Interpretation, by William M. 
Swartley, Horizons In Biblical Theology: An International Dialogue 7, no. 1 (June 1985): 
119-122.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, viii-ix; idem, A Christian Perspective 
on Political Thought. 7.
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otherwise might be neglected receive attention. In the process,
modem sociological and ethical categories are applied to the materials of the 
Bible to suggest new possibilities o f meaning and to provide a means of assessing 
the applicability of the results o f exegesis to contemporary discussion. When 
such terminology does clarify the meaning of Scripture, biblical interpretation 
finds new vocabulary with which to address current problems. Sometimes, 
however, the categories are dissonant with the text, and analysis makes it apparent 
that the passages have little immediate relevance to modem questions. Then for 
Scriptural guidance we must depend upon the more general framework of values 
and attitudes in the Biblical witness.. . .  These non-biblical constructs aid the 
understanding of Scripture and are tested and refined where the biblical Word 
relates to them; where it does not relate, they are set aside.1
This has been Mott’s approach to the social application of the Bible, and can be seen in
the context o f his reading and opening o f Scripture towards the possibilities of meaning
in the two most important themes he has become impressed with for moral theory, e.g.,
social involvement and justice.
While the stated role of Scripture in Mott’s moral theory is thus clear and forceful,
the concern here for this study relates to whether or how the eschatological paradigm
either influences or is influenced by Mott’s presuppositions or methodology with regard
to Scripture. The following points can be noted from Mott’s use of the eschatological
paradigm in relation to Scripture:
Unity o f Scripture
The reign o f  God is inextricably linked with the question of the unity of Scripture. 
Mott notes:
One of the most critical consequences o f interpreting New Testament ethics in
lMott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, viii, ix.
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continuity with the Old Testament is the impact it makes upon the concept o f the 
reign of God. The reign of God is a theme which sums up the hope of the Old 
Testament.1
And again:
A logical progression can be traced from the neglect of the Old Testament context 
for New Testament ethics to a denial of the social aspects o f the Reign of God 
concept to a dismissal of the social ethics o f the New Testament.2
The unity o f Scripture is fundamental to Mott’s social moral theory in that
“without the Old Testament” the contribution of the New Testament to social ethics is
“incomplete.”3 Mott affirms the Old Testament as the Scripture of Jesus and the early
church, and as such, New Testament ethical topics, raised to meet ad hoc problems, do
not form the entire content of the New Testament church’s ethical belief.4 Behind the
New Testament lies an authoritative text which demonstrates rich social moral content.
For Mott, this theological and ethical unity provides the hermeneutical context for
adequately understanding and articulating the reign o f  God and subsequently New
Testament social ethics. Two complementary perspectives are apparent here. One is that
Scripture is informing the social content o f the reign o f  God. The other is that the reign
o f  God is informing and facilitating an understanding of the social content of Scripture.
While “the most critical consequence of interpreting New Testament ethics in continuity
with the Old testament is the impact it makes upon the concept of the reign of God," the
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opposite is functionally true for Mott as well, e.g., a proper understanding and nuancing 
of the reign o f  God will both affirm the unity of Scripture for moral theory and facilitate 
its interpretation in the context of the New Testament.1 This can be particularly observed 
in how Mott traces his leitmotif of justice through Scripture and ascribes it as 
fundamental to the meaning of the reign o f  God. The eschatological paradigm, then, 
becomes a hermeneutical bridge between testaments.
Meaning and Content of Text and Words
The reign o f  God is related to the authoritative meaning and content of the biblical 
text and words themselves. Mott notes that the social meaning o f the reign o f God is 
obscured when the reign o f  God is defined as symbol rather than a concept.2 Symbol is 
seen in contrast to concept. Symbol is figurative, invoking meaning and/or experience. 
Concept is literal, containing its own truth claim. According to Mott, an existential 
symbolic interpretation of the reign o f God separates it “from its Biblical background and 
its social and ethical content.”3 For Mott, Scripture provides objective content in its text 
and words,4 and the concept of a just rule and an ideal order is part of the biblical
'Mott states that the concept of the reign o f  God presses us to deal with what is 
new in the New Testament in addition to the social tradition it has inherited (Ibid., 233).
2Ibid., 232.
3Ibid., 233.
4Mott is aware, however, that this objective content may be expressed in 
symbolism or metaphor. While developing his biblical perspective of prohibiting interest 
on loans because it undermines the poor, Mott refers to hand as a metaphor for power.
The Hebrew expression “his hand quivers with you” refers to how the poor person is one 
whose power in the community is slipping and who is becoming dependent on others
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portrayal o f reign. The reign o f  God, then, is a historical reality with truth claims about 
rule, just rule, and an ideal new social order.'
Theological Affirmation of Scripture
The reign o f  God is viewed as a basic theological affirmation of Scripture.2 For
Mott, the recognition of the authority o f God in the particular teachings and stories o f the
Bible—concrete injunctions—must be combined with an acknowledgment of the other
ways in which the Bible is authoritative:
The authority of God in the concrete injunction must be interpreted with attention 
to God’s authority in mighty acts, in the theological affirmations, and in the 
prevailing ethical principles. And the specific teachings and propositions are 
needed to give concrete interpretation of the broad and general truths and actions.3
As one of the theological affirmations of Scripture, the reign o f  God brings broad
conceptual imagery—authoritative truth—which is important in the interpretation of
specific teachings and propositions found in particular passages o f Scripture. It provides
(Stephen Charles Mott, “The Prohibition of Interest on Loans.” Christian Social Action 4. 
no. 8 [September 1991]: 37). The exegetical and hermeneutical question at bottom is a 
longstanding principle of Evangelical interpretation that the interpreter must 
communicate what is intended in the metaphor (Stephen Charles Mott, “Limiting 
Masculine References to God,” Christian Social Action 6, no. 7 [July/August 1993]: 38). 
But while metaphor and symbol can have intended meaning for Mott, e.g., objective 
content, he clearly rejects the notion that the reign o f  God falls within this category of 
biblical communication.
'Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 232-233.
2"The concept of the Reign of God is an example o f a basic theological 
affirmation, rather than a specific mighty act of God (although it involves such). It is 
expressed in many ways in many different portions of Scripture.” Mott, “How Should 
Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 10.
3Ibid„ 11.
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an authoritative umbrella for the exegesis and application of concrete biblical 
injunctions.1 But Mott considers the reign o f  God a “basic” theological affirmation which 
not only provides a context for interpreting concrete injunctions, but ties together and 
facilitates the interpretation o f other Scriptural theological themes.2 This study has 
already observed this somewhat when it noted above how Mott nuances the 
eschatological paradigm through the reign of God leitmotif, e.g., (1) the reign of God 
provides a context for God’s universal ethical concerns; (2) the reign of God furnishes a 
concept o f history into which other New Testament themes can be placed, etc.
Summary
In each of the above—unity of Scripture, content and meaning of the biblical texts 
and words, and basic theological affirmations—there is indication that Mott consciously 
attempts to conceive and articulate the eschatological paradigm from the standpoint of
'It is significant that Mott states that “the specific teachings and propositions are 
needed to give interpretation of the broad and general truths and actions.” This is 
important balance for hermeneutical theory which relates to specificity and content in 
moral theory. See below pp. 172-181 for more detailed discussion of this principle in 
relation to the eschatological paradigm.
2This can be observed in how Mott articulates the reign o f God in relationship to 
social emphasis and all of creation. A particular example can be seen in one of his 
reviews: “If within a biblical theology of the reign o f God one relates more closely the 
sphere o f creation and the sphere o f eternal personal salvation, one will not desire the 
formation of political philosophy to be so clearly separated from the sphere of the church 
and its theology. Then political work, while not providing personal salvation and not as 
independent human action, is done as a channel o f God’s reign, which is breaking into 
history, personally, and socially—although only in part in this age” (Stephen Charles 
Mott, review of Everything Is Politics but Politics Is Not Everything, by H. M Kuitert, 
The Journal of Religion 68 [July 1988]: 480).
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biblical theology and exegesis. This attempt to articulate the eschatological paradigm 
from the standpoint of biblical theology and exegesis can be seen as well in how he both 
perceives and nuances the eschatological paradigm. His use of the eschatological 
paradigm further appears to use Scripture or influence the use of Scripture in a way in 
which Scripture maintains an authoritative, assertive role in the process of application. In 
addition, there is evidence that Scripture influences the understanding of the 
eschatological paradigm as well as the paradigm influencing the understanding of 
Scripture.
It should be noted, however, that while writing in the context of a clearly stated 
“eschatological reserve,” Mott’s nuancing of the horizon o f  the future appears to share 
some philosophical aspects found in the more liberal optimistic eschatological-oriented 
ethics.1 And because his leitmotif in eschatology (reign o f  God): (1) largely facilitates 
his leitmotif for social ethics (justice); (2) is useful in incorporating the imperative for 
social responsibility into his moral theory; and (3) sets Christology in the functional role 
of largely facilitating his leitmotif for social ethics, his intended focus on biblical 
theological and exegetical methodology appears to blur with aspects of an ethical- 
oriented eschatology.
Role of Community
For Mott, “the church. . .  must be understood in relation to the Reign o f God, the
'E.g., “changing the world in the direction of God’s promises,” etc. (Mott, A 
Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 110).
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eschatological order now appearing in history."1 As outlined in chapter 2, the role which 
the Church assumes in eschatological ethics has revolved around three fundamental 
issues, i.e., (1) as a source of moral authority; (2) the field of moral operation; and (3) its 
linkage with the ethical needs/agenda of the larger human society.2 The role of 
community in Mott’s application of the eschatological paradigm in these three areas is for 
the most part clear and deliberate.3
Subordinate to Scripture
The Christian community assumes primarily a subordinate, yet vital, source of 
moral authority in relation to that o f Scripture. While Mott does not address this question 
directly, his four-part “dialogical approach to biblical hermeneutics" brings insight toward 
his thinking. His dialogical approach includes the religious source of knowledge found in 
Christian tradition and history.4 “The careful use of reason, particularly as theology, 
guides the process”5 of interpretation. “The thought and practice o f Christians who went
'Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 129.
2See above, 99-107. Related issues include the dualities o f  Christian social and 
personal ethics, and the relationship between evangelism and social responsibility in 
terms of the Church’s mission. The role of the Christian community is organically 
linked, too, with the question o f social involvement.
3Extended discussions with regard to the role of community are found in Mott, 
Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 82-141; idem, A Christian Perspective on Political 
Thought. 42-57.109-112.
4Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 7. See also Mott, “Avoiding 
the Capture of the Gospel,” 38; idem, “When the Bible Seems Silent,” 39; idem, Biblical 
Ethics and Social Change, vii-ix.
5Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 7.
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before in the history o f the church, as well as that o f fellow members o f  the present 
church, confirm one’s interpretation,”1 he notes. Furthermore, “the task of interpretation 
belongs in the church."2 Since this dialogical process is one where “a great deal of post- 
biblical information and reflection is needed,”3 and one where “biblical insights pertinent 
to a social ethics may form a sociopolitical vision more fully formed than yet expressed 
in Scripture,”4 the believing community holds an obvious important and vital role in the 
interpretation and application process. And yet, the primacy of Scripture is maintained.
Paradigmatic Social-Ethical Reality
The Christian community is the primary, purposive, and distinct new society
whose victory provides unique visibility for the reign o f  God.5 The Church itself is a
unique society, a new realm of social existence:
The relationships among its members, the ways of dealing with their differences 
and needs, and the patterns of leadership and decision making constitute a discrete 
societal structure within the larger society. Thus the church can embody the 
patterns of shared life that God desires for all humanity. Because the church is the 
manifestation of the Reign of God, the norms that guide it must exemplify the 
highest vision of human community.6
‘Ibid.
2Mott, review of “Slavery, Sabbath, War and Women: Case Issues in Biblical 
Interpretation,” 122.
3Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 241.
4Ibid.
sMott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 129; idem, A Christian Perspective on 
Political Thought. 111.
6Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 131.
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From the standpoint of the multiplicity of groups and the integrity of each type, 
the church is one among other groups in the society. From the standpoint of 
meaning and coherence, however, the church’s role is unique. Because it is the 
channel of faith that is comprehensive of all life, the church clarifies the 
normative purpose of other groups. It thus must resist identification with them or 
itself merely reflecting their understanding.1
The transforming of human nature, however, a vital and central form o f the Reign, 
is present only in the church.2
The Christian community, then, displays in an empirical way the moral reality of 
God’s invisible Kingdom. It is a concrete social context that is set apart from society as a 
kind of “counter society,”3 a paradigmatic social-ethical reality which prefigures Christ’s 
goals in history.4 It is the fundamental field o f moral operation for the reign o f  God. 
Embodying the presence of God’s reign, the Christian community “submits itself in 
uncompromising faithfulness to its new covenant ethics.”5
'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 47.
2Ibid., 112.
3"For the church to have a corrective impact on culture it must maintain a separate 
and distinct identity from the surrounding society and any new society that it may help 
create. Mission is consistent with separation as long as it is kept in mind that the 
motivation for that separation is mission, and not separation for its own sake” (Mott, 
Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 133).
4"The church is to be the community in which, through its behavior and its 
mission, the Reign of God becomes visible, serving as a precursor and avant-garde of the 
society that will be the fulfillment of all hope. The church is called to represent the Reign 
of God ‘between the times’” (ibid., 106).
sIbid., 133. Mott clarifies the meaning of new covenant ethics: “Jesus’ ethical 
precepts are the ethics o f the Reign, not ethics of preparation or of waiting for the Reign. 
They are the ethics of the present Reign of God, or new covenant ethics.. . .  Those who 
respond to Jesus are to live by the demands of the new age of justice that is breaking into 
history” (ibid., 89).
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Primary Social Structure for Change
The Christian community is the primary social structure through which the gospel 
works to change other structures.1 Mott begins his discussion of the Church as a 
“counter-community” with the words of John Howard Yoder: “The primary social 
structure through which the gospel works to change other structures is that of the 
Christian community.”2 While the Christian community is the fundamental field o f moral 
operation for the reign o f  God, it is only so principally and initially. The Church is to 
have a “corrective impact on culture,”3 to "contribute to social change,”4 to “raise the 
general moral level in the secular world around it.”5
Mott is writing in the context of the biblical importance of groups and the reality 
that groups are channels for influencing society.6 It is a context, too, that affirms that the 
scope of God’s “kingdom work" is not confined to the Church.7 Furthermore, “history is 
fundamentally one, but its unity will be fully established only at the final reconciliation at
'Ibid., 128.
2Ibid.; Yoder. The Politics of Jesus. 157.
3Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 133.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., 136.
6Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 42-49. In this context Mott 
notes, “The state cannot be an effective agent for justice until its justice reflects the life of 
other groups of society. Such a group is the church, not only in terms of its own life, but 
also in terms of the meaning it is holding forth for the other groups of the community” 
(ibid., 56).
7Ibid., 111.
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the end of history. Nevertheless, glimpses o f that unity appear in the present time.”1 
While “the activity o f God outside the presence of the Church must be discerned by the 
eyes of faith,"2 and can only be “partial in its realization,"3 the reality of the Church in the 
world not only “provides unique visibility for the reign of God,”4 but through that 
visibility “produces social change in the surrounding society."5 However, the 
demonstration of Christian community is only one facet o f social change, it is inadequate 
as an expression of social justice.6 Faithfulness to the demands for justice necessitates 
social programs and social struggle.7
'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 111. Mott cautions here: 
“Miguez Bonino correctly rejects the dualistic and monistic solutions to the relationship 
between God’s redemptive work and secular history. The dualistic solution of two 
separate histories—one of Israel and the church and the other secular—removes the 
Lordship of God from general history. In the monistic solution, on the other hand, there 
is but one history. The history of salvation is identical with the historical struggle for 
justice, an accusation made (often falsely) o f  liberation theology. This approach removes 
the independent significance of Jesus Christ and the church and renders a dangerous 
ultimacy to particular struggles” (ibid.).
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 112.
4Ibid., 111. “The Christian community as a city shedding light in the world seems 
a fitting picture of the social impact of the Church as an alternative social reality” (Mott, 
Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 137).
sMott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 135. “Two movements in the Christian 
community help to effect such change. The first is withdrawal of support from practices 
contrary to the inbreaking of the Reign. The second is [sic] the example a community 
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Summary
The role of the believing community in Mott’s application of the eschatological 
paradigm is clear and deliberate: (1) it is a subordinate, yet vital, source of moral 
authority in relation to that o f  Scripture; (2) it is the primary, purposive, and distinct new 
society which gives unique visibility to the reign o f  God; and (3) it is the principal social 
structure through which the gospel works to change other structures within the larger 
society. In addition, the Christian community’s mission to facilitate the demands for 
justice necessitates social programs and social struggle.
Nature of Social involvement
The nature of social involvement for Mott can be capsuled with one pregnant 
word, “justice." “Justice, more than any other concept provides the positive meaning of 
politics," he writes in his A Christian Perspective on Political Thought.1 But that could 
be said, too, about his social theory in general. “Paths to Justice” is how he outlines the 
second part of his Biblical Ethics and Social Change. After building a biblical theology 
of social involvement which revolves largely around the concept o f biblical justice,2 he 
develops a variety of ways in which Christians bring about social change. These varied 
ways are, in his view, "Paths to Justice." As outlined already above, as an attribute of
'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 74.
2Chapters 4 and 5— “God’s Justice and Ours” and “The Long March of God”— 
which develop the theme of biblical justice, comprise nearly half of the first section 
(Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59-106).
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God and a major mandate of Scripture,1 biblical justice is Mott’s leitmotif for social 
ethics. And by interpreting the reign of God largely through the category of biblical 
justice, Mott facilitates his leitmotif for social ethics. But what practical shape does 
biblical justice take in Mott’s moral theory? What is the nature of social involvement as 
He perceives it under this eschatological-packaged leitmotif?
Character of Biblical Justice
According to Mott, the comprehensive character of biblical justice is shaped by 
several important perspectives:2
1. Justice must be understood in the context of people as social beings. One’s 
conception of justice corresponds to an understanding of the relationship that the 
individual has to society. The biblical view assumes that people are social beings in 
contrast to modem liberal views which presupposes that individuals naturally live in 
separation from one another. In a social context, then, justice serves to enforce positive 
responsibilities o f care for one another as opposed to only preventing one’s exercise of
'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 74.
2Mott asserts that justice is a common biblical term even though English 
translations often veil the frequency and importance of justice in Scripture. According to 
Mott, ambiguity arises over the meaning of the biblical terms righteousness and 
judgment. The chief Hebrew and Greek words approximate our term justice. A rule of 
thumb is that when one sees righteousness or judgment in the context o f social 
responsibility or oppression, one can assume that justice would be a better translation. 
See his discussion, Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59; idem, A Christian 
Perspective on Political Thought. 77-78. This is a major presupposition behind Mott’s 
leitmotif.
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freedom from causing harm to one another.1
2. Justice is an essential characteristic of the children o f God. “Justice is very 
important in the biblical order of values. It is a central duty of the children of God.2 It 
shows that they have the true God as the object of their worship and devotion.3
3. Justice must be partial in order to be impartial, and that bias is toward the 
weak.4 Biblical justice presupposes that impartial treatment of all members of the 
community requires special attention to the groups of society who are most needy.5 
Within the limits of what is due to the poor and oppressed, it is impartial.6 This bias
'Mott, “The Partiality o f Biblical Justice,” 23.
2Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 78. According to Mott, this 
mandate can be found in such passages as: “let justice roll down like waters and 
righteousness like an overflowing stream” (Amos 5:24 NRSV); “Woe to you, scribes and 
Pharisees, hypocrites! For you pay tithe on mint and anise and cumin, and have neglected 
the weightier matters of the Law: justice and mercy and faith” (Matt 23:23 NKJV); and 
“He has shown you, O man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you but to 
do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God?” (Mic 6:8 NKJV). “Social 
justice is a theme that runs through the prophetic literature and into the New Testament, 
and it is regarded as so crucial to faith that without it other forms of piety are worthless” 
(Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 74-75).
3Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 79.
4Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 66; idem, “The Partiality of Biblical 
Justice,” 23-29.
5The poor had specific claims as members of a needy group (Jer 5:28; Prov 29.7).
6According to Mott, “the difference between scriptural and classical justice lies in 
the understanding of what is to be the normal situation in society. The Scriptures do not 
allow the presupposition of a condition in which groups or individuals are denied the 
ability to participate fully and equally in the life of the society. For this reason, justice is 
primarily spoken of by the biblical writers as activity on behalf of the disadvantaged” 
(Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 65).
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toward the weak means that in the social struggles in which the poor are perennially 
victims o f injustice, God and the followers of God take up the cause of the weak.1
4. Justice is “a call to action more than it is a principle of evaluation.”2 Justice is 
not so much what we know, as what we are to do. “It goes beyond simply being just in 
one’s personal relationships; it implies an active responsibility to see that justice is done 
in the community.”3 The activism of the biblical language of justice is striking: “loose the 
bonds . . .  undo the thongs . . .  let the oppressed go free . . .  break every yoke” (Isa 58:6-8, 
RSV). It means taking upon oneself the cause of those who are weak in their own 
defense.4 In this context, justice includes deliverance, i.e., the rectifying of gross social 
inequalities of the disadvantaged, the removal o f oppression, and intervening power to 
overcome exploitive power over the weak.s
5. God’s justice is our model of justice oriented to the poor and weak.6 The 
justice which characterizes God’s defense of the poor is the same justice which is 
demanded of humanity.7
'In passage after passage the group to whom justice is to be applied is the 
oppressed—the widow, the orphan, the resident alien, and the poor.
2Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 79.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 72.
4Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 79.
5Ibid., 80, 21-24; Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 25.
6Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 25.
7Ibid.
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There is a continuity between divine and human justice. Human beings receive 
justice from God for their decisions and responsibilities, and they leam justice 
from God. It is methodologically necessary to look at the biblical materials 
describing God’s social justice to develop the understanding of human 
responsibilities injustice.1
6. Justice is a restoration to community and provides the basic conditions for
active participation in community.2 Justice presupposes God’s intention for people to be
in community.3 Community membership means “the ability to share fully within one’s
capacity and potential in each essential aspect o f community."4 This restoration to
community assumes a basic relative equality based on basic needs and rights rather than
wealth, status, birth, education, ability, contract, religion, mathematical uniformity, etc.
There are benefit rights as well as freedom rights:5
When justice is set forth, it is the basic needs for inclusion in community which 
are set forth; and these concerns give direction to the economic, social and legal 
ordering of society.6
'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 80.
2Ibid.; Mott, “The Partiality o f Biblical Justice,” 25.
3Mott, “Justice,” 828.
4Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 25. According to Mott, the spheres of 
participation in the community have multiple dimensions, e.g., physical life itself, 
political protection and decision making, social interchange and standing, economic 
production, education, culture, and religion.
5Mott, “The Contribution of the Bible to Human Rights,” 5-12; idem, “Human 
Rights and Christian Thought,” 9-11; idem, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 
81-85.
6Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 29.
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7. Love is the basis o f biblical justice.1 Biblical justice is frequently found in
close association with love. “Together, love and justice make up the most important and
most characteristic component of biblical ethics."2 Because love is the meaning of Law,
and Law provides content for love, justice as a major part o f  the demand of the Law
provides structure to make love more possible in a social context.3 Love itself cannot
present a reason for preferring the cause of one neighbor over another.4 Justice, then, is
the servant of love. It specifies the meaning of love in the perennial situations o f human
conflict over the goods of social life.5 Furthermore, love gives justice moral meaning:
Love must persist even after it has propelled us into the realm of justice. ‘Love 
can only do more, it can never do less, than justice requires.’ It transcends justice 
because it is that which gives justice its moral meaning. Paul wrote, ‘If I divide 
up and distribute my possessions . . .  and do not have love, it is of no benefit’ (1 
Cor. 13.3).6
These characteristics o f biblical justice are set within the context of the reality of 
social evil.7 A major component of Mott’s social theory includes the background concept
’Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 92; idem, Biblical Ethics and 
Social Change. 48-56.
2Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 59.
3Ibid., 48-54.
4Ibid., 54.
5,1 Justice is the guide for reaching a proper equilibrium in the midst of the 
conflicting claims upon our love” (Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought.
91, 92).
6Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 54.
7See ibid., 1-21 (these thoughts first appeared in an article by Stephen Charles 
Mott titled, “Biblical Faith and the Reality of Social Evil,” Christian Scholar’s Review 9,
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that evil has a social and political character beyond isolated actions o f individuals. Evil is
in the very fabric o f our social existence.1 Furthermore, there is no radical distinction
between the person as an individual and as a social being. Evil exists in the society
outside the individual and exerts an influence upon him or her.2 The dynamic behind this
evil within sociopolitical reality is the evil supernatural powers.3 The implications of this
demonic-inspired evil residing in society concern its powerful influence on our customs,
traditions, thinking, and institutions. And so,
our struggle with evil must correspond to the geography of evil. In combating 
evil in the heart through evangelism and Christian nurture we deal with a crucial 
aspect of evil, but only one aspect. Dealing with the evil of the social order and 
the worldly powers involves social action, action in the world.4
And because we serve a different order, the reign o f  God, which comes in contrast
to the prevailing way of life in the social order as supported by the fallen powers, we are
to follow the Lordship of Christ who judges the world and conquers it.5 Our justice then,
will necessarily include the structures of social reality.
no. 3 [1979/1980]: 225-240); idem, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 26-41. 
'Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 4,6.
2Ibid., 5.
3Ibid., 6-10. According to Mott, “the biblical concepts of cosmos and the 
supernatural powers comprise an objective social reality which can function for good or 
for evil” (ibid., 10).
4Ibid., 16.
5Ibid., 18. “The church is to be engaged in a battle against evils within the social 
structure, because they mark the points of these powers’ penetration into our history” 
(ibid., 19).
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For Mott, “justice is more than a principle of analysis. It is a rallying point. 
Justice is a powerful motivator. One should have a passion for justice.”1 But what 
practical shape does this passion for justice take in social involvement?
Paths to Justice
According to Mott, the paths to justice begin with evangelism. Evangelism 
contributes significantly to moral change in the members of society, which in turn brings 
a leavening influence to society. It is also a major factor in heightening awareness of 
moral responsibility and producing social activists.2 But there are limits to evangelism. 
The objective reality of social life and social evil are not directly or fully confronted by 
the more individualistic dynamics o f evangelism. Paths to justice other than evangelism 
must also be followed.3 Evangelism and the implementation of justice are inseparable, 
however, both in Christian conduct and in the goal of God’s work in history. This 
interdependence can be seen from three perspectives: (1) witness is hurt when social 
action is absent; (2) witness is helped when social action is present; and (3) social action 
is needed to protect the fruits of witness.4 Mott notes that “social ministry and
'Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 74.
2Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 110-112. Mott notes that when revival 
and spiritual awakenings have been widespread in a society, they have frequently resulted 
in movements of social concern and reform.
3Ibid., 122.
4Ibid., 122-126.
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evangelical witness exist side by side in Scripture without conflict o f subordination."1
Because of this, there can be no designation of primary and secondary tasks. We need to
render wholehearted obedience to both tasks.2
Beyond evangelical witness, the path to justice for Mott, is comprehensive:
The obligation to do justice makes us responsible for the conduct of society in the 
most comprehensive sense. Wherever there is a basic need, we are obliged to help 
to the extent o f our ability and opportunity. ‘Do not hold back from those who are 
entitled to it, when you possess the power to do it’ (Prov. 3.27) sums up the whole 
teaching and how we are to relate it to our varying circumstances. Our power 
includes not only our personal resources but also class position and political 
opportunities.3
Wherever there is a basic need, help needs to be given to the extent o f our ability or 
opportunity. We are to do this within the context of the understanding of biblical justice 
as outlined above.
This principle, o f  course, can be read primarily in the context of individual social
responsibility and involvement. For Mott, though, such individual social responsibility is
very significant in influencing society. While groups, not individuals, formulate public
policy, the individual through associations ‘‘can get a piece o f the action by participating
in the process of making social decisions:"4
By neglecting the associational involvement of their members, churches are often 




“Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 47. Mott has in mind here 
lobbies, public interest groups, professional and trade associations, etc.
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influence on the institutions o f their society. The churches tend to promote a 
merely personal ethic and to ignore nonecclesiastical associational 
responsibilities. When members do participate, their associations are often not 
those that affect public policy; rather, they are those that are concerned with 
sociability.1
Individual Christian social responsibility and influence is thus a significant part of 
Mott’s social moral theory. In this context, the Christian community’s responsibility is 
one of support and providing the biblical, theological, and ethical resources necessary for 
its individual members to intelligently address social and political issues in the context of 
their opportunities or calling.2
Mott’s view of the Church as a "counter-community," however, goes beyond the 
action of its individual members. Because groups are channels for influencing society,3 
and individuals are necessarily limited in what they can realistically contribute toward or 
oppose,4 the Christian community, as a group within society, must exert its influence 
through its own life, word, and deed.5
'Ibid., 47-48. The point here concerns viewing society as a composite o f  groups 
rather than a composite of individuals. The associational slumber of the churches Mott 
refers to reflects “a composite of individuals” view of society, and overlooks how groups 
are channels for influencing society.
2Ibid., 10. No doubt this is what Mott is seeking to do in his social moral theory.
3Ibid., 47.
4Ibid.
5Mott suggests that the Christian community contributes to social change in three 
ways: (I) through various forms o f social action and service; (2) though the impact its 
nonconforming life has on the surrounding community; and most important (3) the 
support it gives to the individual involved in social action and mission (Mott, Biblical 
Ethics and Social Change. 133).
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It has already been noted that “the Reign o f God is not a social program, but 
faithfulness to its demands for justice necessitates social programs and social struggle.”1 
The social programs and social struggle will be consistent with the vision of justice Mott 
has articulated, e.g., the economic, social, and legal ordering of the community.2 It will 
be necessarily political.3 But through it all, it will show “an eschatological reserve,” and 
be a “realistic activism.”4 Mott thus articulates a model of social responsibility that is 
inclusive o f  the caring functions of the soft revolution, evangelism, and moral protest 
and personal influence in the socio-political arena. It is interesting to note here, though, 
that the direction of his political theory strongly leans towards a non-Communist 
socialism. In his opinion, this form of the common life most closely approximates the 
Christian vision. It has communal, democratic elements, much like the kibbutz, about 
which he has written with considerable conviction. According to Mott, “the hidden 
elements o f Christianity in Marxism make many of its concepts appropriate for an overtly 
Christian social philosophy."5
‘Ibid., 106.
2Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 29.
3Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 110, 70.
4Ibid., 108-111.
5Ibid., 197. He adds, “It is also conceivable for a Christian to interpret history by 
means of a dialectical historical analysis subsumed under the Reign of God, never fully in 
history” (ibid.). See Mott’s extended positive assessment of Marxist socialism and 
socialism in general, Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 183-218. See 
also, Max Lynn Stackhouse, review of A Christian Perspective on Political Thought, by 
Stephen Charles Mott, The Journal of Religion 75, no. 1 (January 1995): 149; and David 
Attwood, review of A Christian Perspective on Political Thought, by Stephen Charles
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Summary
The nature o f social involvement for Mott can be capsuled under the rubric, 
“biblical justice." The comprehensive character o f  biblical justice is shaped by several 
important perspectives, i.e., justice (1) must be understood in the context of people as 
social beings; (2) is an essential characteristic o f the children of God; (3) must be partial 
in order to be impartial— biased toward the weak; (4) is a call to action more than a 
principle o f evaluation; (5) reflects God’s justice which is our model of justice oriented to 
the poor and weak; (6) includes a restoration to active participation in community; (7) 
finds its moral meaning in love. The reign o f  God is interpreted largely through this 
leitmotif for social ethics. In doing so, Mott brings practical shape to his moral theory 
through what he terms “paths to justice." These “paths to justice” include a variety of 
ways in which Christians can bring about social change, i.e., evangelism, individual 
social responsibility and influence, moral protest and personal influence in the socio­
political arena, social programs and social struggle. A non-Communist form of socialism 
is envisioned as the form of the common life most closely approximating the Christian 
vision.
Implications for Moral Theory
While the broad outline of Mott’s application of the eschatological paradigm to 
moral theory is now clear, it is important to survey his application of the paradigm’s 
ethical implications with respect to the level of moral reflection and its potential for
Mott, Expository Times 105, no. 8 (May 1994): 253.
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concrete social content. The issues here deal primarily with questions of specificity and 
consistency with respect to the eschatological paradigm’s application. They bring into 
practical focus where normative content and guidance lie in the application process, and 
the carefulness with which they are used towards concrete ethical exigencies. This 
survey includes: (1) the theoretical level of moral reflection which the paradigm appears 
to elicit in Mott’s thinking; (2) the meaning and function o f paradigm in Mott’s moral 
theory; and (3) Mott’s correlation of the eschatological paradigm to philosophical ethics.
Level of Moral Reflection
As indicated in an earlier chapter, a correspondence can exist between a paradigm 
operating on either the macro, meso, or micro level, and the ingredients in the structure of 
ethics.1 This correspondence between the levels o f paradigm operation and ethical 
structure is only true in the order that has been suggested, i.e., macro/bases, 
meso/principles, micro/area rules. The question o f “theoretical level," which this 
correspondence facilitates between paradigm operation and moral reflection, enables one 
to clarify how concretely the eschatological paradigm might legitimately speak to modem 
ethical concerns.
The issue of “sufficient concreteness” is at the heart of Mott’s discussion o f the 
use o f Scripture in contemporary moral theory.2 His concern is understanding the place
'See above, p. 23, note 1. The ethical categories and terminology used in this 
study reflect Holmes’s ingredients for structuring an ethical theory (Holmes, 50-56).
2Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 238-247; idem, “How 
Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 719; idem, “The Contribution of the Bible
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of concrete decision making within different aspects o f  ethical thought, and showing how 
principles and concrete injunctions relate in Scriptural thought.1 It is within this larger 
discussion of the use o f Scripture that the "theoretical level" of the eschatological 
paradigm comes into view.
Macro/Bases
For Mott, Scripture is authoritative for ethics in different but complementary
ways. Scripture’s contribution to ethics is found in the mighty acts of God, in prevailing
ethical principles, in theological affirmations, and through particular concrete injunctions
(teachings and stories of Scripture).2 It is in this context that he states an important
hermeneutical principle:
The authority o f God in the concrete injunction must be interpreted with attention 
to God’s authority in mighty acts, in the theological affirmations, and in the 
prevailing ethical principles. And the specific teachings and propositions are 
needed to give concrete interpretation o f the broad and general truths and actions. 
. . .  If the concrete commandments are interpreted apart from consideration of the 
implications of the great acts of God recorded in Scripture and its basic 
theological affirmations, our ethical response is in danger of being theologically 
vacuous and cut off from the core of Christian life and commitment.3
Mott earlier asserts that “the concept of the Reign o f God is an example o f a basic
theological affirmation, rather than a specific mighty act o f God (although it involves
to Human Rights,” 25-34.
lMott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 239.
2Ibid., 243; Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11.
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11.
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such)."1 As a “basic theological affirmation” of Scripture, the reign o f  God would be 
expected, then, to bring moral reflection from the “macro” level o f paradigm application. 
In doing so, it would correspond primarily to the “theological or philosophical bases” 
ingredient in the structure of ethics. This is consistent with the broad way in which Mott 
does in fact apply the eschatological paradigm toward moral theory. As noted earlier, the 
reign o f  God “provides a context for God’s universal ethical concerns,” and it “furnishes a 
concept o f  history into which other New Testament themes can be placed.”2 There is an 
“eschatological vision" that presents “a continuing critique of all that falls short o f it” and 
“a normative glimpse of a perfect society.”3 The eschatological paradigm brings 
perceptions o f reality, a particular view of the world which, according to Mott, is an 
integral aspect of interpreting both social reality and Scripture itself.4
As a “basic theological affirmation,” the reign o f  God is seen in the hermeneutical 
context o f  opening the ethical meaning of Scripture, and providing parameters for 
interpreting specific concrete injunctions o f Scripture. The bridge between the two 
(theological affirmations and specific concrete injunctions) is the reality of their both 
yielding normative content of Scripture.
'Ibid., 10.
2Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 231. See above, 134-
139.
3Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 15.
4Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 240-241.
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Meso/Underlying Principles
There is evidence, however, that Mott articulates moral reflection from the “meso" 
level of paradigm application as well. In the structure of ethics, this would mean 
articulating underlying principles that can be applied in a universal way to various areas 
of moral activity.1 His statement that the “concept of the Reign of God is an example of a 
basic theological affirmation, rather than a specific mighty act of God (although it 
involves such)," yields an important qualification. While the reign o f  God is a basic 
theological affirmation, rather than a specific mighty act o f God, it nevertheless involves 
such. The reign o f  God is not just a perception o f reality, or a particular view of the 
world, it is the manifestation of God’s reassertion of sovereignty in history.2 For Mott, 
what God does is significant, and it is paradigmatic. There is specific moral content in 
what God does, toward which one can focus one’s moral reflection. Through God’s acts 
one finds moral principles that touch upon life. According to Mott, we learn from God 
compassion, love, justice, and social responsibility. Because justice characterizes God’s 
reign,3 is an expression of God’s reign,4 and the proclamation of the reign o f  God brings 
with it an imperative for justice,5 one is drawn from the broad realm of worldview to the 
more concrete level of underlying principles that can be applied to life.
'See Holmes, 51-53.
2Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 8.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 85.
4Mott, “The Contribution of the Bible to Human Rights,” 32.
5Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 97, 100.
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Since for Mott, the biblical language (reign, justice) facilitates the merging of his 
leitmotif for eschatology with his leitmotif for social ethics, he is able to outline 
prevailing ethical principles which delineate the basic goals, priorities, and concerns of 
social life.' This application of the reign o f  God from the “meso” level o f moral 
reflection (for ethics, underlying principles) illustrates that Mott’s approach to social 
ethics is a paradigmatic one, and that eschatology is likewise both perceived and 
employed paradigmatically.
It must be remembered that these observations come in the context of the 
important question of how to translate ethical reflection from one level to another.2 It is 
important to note, too, that the socalled “basic theological affirmations” receive their 
concrete content and interpretation via the specific teachings and propositions found in 
concrete injunctions.3 An organic hermeneutical relationship exists between the two 
levels o f moral reflection—one that is complementary, dependent, and interpretive. 
Concrete injunctions are necessary to interpret theological affirmations, and theological 
affirmations are needed to interpret concrete injunctions. Thus, the reign o f  God opens
'These have been broadly outlined in the above discussion of the character of 
biblical justice.
2I.e., from the macro to the meso to the micro, and from theological/philosophical 
bases to underlying principles to area rules. This includes the ability to move oppositely, 
i.e., area rules to underlying principles to bases, and micro to meso and macro where 
possible.
3For Mott, Scripture provides content for one’s worldview. He writes, 
“Scripture’s most important contribution to ethics may be in the content it provides for 
one’s world view” (Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 241).
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the way toward identifiable content and reasonable specificity with respect to application 
for moral theory.
Micro/Area Rules
Having surveyed Mott’s use of eschatology in moral theory, two important 
questions come to view with respect to the eschatological paradigm and contemporary 
praxis, i.e., (1) How does Mott’s application of the eschatological paradigm relate to 
contemporary ethical issues? and (2) How specific or concrete does his application of the 
eschatological paradigm allow him to be with respect to these issues? These questions 
bring us to the “micro” level of paradigm application and the corresponding “area rules” 
in moral theory.1 Answers to these questions are twofold. One revolves around Mott’s 
view of the nature of Scripture and his hermeneutic which attempts to interpret 
organically the different, but complementary, ways Scripture is authoritative for ethics. 
The other revolves around the nature o f the themes he addresses as important in the 
context of his moral theory.
Mott reads Scripture “with the expectation o f answers to questions o f social 
justice and oppression.”2 This is evidenced in his somewhat topical approach to Scripture 
which asks o f Scripture a question that may be commonplace in contemporary Christian
'Area rules are moral rules that apply to various areas of life, i.e., value of fetal 
life, truth telling, business transactions, economics, human rights, social justice, etc. (see 
Homes, 51, 53-54).
2Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, viii.
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ethics, but which would likely have been unfamiliar to first-century Christians.1 He thus 
tends to produce studies of immediate and concrete relevance. His broad outline of the 
nature o f social involvement and social change becomes focused, then, to include a wide 
array of specific contemporary ethical concerns. His “From the Word” column in 
Christian Social Action indicates this diversity,2 including such practical topics as interest 
on loans, ecological responsibility, capital punishment, homosexuality, centralized 
government, legislating religious values, unpaid wages, welfare reform, the 
interconnection of violence and injustice, gambling, and affirmative action.3
Beyond these focused columns, Mott’s larger works also express practical 
concerns such as the nature and content o f human rights, civil disobedience, revolutionary
'Verhey, 25.
2Mott’s monthly “From the Word” contribution to Christian Social Action has 
been consistent since his first column in the July/August issue, 1990.
3Stephen Charles Mott, “The Prohibition of Interest on Loans,” 37; idem, 
“Humankind’s Dual Relationship to the Creation,” Christian Social Action 3, no. 8 
(September 1990): 38; idem, “Biblical Injunctions on Capital Punishment.” Christian 
Social Action 3, no. 10 (November 1990): 39; idem, “Homosexual Practice and the Bible: 
Key Issues.” Christian Social Action 4. no. 2 (February 1991): 38; idem, “Status, Purity, 
and the Church’s Discussion of Homosexuality.” Christian Social Action 5, no. 5 (May 
1992): 44; idem, “Samuel’s Warning and Centralized Government,” Christian Social 
Action 4. no. 9 (October 1991): 37; idem, “Legislating Religious Values and Abortion,” 
Christian Social Action 5, no. 8 (September 1992): 37; idem, “The Land Cries Out 
Against Unpaid Wages,” Christian Social Action 6, no. 3 (March 1993): 37; idem, 
“Sabbatical Year Principles for Welfare Reform,” Christian Social Action 6, no. 9 
(October 1993): 35; idem, “The Pair o f Social Justice and Welfare Reform,” 38; idem, 
“Violence and Social Justice,” 39; idem, “Work: The Victim of Gambling,” Christian 
Social Action 7, no. 7 (July/August 1994): 34; idem, “Lazarus, Dives, and Affirmative 
Action,” 37.
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violence, and economics.1 His comprehensive discussion of politics opens toward the 
concrete concerns o f power in society, groups in society, the purpose o f government, a 
critique for the evaluation of political ideologies, and the shape of creative political 
reform.2
Mott’s discussion of the homeless is particularly revealing as to how his works 
tend to focus ultimately towards practical needs. It is particularly interesting to note how 
his lengthy discussion of homelessness in Christian Social Action includes the full range 
of paradigm operation (macro, meso, and micro) and the ingredients of ethical structure 
under discussion here (bases, underlying principles, area rules). It presents a clear 
example o f his methodology, both in operation and application. After outlining the 
realities and causes of homelessness in the United States, Mott presses for a political 
consciousness which goes beyond the relief o f immediate needs or mere financial 
assistance to address the root causes found in society-wide patterns. Individuals and 
groups o f Christians are called to work with local government agencies that serve as 
advocates for the poor and that address issues of empowerment.3 Here Mott’s
'Mott, “The Contribution of the Bible to Human Rights”; idem, “Human Rights 
and Christian Thought”; idem. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 142-166, 167-191; 
idem, “Lethal Force in the Context of a Theological Understanding of Power,” 61-68; 
idem, “Pacifism? Come Now!” The Other Side 13, no. 2 (July 1977): 64-69; idem, “The 
Politics o f Jesus and Our Responsibilities,” The Reformed Journal 26, no. 2 (February 
1976): 7-10; idem, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?”
2See Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought: idem, Biblical Ethics 
and Social Change. 192-208.
3Stephen Charles Mott, “Because Jesus Was Homeless for Us: A Biblical Study 
on Our Reponsibility to the Homeless,” Christian Social Action 2, no. 2 (February 1989): 
4-15.
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eschatological leitmotif—reign o f God—becomes an integral part of his biblical study of 
our responsibility to the homeless by providing a theological base, underlying principles, 
concrete content, as well as moral stimulus (compassion and motivation towards ministry 
to the homeless).
This focus toward immediate and concrete relevance is not programmatic, 
however. While social programs and social struggle are viewed as inevitable realities in 
light of the demands for justice which the reign o f  God brings,1 the “question of strategy” 
for implementation is not part of Mott’s focus.2 He offers no easy syllabi for executing 
his moral theory. Mott is a theorist. He works primarily on the levels of theological 
bases and underlying principles. But he does so with an eye constantly toward concrete 
biblical injunctions and specific social needs o f contemporary society. This awareness 
pulls him inevitably toward “area rules" in moral theory. Together with his hermeneutic 
of relating biblical principles and concrete injunctions, this tending toward “area rules" 
enables clear directions for Christian social involvement. This tending toward “area 
rules” in moral theory exhibits how paradigm for Mott includes this level o f  moral 
reflection.
Summary
With the above analysis in view, it is appropriate to conclude that, for Mott, the
'Mott. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 106.
2Verhey, 26.
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eschatological paradigm facilitates moral reflection across the spectrum of macro, meso, 
and micro paradigm operation. Because o f its close proximity to the biblical text, the 
eschatological paradigm enables moral reflection that includes theological bases, 
underlying principles, and area rules. The different levels of moral reflection are kept in 
view and are consciously related to so as to provide conceptual integrity and purposeful 
application for contemporary moral exigencies.
Paradigm Role and Function 
Paradigm1 is an integral part of Mott’s moral theory particularly as it relates to the 
question of an interpretive framework for concrete injunctions, finding values,2 
overarching principles, and cross-cultural applicability. His discussion of paradigm 
comes in those contexts where he is articulating how principles and concrete injunctions
'While this study uses the concept of paradigm in conjunction with eschatology, 
paradigm is used more broadly and generally by both Mott and Ogletree. In order to 
understand fully how these two ethicists apply eschatology as a paradigm, it is useful to 
observe how they relate to the concept of paradigm more generally and/or in other areas 
thought. For the purpose of clarification, the term “eschatological paradigm” is used 
where this study is focusing principally on their application of eschatology, and 
“paradigm” where it is discussing paradigm generally in order to understand how 
eschatology as paradigm correspondingly would be viewed or applied.
2The concept of “values” is introduced here as a component in Mott’s moral 
theory, but it is not crucial for the purposes or argumentation of this study. According to 
Mott, “one must discover the values in the economic, social, and political systems in the 
Bible and in theological reflection upon the Bible and the subsequent history of the 
church and indicate the modem arrangements which would best implement those values. 
Such a case will require empirical and historical information far beyond that which can be 
furnished from the Bible” (Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?”
17). It appears that values thus have a motivational function in both the search for and 
application of principles in the concrete injunctions o f the biblical text.
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relate in Scriptural thought.1
The "concrete materials" o f Scripture have “normative significance.”2 "Scripture
is very concrete because of God’s care for humanity in its particular material and social
existence.”3 This affirmation about the normative significance of concrete materials
should not, however,
mean a denial of the differences in our situation from that o f the original reception 
of the biblical passages, nor should it deny the incompleteness of these 
commandments for the whole o f ethical guidance. It means that since God’s 
revelation does come in concrete forms, every passage and every commandment 
o f Scripture should be examined for whatever meaning that they might contain 
which would transcend the original situation and relate to the situation of the 
reader o f another place and time.4
This search for meaning that would transcend the original situation includes 
finding values, overarching principles, and cross-cultural applicability. It means 
understanding “the often strange and seemingly archaic concreteness o f Scripture as an 
historical expression of transcendental truth designed for all humanity.” We thus 
"approach the Bible anticipating an inexhaustible richness o f meaning." Through valid 
exegesis we discover “in the particulars truths of greater universality." Behind specific
'Ibid., 11-15; idem, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 243-246; 
idem, “The Bible and Economics,” 26, 31-33; idem, “Limiting Personal Enforcement of 
the Law,” 37.
2Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 16.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 11. “The Bible’s very involvement with the historical moment makes the 
injunctions o f the Scripture dated for those who are struggling to be faithful in situations 
far removed in time” (ibid., 16).
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injunctions, we look for ethical principles.1 The paradigmatic nature o f specific
commands comes into view against this search for ethical principles:
In addition to general and summary commands, many very specific commands 
have within themselves a generalizing character.. . .  These specific commands are 
paradigmatic. They point to a range of activity much broader than what is stated. 
They model behavior which the hearer, or reader, is expected to identify and to 
apply to similar areas of life .. . .  The identification of other applications requires 
the hearer at some level of thought to define a principle o f conduct which unites 
the specific commandment to other specific, yet different applications. The 
modem reader similarly must identify the principle and determine appropriate 
applications in her or his social situation.2
Furthermore, the nature of Hebrew Law itself is viewed as paradigmatic and 
partial.3 It does not attempt to list everything that a law covered, but rather it provides a 
prominent example. It was to be applied to other similar examples.4 The role and 
function o f paradigm, then, articulate how principles and concrete injunctions relate in 
Scriptural thought.
Additionally, paradigmatic injunctions can appeal to imagination rather than
express mere abstract propositions:
Most of Jesus’s injunctions were paradigmatic.. . .  As in his parables, Jesus 
commands had a dramatic, poetic, and pictorial character. Rather than abstract
'Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 244.
2Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 13.
3Ibid., 14.
“Mott, “Limiting Personal Enforcement of the Law,” 37. “The Law functioned in 
a paradigmatic fashion, providing guidance for the village elders or other judges.. . .  
Paradigmatic means that its provisions served as examples and guides for application to 
specific cases as they arose. They were not directives to be carried out in exact detail” 
(Mott, “The Bible and Economics,” 31).
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principles, they appealed to imagination to stir conscience to look for the 
principle.1
While Mott discusses paradigm primarily in the context o f  eliciting authoritative
meaning from concrete injunctions, paradigm nevertheless factors largely in his overall
hermeneutic.2 This importance here is not paradigm itself, but the authoritative nature of
Scripture and the broad way in which it can be approached and interpreted. The
normative content—whether in concrete injunction, prevailing ethical principles, mighty
acts o f God, theological affirmations, or enduring values—is not in any paradigmatic
reality itself, but in the text. While the text creates the paradigm, the paradigm opens
back towards the text. Again, the hermeneutical principle Mott articulates is that
The authority of God in the concrete injunction must be interpreted with attention 
to God’s authority in mighty acts, in the theological affirmations, and in the
‘Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 245. An example Mott 
cites is the command to “turn the other cheek,” which points to a much broader range of 
activity than a literal slap on the face. It is paradigmatic in that it is a model of behavior 
where the hearer is expected to recognize the principle and apply it. “Even though the 
injunction is limited and incomplete, the way it applies its principles sets a pattern for 
later Christians to follow in different circumstances which possibly allow a fuller 
understanding. Since the controlling factor is the principle of which the injunction is an 
example, it allows a flexible adaptation to new historical situations.. . .  Although 
exemplary, the specific injunction is to be taken seriously. In fact, the argument that, 
because the injunction is paradigmatic, it is not law misses the paradigmatic nature of the 
Torah. In addition, the fact that the commands of Jesus are difficult to obey or to enforce 
does not rule out their character as law. Law has an important symbolic and educative 
function even when it does not actually control behavior. It gives expression to social 
imagination” (ibid., 245, 246).
2Mott asserts that the Exodus is a paradigm of justice (Mott, “The Bible and 
Economics,” 26), and in his view, in interpretation “one seeks to express in social life 
meaning which is analogous to the basic acts and affirmations o f the Bible” (Mott, “How 
Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11). God models justice, compassion, 
deliverance, etc. (Mott, “The Partiality of Biblical Justice,” 25).
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prevailing ethical principles. And the specific teachings and propositions are
needed to give concrete interpretation o f the broad and general truths and actions.1
These observations are significant for Mott’s application o f the eschatological 
paradigm in that the normative content for the eschatological paradigm likewise would 
lay primarily in the biblical text. In keeping with his approach to paradigm generally, his 
approach to eschatology tends towards specificity and concrete content in the moral 
images that the eschatological paradigm (particularly the reign o f  God) evokes. In 
addition, his application of the eschatological paradigm elicits sustained focus toward 
Scripture in the context of its application in moral theory.
It appears that the role and function o f paradigm, for Mott, is primarily that of 
facilitating an abstract basic principle which then needs to be translated and applied 
towards new situations. However, he also gives evidence that paradigm facilitates the 
imprinting of an inner gripping image which shapes people ethically.2 It appears that his 
use o f eschatology as paradigm is consistent with these conclusions. The eschatological 
paradigm facilitates abstract principles which need to be translated and applied towards 
our contemporary situation. Likewise, the eschatological paradigm has the motivational 
dynamic of imprinting an inner gripping image which shapes people ethically. This is 
further indication of Mott’s ability to nuance the eschatological paradigm through all 
levels o f  paradigm operation and ethical structure. The meso/underlying principles and 
micro/area rules levels of moral reflection are important aspects o f Mott’s moral theory.
•Mott, “How Should Christian Economists Use the Bible?” 11.
2See above discussion, 117-120.
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Relation to Philosophical Ethics
In his writings, Mott appears unconcerned with relating either his moral theory or 
the eschatological paradigm to the categories of philosophical ethics. His interests lie 
squarely in the area of social ethics. The categories of thought he uses are biblical, social, 
economic, and political. He applies modem sociological and ethical categories to the 
material o f the Bible to suggest new possibilities of meaning and to provide a means of 
assessing the applicability of the results o f exegesis to contemporary discussion.1 Where 
normative Scriptural materials relate to the formal components o f social ethics, Mott 
seeks to draw upon them in an authoritative manner.2 He does discuss the concept of 
prima facie duties, however, in his development o f strategic noncooperation.3 Here he 
briefly refers to the principle of utility and the concept o f the good.
Summary
This survey of Mott’s application of the eschatological paradigm’s ethical 
implications has included three important perspectives: (1) the theoretical level of moral 
reflection which the paradigm appears to elicit in Mott’s thinking; (2) the meaning and 
function o f paradigm in Mott’s moral theory; and (3) Mott’s correlation of the 
eschatological paradigm to philosophical ethics. With respect to the level of moral 
reflection, Mott nuances the eschatological paradigm through the full range of paradigm
‘Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, viii.
2Mott, “The Use of the New Testament for Social Ethics,” 241.
3Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change. 154-160.
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operation and ethical structure, i.e., macro/bases, meso/underlying principles, and 
micro/area rules. The role and function of paradigm for Mott are primarily that of 
facilitating an abstract principle which then needs to be translated and applied towards 
new situations. However, there is evidence that the paradigm has the motivational 
dynamic o f shaping people ethically through an inner gripping moral image. Finally, 
Mott appears unconcerned, generally, with relating either his moral theory or the 
eschatological paradigm to the categories of philosophical ethics.
Chapter Summary
Mott’s understanding of eschatology fits the general contours of the 
eschatological paradigm outlined in this study. He both views and articulates this 
paradigm within a realist perspective of human nature and the realities of history. While 
each of the components o f the paradigm is evident in his thinking, the reign o f  God 
becomes his leitmotif for nuancing eschatology toward moral theory. By interpreting the 
reign o f  God primarily through the category of biblical justice, Mott’s leitmotif for 
eschatology largely facilitates his leitmotif for social ethics, i.e., biblical justice. While 
Mott consciously perceives and nuances the paradigm from the standpoint of biblical 
theology and exegesis, the reign o f God, as a basic theological affirmation o f Scripture, 
becomes useful towards interpreting the social content and meaning o f Scripture itself. 
And while the Christian community assumes a subordinate, yet vital source of authority 
in relation to that o f Scripture, it is the primary field of moral operation for the ethics of 
the reign of God, and the primary structure through which the gospel works to change
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other structures. Furthermore, the nature of the Church’s social involvement in the larger 
society revolves around the character of biblical justice, which is always biased in favor 
of the poor and weak and includes a commitment to their defense.
A fundamental concern in Mott’s hermeneutic is the place of concrete decision 
making within different aspects o f ethical thought, and showing how principles and 
concrete injunctions relate in Scriptural thought. In this context, the diverse, but 
complementary, ways in which Scripture is authoritative for ethics are interpreted 
organically. The concrete injunctions must be interpreted with attention to God’s mighty 
acts, theological affirmations, and prevailing ethical principles. Likewise, the specific 
teachings and propositions are needed to give concrete interpretation of the broad and 
general truths and actions. Functionally, this provides the way for responsibly opening 
up the ethical meaning of Scripture across different levels of moral reflection and 
application. The paradigmatic nature of specific commands further facilitates a close 
application of the biblical text toward area rules in corresponding contemporary social 
questions. The role and function of paradigm articulate how principles and concrete 
injunctions relate in Scriptural thought and application toward contemporary society. 
Paradigmatic injunctions elicit both principle and moral imagination. Throughout, the 
normative content lies primarily in the biblical text.
As a  basic theological affirmation of Scripture, the reign o f  God is seen in the 
hermeneutical context of opening the ethical meaning of Scripture, and providing 
parameters for interpreting specific concrete injunctions o f Scripture. The bridge 
between the two is the reality of their both yielding normative content of Scripture. In
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addition, the reign o f  God receives concrete content through its organic relation to the 
concrete biblical injunction. The normative content for the eschatological paradigm thus 
lies primarily in the biblical text. In addition, because the reign o f  God is an expression 
of God’s mighty act to restore creation, His paradigmatic actions facilitate moral 
reflection on the meso level o f underlying principles and prevailing ethical values.
Mott is a theorist who works primarily on the levels of theological bases and 
underlying principles. But he does so with an eye toward concrete biblical injunctions 
and specific social needs of contemporary society. This pulls him inevitably toward “area 
rules” in moral theory. This tending toward “area rules" in moral theory exhibits how 
paradigm (and specifically the eschatological paradigm) for Mott ultimately includes the 
micro level of moral reflection. With this in view, it is appropriate to conclude that, for 
Mott, the eschatological paradigm facilitates moral reflection across the spectrum of 
macro, meso, and micro levels of paradigm operation. Because of its close proximity to 
the themes and values of the concrete biblical texts, the eschatological paradigm enables 
moral reflection that includes theological bases, underlying principles, and area rules.
Mott’s use of the eschatological paradigm in moral theory is consistent with his 
overall hermeneutic, and the use of paradigm in particular. His reign o f  God leitmotif is a 
determinant ingredient in his hermeneutic.
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CHAPTER 4
THOMAS W. OGLETREE’S USE OF ESCHATOLOGY 
IN MORAL THEORY
For Thomas W. Ogletree, “the primary challenge to Christian ethics is to find 
suitable ways of articulating the import of eschatology which figures in the biblical 
materials.”1 Ogletree is concerned with the “troublesome gap between biblical studies 
and Christian ethics.”2 He aims to “set forth an approach and a set of hermeneutical 
understandings for utilizing biblical materials in Christian ethics.”3 Because the biblical
'Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
2Ibid., xi; 1-14.
3Ibid., 11. As with Mott, the question of hermeneutics and methodology is a 
fundamental concern for Ogletree. Ogletree deals with hermeneutical and 
methodological issues in major ways, e.g., The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics: idem, 
Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions of Moral Understanding (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1985); idem, “The Secular City as a Theological Norm,” Religion in Life 36 
(Summer 1967): 202-215; idem, “In Quest of a Common Faith: The Theological Task of 
United Methodists,” Quarterly Review 8, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 43-53; idem, “Dimensions 
o f Practical Theology: Meaning, Action, Self,” in Practical Theology, ed. Don S. 
Browning (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983): 83-101; idem, “Christian Social Ethics 
as a Theological Discipline,” in Shifting Boundaries: Contextual Approaches to the 
Structure o f Theological Education, ed. Barbara G. Wheeler and Edward Farley 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991): 201-239; and idem, 
“Interpretation,” The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (1967), 311.
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materials are seen as opening up an “eschatological horizon of moral understanding”1—a 
“larger horizon of meaning which . . .  displays the significance and authority of moral 
notions”2—Ogletree finds in eschatology an important hermeneutical guide that enables a 
“fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds of meaning and those which make up our 
sense of reality.3 And because “biblical ethics is not yet Christian social ethics,”
Ogletree asserts that “understanding requires us to grasp in a new setting, one more 
complex, the force o f eschatological promise for social organization of life.”4
Ogletree’s project, however, is more than a mere outline of the contours of an 
eschatology-inspired “social organization of life.” His focus, rather, is on crucial, more 
fundamental themes which ethics must consider in relation to biblical materials and 
eschatology in particular, i.e., what he calls “the assumptions and critical principles which 
inform the reading of the biblical text.”5 These assumptions and critical principles 
include insights drawn from European phenomenology and traditional moral philosophy. 
With carefully structured precision, Ogletree lays out a path towards correlating 
phenomenology, moral philosophy, and biblical ethics toward contemporary Christian 
moral theory. Eschatology as a horizon o f moral understanding provides an important 
ingredient for this dialogue between the biblical materials and the critical discourse of
'Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177-192.
2Ibid., 177.
3Ibid., 175.
4Qgletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 143.
5Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, xiii.
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modem society.1
This chapter explores Ogletree’s use of eschatology in moral theory particularly as 
it concerns methodology toward application. It (1) describes the way in which Ogletree 
both perceives and nuances the eschatological paradigm (including his leitmotif); (2) 
outlines the methodological nuances that his application evokes/expresses with regard to 
our three principles of verification (Scripture, community, and nature of social 
involvement); and (3) surveys his application of the eschatological paradigm’s ethical 
implications with respect to level o f moral reflection and social content (macro/bases, 
meso/underlying principles, and micro/area rules).
Because Ogletree comes to the question of eschatology and ethics from the 
direction of phenomenology and moral philosophy, the correlation of the eschatological 
paradigm to philosophical ethics is treated prior to that of “principles of verification” and 
separate from “implications for moral theory.” Placing the discussion of the correlation 
to philosophical ethics earlier facilitates understanding with regard to the other 
methodological concerns outlined by this study as important in the application of 
eschatology in moral theory.
Furthermore, because The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics and Hospitality to 
the Stranger represent Ogletree’s primary and most focused discussion with regard to the
'According to Ogletree, “biblical eschatology presents a profound challenge to 
modem thought, a challenge that such thought will, if possible, ignore or dismiss. Yet if 
eschatology can become more intelligible within the critical discourse of modem society, 
then we will be in a better position to convey in that setting what Scripture has to teach us 
about ethics” (Thomas W. Ogletree, New Haven, CT, to Larry L. Lichtenwalter, 
September 26, 1996,1).
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use of eschatology in moral theory, and are viewed by him as methodologically 
interdependent companion volumes,1 this chapter will draw from them in a principal way 
in relation to his other writings.2
‘Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger, xi-xii. Most of the essays in the 1985 
volume (Hospitality to the Stranger! had been previously published and were written as 
preparatory studies for the 1983 volume (The Use o f the Bible in Christian EthicsL
2Ogletree’s writings express a diversity o f interest in relation to social moral 
theory and the use o f Scripture, e.g., (I) biblical materials, history, and historical thinking 
(Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison of Ernst 
Troeltsch and Karl Barth [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1965]—edited publication of his 
Vanderbilt Ph.D. diss, “Christology and History in the Theology of Karl Barth: A Critical 
Exposition in Light o f  the Historicism of Ernst Troeltsch,” 1963; idem, “Ideology and 
Ethical Reflection,” Working Paper, 1972—copy held at the School of Theology, 
University of the South, Sewanee, TN; idem, “Of Time and History.” Soundings: An 
Intersiciplinarv Journal 62, no. 1 [Spring 1979]: 1-8 ); (2) Marxist-Christian dialogue 
(idem, “What May Man Really Hope For?” in From Hope to Liberation: Towards a New 
Marxist-Christian Dialogue, ed. Nicholas Piediscalzi and Robert G. Thobaben 
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974], 40-51; idem, “Introduction,” in Openings for 
Marxist-Christian Dialogue, ed. Thomas W. Ogletree [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968],
11-46); (3) the nature of God (idem, “A Christological Assessment o f Dipolar Theism,” 
Journal o f Religion 47 [April 1967]: 87-99; idem, “The Gospel as Power: Explorations 
in a Theology of Social Change,” in The Living God, ed. Dow Kirkpatrick [Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1971], 174-206; idem, The Death of God Controversy [Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1967]); (4) trends in theological reflection (idem, “Contemporary 
Emphases in Christian Thought, or How to Be Fashionable in Your Theology.” The 
Christian Ministry 1, no. 3 [March 1970]: 34-37; idem, “From Anxiety to Responsibility: 
The Shifting Focus o f Theological Reflection,” The Chicago Theological Seminary 
Register 58, no. 3 [March 1968]: 1-23; (5) the nature and mission o f the church (idem, 
“The Church’s Mission to the World in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer” Encounter 
25, no. 4 [Autumn 1964]: 457-469; idem, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social 
Teaching,” in Justice and the Holv. ed. Douglas A. Knight and Peter J. Paris [Atlanta,
GA: Scholars Press, 1989], 279-296; idem, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 
in The Annual o f the Society of Christian Ethics, ed. Larry L. Rasmussen [Vancouver, 
BC: Society of Christian Ethics, 1984], 1-17; (6) power (idem, “Power and Human 
Fulfillment.” Pastoral Psychology 22. no. 216 [September 1971]: 42-53; (7) sexuality 
(idem, “The Moral Status o f Gay and Lesbian Partnerships in the Christian Life,” 
Working Paper for Discussion in the Yale Divinity School Community March 18, 1994); 
as well as (8) hermeneutics and methodology as per above, p. 188, n. 3. The import of 
eschatology appears throughout these varied themes, but becomes significantly more
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Eschatological Paradigm and Ethics
The significance o f eschatology in Ogletree’s moral theory can be seen in the 
prominence it is given in his companion volumes The Use of the Bible in Christian 
Ethics and Hospitality to the Stranger. Both volumes conclude with the horizon of 
meaning which eschatology brings to Christian moral theory, i.e., “The Eschatological 
Horizon o f New Testament Social Thought” (chapter 5)1 and “The Eschatological 
Horizon of Moral Understanding” (chapter 6).2 In addition, the three chapters in The Use 
o f the Bible in Christian Ethics which review the moral understandings of selected 
biblical literature each conclude with a statement of how contemporary moral 
understanding is thus challenged.3 The challenge can be summed up in one word: 
eschatology.4 The review of Synoptic materials is titled, “Synoptic Portrayals of 
Eschatological Existence.”5 The discussion of Pauline moral understanding begins with a
focused in his Hospitality to the Stranger and The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics.
'Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 127-149.
2Qgletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177-205. This chapter 
actually begins two pages earlier with the title “Toward Common Grounds of 
Understanding.” “The Eschatological Horizon o f Moral Understanding” is the first major 
section in this discussion. From this point on, eschatology dominates the thrust o f the 
“fusion of horizons” that Ogletree seeks to delineate in his closing discussion of the use 
o f the Bible in Christian moral theory.
3I.e., “The Challenge to Moral Understanding in Israel’s Legacy” (79-82); “The 
Challenge to Moral Understanding in the Synoptic Gospels” (127-130); and “The Pauline 
Challenge to Moral Understanding” (168-171).
4Gary Comstock, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas 
W. Ogletree, The Journal of Religion 66, no. 2 (April 1986): 214.
sOgletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 87-134.
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section titled, “The Primacy of Promise.”1 Finally, the “Prologue” to Hospitality to the 
Stranger sets eschatology as the context in which the hospitality motif is developed. 
These are important observations for two reasons: they indicate (1) that Ogletree 
intentionally and methodologically incorporates eschatology into his moral theory,2 and 
(2) that when he reads the Bible, an intimate connection between ethics and eschatology 
emerges.3
Perceiving the Paradigm 
Ogletree’s understanding of eschatology fits the general contours of the 
eschatological paradigm which this study has outlined. Each of the components of the
'Ibid., 138-146.
2Some have critiqued Ogletree for not making clearer how he thinks eschatology 
advances some of his constructive theses (L. Gregory Jones, review of Hospitality to the 
Stranger: Dimensions o f Moral Understanding, by Thomas W. Ogletree, Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 54, no. 4 [Winter 1986]: 192). Others speak of the 
abruptness with which eschatology is introduced into his description of phenomenology 
and moral philosophy, and how it eventually dominates interpretation so that in fact it 
becomes the primary category (Robin Scroggs, review of The Use of the Bible in 
Christian Ethics, by Thomas W. Ogletree, Chicago Theological Seminary Register 74, no.
3 [Fall 1984]: 44). The implication of these concerns is that eschatology is an adjunct 
theme rather than a ruling one, and that the materials under review do not express 
coherent methodology in using eschatology.
3 James H. Burtness, review of The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics and 
Hospitality to the Stranger, by Thomas W. Ogletree, .Dialog 25, no. 3 (Summer 1986): 
240. This intimate connection between ethics and eschatology has been a part of 
Ogletree’s Yale class lectures in “Basic Christian Ethics.” In his introductory lectures on 
“Christian Ethics as Theological Inquiry,” he includes sections on “The Eschatological 
Horizon: The Presence o f God’s Coming Realm o f Peace (Shalom),” “The Divine 
Sustenance of the Fallen World: The Preservation of Order Under Threats of Oppression 
and Chaos,” and “The Dialectic of Christian Existence ‘Between the Times’” (Thomas 
W. Ogletree, New Haven, CT, to Larry L. Lichtenwalter, March 31, 1993).
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paradigm {already/not yet, reign o f  God, horizon o f  the future) are thus evident in his 
thinking. As with Mott, however, they are not so evident with equal explicit reference or 
precise terminology as this study has defined. In fact, the direction from which Ogletree 
comes toward eschatology, while a direct one, is considerably more subtle with regard to 
particular paradigm components and their implications for moral theory. Standing in a 
developing tradition of reflection on the importance of eschatology for ethics, Ogletree 
extends the discussion towards those issues that are of concern to him.1 In the process, 
some of the components o f the eschatological paradigm are more assumed than they are 
articulated.
Already/Not Yet
According to Ogletree, “the most salient feature of New Testament eschatology is 
the substantive presence o f the new age in the midst of the old. It is existence ‘between 
the times,’ better, existence in the dialectical interpenetration of the times.”2 This 
dialectical interplay between the two ages is the essence of what he terms “dialectical 
eschatologies” in contrast to that of “futurist eschatologies” (eschatologies marked by a 
fundamental duality).3 In describing “dialectical eschatologies,” Ogletree includes 
already/not yet imagery and refers to the “proleptic” fashion in which the new age is 
present:
'Sedgwick, 397, 398.
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 130-131, n. 4.
3Ibid., 177-182.
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They hold that the hoped-for age is already becoming a substantive reality in 
selected spheres of human life despite the general persistence o f the present evil 
age. The coming new age is not yet fully actual, not even in limited regions of 
experience. It is present only in proleptic fashion. Thus, the coming reality 
shows itself in its incompleteness at the same time that it displays its genuine 
actuality. Dialectical eschatologies are comprised of opposing tendencies in 
constant interaction. They say at the one and the same time: yea and nay, already 
and not yet.1
This dialectical interplay between the ages brings expression to the “indicative of 
the gospel” by setting forth some of the substantive content o f the new age as it is taking 
form.2 It expresses, too, the “imperative of the gospel” because “the new age is also a 
task and a demand.”3 The gospel calls for works of ministry which give concrete social 
reality to its promises. The subtle interplay of the indicative and imperative in the 
presentation of the gospel reflects the fact that the eschatological tension which 
characterizes Christian existence cuts into, (1) the believer’s own self-experience,4 (2) the 
interface between the church and the institutions of the larger society, as well as (3) the 
concrete reality of the church itself.5 Thus, there are interior,6 communal, and social 
dimensions of the tensions figuring in eschatological existence.7





6Ibid., 148. “As a person coming to life in Jesus Christ, I continue to be pulled at, 
assaulted, and disturbed by the power of my old self, even though that old self has now 
been consigned to death and is passing away” (ibid., 147,148).
7Ibid., 182-187.
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“The task,” Ogletree states, “is to grasp the way in which the world and its claims 
present themselves to awareness when existence is determined by such an interplay. It is 
to discern how such an awareness impacts our presumptions about the authority of values 
which are constitutive of the present world order.”1 Christians are being summoned to 
live for the new age in the midst of the old, “accepting structures which continue to 
embody the old as spheres o f their activity on behalf of the new.’’2 The state and the 
economic order are seen as having provisional validity, but only insofar as they provide a 
certain order which for the present makes human life possible.3
Reign of God
The concept of the reign o f  God as God’s dynamic rule or government is not 
explicit in Ogletree’s writings. At the most, and rather infrequently, he refers to the 
“kingdom of God,” “coming kingdom,” “coming kingdom of God,” “kingdom of 
heaven,” or “coming realm of God.”4 He does, however, refer to the “coming realm of 
God” as a “primal image” which provides “an encompassing vision” for the moral
'Ibid., 130-131, n. 4.
2Ibid., 166, 167.
3 Ibid., 129.
4Ogletree, “Power and Human Fulfillment,” 44; idem, “What May Man Really 
Hope For?” 44; idem, “The Secular City as a Theological Norm,” 213; idem, Hospitality 
to the Stranger. 127; idem, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 88, 92-94, 99, 127, 
129, 131, n. 5, 132-133, n. 25,135,145; idem, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological 
Discipline,” 212.
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ordering of values and which specifies a pattern of life for Christian ethics.1 And as “the 
new world coming into being,” the Kingdom of God operates by “a different set of 
ground rules.”2 The presentness o f the Kingdom of God includes both “promises” and 
“demands.”3 There are consequences of not responding faithfully to the “claims” of the 
kingdom of God, consequences o f disobedience.4 Discipleship emerges as the central 
category for setting forth the moral life in the Kingdom.5 Discipleship is eschatological 
existence. It is existence governed by the realities of the coming new age (the coming 
Kingdom of God), but lived out under the conditions o f the old.6 Discipleship means 
being governed in activity and thinking by the presence of the coming kingdom.7 The 
substantive content o f  discipleship is radical obedience and steadfast loyalty.8 This 
radical obedience “concerns not merely behavioral correctness, but the total self: not 
simply purposive resolve, but affections, attitudes, feelings, and desires.”9 Thus the
‘Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 121.
2Ogletree, “Power and Human Fulfillment,” 44.
3Ogletree, “The Secular City as a Theological Norm,” 213.





9Ibid., 145 (see also, 90-91, 145-146, 168-169). These thoughts represent a 
synthesis of Ogletree’s development of Synoptic and Pauline eschatological emphasis, 
i.e., their similarities o f focus (deontological/perfectionist thinking where deontological 
thinking is subordinate to and dependent upon perfectionist motifs) and how Paul moves
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concept o f God’s rule or reign is present, but not with the explicit terminology, reign o f  
God.
Horizon of the Future
While Ogletree does not use the terminology horizon o f  the future, the nuances o f 
this paradigm component are nevertheless significant in his thinking. The concept of 
“horizon” is a recurring motif in his two companion volumes. He is searching for an 
“interpretive fusion of horizons” between the thinking o f our contemporary world and 
that of the biblical world.1 He posits the “eschatological horizon” as the crucial 
ingredient for this “fusion of horizons.”2 This “eschatological horizon of moral 
understanding” includes a determinate future ingredient. Ogletree brings this future 
ingredient most clearly into focus under the rubric o f “promise.” Promise is future- 
oriented.3 Promise is a category of the future.4 Promise “expresses the moral creativity 
and imagination elicited by the presence of the new age.”5 It is in full accord with Pauline
the discussion of radical obedience to a more fundamental level (i.e., to 
deontological/perfectionist thinking founded on grace and centering in promise). The 
point here is that, while not mentioned, the reign o f  God finds expression in a life of 
radical obedience and loyalty that finds expression in the total self.
‘Ibid., 3, 39-41, 175.
2Ibid., 177-192; idem, Hospitality to the Stranger. 127-145.
3Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 199-200; idem, Hospitality to 
the. Stranger, 138.
4Ogletree. The Use of the Bible In Christian Ethics. 153.
5Ibid., 200.
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dialectical eschatology1 which Ogletree selects as his “paradigm case” for articulating the 
full import o f New Testament dialectical eschatology.2 In addition, as a “primal image,” 
the “coming realm of God” provides an “encompassing vision” for a moral ordering of 
values which specifies a pattern of life for Christian ethics.3 Finally, as an eschatological 
community, “we are to work out new ways of being together as human beings in the 
presence o f the unfolding purposes of God.”4 This working out “new ways of being 
together” implies Christian thinking about ethics and presupposes a Christian frame of 
reference:
Yet an eschatological orientation is by no means closed, nor can it finally be 
described as circular. It is the orientation o f a pilgrim people struggling in the 
midst o f a hostile environment to enter into the reality of a new order o f the world. 
Its logic is dialectical rather than syllogistic, which means it remains ever open to 
new discoveries and formations in the concrete interactions which are the stuff of 
history. Its basic structure is better represented by an open horizon than a circle.5
This outline o f Ogletree’s use of eschatology reveals how each of the components
'Ibid. Ogletree includes a section titled “The Primacy of Promise” in his 
discussion of Pauline dialectical eschatology. It is a primacy of promise over law, but the 
promise dynamic facilitates an open view towards the future, where the reality o f  the 
future qualifies and motivates present moral life. In effect, the reality of the 
future—which is not—replaces the reality of God’s law and post revelation—which is. 
Ogletree is not precise in indicating whether his view of the reality of the not yet is 
ontological or epistemological.
2Scroggs, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas W. 
Ogletree, 45.
3OgIetree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 212.
4Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 13.
sIbid. (italics supplied).
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of the eschatological paradigm are evident in his thinking, though not with equal explicit 
reference or precise terminology. His understanding of eschatology fits the general 
contours of the eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined. Like Mott, it is 
apparent that Ogletree works within the general assumptions of the eschatological 
paradigm and feels no need to re-articulate every aspect as he moves ahead in extending 
its implications with respect to his project.
Nuancing the Paradigm
Leitmotif
In The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics . Ogletree highlights two basic types of 
eschatology: “futurist eschatologies” and “dialectical eschatologies.”1 He finds these two 
basic types of eschatology apparent in the Old Testament and New Testament biblical 
materials, respectively.2 Subvariants of these two types of eschatologies can be identified 
in each.3
Ogletree finds “futurist eschatologies” most apparent in exilic and postexilic 
literature of the Old Testament.4 Futurist eschatologies “call attention to the alien nature 
of the existing world, yet refuse to grant ultimacy to that world.”5 They “generate ethical
'Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177-182.
2Ibid., 177.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 177, 69-71, 79-82.
5Ibid., 177.
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perspectives marked by a fundamental duality,”1 i.e., “an ethic of hope directed to a world 
which is not yet,2 and an ethic o f patient waiting and faithful enduring in the alien 
circumstances of the present.”3 Both the hope and patient-waiting features of “futurist 
eschatologies” presuppose a faithful community which maintains standards and 
perceptions different from the dominant society.4
Ogletree finds “dialectical eschatologies” most apparent in Synoptic and Pauline 
literature of the New Testament.5 “Dialectical eschatologies,” while reflecting most of 
the features of “futurist eschatologies,” include one important modification. The hoped- 
for age is already becoming a substantive reality in selected spheres o f human life despite 
the general persistence of the present evil age.6 There is a proleptic presence of the new 
age. While incomplete, the new age displays genuine actuality. Like “futurist 
eschatologies . . .  dialectical eschatologies . . .  depend for their social reality on faithful
'Ibid.
2"The ethic o f hope looks to a coming world where human well-being and 
fulfillment are genuine possibilities. It nurtures understandings and expectations which 
belong to that world, even though they are out of line with presently existing realities. It 
refuses to concede the final word to the taken-for-granted dictums of the present age. It is 
quite able and willing to expose and resist their oppressive features” (ibid.).
3"The ethic o f patient waiting and faithful enduring concerns ways of coping with 
the alien realities o f the present. For this ethic, the issue is fidelity to a manner of life 
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communities which stand over against the world even as they are situated within it.”1
What is distinctive for “dialectical eschatologies,” however, is that
these communities attest the newness o f the power at work in them to a  degree not 
so clearly manifest in futurist eschatologies. The people are not simply enduring, 
no matter how faithfully: they are also participating in the transforming power of 
the age for which they hope.. . .  They are working out new understandings and 
new ways of being together which challenge the institutional arrangements o f the 
larger society. They are already an eschatological community. The ethic of 
dialectical eschatologies is itself dialectical in form.2
While acknowledging that the differences between these two eschatologies can be 
overstated, Ogletree asserts that the most salient differences concern the ways in which 
the two communities (those futurist or dialectically formed) place themselves in the total 
movement of history.3 “At issue is the degree of continuity perceived to hold between the 
past and present and between present and future.”4 “Futurist eschatologies” tend to 
accent continuity with a sacral tradition where the redemption offered by the hoped-for 
future can be realized only by a qualitative break with present realities.5 For “dialectical 
eschatologies,” a decisive break with the past has already occurred, sacral traditions are 
significantly modified by new realities coming into being, and an orientation to the
'Ibid., 179.
2Ibid. The dialectical form which the ethic of “dialectical eschatologies” assumes, 
on the one hand, seeks appropriate ways of articulating the moral import of the present 
reality of the new age and, on the other hand, reflects the incompleteness of the new age 
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creation of the new exists.1 The substantive theological difference between these two 
types o f eschatology is the coming of the Messiah and the inauguration of the new age, 
though its consummation remains outstanding.2
The purpose of Ogletree’s contrasting “futurist eschatologies” with “dialectical 
eschatologies” is to highlight the larger horizon of meaning which New Testament 
eschatology brings for Christian moral reflection.3 In light o f New Testament biblical 
materials, that larger-meaning horizon is seen as “dialectical” in nature. The “heart of 
eschatological existence” is “existence ‘between the times,’ better, existence in the 
dialectical interpenetration of the times.”4 It is “participating in a dialectic which presses 
toward a creative compromise.”5 Eschatology thus “generates understandings that are 
dialectical through and through.”6 While Ogletree works within the general contours of 
the eschatological paradigm, it is this already/not yet dialectical which dominates. Nearly
‘Ibid. For Ogletree, this orientation to the creation of the new has a universal 
reach and includes a readiness to rethink ancient legacies which permits a new kind of 
openness to the plurality of human cultures and the formation of community with persons 
from many nations and races.
2Ibid„ 181.
3Ibid., 176-177. While “futurist eschatologies” reflect primarily an Old Testament 
perspective, Christian communities may function in ways that are essentially identical 
with characteristics o f the Jewish heritage. When they do not display in their practical 
everyday affairs a strong sense of the inauguration o f the messianic age with the openness 
to new understandings and associations which that implies, their eschatology assumes a 
largely futurist form (ibid., 182).
“Ibid., 130-131, n. 4.
5Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 14, 12-13.
6Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31, 1993, 1.
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every perspective of his eschatologically informed ethic falls within the context of this 
dialectical. The already/not yet, then, is Ogletree’s leitmotif for nuancing the 
eschatological paradigm.
Hermeneutical Nuances
As Ogletree’s leitmotif for nuancing the moral implications of the eschatological 
paradigm, the already/not yet dialectical yields significant hermeneutical value.
Creative context for future orientation
The already/not yet provides the creative context for a focused future orientation 
in ethical methodology. The import of Ogletree’s contrasting “futurist eschatologies” 
with “dialectical eschatologies” is more than simply contrasting New Testament over that 
o f  Old Testament eschatologies, or in highlighting the most salient feature of New 
Testament eschatology as dialectical. It is in nuancing realities o f the “future” in the 
context o f this “dialectical.” The casual reader may rightly conclude that, for Christian 
ethics, “dialectical” is preferable over that of “futurist,” but the careful reader will sense 
the “consistently future movement” in Ogletree’s use o f “dialectical” and in his ethical 
method as a whole.1 His contrasting terminology “futurist” and “dialectical” can be 
misleading. “Futurist” is used here primarily with reference to the fundamental duality 
some eschatologies imply, together with their orientation to past sacral traditions and an 
anticipated radical break between the ages somewhere in the future. Ogletree, however, 
is not discussing the reality of “future” within “dialectical eschatologies,” the horizon o f
'Burtness, 239.
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the future component of the eschatological paradigm, or theologies of the future within 
twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology.
In reviewing emphases in Christian theology through the 1960s (process 
theologies, political theologies, and theologies of the future), Ogletree noted common 
motifs o f change, process, novelty, creativity, promise, and the future.1 His discussion of 
“theologies of the future” (or the “theologies of hope”) describes how such theologies 
“are carried out in openness to the future, in the presence o f new possibility.”2 He further 
notes how “theologies of the future were developed in large measure in dialogue with 
contemporary Marxist philosophers, especially Ernst Bloch.”3 Moltmann and Pannenberg 
are named as principal architects o f theologies of the future.
Ogletree is thus well versed with a very different kind of “future” emphasis with 
regard to understanding eschatology than the “futurist eschatologies” he discusses in The 
Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. Furthermore, his ethical method displays a 
“consistently future movement” in keeping with the broad contours o f theologies o f the 
future. In outlining his perspectives on the horizon o f  the future , it was noted that the 
“eschatological horizon of moral understanding” includes a determinate future 
ingredient.4 This future ingredient is most clearly focused under the rubric of “promise,”
'Ogletree, “Contemporary Emphases in Christian Thought, or How to Be 
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which is said to be “future-oriented,” “a category of the future.” Furthermore, “promise” 
“expresses the moral creativity and imagination elicited by the presence of the new age.”1 
The basic structure of the Christian frame of reference is “an open horizon,” a horizon 
that is “ever open to new discoveries and formations in the concrete interaction which are 
the stuff o f history.”2
This “future” focus finds further expression in his participation in the Marxist- 
Christian dialogue.3 In addressing the question “What May Man Really Hope For?” 
Ogletree asserts the need for two levels of hope in order to be realistic: the ultimate 
religious hope and concrete historical hope.4 “Christian hope involves (1) an ultimate 
religious hope of participation in the divine life, but it also involves (2) ever-new forms of 
concrete historical expression o f that ultimate hope.”5 Christian hope must be continually 
understood as
a present reality qualifying our life in this world, sustaining us in our secular 
existence as we face everyday problems and struggle to overcome very specific 
and concrete wrongs by projecting and working to realize alternate historical 
futures.6
'Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 200. One problem with 
promise as a category is that it becomes a general concept. In Scripture, however, 
promise is always concrete. It is the promise of something concrete in space and time 
that when fulfilled can be actually verified.
2Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 13.
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In other words, “ultimate religious hope can have some very important
consequences for the way we engage in concrete, historical struggles.”1 Ogletree suggests
that Marxists have provided us with a model for giving social reality and substance to the
concrete historical expression o f Christian hope.2 The level o f  concrete historical hope,
however, cannot abolish the human significance of a more ultimate level of hope:3
Christian hope reminds us that man cannot find fulfillment in his total being by 
the creation of any conceivable society. Any society we are able to bring into 
being is going to have its own distortions, its own brokenness, its own ambiguity, 
its own pain, its own incompleteness.4
Ogletree states that the treatment of eschatology he finds most congenial is 
probably that elaborated by Moltmann, though he would not describe his work as 
dependent upon Moltmann.5 His views of eschatology grew out o f his own attempt to 
make sense of biblical materials in conjunction with a dialectical reading of historical
'Ibid., 49.
2Ibid., 51,43, 44,47. Ogletree notes that the import o f  Marx’s interpretation of 
ideology for ethical reflection includes eschatological, dialectical, and community themes 
(Ogletree, “Ideology and Ethical Reflection,” 9,10).
3Ibid.,51.
4Ibid., 43.
5Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31,1993,2. Ogletree writes that, while his 
roots are Methodist and Wesleyan, he identifies his perspective with ecumenical 
Protestantism and claims rootage in the liberal commitment to the social gospel. He 
views the social gospel as a social and institutional articulation o f evangelical 
Protestantism (ibid., 2; idem, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social Teaching,” 279- 
296; idem, “In Quest of a Common Faith: The Theological Task of United Methodists,” 
43-53; idem, “In Quest of Multi-Cultural Theological Education,” Drew Gateway 59, no. 
1 [Fall 1989]: 43-48).
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development.1 In this context, Ernst Troeltch2 and Ernst Bloch3 have both been 
contributors.
The point here is that, while “eschatology generates understandings that are 
dialectical through and through,”4 Ogletree’s application of the eschatological paradigm 
essentially nuances toward the horizon o f  the future component. No doubt, the realities 
and import o f “future” are nuanced in the context o f  the “dialectical.” Yes, they are 
articulated through the “dialectical.” Nevertheless, his ethical method expresses a 
consistently future movement in keeping with the broad contours o f theologies of the 
future. Ogletree’s dialectical horizon of moral understanding is essentially a horizon o f  
the future where moral creativity and imagination are elicited in the context o f the 
presence o f the coming new age.5 While the already/not yet dialectical is the determinate 
context in which this future movement appears, “future” is, in fact, Ogletree’s functional 
emphasis with respect to paradigm application and implications for moral theory.
Though the already/not yet dialectical is the controlling and contextualizing component,
'Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31, 1993,2.
2Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context o f Christian Ethics,” 14; idem, “Christian 
Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 221; idem, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant 
Social Teaching,” 289,293; idem, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison of 
Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Barth: idem, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 17.
3"One of my favorite Marxists is a man by the name of Ernst Bloch” (Thomas W. 
Ogletree, “Response” in From Hope To Liberation: Towards a New Marxist-Christian 
Dialogue, ed. Nicholas Piediscalzi and Robert G. Thobaben [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1974], 61).
4Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31, 1993,1.
sOgletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 200.
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functionally, the horizon o f  the future is Ogletree’s determinate emphasis in nuancing the 
eschatological paradigm.1 By keeping the horizon o f  the future closely linked to and 
controlled by the already/not yet dialectical, however, he is able to avoid some of the 
imbalance (and often, extremes) found in most theologies of the future. Were it not for 
his repeated and strong emphasis on the “dialectical,” one could easily posit Ogletree’s 
methodology as that o f a theology of the future. At the least, his is a strongly future- 
oriented subvariant o f “dialectical eschatologies.”2
Furnishing a  meaning horizon
The already/not yet dialectical furnishes a meaning horizon for Christian moral 
consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon of human experience. According 
to Ogletree,
to speak o f eschatology is to characterize the larger horizon of meaning which in 
given traditions displays the significance and authority of moral notions. This 
meaning horizon does not directly generate specifically moral notions, but it 
profoundly qualifies them and substantially informs the manner in which they 
present themselves to consciousness.3
'This point will become clearer as other issues under discussion in this chapter are 
developed, i.e., the role of Scripture, the nature of social involvement, level o f moral 
reflection, and concrete content.
2Of course, the notion of “dialectical” is apparent in nearly all theologies o f the 
future, but some, by emphasizing the “ontological priority of future,” or the “future of 
God as the future o f history,” functionally detach themselves from the biblical notions 
and cautions of that “dialectical.” In so doing, they lose balance and in essence are no 
longer really “dialectical” but “futuristic.” It appears that Ogletree is attempting 
throughout to maintain “dialectical” balance and avoid the extremes of distorted 
eschatologies.
3Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
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Furthermore, “the discussion of eschatology represents one way of articulating the 
question of the meaning of being.”1 According to Ogletree, the meaning of being “hovers 
before all facets of moral awareness.”2 It is a question that “concerns the ultimate sense 
and significance of the human pilgrimage.”3 It is the “wider matrix of meaning within 
which the moral life itself is situated.”4 In fact, moral life is framed by the question o f the 
meaning of being.s It is the context in which we interpret and assess distinctively moral 
notions.6 Furthermore, “our way of apprehending the meaning of being will materially 
inform the moral meanings themselves.”7
The meaning of being for Ogletree is linked to the temporal horizon of human 
experience and consciousness, i.e., historical contextualism.8 There is a concrete 







7Ibid., 38. “The larger meaning horizon which provides the matrix for our moral 
understandings is in no case neutral in its import for the latter” (ibid., 39).
8Ibid., 192,34-41. “Historical contextualism accents the fact that the possibilities 
o f moral understanding given with the constitutive structures of human being always 
appear in historically determinate forms” (ibid., 35).
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cultural contexts.”1 History gives concreteness to human understandings of moral life.2 
According to Ogletree,
the strength of historical contextualism is that it directs us to concrete experience 
and to the meanings which form it. In so doing it serves a lively discourse about 
what is going on in our common world, and about the proper response to it.3
Two important issues are apparent in the above discussion o f meaning of being
and historical contextualism. One has to do with worldview, metaphysics, and the
ultimate whence. The other has to do with life in the world, concrete history, and the
pertinent and timely. Describing twentieth-century work in Christian ethics as “by and
large, marked by a strong historical consciousness,” Ogletree states, “We no longer seek
the absolute and the final; we search for the pertinent and timely.”4 In other words, in the
end, we seek that which is relevant and practical to temporal human experience.5 Only in
this way can moral theory and the biblical materials become useful in contemporary life.
'Ibid., 35,192-193. Culture historializes the possibilities o f moral understanding 
which belong to human being.
2Ibid. According to Ogletree, “moral understandings are always relative to a 
particular history, to the possibilities it has actualized, to the limits it sets to further 
developments, to the openings for movement and creative growth is has brought into 
being” (ibid.).
3Ibid., 38.
4Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 97.
5OgIetree’s concern in this context is how often universalized moral principles are 
applied without critical awareness of the concrete meanings that should be associated 
with them. We are not able in practice to think about concrete moral problems in strictly 
universal terms. Critical scholarship and philosophical ethics have gone awry, often 
tending toward abstractness and the irrelevant, towards language and logic rather than 
concrete experience.
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The already/not yet dialectical provides a meaning horizon for moral 
consciousness that includes this temporal horizon of human experience. The dialectical 
interplay between the two ages direct us to concrete experience and to the meanings 
which form concrete experience. That same dialectical interplay gives a sense of “what is 
going on in our common world” and what “proper response” there should be to it.1 The 
meaning horizon which the already/not yet dialectical furnishes is that Christian existence 
unfolds in the midst of concrete historical life. For Ogletree, the task o f Christian ethics 
is to grasp the way in which the world and its claims present themselves to awareness 
when existence is determined by the interplay of existence “between the times.”2 “It is to 
discern how such an awareness impacts our presumptions about the authority of values 
which are constitutive of the present world order.”3 The already/not yet dialectical 
facilitates this kind of awareness and interaction with our world. While presenting a 
distinctive worldview, it relates to life in the world. While opening awareness to our 
ultimate whence, it is pertinent and timely. It provides a version o f historical 
contextualism, a sense of history, and an understanding as to how one should place
1 Ogletree’s project seeks to contribute to and carry out the style of thinking 
expressed in H. Richard Niebuhr’s proposal for an “ethics of responsibility” (Ogletree, 
Hospitality to the Stranger. 99, 100, 121; idem, “Interpretation,” 311). For an ethics of 
fitting, Niebuhr contends that “in our responsibility we attempt to answer the question: 
‘What shall I do?’ by raising the prior question: ‘What is going on?’” (Niebuhr, The 
Responsible Self. 63).
2Qgletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 130-131, n. 4.
3Ibid.
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oneself in the total movement of history.1 
Fusion o f  horizons
The already/not yet enables a “fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds of 
meaning and those which make up our sense of reality. Ogletree asserts that there are 
larger meanings capable of binding together contemporary interpreter and ancient text,2 
e.g., meanings which provide a point o f  contact, meanings which initiate conversation, 
meanings that can be shared. These meanings relate to the question o f the meaning of 
being and the realities of temporal human experience.3 They extend from a set of 
preunderstandings of the moral life which express certain taken-for-granted ideas at work 
in moral thought and experience,4 i.e., types of moral reasoning with corresponding 
structures of action.5 These meanings are present in the biblical text as well as in 
contemporary life.6 The historical situatedness o f the biblical materials implies their 





5These include: (1) consequentialist thinking, which elicits goal-oriented actions 
and relate to the question of values and intentionality; (2) deontological views, which 
elicit communicative interactions and relate to the question of intersubjectivity and one’s 
obligations to others; and (3) perfectionism thinking, which elicits processes of self­
formation and relate to the question o f virtues (ibid., 16-18,40, 176-177).
6Ibid.
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uttered.1 “This surplus of meaning stems from that about which the texts speak,”2 i.e., the 
“concerns addressed by the biblical texts.”3 It is this subject matter which offers the 
possibility o f common ground for understanding biblical worlds o f  meaning and those 
that make up our sense of reality.4
Because the already/not yet (1) furnishes a meaning horizon for moral 
consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon of human experience, and (2) 
represents one way of articulating the question of the meaning of being, it provides a 
frame of reference which permits us to engage the biblical texts not simply as artifacts of 
an ancient culture but as utterances possibly saying something true about our own reality.5 
In doing so it enables a “fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds o f meaning and 
those which make up our sense of reality. In addition, it facilitates a synthesis toward 
integrating moral philosophy and biblical ethics into contemporary Christian ethical 
theory.
Dialectical nature o f  Christian ethics
The already/not yet elucidates the essential dialectical nature o f Christian moral 
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is important to specifically note that “existence in the dialectical interpenetration o f the 
times” brings corresponding dialectical shape to Christian moral theory and methodology. 
“The ethic o f dialectical eschatologies is itself dialectical in form.”1 This explicit 
dialectical methodology and thinking is to find expression in moral reflection with regard 
to the interior, communal, and social dimensions of the tensions figuring in eschatological 
existence. In other words, it is to impact the believer’s own self-experience, the concrete 
reality of the church itself, and the interface between the church and the institutions of the 
larger society.2 Insofar as this dialectic captures the moral structure of the eschatological 
community,3 it opens the way towards understanding (1) the relation between law and 
promise,4 (2) the moral import of the gospel’s indicative and imperatives,5 and (3) the 
realities o f social alienation and communal commitment.6
Summary
The import of eschatology in Ogletree’s moral theory can be seen in the 
prominence it is given in his companion volumes The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics
'Ibid., 179.
2See above, 195.
3Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 202.
4Ibid., 202. Ogletree asserts that “law and promise are . . .  dialectically related.”
5Ibid., 187, 180.
6I.e., some degree o f alienation from the institutional arrangements of the larger 
society, and deep involvement with a community which is engaged in developing 
qualitatively distinct alternatives to those arrangements (ibid., 182-187).
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and Hospitality to the Stranger. The thesis he argues is that “the New Testament has 
eschatology to teach.”' Like Mott, this eschatology fits the general contours of the 
eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined. While he works within the general 
contours o f the eschatological paradigm, however, he clearly nuances the already/not yet 
component over that of the reign o f  God and the horizon o f  the future. The already/not 
yet thus becomes his leitmotif for nuancing the moral implications o f the eschatological 
paradigm. These hermeneutical nuances include (1) providing the creative context for a 
focused-future orientation in ethical methodology; (2) furnishing a meaning horizon for 
Christian moral consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon of human 
experience; (3) enabling a “fusion o f horizons” between biblical worlds o f meaning and 
those which make up our sense of reality; and (4) elucidating the essential “dialectical 
nature” o f Christian moral theory and methodology. While “eschatology generates 
understandings that are dialectical through and through,” application of this dialectical 
within the eschatological paradigm essentially nuances towards the horizon o f  the future. 
Ogletree’s ethical method thus expresses a consistently future movement in keeping with 
the broad contours of theologies of the future.
Relation to Moral Philosophy
As we undertake a critical engagement with the Bible on the nature of moral 
experience, our first task is to gain greater self-awareness about our own taken- 
for-granted beliefs and convictions. In questioning the Bible about its moral 
understandings, or in seeking to uncover the questions to which it presents itself 
as an answer, what do we conceive the subject matter o f  the inquiry to be? What 
preunderstandings guide it? What presuppositions govern our angle of vision on
‘Ibid., 130, n. 4.
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it? What are the bases for these preunderstandings? How sound are they?1
Ogletree’s goal “is to enhance our grasp of the moral life by way of critical 
engagement with the biblical texts.”2 If one takes the material o f his companion volumes, 
The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics and Hospitality to the Stranger, in the order in 
which they were written, looking at the latter volume first, it becomes clear that Ogletree 
is very indebted to moral philosophy, and phenomonology in particular, for his 
“assumptions and critical principles which inform the reading o f  the biblical texts.”3 In 
fact, the hermeneutical theory behind his methodology is Gadamer’s phenomenology and 
the interpretive fusion o f horizons.4 So much is this so that the title for The Use of the 
Bible in Christian Ethics can appear misleading. The book is really concerned with 
common ground between the Bible and accounts of the moral life developed in 
phenomenology.5 With carefully structured precision, Ogletree lays out a path towards 
correlating phenomenology, moral philosophy, and biblical ethics toward contemporary
'Ibid., 15.
2Ibid., xii.
3Burtness, 239; Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, xiii.
4Comstock, 213. Ogletree writes, “The account of interpreting here being set 
forth depends throughout on Gadamer’s accomplishments. See also chap. 1 of The Use 
of the Bible in Christian Ethics, pp. 1-6; idem, Hospitality to the Stranger. 33, n. 26.
There are extensive references to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Haermas, Martin 
Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Paul Ricoeur, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Immanuel Levinas. 
See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 306-307, 
374-375, 397, 576, for his “fusion of horizons” in interpretation theory.
5Sedgwick, 404. Burtness, however, states that Ogletree’s books are not about 
phenomenology per se, but rather that he makes use of phenomenology because it helps 
him attend to method in his doing ethics (Burtness, 239).
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Christian moral theory.
The “interpretive task” is the achievement o f a common mind, a “fusion of 
horizons” between biblical worlds of meaning and those which make up our sense of 
reality.1 “It is to reach a shared understanding of the subject matter which provides the 
common ground between the texts and our own inquiries.”2 According to Ogletree, “we 
move toward this fusion of horizons by making explicit our own preunderstandings of the 
subject matter of the texts.”3 These preunderstandings are “preunderstandings of the 
moral life” and “express certain taken-for-granted ideas at work in moral thought and 
experience.”4 They are the “plurality of views in our own intellectual context” and 
“contemporary culture.”5 These preunderstandings include (1) moral philosophy, (2) 
phenomenology, and (3) historical contextualism. Ogletree asserts that his treatment of 
these “promising resources for preunderstandings which can equip us to engage the 
biblical texts in a discourse about the moral life” have not been “worked out in isolation 
from the biblical faith itself.” In unfolding their meaning and significance, he already has 
in view “the distinctiveness of the world of the Bible.”6 These three “promising resources
'Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 175, 2-4.
2Ibid., 3.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 175, 16. According to Ogletree, “they represent fairly advanced stages of 
thinking about moral life” (ibid., 5).
5Ibid., 16.
6Ibid., 5. This is an important observation in light of the problem as to how the 
questions contemporary culture and experience ask or bring to the biblical text determine
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for preunderstanding” find correlation and biblical orientation through the New 
Testament dialectical of eschatology as a horizon o f moral understanding.
Moral Philosophy and Phenomenology 
Ogletree’s methodology outlines and analyzes three dominant perspectives of 
moral philosophy in Western thought: consequentialist, deontological, and perfectionist 
perspectives.1 Because these three perspectives have all found strong philosophical 
statement and defense in modem thought, their significance is not simply philosophical. 
They have persistent “importance in treatments of ethics because of their relative success 
in articulating elemental facets of concrete moral experience.”2 Neither of these 
perspectives, however, is adequate if taken separately. Rather, a synthesis is required for 
their effective import for Christian ethics in relation to the biblical materials.3
These three perspectives have persistence in human thought because they are 
rooted in fundamental structures which order our being in the world as human beings. 
Ogletree’s primary interest is “to display in the structures that make up the life world the
interpretation (and reciprocally, how much the Bible determines interpretation). Ogletree 
asserts that, “given the role of the Bible in Western civilization, almost any o f our moral 
notions will reflect its impact in some fashion. To its direct influence must be added the 
interpretive accomplishments of many predecessors, especially the great teachers of the 
church, and those who have contributed to the mediation of biblical faith in the practical 
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experiential bases o f these three ethical perspectives.”1 In other words, he is concerned 
with the “underlying structures” on which they are founded.2 To accomplish this, he is 
guided by phenomenological descriptions of constitutive features of our worldly being,
i.e., intentionality, intersubjectivity, and the implications o f the self.3 Moral philosophy, 
then, is viewed and nuanced via phenomenology. Consequentialist, deontological, and 
perfectionist perspectives are viewed and nuanced via intentionality, intersubjectivity, and 
the implications of the self, respectively.
It should be noted here that Ogletree sees the task of phenomenology as describing 
“the constitutive features of the life-world in terms of intentional structure of 
consciousness.”4 This perspective entails “making explicit the acts of consciousness 
which correspond to the various modalities of sense that present themselves to the 
awareness in the life-world.”5 In other words, it deals with the ways of being and acting 
in the world. It facilitates a life-world perspective. It puts us in touch with the way the 





4Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 15. (Ogletree refers to a “life world” and to 
a “life-world.” While there may be a bit of inconsistency here, the former appears to 
assert the reality that there is a “life world,” while the latter is his technical term for what 
that “life-world” constitutes in terms of ethical perspectives and constituent features.
5Ibid.
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Viewing and nuancing moral philosophy via phenomenology yields, then, 
significant insight into the ideas at work in moral thought and experience.
1. Consequentialist theories of the moral life are seen as presupposing and 
articulating the intentional structure of human action.1 They express values and goal- 
oriented actions which in turn express the overall meaning of our worldly being.2 In 
addition, they articulate what is morally at stake in the intentional structure of action.3
2. Deontological theories are viewed as deriving their force from the 
intersubjective structure of action. They focus on the constraints and imperatives of 
action which are generated by the presence of other persons in our field of action.4 The 
special significance of deontological perspectives on the moral life is their “ability to 
articulate the basic requisites of human life and dignity.”5
3. Perfectionist theories are seen as highlighting “the personhood of the moral 
actor.”6 They elicit processes of self-formation and relate to the question of virtues.7 
They point to those aspects of our being that we can most readily subject to explicit moral
'Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 18.
2I.e., values specify what we have come to acknowledge as desirable, as worthy of 





7Ibid., 28-31. “For perfectionist theories, it is the fullest realization of virtue by 
concrete human persons which is the primary substance of the ethical” (ibid., 32, 33).
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and ethical reflection.1 Furthermore, “the being of the self as body is crucial to self- 
identity.”2 My body locates me in the world, hence, self-identity above all involves 
temporality.3
Historical Contextualism
In seeking a theory which encompasses consequentialist/intentionality, 
deontological/intersubjectivity, and perfectionist/self-formation perspectives, Ogletree 
articulates a framework of thought which grants preeminence to human historicity.4 In 
other words, his desired synthesis between the dominant models of moral philosophy is 
determined by the temporal horizon o f human experience.5 He labels this view “historical 
contextualism.”6 The account of temporality highlights the larger-meaning horizon which 
gives unity and significance to these three basic structures and the modes of 






5Ibid., 17. “It is chiefly the temporal structure o f experience which leads us to 
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Phenomenology, then, leads ultimately to the question of the temporal horizon of
human existence and the meaning of being.1 As quoted earlier:
The strength of historical contextualism is that it directs us to concrete experience 
and to the meanings which form it. In doing so it serves a lively discourse about 
what is going on in our common world, and about the proper response to it.2
The temporal horizon of human experience together with the meaning of being
express two important issues in fundamental ethics: worldview and life in the world. In
other words, it has to do with that which is relevant and practical to temporal human
experience. To sum up,
we have goal-oriented actions, communicative interactions, and processes o f self- 
formation. To these three aspects o f our practical worldly engagements 
correspond three modalities o f meaning: values, obligations, and virtues. These 
types o f meanings in their historialized forms make up the substantive content of 
the moral life. The moral life in turn is framed by the question of the meaning of 
being. It is the latter question which directs us to the totality of understanding 
within which we are able to establish and confirm the significance o f the more 
discrete meanings which belong to moral awareness.3
Scripture and Eschatology 
The above correlation—of moral philosophy and phenomenology— provides a 
“paradigm” that Ogletree believes will help elucidate the moral import o f biblical 




4Robert Giannini, review of The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas 
W. Ogletree, Saint Luke’s Journal of Theology 29 (December 1985): 73.
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interpreter in a presentation o f biblical notions and engages the biblical texts in a 
discourse about the moral life.1 He attempts, then, “a reconstruction of pivotal themes of 
biblical faith, ordered with reference to those preunderstandings.”2
A key presupposition here is that what is being asked by these preunderstandings 
and what the biblical texts are actually saying will intersect productively in some fashion, 
though perhaps not exactly as one initially supposes.3 This presupposition assumes that 
the world of the Bible fundamentally shares the human ways of being and acting in the 
world, i.e., the temporal horizon of human experience and the meaning of being. The 
biblical world has a “historical situatedness.”4 “Life situations” shaped the production, 
development, and transformation of materials found in the biblical texts, as well as 
provided the context for those concerns addressed by that data.s
It is precisely here, at the temporal horizon of human experience and the meaning 
of being, that the possibility exists for the biblical world of meaning and our world of 
meaning to intersect. Because eschatology (1) furnishes a meaning horizon for moral 
consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon o f human experience, and (2) 
represents one way of articulating the question of meaning of being, it opens this
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possibility up to actuality.1 The eschatological dimension becomes just what is needed if 
we are to move from the philosophical models (Ogletree’s preunderstandings based on 
moral philosophy and phenomenology) to the meaning horizon of the biblical materials, 
and then, on to a  Christian moral theory for today. Because eschatology takes seriously 
the “question o f being,” that is, the challenge o f human existence as rooted in a particular 
time and place, it provides the means whereby concerns of phenomenology can be 
integrated with traditional moral philosophy and biblical ethics into Christian moral 
theory.2
Testing the biblical material against this scheme, Ogletree shows that the Old 
Testament is predominantly deontological in character, though with a significant element 
o f perfectionism in later books.3 He finds the New Testament, however, primarily 
perfectionist in character.4 In particular, “eschatology is the basis for the predominance
'See above discussion, 209-215.
2 John Barton, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas W. 
Ogletree, Hevthrop Journal 29, no. 2 (April 1988): 246.
3Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 47, 48, 76-82, 193. His 
analysis o f Old Testament material concentrates on the Pentateuch, especially its legal 
traditions, and on the eighth- and seventh-century literary prophets. Ogletree states that 
his selection of Old Testament and New Testament biblical materials for his study was 
not arbitrary, but rather reflects the brief nature of his study and a judgment concerning 
what is most distinctive and interesting in the Bible so far as contemporary Christian 
ethics is concerned (ibid., 10,11).
4Ibid., 89, 90, 194. His analysis of the New Testament material concentrates on 
the Synoptic Gospels and the Pauline corpus (ibid., 11). It is interesting that Ogletree 
does not include any of the biblical apocalyptic materials from either testaments.
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of perfectionist themes in the New Testament.”1 Deontological thinking, however, is not 
absent in the New Testament. Rather, it is subordinated to and dependent upon 
perfectionist motifs.2 Laws and commandments function not simply as statements of 
what we are to do, but predominantly as specifications of who we are to become.3 Where 
deontological themes are present, they are so without the benefit o f the category o f  law,4 
and are expressed within the context o f ordering the eschatological community where 
perfectionist themes predominate with relational emphases.5 Eschatology is seen as 
providing the dialectic between law and promise which enables deontological thinking to 
work within the purview of perfectionism.6 Neither testament contains more than the 
merest hint of consequentialism.7
Summary
Unlike Mott, the categories of moral philosophy factor largely in Ogletree’s 
eschatologically oriented moral theory. In fact, it is striking to find such a readiness to 
see analogies with classical moral theories in the Bible. It is very rare to find any 
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creative way, and one which includes the concerns of phenomenology as well as that of 
biblical eschatology.1 Ogletree’s style makes it hard to see, at times, where all this 
theoretical discussion is going. Nevertheless, it represents his understanding of the 
“interpretive task.” And that is to achieve a common mind, a “fusion of horizons” 
between biblical worlds of meaning and those which make up our sense of reality. To do 
so he focuses on what he considers crucial, more fundamental themes which ethics must 
consider in relation to the biblical materials. By (1) viewing and nuancing the dominant 
conceptualizations of moral life (consequentialist/vale, deontological/law, and 
perfectionist/virtue) via their corresponding constituents o f our worldly being 
(intentionality, intersubjectivity, and the implications of self, respectively), and (2) setting 
this synthesis within the temporal structure of human experience (historical 
contextualism), Ogletree finds a promising resource of preunderstanding with which to 
engage the biblical materials in a discourse about the moral life. Because eschatology is 
both central to these biblical materials and provides a larger horizon of moral 
understanding which takes serious the temporal horizon of human experience and the 
question o f the meaning of being, it becomes just what is needed to bring an overall 
correlation towards contemporary Christian moral theory.2
'Barton, 245,246.
2My phrase “just what is needed” is not intended here as pejorative as if  to convey 
a sense o f a fortuitous circumstance or a convenient discovery on the part of Ogletree. 
Ogletree is concerned with facilitating dialogue between the biblical materials and the 
critical and often abstract notions o f modem philosophical ethics. For him, biblical 
eschatology provides the best bridge in that dialogue, one which both conveys what the 
Scriptures has to teach us about ethics and which presents a profound challenge to 
modem thought.
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Paradigm and Principles of Verification
As we have seen, Ogletree’s work as a whole is guided by a methodology based 
on phenomenological investigations.1 It is a methodology governed by a life-world 
perspective2 which serves to develop the connections between moral philosophy, biblical 
studies, and Christian ethics. In this context eschatology plays a hermeneutical role 
toward the overall synthesis. The methodological nuances which this application of the 
eschatological paradigm to moral theory evokes/expresses with regard to our three 
principles of verification (Scripture, community, and the nature of social involvement) are 
significant.
Role of Scripture
The important role which Scripture plays in Ogletree’s moral theory is seen in the 
fact that he undertakes the task of “setting forth an approach and a set of hermeneutical 
understandings for utilizing biblical materials in Christian ethics.”3 “Christian ethics 
soon loses its distinctive power if it cuts itself off from its biblical foundations,”4 he 
asserts. Therefore, I want to “venture formulations of the moral life which are congruent 
with central features of biblical faith.”5 Furthermore
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if  we turn to the Bible in our ethical inquiries, it is because we believe that it can 
disclose something important about moral experience. The interest in the Bible is 
not simply historical, the attempt to re-present moral notions which are 
characteristic of an ancient cultural totality, for the sake, let us say, o f an enlarged 
consciousness of the origins o f our own culture. It is existential, the concern to 
make sense o f the moral life in relation to possibilities opening up in our own 
setting. It is for the sake of truth and goodness that we turn to the Bible. In 
directing our attention to the Bible in this fashion, we presume that it has 
something to say to us that we do not already know.1
Like Mott, Ogletree is very deliberate in explaining his approach to Scripture.2 
And with Mott, he shares a fourfold methodology in keeping with his Wesleyan and 
Methodist heritage. In discussing the place of Scripture among the sources and criteria of 
theology in United Methodism, he articulates Scripture, tradition, experience, and reason 
as interacting reciprocally, so that each illumines and is illumined by the others.3 The 
issue he has in view is the question o f the “primacy of Scripture” in relation to the other 
constituent features o f this methodology. “The primacy of Scripture is a reality for us not 
apart from the other three resources, but only in and by means of their full operation.”4 
He further asserts:
It has been suggested that the emphasis on the primacy of Scripture establishes as
'Ibid., 1.
2Ibid., 1-14; idem, “The Secular City as a Theological Norm,” 213, 214; idem, 
“Interpretation,” 311; idem, “In Quest o f  a Common Faith: The Theological Task of 
United Methodist,” 47-50; idem, “Dimensions of Practical Theology: Meaning, Action, 
Self,” 87-90.
3Ogletree, “In Quest of a Common Faith: The Theological Task of United 
Methodists,” 47. This 1988 article in the Methodist Quarterly Review focuses on the 
Methodist General Conference Commission Report of a then-proposed new statement on 
the theological task of United Methodists.
4Ibid.
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normative one particular theological option: namely, ‘biblical theology.’ I would 
contend instead that any approach to theology is permitted, even encouraged, 
which clearly acknowledges the primacy of Scripture and recognizes at the same 
time the indispensable role of tradition, experience and reason in appropriating the 
biblical witness into our total understanding of reality. Where United Methodists 
disagree, is not over the primacy of Scripture, but over the way Scripture is 
received and interpreted.1
The issue, then, for Ogletree is not the “primacy of Scripture” per se, which he 
steadfastly affirms, but rather the way in which Scripture is actually “received and 
interpreted.” Tradition, experience, and reason are indispensable in appropriating the 
biblical witness into our total understanding of reality. They play an obviously crucial 
role in how Scripture is both received and interpreted. In light of his hermeneutic based 
on phenomenological investigations, it is clear how important moral philosophy, 
phenomenology, and historical contextualism are in this receiving and interpreting 
process. They provide the clear assumptions and critical principles which inform the 
reading of the biblical text.2 Furthermore, Ogletree’s methodology shows dependence 
upon and an openness toward historical-critical methodology which includes tradition 
criticism, form criticism, redaction criticism, and literary criticism in the study of the 
biblical texts.3 Because tradition criticism attends to the life situations underlying the 
transmission of traditions, it provides data of particular interest to a hermeneutic 
governed by a life-world perspective.4 The account of life-world structures, which the
'Ibid., 48.
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, xiii.
3Ibid., xi, 6.
4Ibid., 7.
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traditio-historical school brings, enables one to thematize the religious dimensions of 
moral awareness in a fashion that puts them in critical contact with concerns addressed by 
the biblical texts.1
In the context o f these observations, three further observations can be made with
regard to Scripture in Ogletree’s moral theory.
1. Ogletree’s view of the nature of Scripture largely follows that of existential and
quasi-encounter theology.2 As literature, the Bible is made up of human documents
written in the past against a backdrop of quite different social and cultural milieus.3 Its
fundamental meaning is historical and existential.4 While we must keep its historical
situatedness clearly in view,
its meaning is not reducible to the conscious intentions o f its authors in the 
original situations of production, nor to the senses it had for its initial readers.. . .
There is a surplus o f meaning in texts beyond what is explicitly uttered. This 
surplus stems from that about which the texts speak. It is this subject matter 
which offers the possibility of common ground for understanding between authors 
and interpreters.. . .
'Ibid.
2Ogletree states that his re-presentation of classical biblical themes draws largely 
upon biblical scholarship embodying or depending upon form and tradition criticism. “In 
regard to Old Testament texts, the accomplishments of Martin Noth and Gerhard von Rad 
will be the central resource. For the New Testament, the studies that presuppose and 
build upon the work of Rudolf Bultmann, moving to and including the more recent 
redaction criticism, will occupy an analogous position” (ibid., 6, 13, n. 6). Ogletree is 
largely dependent upon others for those chapters where he presents textual analysis 
(Kenneth R. Himes, “Scripture and Ethics: A Review Essay,” Biblical Theology Bulletin 
15 [April 1985]: 66).
3Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 10, 2.
4Ibid., 1,10.
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Interpretation. . .  does not consist simply in the exposition o f the original 
meanings. It finally involves an enlargement of the understanding of the 
interpreter concerning that about which the texts speak as a result o f an encounter 
with the texts-----
a work of the productive imagination of the interpreter. . .  will raise what the 
texts are saying to a higher level of generality, one capable of expressing the 
interpreter’s own sense of the truth. To capture what the texts are saying, we 
cannot simply repeat or paraphrase their explicit utterances.. . .  We must rather 
generate new utterances, new accounts o f the subject matter of the texts, which 
also make sense to us. Here we come up against a basic paradox, to say the same 
thing as the texts, we must say something different.1
While we presume that the Bible has something to say that we do not already
know, and on this presumption we dare to place our own convictions at risk in our
reading of the biblical texts,
such receptivity to the world of the Bible does not in itself imply any dogma of 
biblical authority. It requires no more than the recognition of a phenomenon: that 
the biblical texts have in the course o f our history been able to prove themselves 
over and over as saying something true.2
Furthermore, the biblical materials participate formatively in constructing ethical 
theory that is intentionally only provisionally held by the believing community. Ongoing 
dialogue may alter it further.3 And while an essential thematic unity of the biblical 
witness exists, that unity “resides more in the unfolding identity o f a people, and of a
'Ibid., 2, 3.
2Ibid., 1, 2. One can rightly ask Ogletree, “What is the real meaning of the 
primacy o f Scripture if it does not in itself imply any dogma of biblical authority?” 
Ogletree undoubtedly is reacting here to a fundamentalist, literalistic biblicism. 
Nevertheless, his statement does seem to imply that the biblical materials are 
authoritative only because they have proven themselves to be so, rather than having any 
inherent authority in themselves as God’s inspired revelation to man.
3Ibid., 200-203.
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church arising in relation to that people, than in particular themes, beliefs, or ways of 
thinking as such.”1
Ogletree’s stated purpose, however, is to “venture formulations o f the moral life 
which are congruent with central features o f biblical faith.”2 He is concerned with the 
“retrieval of biblical convictions” about the moral life.3 In conversation with the text, our 
preunderstandings themselves are subject to questioning in terms of what the texts say.
We must be prepared to modify them [our preunderstandings] in light o f  this
questioning, until we are able to give them a form which links us to the meanings
uttered in the texts. In the process we grant the texts the power to open up and
transform our understanding of the matter under inquiry.4
In his thinking, he already has in view the distinctiveness of the world o f the Bible 
when he formulates and begins to apply his preunderstandings of the moral life. He 
works them out in the context of biblical faith itself.5 There is the sense that, in the final 




4Ibid., 4. While our preunderstandings will themselves be placed in question, and 
be transformed through encounter with the texts, this “transformation does not entail total 
surrender to the texts. It does not require us to give up all independent judgment, all 
personal responsibility for apprehending and articulating what is true and good .. . .  The 
paradox of interpreting is that we are able to say the same thing as the text only by saying 
something different” (ibid., 176).
5Ibid., 5.
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and classical moral theory gives only a few analytical tools towards interpretation.1
Still, while Ogletree insists that Scripture is uniquely authoritative for Christian 
ethics, it is not because it reveals timeless truths or proposes unchanging ethical 
principles. The enduring value of Scripture is not to provide concrete guidance about 
current moral issues but to present a horizon of understanding within which very diverse 
peoples can identify themselves.
2. Interpretation is a dialogical process in which we encounter the biblical texts as 
pointers to elements o f human experience that may illumine our own historical 
experience.2 Interpretation involves three distinct and interrelated processes:3 (a) 
exegesis, reading the biblical materials in their own social and cultural settings, aided by 
the tools of historical and literary criticism;4 (b) critical engagement, reading the biblical
‘It would be a mistake to suppose, as some do, that Ogletree has first accepted 
philosophical moral theory, phenomenology, and historical contextualism and has then 
interpreted Scripture in such a way that it will conform to this secular philosophy. 
Rather, Ogletree sees in these categories the very tools which are needed for his own 
hermeneutical approach to the use of the Bible in Christian ethics. He begins with the 
premise of the primacy of Scripture and the anticipation that Scripture will adjust the 
interpreter’s thinking and preunderstandings o f the moral life.
2Hays, 23.
3Ogletree, “Interpretation,” 311.
4The task of exegesis “is not to understand what the texts of the Bible are saying, 
but to understand with the help of the biblical texts the reality which presently concerns 
us. Defining the exegetical task in this way does not imply a search for texts which have 
something specific to say to situations that parallel more or less exactly those faced by
contemporary man Instead it indicates the necessity of exploring the richness and
variety of the biblical materials in relation to the issues which pose most acutely the 
challenge to Christian existence in a given situation” (Ogletree, “The Secular City as a 
Theological Norm,” 213).
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materials as speaking to questions which are also our questions, and therefore, as possibly 
saying something to us;1 and (c) constructive appropriation, unfolding a coherent, 
contemporary account of the moral life which contains a reformulation of biblical 
notions. In the context of his The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, interpretation 
includes:2 (a) an explicit account of salient preunderstandings of the moral life; (b) a 
reconstruction o f pivotal themes of biblical faith, ordered with reference to those 
preunderstandings; and (c) constructive suggestions towards a “fusion” in contemporary 
life and thought of these to worlds of meaning.
3. There is the practical role which Scripture actually assumes in Ogletree’s 
methodology.
a. His reconstruction of pivotal themes of biblical faith are ordered with 
reference to his proposed preunderstandings of the moral life.3 Because of this, 
classical and modem philosophical modes of thinking, rather than Scripture, 
provide the conceptual categories for dialogue with Scripture.
b. He asserts that we begin our discourse with Scripture from within our own
'“The successful appropriation of biblical faith in a new situation implies the 
emergence of new meanings and understandings, meanings which do not in the strict 
sense embody the intentions of the biblical writers. In the frame of reference a biblically 
grounded theology is not one that is restricted to explicit biblical ideas and concerns. It 
consists o f understandings which appropriately extend or, better, transform the original 
message of the Bible so as to disclose its meaning in relation to the struggles and 
challenges of contemporary . . .  existence” (ibid., 213, 214). In this context, Ogletree 
acknowledges the clear danger of violating the integrity o f biblical faith that this approach 
brings.
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 4.
3Ibid., 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
236
life situations, venturing reconstructions o f the questions to which the texts under 
study can be read as answers to our preunderstandings.1 Because of this, our 
world o f meaning and our questions, rather than the biblical world o f meaning and 
the questions Scripture might ask us, assume the lead toward finding common 
ground and a fusion of horizons.
c. The biblical materials are viewed as participating formatively in 
constructing ethical theory that is intentionally only provisionally held by the 
believing community. Ongoing dialogue may alter it further.2 Because of this. 
Scripture functions primarily in a “mentoring” role in relation to the believing 
community.
While the stated role of Scripture in Ogletree’s moral theory is thus clear and 
forceful, the concern here for this study relates to whether (or how) the eschatological 
paradigm either influences or is influenced by Ogletree’s presuppositions or methodology 
with regard to Scripture. The following points can be noted from Ogletree’s use o f the 
eschatological paradigm in relation to Scripture:3
'Ibid., 3; idem, “Interpretation,” 311.
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 200-203.
3These observations reflect some conclusions drawn from discussions above on 
“Eschatological Paradigm and Ethics” (192-216) and “Relation to Moral Philosophy” 
(216-227). Because they represent here summaries viewed from the standpoint of 
Scripture there is no need for sustained extended development.
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Eschatology to Teach Us
Eschatology is articulated as fundamentally central to the biblical materials and 
witness. Ogletree’s thesis is that Scripture, especially the New Testament, has 
eschatology to teach us.1 He consciously attempts, then, to conceive and articulate the 
eschatological paradigm from the standpoint of biblical theology and exegesis. The fact 
that (1) he intentionally and methodologically incorporates eschatology into his moral 
theory, and (2) that when he reads the Bible, an intimate connection between ethics and 
eschatology emerges,2 both reflect the priority Scripture has with respect to his broad 
presuppositions and methodology. Furthermore, the dialectical character which Ogletree 
understands New Testament eschatology as having (i.e., his already/not yet leitmotif) 
likewise expresses scriptural influence and the essential meaning of the biblical witness.
Unique Contribution
Eschatology provides the one unique and determinate scriptural contribution to 
the equation of conceptual categories in the dialogue between biblical worlds of meaning 
and our own sense of reality. The one feature that gives Scripture a quite different flavor 
from the various philosophical notions is its concern for history and time in the context of 
dialectical eschatology. This is important for Ogletree in light of twentieth-century style 
moral and ethical thinking which has a distinctly historical orientation.3 His proposed
'Ibid., 131, n. 4.
2See above, 188-193.
3Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 97,121; idem, “Christian Social Ethics as a 
Theological Discipline,” 216, 217.
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methodology implies that our preunderstandings of the moral life cannot remain 
unchallenged,1 and that when taking up conversation with the text, we must subject the 
preunderstandings themselves to questioning in terms of what the texts say. “In the 
process we grant the texts the power to open up and transform our understanding of the 
matter under inquiry.”2 The three chapters in The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 
which review the moral understandings o f selected biblical literature, each conclude with 
a statement o f  how contemporary moral understanding is thus challenged.3 The challenge 
can be summed up in one word: biblical eschatology.
Horizon of Meaning
Eschatology elucidates the larger-meaning context of biblical moral thought by 
providing a biblical horizon of meaning which profoundly qualifies and substantially 
informs the manner in which moral notions present themselves to consciousness.4 This 
biblical horizon of meaning is essentially dialectical in character and calls for a 
corresponding dialectical in moral thinking. The already/not yet tensions of 
eschatological existence are seen as impacting on the believer’s own self-experience, the 
concrete reality o f the church itself, and the interface between the church and institutions
'Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 4.
2Ibid.
3See discussion above, 192, n. 3.
4Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
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of the larger society.1 Furthermore, because this meaning horizon encompasses the 
temporal horizon of human experience, and represents one way of articulating the 
question o f the meaning of being, eschatology enables a “fusion of horizons” between 
biblical worlds of meaning and those that make up our sense of reality.
In each of the above—the focus of the biblical witness, the unique contribution of 
Scripture to the equation of conceptual categories, and the biblical horizon of meaning— 
there is indication that Ogletree consciously attempts to conceive and articulate the 
eschatological paradigm from the standpoint o f biblical theology and exegesis. 
Furthermore, his presuppositions regarding the nature o f Scripture appear to flavor his 
understanding of the eschatological paradigm: (1) because the fundamental meaning of 
Scripture is understood as historical and existential,2 the important categories for 
nuancing the meaning of the eschatological paradigm are, likewise, historical and 
existential (i.e., temporal horizon of human experience, and the meaning o f being);3 (2) 
because historical-critical methodology is embraced as providing appropriate tools for 
opening up the fundamental meaning of the Scripture,4 the eschatological paradigm, 
likewise, becomes explicated within the purview o f the presuppositions o f this 
methodology; (3) because the enduring value o f Scripture is found in the surplus of
'See above discussion, 214-216.
2Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 1, 10.
3Ibid., 192, 193.
4Ibid., xi, 7.
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meaning beyond what is uttered in the biblical texts,1 and which is in need of higher 
levels of generality in order to find common ground with contemporary society,2 the value 
of the eschatological paradigm, likewise, is found in broad, generalizing horizonal 
meanings rather than in generating specifically moral notions.3
On the other hand, Ogletree’s application of the eschatological paradigm appears 
to influence his interpretation and use of Scripture. Since the already/not yet dialectical 
of eschatological existence brings a level of ambiguity, relativity, and contingency to 
moral notions,4 the New Testament materials are viewed and articulated from this 
perspective. Promise becomes more fundamental than law.5 Cultural pluralism becomes 
an informing principle in Christian moral thought.6 Persons of faith remain subject to the 
law in a provisional and qualified sense.7 Moral understandings must themselves remain 
open to fresh interpretation, even continual renegotiation, in the ongoing life of the people 
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Ethical theory drawn from the biblical materials is seen as only provisionally held by the 
believing community, and can be altered through ongoing dialogue.1 Thus, as already 
noted above, Scripture functions practically in a “mentoring” role in relation to the 
believing community.
Furthermore, because Ogletree’s ethical method expresses a consistently future 
movement in keeping with the broad contours of theologies of the future, Scripture is 
viewed and articulated from the standpoint of promise, possibilities, openness, and 
creativity with respect to their moral resource. The enduring value of Scripture is found 
in its surplus of meaning which is a broad, generalizing, horizonal meaning rather than 
specific moral notions or concrete content. The fact that this meaning horizon which 
Scripture provides is one of “meaning” rather than “content,” the fusion of horizons with 
contemporary life will tend toward what is relative, subjective, and existential. There is 
existential encounter rather than timeless truths or unchanging ethical principles. Finally, 
the eschatological paradigm is viewed as creating the context for the eschatological 
community to both understand and use biblical materials in its moral reflection. Scripture 
is to be interpreted and nuanced in an ecclesial context.2 This observation is discussed 
more fully below in “Role of Community.”
Summary
While the “primacy of Scripture” is a firmly established principle in Ogletree’s
'Ibid., 200-203.
2Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 12-14.
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thinking, the practical role Scripture actually assumes in his methodology reflects the 
“primacy” of philosophical categories o f thinking and the existential questions of our 
contemporary life world. Scripture functions primarily in a “mentoring” role in relation 
to the believing community. Nevertheless there is indication that Ogletree consciously 
attempts to conceive and articulate the eschatological paradigm from the standpoint of 
biblical theology and exegesis. Furthermore, his presuppositions regarding the nature of 
Scripture flavor his understanding of the eschatological paradigm, and there are 
indications that his application of the eschatological paradigm influences both his 
interpretation and application o f  Scripture. The enduring value of Scripture is found in its 
surplus of meaning which is a broad, generalizing, horizonal meaning rather than specific 
moral notions or concrete moral content.
The Role of Community 
As outlined in chapter 2, the role which the Christian community assumes in 
eschatological ethics has revolved around three fundamental issues: (1) as a source of 
moral authority; (2) the field o f  moral operation; and (3) its linkage with the ethical 
needs/agenda of the larger human society. The role o f community in Ogletree’s 
application of the eschatological paradigm in these three areas is for the most part clear 
and deliberate.
Interpretive Source of Authority
The Christian community is a vital interpretive source o f moral authority in 
relation to that of Scripture. As outlined above, the “primacy o f Scripture” is a firmly
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established principle in Ogletree’s thinking. However, the authoritative role of the 
community in both interpreting and applying Scripture is pivotal, almost complementary 
and correlative. The dialogical process of interpretation—where Scripture, tradition, 
reason, and experience interact reciprocally so that each illumines and is illumined by the 
other—is to take place within the context of the believing community. “Christian 
thinking about the moral life requires for its integrity and power an ecclesial context,”1 
Ogletree argues. Furthermore, he suggests an ecclesial premise for successful dialogue 
between ethics and Scripture.2 This “ecclesial context for Christian ethics” is no less than 
the “eschatological community,” for “the way into a Christian critique of ethos . . .  is 
through eschatology,”3 and “a distinctively Christian ethic has its social location in 
eschatological community.”* In other words, it is difficult to practice Christian ethics 
while being immersed in non-Christian communities. And in particular, only 
eschatologically oriented communities can foster a fusion o f horizons with the 
eschatological perspective o f the biblical era. The church, then, is a practical necessity if 
the methodological question of eschatology is to be properly dealt with in the dialogue on
'Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 2. According to Ogletree, 
“Christian ethical thinking cut off from a lively involvement with ecclesial existence is 
abstract and impotent.” He is writing in the context of how Christian moral reflection has 
often been determined by non-Christian materials, secular social and philosophical 
categories, issues, and agendas whereby Christian ethics in effect ceases to be Christian at 
all.
2Himes, 67.
3Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 12.
4Ibid., 13.
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Scripture and ethics. If the fusion o f horizons between the biblical world and the modem
world is to occur, there must be faith communities in the present who are engaged in an
eschatological praxis of gospel living:1
From the standpoint of concrete experience, two things would seem to be crucial: 
some degree of alienation from the institutional arrangements o f the larger society, 
and deep involvement with a  community which is engaged in developing 
qualitatively distinct alternatives to those arrangements. The alienation and the 
involvement provide points o f  contact for comprehending what the biblical texts 
are saying.2
The interpretive authority o f the believing community in relation to Scripture
finds further practical expression in the law/promise dialectic which eschatology is seen
as creating and which captures the moral structure of the eschatological community:
Law is provisional and relative; yet once its provisional status is recognized and 
appreciated, it has genuine authority to regulate human activity. Still, the 
provisional and relative standing of law cannot itself become a fixed principle, or 
it would effectively block out the negotiation of new possibilities in the 
community o f faith. Law can serve only to express what is relatively settled, what 
is for the present to be taken for granted. It permits the concentration of the moral 
imagination on issues in eschatological existence which are most in need of 
attention at a given moment. Yet even previously settled matters remain open in 
principle to renegotiation. They can once more become objects of special 
attention, to be worked out anew with full sensitivity to the concrete 
understandings and meanings at play within the community. This account
'Himes, 67.
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 182 (italics supplied). 
Ogletree writes, “An eschatological orientation requires eschatological communities.. . .  
A Christian ethic attentive to the eschatological horizon. . .  is an ethic closely linked to 
the church and its ministry. It finds central expression in the practice o f ministry. If 
Christian ethics is to incorporate the eschatological impulses o f  the New Testament, it 
must give far more attention than is presently customary to the life of the church and its 
ministry. Here the transfer of the New Testament themes to contemporary social realities 
can be strong indeed” (ibid., 185).
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subjects law to promise.1
Moral understandings, stated as law and commandment, must themselves be
open to fresh interpretation, even continual renegotiation, in the ongoing life of
the people o f God.2
The eschatological paradigm is viewed as creating the context for the 
eschatological community to both understand and use biblical materials in its moral 
reflection. Scripture is to be interpreted and nuanced in an ecclesial context. It provides 
horizonal meaning more than concrete content. The believing community extends this 
horizonal meaning toward contemporary ethical exigencies in determining the 
possibilities o f new concrete explication. Finally, the unity of the Bible resides more in 
the unfolding identity o f a people, and of a church arising in relation to that people, than 
in particular themes, beliefs, or ways of thinking.3
Eschatological Community
Eschatological existence is expressed fundamentally within eschatological 
community.4 Ogletree’s basic thesis is that “the radicalism and creativity o f New 
Testament social thought relate chiefly to the internal dynamics of the community of 
faith. They stem from attempts to devise forms o f communal life appropriate to
'Ibid., 202. In essence this subjects law to the community and to culture.
2Ibid., 203.
3 Ibid., 11, 12.
4Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 128-130, 141-142; idem, The Use of the 
Bible in Christian Ethics. 116, 119, 164, 169, 179.
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eschatological existence.”1 More specifically,
an eschatologically determined ethic gives primary weight to the issues involved 
in building up and sustaining eschatological communities, communities bearing 
authentic alternatives to the cultural norms and institutional arrangements o f the 
larger society.2
Because Christian existence is viewed as essentially ecclesial existence,3 the 
church furnishes the social location that defines Christian participation in the life o f the 
world.4 It is a new community, oriented to and based upon the new age, which takes form 
in the midst o f  institutions which remain under the sway of the old.5 It is self-consciously 
oriented to the coming Kingdom of God. It is the fundamental field of moral operation 
for the already/not yet dialectic of New Testament thought.6 “Our primary vocation,” 
then, “is to become eschatological community and to attest its promise for the world.”7
Relates Indirectly to Larger Society
The Christian community relates to the ethical needs/agenda of the larger human 
society in a way that is primarily indirect and by extension and analogy. While the
'Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 128, 142; idem, The Use of the Bible in 
Christian Ethics. 116126,152,180-186.
2Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 187.
3Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, March 31,1993,2; idem, The Use of the Bible in 
Christian Ethics. 90.
4Ibid.
sOgletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 89.
6Ibid., 179-180.
7Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context o f Christian Ethics,” 13.
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Christian community supports public order, the affairs o f the state lie outside o f
substantive Christian concern.1 However, insofar as existing social and cultural forms
function to maintain space for human life, they can be provisionally accepted as spheres
of Christian existence.2 Because eschatological existence is essentially evangelistic and
has a promise to deliver the nations, the possibility is always present that the dynamics of
eschatological existence will set in motion transformative social processes in spheres of
life which previously were almost wholly independent of its central impulses.3 If  a
Christian ethic is to make an original contribution to political and economic thought, it
will not be by way of explicit biblical commentary on the state and its place in human
life. Rather, it will be by elaborating and developing, by analogy, the political and
economic implications o f insights present in the biblical materials’ attention to the
internal affairs o f the eschatological community.4
A distinctively Christian social ethic which reaches beyond concerns internal to 
self-conscious communities of faith pre-supposes situations in which the 
dynamics o f eschatological existence are beginning to work themselves out in 
wider spheres of social life. Once these dynamics are underway, we are in a
'Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 116-117, 180.
2Ibid., 184.
3Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 142.
4Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 129, 130. According to 
Ogletree, “Christian social thought is a fruit of the social practice of Christian churches 
and their affiliated associations and organizations” (Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as 
a Theological Discipline,” 216). It is through participation in the believing community 
that Christians orient themselves to the wider social world.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
248
position to consider the broader social ramifications of elemental discoveries in 
the community of faith itself.1
Summary
Ogletree thus stresses the essential ecclesial nature of an eschatologically 
informed Christian ethics.2 The role which the believing community assumes in his 
application o f the eschatological paradigm is a leading one, providing the context in 
which the “preunderstandings of moral life” are to be viewed in relation to the biblical 
materials and the reality of the already/not yet. The believing community is a vital 
interpretive, almost complementary, source of moral authority in relation to Scripture. It 
is the fundamental field of moral operation for expressing the ethic of dialectical 
eschatology. And it relates to the wider social world indirectly, by extension and by 
analogy from its own moral reflection and experience.
Nature of Social Involvement 
For Ogletree, the nature of social involvement is fundamentally linked with the 
nature and experience of eschatological communities. The New Testament materials 
basically provide an ecclesiology, rather than a comprehensive social ethic in the sense of 
twentieth-century Christian ethics.3 Furthermore, “the radicalism and creativity o f  New 
Testament social thought relate chiefly to the internal dynamics of the community of
‘Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 142.
2Ogletree is viewed, along with Pannenberg and Braaten, as developing the 
ecclesiological implications of eschatological ethics (Sedgwick, 398,402-405).
3Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 117.
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faith. They stem from attempts to devise forms of communal life appropriate to 
eschatological existence.”1 As noted earlier, the affairs o f the state basically lie outside 
substantive Christian concern.2 It is only indirectly, by extension, and by analogy that the 
believing community reaches toward the wider social world.
The first task of the church, then, is to be the church.3 As an essentially religious 
community, it can never be a mere instrument of social change. Rather, its social witness 
must be a piece with it spirituality, with its activities in nurturing faith, and with the 
character of its internal fellowship.4 In short, Christian social ethics requires a discrete 
social-communal base which inescapably involves congregational development. It is 
within the context o f this development and participation within the community that 
Christians orient themselves to the wider social world.5 A distinctively Christian social 
vision presupposes the possibility of awakening moral commitments which go beyond 
interests associated with their own social location.6
“While the first task of the church is to be the church, being the church includes 
public responsibility— at least where Christians have the means to exercise it.”7 This
'Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 128.
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 117.
3Ogletree, “The Renewing of Ecumenical Protestant Social Teaching,” 290.
4Ibid., 289, 290.
5Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 216.
6Ogletree, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social Teaching,” 290.
7Ibid.
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public responsibility has to do with the genuine power and influence which the believing
community has within society.1 In particular, the task of Christian social ethics is viewed
as twofold: (1) it is to help Christian people reflect on their social roles and their realistic
possibilities for influencing the direction o f social evolution; and (2) it is to discover ways
in which Christians can collaborate with persons of different religious and moral
orientations in working toward a shared vision o f  the common good.2 With respect to
these two tasks, Ogletree asserts that the believing community’s “public witness” or
“explicit public vocation” requires critical engagement with the moral ethos o f the larger
secular community, including its diverse religious communities.3 Here he follows
broadly Troeltsch’s concept of “civilization ethic,” where, in order to address the major
social questions of contemporary society, the believing community must join its teachings
to the reigning civilizational ethic of society.4
In secular, pluralistic societies, the church’s social teachings are normally able to 
make their way into the public arena only in conjunction with religious and moral 
ideas that undergird a normative social order, that is, what Troeltsch called the 
“civilizational ethic.”. . .  Any effective synthesis of Christian ideas and 
civilizational ethic constitutes a ‘compromise,’ that is, an adjustment o f Christian 
teaching to the reigning norms of society. However, such a compromise gives 
distinctively Christian social thought a share in the authority of the civilizational 
ethic. It is by way of its participation in a civilization ethic, Troeltsch contends, 
that Christian teaching has been able to influence social processes and policies.s
'Ibid.
2Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 216.
3Ogletree, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social Teaching,” 293-295.
“Ibid.; idem, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 226-227, 232. 
sOgletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 226, 227.
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Because the “civilizational ethic” furnishes the moral notions that make possible a 
public discourse about the common good, an effective public witness is possible only as 
the believing community comes to grips with this ethic, criticizing it, extending and 
developing it, and, insofar as possible, articulating its (believing community) distinctive 
vision in ways that connect with its (civilizational ethic) central tendencies. To renounce 
this undertaking is to set aside an explicit public vocation.1 The “compromise” spoken of 
here is one of creative synthesis of social and cultural ideas with a Christian social 
vision.2 It is the adjustment of Christian teachings to social exigencies.3 Such 
compromise is not seen as a dilution of moral seriousness, but rather as a fitting moral 
response to situations o f substantial moral conflict.4 Following Troeltsch, Ogletree 
contends that the believing community cannot continue to play a role in social evolution 
unless it can maintain and renew such compromises.5
In short, Christians have to develop their social vision in at least two frames of 
reference: (1) they must become clear about their own witness and its grounding in 
fundamental faith convictions and internal relational dynamics; and (2) they must find 





5Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 227.
6Ibid., 232.
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the reality that the moral conflicts o f society are replicated within its own internal life that 
enables the believing community toward sensitive social vision.1
What internal dynamics of communal life, though, does Ogletree see as possibly 
extending toward the wider social world? According to him, four themes merit attention 
with respect to the force of eschatological promise for the social organization of life.
1. The primacy of eschatological community over the family opens the way to 
communities and societies which are radically, ethnically, sexually, inclusive.2
2. The material basis of eschatological community expresses the reversal and 
obliteration of distinctions in existing patterns o f  privilege, power, and wealth in human 
community.3 This includes a critique of the individualism and acquisitiveness of modem 
society and the social understanding of property. It points to the social accountability and 
social use of property relations and in economic activity.
3. The mercy, mutual forbearance, and forgiving love of eschatological 
community transcends national, ethnic, and cultural bases of social order as conditions of 
a public life in communities and societies, as well as violence as the final court of appeal 
in the adjudication of human conflict.4
4. The common life among persons o f diverse backgrounds and cultures within
'Ibid.
2Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 143, 128-130; idem, The Use of the Bible 
in Christian Ethics. 181.
3Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 143-144.
4Ibid., 144.
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the eschatological community brings recognition of the plurality and relativity of human 
cultures and social institutions, as well as the possibility o f  community among culturally 
diverse peoples.1 The relativity of social institutions permits us to accept them and 
function with them as spheres of our own activity without, at the same time, bestowing 
absolute and binding authority upon them.2 This cultural pluralism is founded on the 
primacy of promise over law as the constitutive basis of social existence and the reality 
that all human cultures are relative to the Lordship of Jesus Christ.3
These four themes for the social reorganization o f life reflect a more perfectionist, 
rather than a deontological, orientation toward the personal moral development of 
individuals and the building up of the community.4 A highly relational dynamic exists in 
eschatological communal life. In addition, Ogletree posits “hospitality” as an over­
arching metaphor for his moral theory, i.e., “to be moral is to be hospitable to the 
stranger.”5 In the context o f Christian eschatology, this hospitality motif is viewed as 
expressing at least two unique nuances in relation to the four themes for the social 
organization of life which we have just outlined above:6 (1) the moral import of 
intersubjectivity, and (2) the moral significance of pluralism at an elemental level of
'Ibid., 144, 145; idem, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 152-158.
2Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 171.
3Ibid., 152.
4Ibid., 193-202.
5Ogletree. Hospitality to the Stranger. 1.
6Ibid., 7, 8.
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human experience.1 “To offer hospitality to a stranger is to welcome something new, 
unfamiliar, and unknown into our life world.”2 Furthermore, there are reciprocal acts of 
hospitality, i.e., “My readiness to welcome the other in to my world must be balanced by 
my readiness to enter the world of the other.”3 The importance of this overarching 
metaphor speaks towards an openness to both people and ideas which may be different to 
us.
In the context of these four themes for the social organization of life, Ogletree 
proposes the following pattern of social responsibility for eschatological communities.4
1. Modem societies are sufficiently alien to the central promises o f the Christian 
gospel that the believing community will, in important measure, have to be a community 
apart.5 Being a community apart includes two crucial perspectives for the believing 




4This proposal follows his review of some examples o f social responsibility which 
he asserts have some plausibility as contemporary appropriations o f biblical eschatology,
i.e., (1) eschewing direct involvement in the oversight of the basic economic, political, 
and cultural structures of society, with evangelism as direct witness to larger society, and 
moral modeling as indirect influence; (2) individual members taking responsibility for the 
whole range of social positions open in society; (3) the church concerning itself with the 
possibility of encompassing the whole society in the impulses o f  the coming new age, 
venturing a Christian transformation of social existence; (4) finding in powerful social 
and political movements secular equivalents to the eschatological impulses o f Christian 
faith (ibid., 188, 189).
5Qgletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 189, 190.
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larger society, and deep involvement within the community as it is engaged in developing 
qualitatively distinct alternatives of those arrangements.1
2. The task of the believing community is to bring effective criticism of the basic 
institutions o f the larger society lest their alien and oppressive features become obscured 
in human consciousness. Such criticism, though guided by distinctive Christian 
understandings, will make appropriate use of pertinent social theory.2
3. Christians are free to participate selectively in the basic institutions of modem 
society insofar as they recognize the provisional and ambiguous nature of these 
institutions and maintain their primary allegiance to the realities taking form in 
eschatological community. The participation must, however, be both selective and 
qualified.3
4. In many societies, though not all, Christians actually have an opportunity to 
help shape policy in basic social institutions. Similarly, or alternatively, they may be able 
to relate actively to movements working to bring about morally significant social change, 
influencing the determination of goals and objectives, and also decisions about strategy 
and tactics.4
Finally, there is the question of the believing community’s relation to the
'Ibid., 182-187.
2Ibid., 190.
3Ibid. “A task of Christian ethics is to assist the community o f faith in its 
deliberations on appropriate forms of participation in the life of the larger society” (ibid.).
“Ibid.
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needs/agenda of the larger social world in the setting of world processes and the horizon
of the future. According to Ogletree,
the reach of eschatological community is toward the whole inhabited world. Its 
aim is not the conversion of all peoples to an established point o f view, but the 
negotiation of shared understandings capable of giving rise to a common world 
among women and men from a multiplicity of backgrounds and cultures. Its 
summons is to be a people in freedom and community, not apart from but 
precisely in relation to our social and cultural origins.1
And because Christian hope involves ever new forms of concrete historical
expression of our ultimate religious hope of participation in the divine life,
if I am going to take seriously the hope o f liberation promised to me in faith, then 
I have got to be engaged in concrete liberation struggles in this world. As a matter 
of fact, I do not think I can know what the liberation of men in the Kingdom of 
God means if I have not been involved in struggling with very specific chains that 
enslave people in my own society.2
Summary
For Ogletree, the nature of social involvement is fundamentally linked with the 
nature and experience of eschatological communities. The radicalism and creativity of 
New Testament social thought are focused primarily through the internal dynamics of the 
believing community. It is only indirectly, by extension, and by analogy that the 
believing community reaches toward the wider social world. Even then its social witness 
must be a piece with its spirituality, faith, and internal fellowship. Public responsibility is 
assumed where individual Christians or the believing community have means to exercise 
it, and where it expresses appropriate forms o f participation in the larger society.
'Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context o f Christian Ethics,” 13, 14.
2Ogletree, “What May Man Really Hope For?” 43,44.
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Evangelism, individual social responsibility and influence, moral protest and personal 
influence in the sociopolitical arena, developing social policy, as well as social struggle, 
are each viewed as appropriate forms of public responsibility, though with some 
qualifications. The nature of social involvement is further viewed from the perspective of 
intersubjectivity, relativity and contingency, pluralism as a basic element o f human 
experience, and deontologically qualified perfectionist motifs. At bottom, it is a radical 
relational vision which encompasses the creation of the new in a universal reach toward 
the larger society.
Implications for Moral Theory
The broad outline of Ogletree’s application of the eschatological paradigm to 
moral theory is clear. The question now is his application of the paradigm’s ethical 
implications with respect to the level of moral reflection and its potential for concrete 
social content. By way of review, the issues here deal primarily with questions of 
specificity and consistency with respect to the eschatological paradigm’s application.
They bring into focus where normative content and guidance lie in the application 
process, and the carefulness with which it is used towards concrete ethical exigencies.
This section’s survey includes: (1) the theoretical level of moral reflection which the 
paradigm appears to elicit in Ogletree’s thinking; and (2) the meaning and function of 
paradigm in Ogletree’s moral theory. Ogletree’s correlation of the eschatological 
paradigm to moral philosophy has already been examined in a separate section.
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Level of Moral Reflection
By way of reminder again, this study proposes a correspondence between the 
appropriate levels on which paradigms operate and the ingredients in the structure of 
ethics, i.e., macro/bases, meso/underlying principles, and micro/area rules. The question 
of “theoretical level,” which this correspondence facilitates, enables one to clarify how 
concretely the eschatological paradigm might legitimately speak to modem ethical 
concerns.
With Ogletree, the questions of “theoretical level” and “concreteness” are quite 
straightforward ones. He essentially announces where he is coming from on the former, 
and, in the process, tells us what to expect with regard to the latter. Both companion 
volumes—which represent his primary and most focused discussion with regard to the 
use of eschatology in moral theory, and which this chapter has drawn from in a principal 
way—are concerned with methodology and elemental aspects of human moral 
experience. They are intentionally only preparatory to a more comprehensive treatment 
of Christian ethics.1 The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics relates to methodology in 
linking biblical scholarship and Christian ethics.2 Hospitality to the Stranger relates to 
methodology in the context o f fundamental ethics, i.e., the central constituents of the 
moral life and the manner o f their appearing in concrete human experience.3 It is within
‘Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, xii-xiii, 4, 7,11, 12, 176, 205; 
idem, Hospitality to the Stranger, xi, 29.
2Ogletree, The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics, xii-xiii, 1-14.
3Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger, xi, 10-34.
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this larger framework of moral theory and ethical methodology that the “theoretical level” 
of the eschatological paradigm comes into view.
Macro/Bases
The field of Christian ethics, as Ogletree views it, has three main divisions: 
fundamental ethics, symbolic ethics, and practical ethics.1 Fundamental ethics describes 
the elements o f the moral life and then constructs a theory based on the description.2 It is 
concerned primarily with the elemental constituents o f worldly being. Symbolic ethics 
critically interprets, appropriates, and mediates the traditions which give character to our 
moral understanding.3 It is concerned primarily with particular historically relative 
configurations o f shared meanings which mold, express, and bestow significance on the 
moral life of communities and societies to which we belong. Practical ethics examines 
the organic, psychic, social, and cultural dynamics that channel and constrain the moral 
life. Here, ethical reflection is in critical conversation with the human sciences 
(behavioral and social). The underlying basis for these three distinct inquiries and for 
their interconnections is concrete experience itself: the everyday life-world as it presents 
itself to awareness. Even if all this gets done, however, according to Ogletree, we still 
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In the context of fundamental ethics, Ogletree provides an exposition of some of
the basic features o f phenomenology and moral philosophy in terms of how they explicate
constitutive elemental structures of the life world. These features have already been
outlined in this chapter. Here we want to be reminded that the synthesis of the concerns
of phenomenology and moral philosophy is to realize preunderstandings of the moral life
in relation to the horizon of meaning which is opened up by the question of the meaning
of being.1 His proposed structures of moral thought (preunderstandings) are more
elemental than social, economic, and political arrangements of our life world. Because
they are more elemental, they can enable discourse and an interpretive fusion of horizons
with the biblical materials.
Ogletree is clearly working from the bases level o f the structure of ethics. He is
abstract, philosophical, and theoretical in his outline o f the constituent features o f moral
reality in temporal human experience. It is within the purview of this level of theoretical
reflection that Ogletree primarily discusses the contribution of the eschatological
paradigm to Christian moral theory. In doing so, he is nuancing and applying the
eschatology from the bases level of the structure o f ethics, and correspondingly, from the
macro level of paradigm operation. According to Ogletree,
to speak of eschatology is to characterize the larger horizon of meaning which in 
given traditions displays the significance and authority of moral notions. This 
meaning horizon does not directly generate specifically moral notions, but it 
profoundly qualifies them and substantially informs the manner in which they 
present themselves to consciousness.2
'Ibid., 24; Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 15-45.
2Qgletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
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In addition, Ogletree asserts that “the discussion of eschatology represents one 
way of articulating the question o f  the meaning of being.”1 His focus is toward that 
which is general, elemental, and fundamental. With respect to the biblical materials he is 
concerned with raising what the texts are saying to a higher level of generality, one 
capable o f  addressing our own sense of reality via a fusion o f meaning horizons.2 
Correspondingly, the import of eschatology is found in its ability to qualify and inform 
moral notions in our consciousness rather than generate specific moral notions. As 
outlined in an earlier section of this chapter, the hermeneutical nuances o f the 
eschatological paradigm are found in how the already/not yet dialectic: (1) provides the 
creative context for a focused future orientation in ethical methodology; (2) furnishes a 
meaning horizon for Christian moral consciousness that encompasses the temporal 
horizon o f human experience; (3) enables a “fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds 
o f meaning and those which make up our sense of reality; and (4) elucidates the essential 
dialectical nature of Christian moral theory. These observations affirm that Ogletree’s 
primary application of the eschatological paradigm is from the macro/bases level of moral 
reflection.
Meso/Underlying Principles
There is evidence, however, that Ogletree articulates moral reflection from the 
“meso” level of paradigm application as well. In the structure of ethics, this would mean
'Ibid., 193.
2Ibid., 3,12.
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articulating underlying principles that can be applied in a universal way to various areas 
of moral activity.
According to Ogletree, symbolic ethics critically interprets, appropriates, and
mediates the traditions which give character to our moral understandings.1 It elucidates
the historically relative configurations of shared meanings which mold, express, and
bestow significance on the moral life of communities and societies to which we belong.
In other words, it explores the meaning horizon found in the historical situatedness of
others in relation to our own sense of reality, i.e., enduring universal principles that
transcend culture and time. In the context of Ogletree’s pursuit of the use of the Bible in
Christian ethics, symbolic ethics explores, interprets, appropriates, and mediates the
biblical worlds of meaning, i.e., biblical moral notions and principles. Note what he has
to say with regard to eschatology and symbolic ethics:
Only chapter 5 o f this volume, “The Eschatological Horizon o f New Testament 
Social Thought,” embodies the inquiries which belong to symbolic ethics. Here I 
do not move fully into the systematic task o f symbolic ethics. This is preparatory 
work to such an undertaking, the first attempt at a retrieval of New Testament 
traditions. Yet I do take into account the central challenge for a constructive 
Christian ethics, namely, interpreting the import of New Testament eschatology 
for moral understanding. In this respect, chapter 5 may have suggestiveness 
beyond its own accomplishments.2
The point here is that Ogletree’s observations from the New Testament materials 
with respect to the role o f community and the nature of social involvement encompasses 
symbolic ethics. The exploring, interpreting, appropriating, and mediating the biblical
'Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 11.
2Ibid., 29, 30.
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worlds of meaning with respect to the role o f community and the nature of social 
involvement, in effect, are expressions o f enduring universal principles. The 
eschatological horizon of New Testament social thought is fundamental to this overall 
picture. Ogletree thus articulates moral reflection from the “meso” level of paradigm 
application.
Micro/Area Rules
Given the overall force of Ogletree’s approach and his own stated limits in the 
purpose of his two companion volumes, the micro/area rules level of paradigm 
application is the least observable, if not altogether absent. However, since Ogletree 
insists on dealing with what he calls “the historical context” of his issues, practical ethics 
is always in the picture, even though it is on the periphery.1 In Ogletree’s view, practical 
ethics is not yet applied ethics, nor is it the locus o f concrete moral guidance.2 The terms 
“applied ethics” and “practical ethics” are often used interchangeably to indicate the 
application of ethics to special arenas of human activity, such as business, politics, 
medicine, economics, etc.3 In other words, for many, “applied ethics” and “practical 
ethics” relate to area rules in the structure o f ethics, which would be our micro level of 
paradigm operation. While Ogletree obviously sees a distinction between “practical
‘Charles Courtney, review of Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions of Moral 
Understanding, by Thomas W. Ogletree. Drew Gateway 58. no. 3 (Spring 1989): 83.
2Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger, 11.
3James F. Childress, “Applied Ethics,” The Westminster Dictionary of Christian 
Ethics ( 19861.38.
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ethics” and “applied ethics,” he nonetheless does have areas of human activity or area 
rules in mind as he develops his moral theory. These concerns, while on the periphery, 
are always in the picture. The full explication of these issues and concerns await his 
systematic treatment o f Christian ethics.1 Ogletree relates the eschatological paradigm 
broadly towards area rules and micro application throughout his inquiries o f symbolic 
ethics in the context o f  the biblical worlds of meaning as they relate to our own sense of 
reality.
Summary
With the above analysis in view, it is appropriate to conclude that, for Ogletree, 
the eschatological paradigm facilitates moral reflection primarily across the spectrum of 
macro and meso paradigm operation. This conclusion reflects, however, what he has 
written to date. One could rightly conclude from what has been written thus far, that the 
eschatological paradigm could/would appropriately be articulated on the micro/area rule 
level in any subsequent systematic treatment of Christian ethics. Ogletree’s style and 
focus in both theology and ethics have predominantly been toward the theoretical, dealing 
with broad sweeping issues, principles, fundamentals, and methodology, rather than 
focusing on specific themes or areas of moral concern. This can be observed throughout 
his projects through the years. The reality, then, is that specificity and concrete 
application in his writings are usually remote and peripheral. This is true with regards to 
application of the eschatological paradigm to moral theory as well.
'Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 205, 12.
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Paradigm Role and Function
While the term “paradigm”1 is used only occasionally in Ogletree’s projects, it is 
nevertheless an integral part o f his moral theory particularly as it relates to an interpretive 
framework for elucidating the meaning of Scripture for Christian ethics or issues o f 
theology and methodology. The reality of paradigm, whether explicit or implicit in his 
thought, factors largely in his overall hermeneutic. While he has not stated it as such, his 
proposed correlation of moral philosophy, phenomenology, and historical contextualism, 
as a structure with which to come to an understanding of ethics in the Bible, is viewed by 
others as providing “a paradigm that Ogletree believes will help elucidate the Biblical 
data.”2 This observation is affirmed by how his proposed structure is implicitly used 
throughout his companion volumes on eschatology and Christian moral theory. Likewise, 
while not calling it such, the orientation which he perceives the already/not yet dialectical 
o f  New Testament eschatology as bringing to Christian moral thought is also viewed and 
applied paradigmatically.3 This can be extended to his use of eschatology as a whole, 
which he posits as providing an “horizon of moral understanding” which orients and 
motivates personal and communal moral life. More specifically, Ogletree refers to
'While this study uses the concept of paradigm in conjunction with eschatology, 
paradigm is used more broadly and generally by both Mott and Ogletree. For the 
purposes of clarification, the term “eschatological paradigm” is used where this study is 
focusing principally on their application of eschatology, and “paradigm” where it is 
discussing paradigm generally in order to understand how eschatology as paradigm 
correspondingly would be viewed or applied.
2Giannini, 73.
3Scroggs, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas W. 
Ogletree, 45; Burtness, 240.
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paradigm in the context of the meaning of reality which the Christ event brings1 and the 
moral understandings of specific biblical materials.2 Finally, Ogletree refers to the 
“coming realm of God” as a primal image which elicits an encompassing image for the 
moral ordering of values and a pattern of life for personal and communal existence.3
The purpose here is to determine the role and function o f the eschatological 
paradigm in Ogletree’s moral theory. Is it primarily that o f facilitating an abstract basic 
principle which needs to be translated and applied toward new situations? Or does it 
facilitate the imprinting of an inner gripping image which shapes people ethically? Is it 
primarily conceptual or motivational? It is both! But Ogletree’s primary orientation is 
toward the inner gripping image which motivates and shapes people ethically.
According to Ogletree, paradigmatic roles or paradigmatic happenings provide “a 
controlling interpretive role in man’s understanding o f  himself and his world.”4 “We find 
ourselves claimed by the reality disclosed in a certain set o f happenings . . .  before we 
have begun to grasp all that it means or implies.”5 The role of reason is to unfold the
'Ogletree, “A Christological Assessment of Dipolar Theism,” 92-97; idem, “The 
Gospel as Power,” 178,184, 196; idem, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 195.
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 67.
3Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 212.
4OgIetree, “A Christological Assessment o f Dipolar Theism,” 92.
5Ibid., 93. This discussion of the role and function of paradigm in Ogletree’s 
thinking refers to “paradigmatic happenings” or “paradigmatic events.” These are his 
conceptions. While they differ from the use of paradigm presented thus far in this study, 
including his view o f  the eschatological paradigm, they nevertheless provide insight into 
the role and function of paradigm in Ogletree’s thinking as a whole.
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basic understanding of reality expressed in a paradigmatic happening.1 Furthermore, the 
very logic o f paradigmatic happening pushes us toward universality.2 And, “if a 
happening is genuinely paradigmatic, constituting the decisive point of reference for 
interpreting the totality of experience, the reality it discloses in some sense encompasses 
the reality o f all things.”3 Referring to the model of self-giving presented in the death and 
resurrection of Jesus, Ogletree states that “a single set o f  paradigmatic events discloses 
both the indicative and the imperative of the gospel.”4 In other words, paradigm brings 
both a  sense of identity and moral urgency. In the context of a discussion of value 
orientations, he refers to the eschatological import o f the complex of events associated 
with Jesus as the decisive paradigm for theological understanding.5 In other words, 
paradigm brings value orientation. The moral ordering of values for a pattern of personal 
and communal life is likewise in view with the encompassing vision which the primal 
image of the coming realm o f God brings.6
This focus toward a broad moral orientation, rather than specific moral principles, 
can be seen in Ogletree’s overall use o f the eschatological paradigm in moral theory. 




4Ogletree. The Use o f the Bible in Christian Ethics. 195.
5Ogletree, “The Gospel as Power,” 184-196.
6Ogletree, “Christian Social Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 212.
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manner in which moral notions present themselves to our consciousness, rather than 
generating specific moral notions.1 The already/not yet dialectical presents the structure 
o f eschatological existence and Christian moral reflection.2
Summary
This survey of Ogletree’s application of the eschatological paradigm’s ethical 
implications has included two important perspectives: (1) the theoretical level of moral 
reflection which the paradigm appears to elicit in Ogletree’s thinking; and (2) the 
meaning and function of paradigm in Ogletree’s moral theory. It has determined that, for 
Ogletree, the eschatological paradigm facilitates moral reflection primarily across the 
spectrum of macro and meso paradigm operation. While the micro/area rules level of 
paradigm application is the least observable and on the periphery, nevertheless, it is 
within Ogletree’s view of thought, and could/would appropriately be articulated in any 
subsequent systematic treatment o f Christian ethics. Specificity and concrete application 
are usually remote and peripheral in his projects. With respect to paradigm role and 
function, Ogletree’s focus in the use o f the eschatological paradigm in moral theory is 
toward broad moral orientation, rather than specific moral principles. This is in keeping 
with the overall horizonal sphere o f reflection towards which he draws us and with which 
he is concerned in his writings.
‘Ogletree. The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 177.
2Ibid., 179,181.
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Chapter Summary
The import o f eschatology in Ogletree’s moral theory can be seen in the 
prominence it is given in his writings. Like Mott, his understanding of eschatology fits 
the general contours o f the eschatological paradigm that this study has outlined. While he 
works within the general contours o f the eschatological paradigm, however, he clearly 
nuances the already/not yet component over that o f the reign o f  God and the horizon o f  
the future. The already/not yet becomes his leitmotif for nuancing the moral implications 
of the eschatological paradigm. These hermeneutical nuances include (1) providing the 
creative context for a focused future orientation in ethical methodology; (2) furnishing a 
meaning horizon for Christian moral consciousness that encompasses the temporal 
horizon of human experience; (3) enabling a  “fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds 
of meaning and those which make up our sense of reality; and (4) elucidating the essential 
“dialectical nature” of Christian moral theory. Ogletree’s ethical method expresses a 
consistently future movement in keeping with the broad contours o f theologies of the 
future.
Unlike Mott, the categories of moral philosophy factor largely in Ogletree’s 
eschatological-oriented moral theory. By viewing and nuancing moral philosophy via the 
concerns o f European phenomenology, and setting this synthesis within the temporal 
structure of human experience, Ogletree finds a promising resource of preunderstandings 
with which to engage the biblical materials in a discourse about the moral life. Because 
eschatology is both central to these biblical materials and provides a larger horizon of 
moral understanding which takes seriously the temporal horizon o f human experience and
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the question of the meaning of being (according to his preunderstandings o f moral life), it 
facilitates an overall correlation of ideation towards contemporary Christian moral theory. 
Ogletree’s work as a whole is guided by a hermeneutic based on phenomenological 
investigations. It is a hermeneutic governed by a life-world perspective. In his view, this 
life-world perspective brings a level of concreteness to the otherwise abstract and often 
remote critical biblical scholarship and philosophical ethics.1
While the “primacy of Scripture” is a firmly established principle in Ogletree’s 
thinking, his view of the nature of Scripture largely follows that of existential/encounter 
theology. In addition, the practical role Scripture actually assumes in his methodology 
reflects the “primacy” of philosophical categories of thinking and the existential questions 
of our contemporary life world. He does not clearly underscore the point that our 
“preunderstandings” must never be permitted to control our reading of Scripture. Nor 
does his methodology indicate clearly how they can be kept from doing so. While the 
ingredients o f the dialogical process of interpretation are similar for Ogletree and Mott 
(Scripture, reason, tradition, and experience), the community plays a significantly more 
aggressive and determinative role for Ogletree than with Mott. Scripture functions
'Ogletree’s interest in phenomenology is as a useful tool to assist his efforts to 
read Scripture faithfully. Phenomenology facilitates his attempts to read Scripture in a 
manner that equips him to appropriate its truth in the context of the contemporary world. 
This includes giving an account of truth in a form that engages the best critical thinking 
of our age. Phenomenology is seen as important for two reasons. First, “it helps us 
display the essential abstractness of the empirical sciences so that we can more precisely 
specify the limits of empirical scientific study.” Second, it “helps recast the central 
notions o f modem philosophical ethics so that the preoccupation with language and logic 
that characterizes those notions can be corrected by a richer account of concrete 
experience.” See Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26, 1996,2; idem, Hospitality to 
the Stranger. 97-126.
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primarily in a “mentoring” role in relation to the believing community.
Nevertheless Scripture’s influence in perceiving and nuancing the eschatological 
paradigm can be seen in: (1) how eschatology is articulated as fundamentally central to 
the biblical materials and witness; (2) how eschatology provides the one unique and 
determinate scriptural contribution to the equation of conceptual categories in the 
dialogue between biblical worlds o f meaning and our own sense o f reality; and (3) how 
eschatology elucidates the larger-meaning context o f biblical moral thought by providing 
a horizon of meaning which profoundly qualifies and substantially informs the manner in 
which moral notions present themselves to consciousness. On the other hand, there are 
indications that his application o f the eschatological paradigm influences both his 
interpretation and application o f Scripture.
Unlike Mott, who finds authority in the concrete meaning of the biblical text in 
themselves, Ogletree finds the enduring value of Scripture in its surplus of meaning 
which is a broad, generalizing, horizonal meaning, rather than specific moral notions or 
concrete moral content. It should be noted, though, that in his view, this “surplus of 
meaning” in the biblical text does not express a movement to a higher level of generality 
beyond the concreteness o f the text.' His own application of the meaning of the text is 
viewed as “quite specific in its own way.”2 While specific in its own way, however, it 
remains more toward the macro level than either of the other levels of critical reflection.
Ogletree stresses the essential ecclesial nature of eschatological ethics. The role
'Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26,1996,2.
2Ibid.
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which the believing community assumes in his application o f  the eschatological paradigm 
is a leading one, providing the context in which the “preunderstandings o f moral life” are 
to be viewed in relation to the biblical materials and the reality o f the already/not yet.
The believing community is a vital, interpretive, almost complementary source of moral 
authority in relation to Scripture. As an alternative community (as with Mott), the 
believing community is also the fundamental field of moral operation for expressing the 
ethic o f dialectical eschatology. It relates indirectly to the wider social world, however, 
by extension and by analogy from its own moral reflection. While Mott would support 
this extension by analogy, he is more aggressive and direct than Ogletree with respect to 
the role o f community as a change agent in relation to the needs o f the wider social world. 
For Ogletree, the nature o f social involvement is fundamentally linked with the nature 
and experience of eschatological communities. The radicalism and creativity of New 
Testament social thought are focused primarily through the internal dynamics of the 
believing community. Social witness and involvement need to be a piece with their 
spirituality, faith, and internal fellowship.
Like Mott, Ogletree is a theorist who works primarily on the levels of theological 
bases and underlying principles. However, he tends more towards the former than the 
latter, and is more philosophical and generalizing in his perspective. His style and focus 
in both theology and ethics have predominantly been toward the theoretical, dealing with 
broad sweeping issues, principles, fundamentals, and methodology, rather than focusing 
on specific themes or concrete areas of moral concern. Specificity and concrete 
application in his writings are usually remote and peripheral. This is true, as well, with
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regard to his application of the eschatological paradigm and its implications for moral 
theory. In keeping with this broad horizonal perspective on which he tends to work, the 
function and role of paradigm for Ogletree are toward broad moral orientation, rather than 
specific moral principles, or more concrete area rules.1
Ogletree’s use of the eschatological paradigm in moral theory is consistent with 
his overall methodology and hermeneutic, his use o f paradigm in particular, and his view 
of ecclesiology and the nature of Scripture. Eschatology is a significant and determinate 
ingredient in his hermeneutic.
'It should be noted, however, that while Ogletree’s application o f the 
eschatological paradigm is predominantly on the macro level of critical reflection, his 
attempt to epitomize biblical eschatology is sincerely intended to be specific in its own 
way. Obviously, there can be differing levels o f concreteness or specificity. There can be 
concreteness and specificity on the macro level as well as the level of area rules and 
underlying principles. To be able to effect a hermeneutical bridge or a fusion o f horizons 
between the biblical world of meanings and that o f  our contemporary life world in itself 
could be viewed as a concrete application of the eschatological paradigm, albeit still quite 
abstract. Ogletree’s phenomenology based hermeneutic is an attempt toward 
contemporary relevancy in light of the abstract nature of philosophical ethics in general. 
See Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger. 97-126.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter Orientation
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and evaluate the implications o f the 
methodological application of eschatology as paradigm for developing contemporary 
Christian moral theory. It focuses on the interplay of eschatology as a methodological 
tool and the ethical system that results from it. More specifically, it seeks to demonstrate 
that “this is what happens if you take the eschatological paradigm and apply it this way or 
that way.” Mott and Ogletree were chosen as case studies for this endeavor because they 
clearly belong to the eschatological movement in contemporary Christian ethics. Having 
described and analyzed their use o f eschatology in moral theory,1 this chapter evaluates 
and compares the impact that the eschatological paradigm has on their respective projects. 
In doing so, we are brought closer to answering the questions that have initiated this 
study— “Why does the eschatological paradigm function so differently among Christian 
ethicists and theologians? Does it still hold promise as the starting point for a
‘Both Mott’s and Ogletree’s own assessment of this study’s outline and analysis 
of their respective use of eschatology in moral theory have been positive and affirming as 
to its overall fairness and accuracy of description, as well as its being insightful and a 
discerning interpretation of their methodology, meaning, and purposes (Mott to 
Lichtenwalter, April 20,1996; Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26, 1996).
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comprehensive approach to moral theory?”
This chapter’s evaluation and comparison of Mott’s and Ogletree’s use o f 
eschatology in moral theory include their similarities and differences with respect to (1) 
their perceiving and nuancing the eschatological paradigm and its components, (2) the 
role which the principles of verification play for them in relation to the eschatological 
paradigm, and (3) the level of moral reflection and role that paradigm plays in their moral 
theory. This chapter also proposes what appears to be the strengths and contributions of 
their respective methodology in using eschatology in moral theory. This process enables 
us to ascertain how and why the eschatological paradigm can function differently. It 
enables us to appraise the problems and issues regarding the use of eschatology in 
Christian moral theory. It also enables us to propose the implications that exist for 
credibly using the eschatological paradigm in Christian moral theory. Mott’s and 
Ogletree’s similarities, differences, strengths, and weaknesses in each of the areas 
outlined above are evaluated together in a flowing discussion rather than being 
considered separately.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to orient ourselves by way of review 
of the context in which Mott and Ogletree are being evaluated and compared. As 
participants in the developing tradition o f the eschatological movement in Christian 
ethics, they represent the latter, contemporary phase of twentieth-century re-interpreted 
eschatology and its application toward moral theory.
Following a checkered history o f the eschatology/ethics relationship throughout 
Christian history— one which has often exhibited an “eschatology sans ethics” or an
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“ethics sans eschatology” rather than the vivid biblical eschatology with its corresponding 
moral consciousness—the twentieth century has produced a radical renewed interest both 
in eschatology and the eschatology/ethics dialogue. Various shades of ethical-oriented 
eschatologies and eschatological-oriented ethics have been generated in the course of this 
renewed interest in eschatology.1 But the relationship between eschatology and ethics 
essentially remained problematic through the first half o f the twentieth century. While 
solutions to the tensions and problems were emerging, no final clarification of their 
relationship could be given even by the 1970s. Yet, by the 1970s, a twofold pattern had 
emerged. First, eschatology was becoming increasingly recognized for its potential as a 
paradigm for Christian ethics. Second, eschatology was being viewed/articulated 
primarily through three significant models, i.e., the already/not yet, reign o f  God, and the 
horizon o f  the future. These three models were seen as elucidating the eschatological 
paradigm in relation to its biblical primary model, the Kingdom of God. This study has 
suggested that these models are like a three-stranded cord forming the components parts 
o f a commonly accepted comprehensive eschatological paradigm for Christian ethics. 
They are the key theological images which the Kingdom of God together with its various 
supporting models projects within the eschatological paradigm.2
But while a commonly accepted comprehensive eschatological paradigm had both 
emerged and crystallized through the 1970s, no final clarification of the relationship of 
eschatology and Christian ethics could yet be given. The eschatology/ethics question was
'See above, 33-54.
2See above, 70-78.
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still problematic in the actual application of the paradigm toward moral theory. Each of 
the paradigm’s components generates forceful and specific ethical nuances which are rich 
for application toward moral theory. However, determining how these moral nuances are 
actually elicited or have themselves been cast with respect to moral theory remains a 
challenge. This has become evident when viewed against my designated principles of 
verification and the varied ways we have seen that ethicists have perceived them in 
relation to the divergent moral nuances projected through the paradigm. The possible 
combinations of implications for moral theory are both numerous and complex.1
Furthermore, adequately applying eschatology as paradigm toward moral theory 
demands an understanding of the subtle dynamics of paradigm in relation to its 
supporting models, as well as principles and rules. In addition, there are the varied levels 
in both the structure of moral thought (bases, principles, area rules) and paradigm 
operation (macro, meso, and micro). Together, these several issues press questions of 
consistency and concreteness o f application toward moral theory.2 Because of these 
numerous and complex interrelated issues and problems, eschatology has remained, for 
many, one of those “slippery words” with a “multiplicity o f meanings” which at best is 
“ambiguous and makes for looseness of expression and thought.”3 The need has been 
recognized for further refinement and development. Clearer principles need to be 
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This study has suggested that this need for further refinement and development 
does not lay in the paradigm per se, but rather in its application for moral theory. How 
the application o f the eschatological paradigm toward moral theory facilitates and is 
facilitated by the role o f Scripture, the role of community, and the nature of social 
involvement remains open for clarification and resolution.
And so I turn to Mott and Ogletree. As ethicists working in the latter, 
contemporary phase of twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology, they vividly express 
the impact that the application of the paradigm is having in contemporary Christian moral 
theory and ethical method. They open windows toward working one’s way through the 
complex and often subtle nuances expressed between the paradigm’s components in 
relation to my stated principles of verification and level o f moral reflection. In addition, 
Mott and Ogletree highlight the obvious important role that Scripture has come to play as 
ethicists make the important transition from formulating the eschatological paradigm 
itself to that of its actual application for moral theory.
As stated earlier, this study looks developmentally up through the 1970s for the 
basic crystallized eschatological paradigm. It looks to the 1980s and 1990s for clearer 
methodological application of the paradigm for moral theory by ethicists. It assumes that 
Mott and Ogletree are consciously extending a discussion they consider incomplete and 
unfinished with respect to the use of eschatology in Christian moral theory.
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Evaluation of Mott’s and Ogletree’s Use 
of Eschatology in Moral Theory
Perceiving and Nuancing the Paradigm 
We have seen how both Mott’s and Ogletree’s understanding of eschatology fit 
the general contours of the eschatological paradigm outlined in this study. We have also 
seen that, while the paradigm and each of its components (already/not yet, reign o f  God, 
horizon o f  the future) are evident in their thinking, they clearly nuance the paradigm 
differently. Mott chooses the reign o f God as his leitmotif for nuancing eschatology 
toward moral theory. For Ogletree, it is the already/not yet. These respective choices 
reflect not only the direction o f their interests in moral theory, but how they read the 
eschatological paradigm in relation to moral theory and ethical method.
For Mott, the reign o f  God provides a context for God’s universal ethical 
concerns. It furnishes a concept of history into which other New Testament themes can 
be placed. More specifically, the reign o f  God elucidates for him the centrality o f biblical 
justice as an attribute of God and a major mandate of Scripture, and, in doing so, 
incorporates the imperative for social responsibility into God’s goals in history. For 
Ogletree, the already/not yet provides the creative context for a focused future orientation 
in ethical methodology. It furnishes a “meaning horizon” for Christian moral 
consciousness that encompasses the temporal horizon o f human experience. More 
specifically, it enables a “fusion of horizons” between biblical worlds o f meaning and 
those which make up our sense of reality. Finally, the already/not yet elucidates the 
essential “dialectical nature” of Christian moral theory and methodology.
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Both Mott and Ogletree have issues of universality and integration in view with 
respect to moral principles and ethical themes in relation to the biblical witness and 
history. And they both perceive eschatology as providing a larger-meaning context for 
placing the important issues in moral theory and for facilitating ethical method. Their 
differences lay in the fact that universality for Mott has to do with concrete biblical moral 
concerns, while, for Ogletree, universality has more to do with generalized “worlds o f 
meaning” or “meaning horizons.” Likewise, integration for Mott has to do with specific 
biblical themes within the larger biblical moral witness and God’s purposes in history.
For Ogletree, however, integration is viewed in terms of “fusion o f horizons” between 
biblical worlds of meaning and our own.
Additionally, Ogletree’s interests are largely methodological. Because of this, the 
already/not yet becomes important as his leitmotif. He rightly affirms the already/not yet 
as elucidating the essential “dialogical nature” of Christian moral theory and 
methodology. This leitmotif, however, is nuanced to facilitate his affinity with theologies 
o f the future.1 Mott’s interests, on the other hand, are toward specific biblical themes and 
issues that he deems apropos for contemporary Christian ethics. These include biblical 
justice and the imperative of social involvement. By interpreting the reign o f God 
primarily through the category of biblical justice, Mott facilitates his interest in the social 
justice dialogue. This rather tight focusing of his moral theory around one integrating 
theme tends to homogenize the biblical materials and narrow the scope of influence that
'By doing so, Ogletree essentially undermines the very balance which he intends 
to bring to Christian moral theory. He also opens the way toward speculative nuancing of 
the eschatological paradigm.
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the reign of God could have toward other issues in Christian moral theory.
Finally, eschatology for Ogletree brings an openness toward moral creativity and 
imagination elicited by the presence o f the new age. There is an open horizon which 
enables ever new forms of concrete historical expression o f our ultimate hope. 
Eschatology for Mott is integrally linked with God and the reality of His righteous reign 
both in history and in contemporary Christian life. It focuses moral imagination toward 
specific biblically defined moral imagery.
These divergences do not necessarily suggest radical disagreement between Mott 
and Ogletree about the use o f eschatology in moral theory. Nor do they imply that the 
biblical witness is unimportant to Ogletree or that Mott is not as interested in 
methodology. Surely Mott’s project reflects an understanding of the “dialectical nature” 
o f Christian moral theory and methodology, and Ogletree provides some examples of 
how moral imagination can be stimulated by specific biblically defined imagery. Rather, 
these divergences reflect the direction of their interests in moral theory. They also reflect 
how they read the eschatological paradigm in relation to moral theory and ethical method. 
Mott’s interests lay in the movement from the concrete principles and themes of biblical 
ethics toward the imperative for contemporary social change. Ogletree’s interests lay in 
methodological structure that facilitates the use of Scripture in Christian ethics. Mott is 
primarily oriented to the nurture of believing communities that share, somewhat 
uncritically, common traditions of faith and practice. Ogletree is not so directly pastoral. 
In his scholarly writings, he critically distances himself provisionally from the pastoral 
calling in order to engage the best thinking of the age, to the degree that such engagement
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is possible.1 Generally speaking, then, Mott reads the eschatological paradigm within 
more biblically defined parameters, while Ogletree correlates it with broader 
methodological issues of moral theory in general.
In keeping with the direction of these observations, it would be well to insert here 
this study’s discussion of Mott’s and Ogletree’s correlation of the eschatological 
paradigm to philosophical ethics. Mott, we have learned, appears generally unconcerned 
with directly relating either his moral theory or the eschatological paradigm to the 
categories or concerns of philosophical ethics. Rather, his interests lie squarely in the 
area of social ethics. The categories of thought he uses are primarily biblical categories. 
He does, however, consciously apply modem economic, sociological, and political 
categories of thinking to the materials of the Bible in order to suggest new possibilities of 
meaning and to provide a means of assessing the applicability of the results of exegesis to 
the formal components of social ethics.
Unlike Mott, the categories of moral philosophy factor largely in Ogletree’s 
perceptions, interests, and methodology. Ogletree, we have learned, comes to the 
question of eschatology and ethics from the direction of phenomenology and moral 
philosophy. By viewing and nuancing moral philosophy via the concerns of 
phenomenology, and setting this synthesis within the temporal structure of human 
experience, Ogletree finds a promising resource of preunderstandings with which to 
engage the biblical materials in a discourse about the moral life. Since eschatology is 
both central to these biblical materials and provides a larger horizon of moral
'Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26, 1996, 3.
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understanding in keeping with the temporal structure o f human experience which 
phenomenology and moral philosophy delineate, it plays an important hermeneutical role 
in bringing an overall correlation of ideation towards contemporary Christian moral 
theory.1
The question might be rightly asked, though, “Are they not really doing the same 
thing, only differently?” In other words, “Is Mott’s application of modem economic, 
sociological, and political categories of thinking to the biblical materials in order to 
suggest new possibilities of meaning and provide a means of assessing the applicability of 
the results of exegesis really any different from Ogletree’s readiness to see analogies with 
classical moral theories in the Bible or his attempts to use moral philosophy and 
phenomenology to engage the biblical materials in a discourse about the moral life?” 
Viewed broadly, there may not appear to be any substantive difference. In fact, for some, 
social, economic, and political categories o f thinking could be viewed broadly as being 
concerns accessory to moral philosophy.
The difference, however, lay in the fact that, in principle,2 the contemporary 
categories Mott facilitates in his project reflect concrete areas o f life application which 
the biblical materials point toward and which exegesis outlines. There is movement from 
the biblical record towards the concrete areas of life application which Scripture is 
addressing. The categories Mott selects bring contemporary clarity to the issues and
‘See above, 216-227.
2I say “in principle” because it is possible to use these “areas o f application 
categories” as “methodological structures” which could in fact restrict or misrepresent the 
real meaning o f the biblical materials.
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principles which Scripture elicits with respect to these concrete areas of moral life.
Ogletree’s preunderstandings of the moral life, on the other hand, present 
structures of thought which lay outside the apparent purview of the biblical materials. 
Rather than concrete areas of life application they are an interpretive framework used to 
engage the Bible in a discourse about the moral life. In doing so, they essentially bring 
the biblical materials toward philosophical perceptions o f reality and moral life rather 
than bringing philosophical perceptions of reality and moral life toward the biblical 
materials. The biblical materials are interpreted via these philosophical 
preunderstandings of moral life, hence the philosophical preunderstandings have implicit 
controlling qualities in the dialogue. This will be discussed again in more detail below. 
For now, however, it needs to be noted that Ogletree’s work as a whole is guided by a 
hermeneutic based on phenomenological investigations. It is a hermeneutic governed by 
a life-world perspective. It differs fundamentally, then, from Mott’s, whose starting point 
is biblical imagery, theology, and exegesis. Moral philosophy in reality assumes a more 
controlling role in Ogletree’s interpretive task than what he may be consciously 
attempting to effect. Again, these divergences reflect directions, interests, and 
methodology with respect to application of the eschatological paradigm in moral theory. 
While their differences may appear subtle, the implications for answering the questions o f 
this study are significant.1
'Referring to Mott’s rather topical approach to the use of Scripture in Christian 
ethics, Verhey writes, “He is profoundly attentive to Scripture as a source of a genuinely 
Christian posture in society, and in attending to it he is careful to do justice to the 
sociological, historical, and literary contexts o f the biblical materials. His brief but 
candid attention to methodological questions concerning the use of Scripture in ethics
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Principles of Verification
This study has proposed that by comparing and evaluating Mott’s and Ogletree’s 
use of the eschatological paradigm in relation to our stated principles of verification, we 
can get a sense for how effectively the eschatological paradigm answers the long-standing 
crisis of “authority” and “relevance” in Christian ethics during this century.1 We can also 
observe whether or how the eschatological paradigm influences or is influenced by 
presuppositions regarding these significant issues (principles of verification) within 
contemporary Christian moral dialogue. In addition, we are able to answer questions of 
foundations and presuppositions. In other words, is their use of the eschatological 
paradigm rooted in philosophy, philosophical ethics, social moral agenda, biblical 
theology, the community (tradition), or some hybrid of these?
Role of Scripture
Both Mott and Ogletree are very deliberate in explaining their approach to 
Scripture. Together they share a fourfold methodology in keeping with their Wesleyan 
and Methodist tradition, i.e., the dialogical interplay of Scripture, reason, Christian 
tradition, and experience. Together they understand that Christian ethics is not 
synonymous with biblical ethics, nor is Scripture alone sufficient for Christian ethics. 
They share the common goal of building a responsible bridge between the biblical 
materials and contemporary Christian moral theory. And they both steadfastly affirm the
provides an important protection against possible rationalization in using it for this 
purpose” (Verhey, 25).
'See above, 19-20.
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“primacy o f Scripture” in relation to the other constituent features of their methodology! 
There is divergence, however, in the way they view the nature of Scripture and the 
functional role it should have in relation to the other aspects of their methodology.
Mott’s methodology reflects a fundamental commitment to the primacy and 
ultimate authority of Scripture.1 Practically, this means that the text itself is the revelation 
of God and that the authority of the Scriptures lies within the intentionality of the given 
passage. Scripture is the ultimate authority on the issues that it addresses as well as the 
crucial nature of those issues. Mott shows respect for the plenary inspiration of the 
biblical text, and he demonstrates thoughtful exegesis. He also affirms the essential 
theological and ethical unity of the Bible, and assumes that its primary orientation is 
historical.
Ogletree rightly notes that divergence with respect to the role of Scripture in 
ethical method is usually not over the issue of the “primacy of Scripture” per se, but “over 
the way Scripture is actually received and interpreted.”2 Obviously, one can always assert 
the “primacy of Scripture.” How one actually receives and interprets Scripture, however, 
determines the issue of primacy by default. Interestingly, this is what we find with
'Curry notes Mott’s explicit commitment to the primacy of Scripture, "One cannot 
but be struck by now consistently the author dares to deal with the primacy of the biblical 
text. This work presents the reader with an unmistakable integrity, both in its treatment 
of the scriptural text and in its fair presentation of the various issues illuminated by the 
text” (Michael S. Curry, “The Partiality of Justice,” Sojourners 13, no. 3 [March 1984]: 
36). See also F. Burton Nelson, review of Biblical Ethics and Social Change, by Stephen 
Charles Mott, TSF Bulletin 7, no. 2 (November-December 1983): 24; Hays, 25.
2Ogletree, “In Quest of a Common Faith: The Theological Task of the United 
Methodists,” 48.
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Ogletree. While asserting the “primacy o f Scripture,” Ogletree formulates a way of 
receiving and interpreting the biblical materials that functionally undercuts that very 
assertion.1 Moral philosophy, phenomenology, and historical-critical method blend 
together towards a view of the nature of Scripture that largely follows that of existential 
and encounter theology. In the process, Ogletree does not clearly underscore the point 
that our “preunderstandings” must never be permitted to control our reading of Scripture. 
Nor does his methodology indicate clearly how they can be kept from doing so. 
Furthermore, the uniquely authoritative role o f Scripture is found in a horizon of 
understanding within which diverse peoples can identify themselves, rather than in 
revealing timeless truths or proposing unchanging ethical principles.
The implications of their respective presuppositions regarding the nature and 
authority o f Scripture find forceful expression in their use of the eschatological paradigm 
in relation to the biblical materials. Mott’s application of the eschatological paradigm, 
for the most part, uses Scripture in a way in which the biblical materials maintain an 
authoritative, assertive role in the process o f application. The primacy and ultimate 
authority o f Scripture can be viewed through his reign o f  God leitmotif in such issues as 
the theological/ethical unity of Old and New Testament Scripture, the authoritative 
meaning and content of the biblical text and of the words themselves, as well as the 
theological affirmations of Scripture, acts o f God, and prevailing ethical principles.
Ogletree’s application of the eschatological paradigm in relation to Scripture is
‘Edward Vacek, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas 
W. Ogletree, Theological Studies 45 (December 1984): 753.
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more subtle and complex. On the one hand, eschatology is understood as expressing the 
essential meaning of the biblical witness. It is viewed as the unique contribution of 
Scripture to the equation of conceptual categories in his ethical method. And it provides 
the biblical horizon of meaning, which profoundly qualifies and substantially informs the 
manner in which moral notions present themselves to consciousness. Here the 
eschatological paradigm clearly expresses considerable Scriptural influence.
Furthermore, Ogletree’s already/not yet leitmotif rightly draws upon biblical exegesis and 
theology.
On the other hand, Ogletree’s presuppositions regarding Scripture appear to color 
his use o f the eschatological paradigm accordingly: (1) because the fundamental meaning 
of Scripture is understood as historical and existential,1 the important categories for 
nuancing the meaning of the eschatological paradigm are, likewise, historical and 
existential (i.e., temporal horizon o f human experience, and the meaning of being);2 (2) 
because historical-critical methodology is embraced as providing appropriate tools for 
opening up the fundamental meaning of Scripture,3 the eschatological paradigm, likewise, 
becomes explicated within the purview of the presuppositions of this methodology; (3) 
because the enduring value of Scripture is found in the surplus of meaning beyond what is 
uttered in the biblical texts,4 and which is in need of higher levels of generality in order to
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find common ground with contemporary society,1 the value of the eschatological 
paradigm, likewise, is found in broad, generalizing horizonal meanings rather than in 
generating specifically moral notions.2
Role of Community
As outlined in chapter 2, the role which the Christian community assumes in 
eschatological ethics has revolved around three fundamental issues: (1) as a source of 
moral authority; (2) the field of moral operation; and (3) its linkage with the ethical 
needs/agenda of the larger human society. As we have seen, the role of community in 
Mott’s and Ogletree’s application of the eschatological paradigm in these three areas is 
for the most part clear and deliberate.
For Mott, the Christian community constitutes primarily a subordinate, yet vital, 
source of moral authority in relation to that of Scripture. The believing community holds 
an obvious important and vital role in the interpretation and application process in 
relation to Scripture, but the primacy and ultimate authority of Scripture is an unbending 
given. Mott also presents the believing community as the primary, purposeful, and 
distinct new society which gives unique, empirical visibility to the reign o f  God. It is a 
concrete social context that is set apart from society as a kind of “counter society.” It is 
the paradigmatic field o f moral operation for the reign o f  God. Additionally, the 
believing community is viewed as the primary social structure through which the gospel
'Ibid., 3,12.
2Ibid., 177.
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works to change other structures within the larger society. Since the demonstration of 
Christian community is only one facet o f social change, it is inadequate as an expression 
of social justice toward the world. Faithfulness to the demands for justice necessitates, 
then, social programs and social struggle.
For Ogletree, the believing community is a vital interpretive, almost 
complementary, source of authority in relation to Scripture. The dialogical process of 
interpretation—where Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience interact reciprocally so 
that each is illumined by the other—is to take place within what Ogletree terms “an 
ecclesial context.”1 In particular, successful dialogue between ethics and Scripture is 
viewed as requiring an ecclesial premise. This “ecclesial context” is no less than the 
“eschatological community.” According to Ogletree, the “way into Christian critique of 
ethos . . .  is through eschatology,” and “a distinctive Christian ethics has its social 
location in eschatological community.”2 In other words, it is difficult to practice 
Christian ethics while being immersed in non-Christian communities. And in particular, 
only eschatologically oriented communities can foster a genuine fusion of horizons with 
the eschatological perspective of the biblical era. The church, then, is a practical 
necessity if  the methodological question o f eschatology is to be properly dealt with in the 
dialogue on Scripture and ethics.3 If fusion of horizons between the biblical world and 
the modem world is to occur, there must be faith communities in the present who are
'Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context of Christian Ethics,” 2.
2Ibid., 12, 13.
3Himes, 67.
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engaged in an eschatological praxis of gospel living.1 The eschatological paradigm is 
viewed as creating the context for eschatological community to both understand and use 
biblical materials in its (eschatological community) moral reflection. Because the biblical 
materials participate formatively in constructing ethical theory that is intentionally only 
provisionally held by the believing community, and because ongoing dialogue may alter it 
further,2 Scripture essentially functions in a “mentoring” role in relation to the believing 
community. Furthermore, Scripture provides horizonal meaning more than concrete 
content. It is the believing community, then, which extends this horizonal meaning 
toward contemporary ethical exigencies in determining the possibilities of concrete 
explication. Accordingly, the unity of the Bible is seen as residing more in the unfolding 
identity of a people, and a church arising in relation to that people, than in particular 
themes or beliefs.
Because Ogletree views Christian existence as essentially ecclesial existence 
(eschatological existence), the believing community furnishes the fundamental social 
location that defines Christian participation in the life of the world. The primary task is 
building up and sustaining eschatological communities. Eschatological ethics, then, is 
expressly directed toward the eschatological community. Accordingly, the Christian 
community relates to the ethical needs of the larger human society in a way that is
‘This contention of Ogletree’s shares some features of liberation theologies that 
stress that the locus o f theologizing is the experience of basic Christian communities who 
self-consciously understand themselves to be critics of and alternatives to political and 
economic systems deemed oppressive (ibid.).
2Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 200-203.
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indirect. It relates to the larger world by extension and by analogy from its own moral 
reflection and experience.1
The functional role which Scripture assumes in Mott’s and Ogletree’s 
eschatologically informed thinking thus finds some interesting parallels in their respective 
perceptions of the role of community. While they both affirm the important role o f 
community in the dialogical process of ethical method, Mott is unbending in the primacy 
and the ultimate authority o f Scripture over that of the community. Ogletree, however, 
places the believing community in a role that essentially qualifies the primacy and 
authority o f Scripture in favor o f the reflective community and its eschatological praxis of 
gospel living. Ogletree rightly argues for an “ecclesial context” for interpreting Scripture 
and doing Christian ethics. He correctly outlines this “ecclesial context” as being 
essentially one of “eschatological community.” He is right, too, in affirming that the 
eschatological praxis of gospel living provides points o f contact for comprehending what 
the biblical texts are saying. In other words, only eschatologically oriented communities 
can really foster a fusion of horizons between the biblical world and our modem world.
'But where are such communities of faith? It is unclear which community and/or 
tradition Ogletree, or Mott for that matter, has in mind here (Larry Rasmussen, “Bible and 
Ethics: A Creative Moment,” review The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas 
W. Ogletree, Christianity and Crisis: A Christian Journal o f Opinion 44 (March 19,
1984): 94; Jones, 192). Neither of their ecclesiologies has been developed with sufficient 
clarity or precision for it to be clear what historically located community they are 
describing as church and how this community does or should relate to the world. While 
standing in a common Wesleyan/Methodist tradition, Mott and Ogletree both articulate 
the eschatology/ethics question in non-sectarian ways towards the larger theological 
ethical dialogue taking place in the Christian community as a whole. While they both 
write within the context of an evangelical perspective, Ogletree’s position is more that of 
“ecumenical” Protestant perspective (Ogletree, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant Social 
Teaching”; idem, “In Quest of Multi-Cultural Theological Education”).
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However, Ogletree could affirm these important hermeneutical points in a way that better 
keeps the primacy and ultimate authority of Scripture fully in view, both in theory and 
function.
The relation between Scripture and community in Mott’s and Ogletree’s use of 
eschatology in moral theory suggests that a correspondence exists between the functional 
authority of the community and the level of concreteness or generality that the biblical 
materials are perceived as capable of engendering. If Scripture is seen as providing only 
broad horizonal imagery, then the importance of the reflective community in the 
interpretive process rises proportionally. In addition, the task of contemporary 
application would of necessity be predominately in the hands of the community. If, on 
the other hand, Scripture is viewed as providing substantial, concrete ethical injunctions 
or specific prevailing moral principles, then the biblical materials are much more likely to 
remain the controlling element in the interpretive process. Scripture would bring both 
structure and guidance to the task of application. It appears that Ogletree’s 
presuppositions regarding Scripture largely influence his view o f what the eschatological 
paradigm is actually capable of producing for the believing community. Because of this, 
the eschatological community competes with the very materials that declare and outline 
its own eschatological identity.
While Mott and Ogletree share similar convictions about the believing community 
being the fundamental field o f moral operation for eschatological ethics, Ogletree’s 
imagery o f “eschatological communities” facilitates a sharper case for defining the 
meaning and content o f eschatological ethics. It also points more precisely to
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eschatological ethics as being expressly directed toward the eschatological community. 
Mott obviously perceives a more direct line from the ethics o f the community toward the 
larger society than Ogletree does. The difference lies in the fact that Ogletree has 
Christian ethics more in view, while Mott has social change in mind. Ogletree’s principle 
that the Christian community relates to the social/political ethical needs o f the larger 
human society in a way that is indirect seems to best reflect the general tenor of the New 
Testament eschatology. He is correct in affirming that the biblical materials basically 
provide an ethic directed toward the eschatological community.
Nature of Social Involvement
In keeping with his understanding that the affairs o f the state lie basically outside 
substantive Christian concern, and that the believing community reaches only indirectly 
toward the wider social world, Ogletree, nevertheless, affirms that deliberate public 
responsibility is to be assumed. It is to be assumed where individual Christians or the 
believing community have means to exercise it. It is to be assumed, too, where it 
expresses appropriate forms of participation in the larger society. The church’s public 
responsibility has to do with the genuine spiritual/moral power and influence which it has 
within the larger society. According to Ogletree, the appropriate forms of this “public 
witness” include evangelism, individual social responsibility and influence, moral protest 
and personal influence in the sociopolitical arena, developing social policy, as well as 
social struggle. These are not without important qualification, however. Any so-called 
“public witness” must be expressed within the spirit of the spirituality, faith, and internal
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fellowship of the eschatological community.
Mott’s broad view of the nature o f social involvement would concur. His “paths 
to justice” include a variety of ways in which Christians can bring about social change. 
These include evangelism, individual social responsibility and influence, moral protest 
and personal influence in the sociopolitical arena, as well as social programs and social 
struggle. Like Ogletree, Mott would qualify any said expression of social involvement. It 
must be consistent with the vision of justice which he outlines as being expressed in the 
eschatological reign o f  God. Ogletree qualifies the nature of social involvement 
through the imagery of eschatological communal reality. Mott, however, does so via the 
imagery of biblical justice which reflects God’s reign. This diversity not only reflects 
their respective interests, but shows again how Mott envisions a more direct line from the 
moral focus o f the biblical materials to the larger society than Ogletree does. Both, 
however, express balance and “realism” in terms of the extent to which Christian social 
involvement can reasonably bring change to the larger society while anticipating the not 
yet o f the Kingdom of God.
Mott and Ogletree could both be characterized as articulating models of social 
responsibility which critically engage the social/moral reality of the larger society. In 
fact, this aspect of social involvement appears to be an important part of their thinking.
But again, we see diversity. For Ogletree, an effective public witness is possible only as 
the eschatological community comes to grips with the contemporary “civilization ethic.”
It does so by criticizing it, extending and developing it, and, insofar as possible, 
articulating its (eschatological community) distinctive vision in ways that connect with
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the central tendencies of “civilization ethics.” To do so, the eschatological community 
must furnish moral notions that make possible a  public discourse about the common 
good. This includes creative synthesis o f social and cultural ideas with a  Christian social 
vision. It means the adjustment of Christian teachings to social exigencies. Such 
adjustments are not seen by Ogletree as a dilution of Christian moral seriousness. Rather, 
it is a fitting moral response to situations o f substantial moral conflict. The problem, 
though, is that Ogletree does not spell out precisely what he has in mind here. Nor does 
he say how this might actually work on a practical level. And he does not indicate, either, 
how concrete such critical engagement can really become in complex or unpredictable 
situations. He suggests only that we somehow adjust or focus Christian teaching toward 
social exigencies.
Ogletree does, however, broadly outline four themes that merit attention with 
respect to the force o f eschatological promise for the social organization o f life.1 He 
outlines these four themes in the context of an overarching metaphor which he terms 
“hospitality.” This “hospitality” is seen as expressing two metaphoric nuances for moral 
theory: (1) the moral import of intersubjectivity, and (2) the moral significance of 
pluralism at an elemental level of human experience. Together they envision an openness 
to both people and ideas which may be different to us. But even here there is no clear 
outline of what he has in mind for engaging the “civilization ethic.” The point here is that
'I.e., (1) ethnic and gender inclusiveness, (2) reversal and obliteration o f privilege, 
power, and wealth distinctions, (3) mercy, mutual forbearance, and forgiving love 
transcending national, ethnic, and cultural bases of social order, and (4) recognition of 
the plurality and relativity of human cultures and social institutions and the possibility of 
community among culturally diverse peoples. See above, 252-256.
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Ogletree remains vague. One can rightly ask him, “In practice, how does the Christian 
social vision keep from getting absorbed into the ‘civilization ethic’?” “If eschatological 
promise is viewed as articulating openness to people and ideas, and encompassing 
plurality and relativity, where are the concrete anchor points?”1 One wishes for that other 
volume Ogletree himself says should come to bring clearer application to his 
fundamentals.
Mott is a theorist too, but he is decidedly more precise in what he has in mind 
with respect to moral protest and engaging the larger social world.2 Not only does he 
work within the parameters of a very developed concept o f “biblical justice,” he has gone 
on to more fully elaborate the implications of these parameters of “biblical justice” 
toward contemporary social/political thought. While not a how-to manual, and still quite 
conceptual, Mott’s project presents a clearer image of the nature of social involvement.
He is more precise, too, in terms of what the issues should be in the context of such social
'Courtney rightly asks, “Is there anything that is not negotiable? And Is there 
something unique about Christian negotiating? Finally, what kind of time-bomb is set on 
the last page when the author envisages interfaith negotiations which presuppose the 
relativity o f constitutive Christian themes?” (Courtney, 88).
2Hays notes that “in many respects, Mott’s argument is a restatement of Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s social ethic, bolstered by much more detailed biblical exegesis and modified by 
a slightly more optimistic assessment of human capacity to achieve justice through social 
institutions” (Hays, 26). In contrast, Ogletree’s arguments are a restatement of Ernst 
Troeltsch’s social theory—the distinctions and interconnections between social forces and 
civilizational values in relation to Christian ethos. Ogletree restates Troeltsch’s social 
theory in the context o f the eschatological dialectic which he asserts can lead equally as 
well to renewed interest in the church as the ecclesial context of Christian ethics, rather 
than away from it as Troeltch ultimately moved in favor of a larger civilization ethic (see 
Ogletree, “The Ecclesial Context o f Christian Ethics,” 11, 12; idem, “Christian Social 
Ethics as a Theological Discipline,” 226-233; idem, “Renewing Ecumenical Protestant 
Social Teaching,” 293-296).
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moral protest. His writings reflect a corresponding realism to the issues he outlines with 
respect to such practical concerns like power, social status, economics, etc. By 
interpreting the reign o f  God largely through the notion o f “biblical justice,” Mott works 
within an existing outline of thought and imagery which Scripture provides with respect 
to his subject matter. His specificity in critical engagement is naturally facilitated by the 
extent and specificity of the given biblical material.1 As a result, he also has a clearer 
picture of the non-negotiables in any said adjustments o f Christian teaching to 
contemporary social exigencies. Ogletree would argue that, in principle, there are 
concrete non-negotiables. His methodology, however, and the categories he articulates in 
terms of public witness are less defining, potentially risky, and too fluid where complex, 
real life situations demand concrete, relevant application.
In this context, though, Ogletree does provide some very useful discussion relative 
to the way one would actually go about determining one’s social responsibility. He 
enunciates two basic principles. First, social responsibility is assumed where we have the 
means to exercise it. Second, it is assumed where it expresses appropriate forms of 
participation in the larger society. Social involvement, then, is selective and qualified. It 
is to be expressed where we actually have influence, opportunity, or power. Despite both 
its generality and implicit relativity, his discussion about the “civilization ethic” does 
accurately outline some of the issues involved in critically engaging the moral thinking of 
the larger society. He is right in asserting that we must find ways of articulating our
'Hays will note a possible hermeneutical weakness with the question, “Is the 
‘Reign of God’ a symbol that we can appropriate as easily and directly as Mott 
supposes?” (Hays, 26).
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distinctive witness in a manner that is suited to a public discourse. We must find 
common language and engage the world, initially at least, on the level of its own agenda. 
For Ogletree, the eschatological community is suited for just such a task.
On this matter, Mott’s prevailing focus on “biblical justice” could be a limiting 
factor in effecting broad-based critical engagement with the larger society. The rich 
complexity of the ethics of biblical materials can easily become homogenized where a 
single motif structures one’s ethic. Certainly our contemporary society’s dialogue on 
social exigencies is broader than the one prevailing theme or interest o f social justice.1
Authority/Relevance
Mott’s and Ogletree’s use o f eschatology in relation to our stated principles of 
verification relate ultimately to the questions of “authority” and “relevance” in Christian 
ethics. They have both explicitly addressed these two concerns in their projects and have 
contributed significantly towards their resolution, though in different ways and varying 
degree.
Broadly speaking, they can both be said to elevate the role that Scripture must 
play in eschatological ethics. This is, perhaps, their major contribution to the 
eschatology/ethics dialogue. Their respective projects have sharpened the issues around 
which the question of the authority o f Scripture revolves. They have shown how 
eschatology can be useful in either solving problems of biblical authority or 
facilitating/obstructing the authority of Scripture in developing moral theory.
'Milton W. Y. Wan, “A Response to Stephen Mott,” Transformation 4, nos. 3 and
4 (June-September/October-December 1987): 34, 35.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
300
But while they both consciously seek to elevate the role o f Scripture in Christian 
ethics via eschatology, Mott conies the closest to demonstrating how the eschatological 
paradigm actually does so. Mott’s application o f the eschatological paradigm, for the 
most part, uses Scripture in a way in which the biblical materials maintain an 
authoritative, assertive, and defining role in the process of application. This happens 
because his presuppositions regarding the nature and authority of Scripture predispose 
him in that direction. The eschatological paradigm, then, reciprocates, so to speak, by 
eliciting methodology in keeping with those presuppositions. Thus, Scripture influences 
the perceptions, nuancing, and application o f eschatology. Correspondingly, eschatology 
influences the functional role Scripture actually plays in that very application toward 
moral theory.
Ogletree, we have seen, leans largely on moral philosophy and phenomenology 
for his orientation to both eschatology and Scripture. While much o f his view of 
eschatology finds correspondence with the biblical materials, it is much less precise with 
respect to the question of authority. Placing authority in the interpretive “ecclesial 
context” o f eschatological praxis makes it too fluid for responsible Christian moral 
theory.
The question of “relevance” points us primarily to the nature o f social 
involvement, but it includes the role of Scripture and community as well. Ultimately, 
Scripture must be seen as relevant to the contemporary situation. Likewise, the believing 
community need a sense of their part in social involvement. Mott and Ogletree have used 
the eschatological paradigm differently to effect similar views of social involvement.
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They have used it differently, too, to facilitate the relevance of the biblical materials to 
contemporary moral exigencies and to help the church know its part in social 
involvement. But as noted above, Mott succeeds in being more precise in his moral 
theory. Because of this, he becomes more immediately relevant. Because he is working 
within parameters defined more closely by the biblical materials themselves, Mott is able 
to present a clearer picture of where he is going. He is closer to finishing, so to speak, 
what he has started. He does not have as large a leap to take from his understanding of 
eschatology to contemporary praxis. He is able to demonstrate both theoretically and 
practically (through his discussion of area rules) how the eschatological paradigm really 
looks in contemporary moral theory and social involvement.1
Ogletree’s orientation in moral philosophy and phenomenology puts his beginning 
point further away from praxis and demands daunting precision in order to effect even 
theoretical relevance. He himself acknowledges that further steps are needed to move 
him from fundamentals to symbolic ethics to practical ethics, and then on to applied 
ethics. His project, then, is only relatively relevant.2 A firm bridge from the biblical
'"His style is lucid and his manner of relating theory to practice is both pertinent 
and convincing” (Ivy George, review of Biblical Ethics and Social Change, by Stephen 
Charles Mott, Christian Scholar’s Review 15, no. 1 (1985): 93.
2Ogletree does not write for the general reader. His project is particularly 
complex and concise with the level o f  reflection/study abstract and remote for those 
looking for concrete or practical solutions to moral or social problems (Paul D. Simmons, 
review of Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions o f Moral Understanding, by Thomas 
W. Ogletree, Review and Expositor 85, no. 3 [Summer 1988]: 577; Giannini, 74).
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materials to social involvement is not erected,1 except perhaps for the eschatological 
community itself. On this point, we find one o f Ogletree’s strengths. His concept o f the 
eschatological community—the ecclesial context for doing ethics and reaching toward the 
larger world—yields the promise of realizing that bridge. This assumes, o f  course, that 
the believing community is attentive to the biblical materials. Ogletree’s point here 
would be much stronger, however, if Scripture were given the same kind o f  primacy and 
authority found in Mott. Nevertheless, the things Ogletree expresses on this matter are 
relevant for the believing community in knowing, generally at least, how they should live 
together and then reach toward the larger world. There is no doubt that both Mott’s and 
Ogletree’s discussion about the need for and ways o f effecting critical engagement with 
the moral thinking of the larger society demonstrates how the eschatological paradigm is 
relevant to the question of the nature of social involvement and how it facilitates such 
dialogue.
This comparison and evaluation of Mott’s and Ogletree’s use of eschatology in 
relation to our principles of verification gives us a fair sense for how effectively the 
eschatological paradigm has come to answer the long-standing crisis of “authority” and 
“relevance” in Christian ethics during this century. In some respects, their use of the 
eschatological paradigm reveals that the issue o f “authority” and “relevance” still very 
much exists. The fact that Mott and Ogletree position the role of the believing
'Scroggs, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics. 45; Jones, 192. 
Attwood suggests that some crucial steps in Ogletree’s arguments about eschatology have 
not been adequately demonstrated and that he “has failed to make certain links hold” 
(Attwood, 156).
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community differently with reference to that o f Scripture, and that both have differing 
approaches in nuancing and defining the nature of social involvement, suggests as much. 
Additionally, there is the reality that they both deal quite largely on theoretical levels. In 
other respects, though, their use of the eschatological paradigm exhibits refinements that 
make the eschatological paradigm more useful toward answering the concerns of 
“authority” and “relevance” in Christian ethics.
Level of Reflection/Paradigm Function 
An integral part of this study’s analysis and evaluation has been Mott’s and 
Ogletree’s application of the paradigm’s ethical implications with respect to the level of 
moral reflection and its potential for concrete social content. This study proposes a 
correspondence between the appropriate level on which paradigms operate and the 
ingredients of ethics, i.e., m acn^ases, meso/underlying principles, and micro/area rules. 
The question of “theoretical level,” which this correspondence facilitates, enables one to 
clarify how concretely the eschatological paradigm might legitimately speak to modem 
ethical concerns. Closely related to the question of “theoretical level” is the meaning and 
function of paradigm. This study has outlined how paradigms serve either to facilitate an 
abstract principle which needs to be translated and applied towards new situations, or to 
imprint an inner gripping moral image which shapes people ethically. The issues here 
deal with questions of specificity and consistency with respect to the eschatological 
paradigm’s application. They bring into practical focus where normative content and 
guidance lay in the application process. They reveal, too, the carefulness with which the
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eschatological paradigm is applied towards concrete ethical exigencies.
Level of Moral Reflection
This study’s analysis has concluded that, for Mott, the eschatological paradigm 
substantially facilitates moral reflection across the full spectrum of paradigm operation. 
We observe Mott drawing moral imagery from each o f the macro, meso, and micro 
levels. In addition, his use of the eschatological paradigm reflects application in the 
corresponding ingredients in the structure o f ethics, i.e., philosophical/theological bases, 
underlying principles, and area rules.
For Ogletree, the eschatological paradigm primarily facilitates the macro and 
meso levels o f paradigm operation. The micro level is somewhat in view on the 
periphery in terms of proposed subsequent systematic treatment of Christian ethics. In 
other words, the micro level is potentially there for Ogletree, although his current projects 
do not reflect it as such. Correspondingly, his use of the eschatological paradigm reflects 
application in the bases and underlying principles ingredients in the structure o f ethics. 
Unlike Mott, Ogletree’s style and focus in both theology and ethics have been 
predominately toward the theoretical. They primarily deal with broad sweeping issues, 
principles, fundamentals, and methodology, rather than focusing on specific themes or 
concrete areas of moral concern. The reality, then, is that specificity and concrete 
application in his writings are usually remote and peripheral. This is true with regard to 
his application of the eschatological paradigm to moral theory.
The questions of “theoretical level,” specificity, and consistency come in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
305
context o f  the important question of how to credibly translate ethical reflection from one 
level to another. Obviously, this has to do with the comprehensiveness of a given 
paradigm and the nature of the imagery it provides. Not all paradigms are capable of 
operating across the full spectrum of the macro, meso, and micro. That the eschatological 
paradigm does so, raises two important questions, “Why?” and “How?” Part of the 
answer, as we have seen, lies in the fact that the eschatological paradigm’s component 
models {already/not yet, reign o f  God, and horizon o f  the future) as well as its primary 
model (kingdom of God) facilitate such movement. Because these components offer all 
three levels, they facilitate a comprehensive biblical paradigm that encompasses the 
macro/bases, meso/underlying principles, and micro/area rules.
In addition, there is the eschatological paradigm’s important relation to the 
biblical materials themselves, and, relatedly, one’s presuppositions with regard to the 
nature o f Scripture. The reason “why” and “how” the eschatological paradigm operates 
across the spectrum of paradigm operation is found in the fact that the biblical materials 
relate the moral imagery of eschatology across the spectrum of what this study has 
outlined as paradigm operation and the corresponding ingredients in the structure of 
ethics. One can credibly translate ethical reflection from one level to another because the 
biblical materials themselves provide both the conceptual structure and the example to do 
so. Mott’s use of the eschatological paradigm exhibits this very point.
Mott is concerned with understanding the place of concrete decision making 
within different aspects of ethical thought. He is interested in showing how principles 
and concrete injunctions relate in Scriptural thought. In other words, he is concerned
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with the question of how to credibly translate ethical reflection from one level to another. 
In this context, Mott interprets organically the diverse, but complementary, ways in which 
Scripture is authoritative for ethics. According to him, the concrete biblical injunctions 
must be interpreted with attention to God’s mighty acts, theological affirmations, and 
prevailing ethical principles. Likewise, the specific teachings and propositions are 
needed to give concrete interpretation of the broad and general truths and actions. 
Functionally, this provides the way for responsibly opening up the ethical meaning of 
Scripture across different levels of moral reflection and application. We see Mott 
demonstrating this approach with his application of the eschatological paradigm in moral 
theory.1 In fact, we see his use of the eschatological paradigm actually facilitating this 
hermeneutical principle, not just applying it. The eschatological paradigm is an integral 
part of his consistently translating ethical reflection from one level to another.
Ogletree’s use of the eschatological paradigm exhibits similar movement from 
one level o f ethical reflection to another. He does so somewhat differently, however, and 
not as precisely or coherently as Mott does. Mott translates ethical reflection from one
'Middlemann worries, however, that Mott’s search for paradigms is more 
important than textual accuracy and that his generalizations at times are so broad that 
important passages have to be abandoned in order to keep ideology alive. He rightly 
muses, “If  the context o f the present human situation becomes the text for our action, the 
Bible can only furnish us with paradigms, symbols, parallels or activism. I suggest we 
need more than that—namely, God’s deliberate information. His text, not the human 
context, must inform us. Otherwise, anyone from whatsoever ideological background, 
will be free to find his or her paradigms about any current concern in various historical 
realities o f the Bible” (Middlemann, 37). While Mott may be myopic at times with 
respect to his biblical justice leitmotif, he nevertheless demonstrates, for the most part, 
the close relation between paradigm and text that I am outlining here.
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level to another because he sees Scripture as providing the structure and the example of 
doing so. He is simply trying to organically interpret the biblical materials. Ogletree 
makes this cross-level movement because moral philosophy calls for such (fundamental 
ethics, symbolic ethics, and practical ethics), and because one can find corresponding 
materials in Scripture to make the bridge. This may be a subtle difference that reflects 
differing interests more than substantive differences, but the fact remains that 
presuppositions about Scripture lie behind their respective approaches. Ogletree’s view 
of the nature o f Scripture places the movement between levels of moral reflection within 
the organic structure of his philosophical methodology, while Mott’s view places this 
movement within the context of the biblical materials and how they organically cohere 
and interrelate. Because of this subtle difference, Ogletree’s movement, as far as the 
biblical materials are concerned, will always appear arbitrary and open to question.1 This 
will be so even though the actual movement itself may correspond to what one actually 
finds in Scripture. In the end, it comes back to the question, "Is it the biblical materials or 
moral philosophy that determines why we are doing what we are doing with the 
eschatological paradigm?”
Having said all this, we need to affirm the fact that Ogletree’s use o f the 
eschatological paradigm does in fact facilitate the movement of ethical reflection from 
one level to another. Like Mott, the eschatological paradigm is an integral part o f his
'Attwood suggests that “the actual moves which Ogletree makes to apply and use 
the Bible are not the decisive test of the book’s (The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics') 
value” (Attwood, 156).
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translating ethical reflection from one level to another. However, he is not as precise or 
consistent as Mott. The point here is that, if the conceptual structure and example for 
movement between levels of moral reflection are rooted in the biblical materials, then the 
question of consistency is gauged by one’s use of the biblical materials themselves. If it 
is found somewhere beyond the biblical materials themselves, then consistency is gauged 
by that other point of reference. I would add that Mott’s project suggests that the bridge 
between the differing levels of moral reflection is the reality of their each yielding 
normative content of Scripture.
Paradigm Role/Function
I now turn to the question of paradigm role and function. Paradigm, as we have 
seen, is an integral part of both Mott’s and Ogletree’s moral theory. This study began 
with the assumption that they embraced a paradigmatic approach to moral theory. This 
assumption implied that the eschatological paradigm (as with any paradigm that 
identifies, structures, and determines methodology) has become for Mott and Ogletree 
their ethical method. The ensuing analysis o f their projects has affirmed the validity of 
this assumption.
For Mott, paradigm relates to an interpretive framework for concrete injunctions, 
finding values, overarching principles, and cross-cultural applicability. His discussion of 
paradigm comes primarily in those contexts where he is articulating how principles and 
concrete injunctions relate in Scriptural thought. Paradigm functions similarly with 
Ogletree. It is an interpretive framework for elucidating the meaning of Scripture for
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Christian ethics, value formation, or issues of theology and methodology. They differ 
only in the fact that the role and function of paradigm for Mott are primarily that of 
facilitating specific moral principles which then need to be translated and applied towards 
new situations. For Ogletree, it is primarily toward broad moral orientation. However, 
paradigm facilitates broad moral orientation for Mott, too. This focus toward broad 
moral orientation or specific moral principles can be seen in their respective overall use 
of the eschatological paradigm in moral theory. The presence o f both qualities of 
paradigm role and function in Mott’s use of paradigm undoubtedly facilitates his ability 
to nuance the eschatological paradigm through all levels o f paradigm operation and 
ethical structure.
This leads one to the question of the specificity and concreteness of interpretation 
and application. Because Mott discusses the role and function of paradigm primarily in 
the context of eliciting authoritative meaning from concrete biblical injunctions, he 
provides significant insight as to the how and why the eschatological paradigm can move 
from broad horizonal moral orientation to specific moral principles and even area rules 
for everyday life. For Mott, the importance of a paradigm is not the paradigm itself, but 
the authoritative nature o f Scripture and the broad way in which it can be approached and 
interpreted. The normative content—whether in concrete injunctions, prevailing ethical 
principles, mighty acts of God, theological affirmations, or enduring values—is not in any 
paradigmatic reality itself, but in the text. While the text creates the paradigm, the 
paradigm opens back toward the text. It can never move away from the text and operate 
on its own.
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These observations are significant for Mott’s application of the eschatological 
paradigm in that the normative content o f the eschatological paradigm likewise would lay 
primarily in the biblical text. We see this operating in his reign o f  God leitmotif. As a 
basic theological affirmation of Scripture, the reign o f  God is seen in the hermeneutical 
context of both opening the ethical meaning of Scripture and providing parameters for 
interpreting specific concrete injunctions o f Scripture. The bridge between the two is the 
reality of their both yielding normative content of Scripture. In addition, the reign o f  God 
receives concrete content through its organic relation to the concrete biblical injunction. 
The normative content for the eschatological paradigm thus lies primarily in the biblical 
text. In addition, because the reign o f God is an expression of God’s mighty act to restore 
creation, His paradigmatic actions facilitate moral reflection on the meso level of 
underlying principles and prevailing ethical values.
Finally, one would expect that a paradigm created or composed of components 
will find its moral specificity or abstraction through or from the moral clarity of those 
components. By extension, the moral specificity or abstraction of a given component part 
is likewise determined by the moral clarity o f the biblical witness with which it is 
defined. If the eschatological paradigm is seen as built on only broad principles or 
generalized abstractions from Scripture, it will not be able to either produce moral 
specificity or bring sustained focus toward Scripture in the context of its application in 
moral theory. On the other hand, if the eschatological paradigm is seen as reflecting 
comprehensive Scriptural/moral focus through the structuring of its components, it will 
tend toward greater specificity/content in the moral images it evokes. In addition, it will
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elicit sustained focus toward Scripture in the context of its application in moral theory. 
Obviously, the meaning and function of paradigm in the mind of the theologian or ethicist 
will significantly influence his perceptions of the potential application o f the 
eschatological paradigm. We have seen this divergence in Mott’s and Ogletree’s use of 
the eschatological paradigm in moral theory. And we can understand better why Mott’s 
project tends to be more specific and biblical oriented than Ogletree’s.
Strengths and Contributions 
This study has looked developmentally up through the 1970s for the basic 
crystallized eschatological paradigm that has emerged in Christian theology during this 
century. It has then looked to the 1980s and 1990s for clearer methodological application 
of the paradigm for moral theory by Christian ethicists. In this process, it has been noted 
that, because of numerous and complex interrelated issues and problems, no final 
clarification of the relationship between eschatology and Christian ethics could really be 
given through the 1970s. Clearer principles were needed with respect to the 
eschatological paradigm’s application in moral theory. This study has suggested that 
Mott and Ogletree have consciously extended this discussion, which they have considered 
incomplete and unfinished with respect to the use of eschatology in Christian moral 
theory. It is appropriate, then, for us to consider their strengths and contributions in light 
of the comparison and evaluations we have just concluded. It is appropriate, too, for us to 
ask whether or not their projects suggest that the eschatological paradigm has become a 
more stable framework for doing Christian ethics.
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Viewed together, Mott and Ogletree have both brought significant contributions to 
the eschatology/ethics dialogue and the question o f applying the eschatological paradigm 
to Christian moral theory. Their major contribution lies in elevating the role that 
Scripture must play in eschatological ethics. Their respective projects have sharpened the 
issues around which the authority of Scripture revolves. They have shown how 
eschatology can be useful in either solving problems of biblical authority or 
facilitating/obstructing the authority of Scripture in developing eschatological moral 
theory. Similarly, their projects have proven useful in clarifying more precisely the role 
of community and the nature of social involvement in Christian moral theory. Together 
they have extended the eschatological paradigm toward more useful and defining issues 
in ethics, i.e., justice, moral protest, ecclesial context, etc.. Finally, they provide 
significant contemporary examples of what happens if  you take the eschatological 
paradigm and apply it this way or apply it that way. Their respective interests and 
methodologies present graphic windows though which one can observe how 
presuppositions and agendas determine the way the eschatological paradigm is 
approached and practically applied.
Mott’s contributions in applying the eschatological paradigm emerge in the way 
he successfully works to bring the relevancy and clarity o f Scripture towards ethics. One 
does not read Mott long without sensing a positive love for Scripture and a profound 
sense of its authority and primacy. This contrasts sharply with Ogletree’s apparent 
detachment (although not intentional) from Scripture. In particular, Mott’s contribution, 
here, lays in the way he demonstrates how the normative content of the eschatological
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paradigm lies in the biblical texts themselves, and how the bridge between the differing 
levels o f moral reflection (paradigm operation and ingredients in ethical structure) is the 
reality of their each yielding normative content of Scripture. He also demonstrates why 
and how one can credibly and consistently translate ethical reflection from one level to 
another.1 It is possible because the biblical materials themselves provide both the 
conceptual structure and the example to do so. Additionally, Mott gives examples of how 
the eschatological paradigm, if seen as reflecting a comprehensive Scriptural/moral focus 
through the structuring of its components, will tend toward greater specificity/content in
'This is not suggesting that Mott necessarily does it right every time or that his 
conclusions or directions in the nature of his social involvement are necessarily always 
valid. Atkinson rightly notes that Mott exhibits “a tendency to over generalization 
without rigorous analysis. In places there is too rapid a move from the OT to the NT.
And there are some places that are just weak” (David Atkinson, “Biblical Social Ethics,” 
Expository Times 94, no. 7 [April 1983]: 214). Verhey will agree, noting that “appeals to 
Scripture are somewhat less convincing” where questions o f strategy for implementation 
are in view than where questions o f the basis for social involvement are being developed 
(Verhey, 26). Topel will add that, while Mott is well read across the spectrum of 
exegetical literature, and judicious in its use, “still, an exegete will notice many lacunae 
or even errors” (L. John Topel, review of Biblical Ethics and Social Change, by Stephen 
Charles Mott, The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 46 [January 1984]: 173). And Sundberg 
writes that “his tendency is to make of the Bible an answer book for contemporary 
questions while ignoring the original contexts faced in biblical epochs” (Walter 
Sundberg, review of A Christian Perspective on Political Thought, by Stephen Charles 
Mott, Word & World 14, no. 1 [Winter 1994]: 103). And one can be rightly troubled by 
the particular direction Mott takes in his A Christian Perspective on Political 
Thought—non-Communist socialism is that form of common life that most closely 
approximates the Christian vision. It has communal, democratic elements, very much 
like the kibbutz, about which he has written with considerable conviction. According to 
Mott, “the hidden elements o f Christianity in Marxism make many of its concepts 
appropriate for an overtly Christian social philosophy” (Mott, A Christian Perspective on 
Political Thought. 197). See Mott’s extended positive assessment of Marxist socialism 
and socialism in general: Mott, A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 183-218; 
Stackhouse, review of A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 149; and Attwood, 
review of A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. 253.
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the moral images it evokes. It will accordingly elicit sustained focus toward Scripture in 
the context of its application in moral theory. Because of these hermeneutical insights, 
Mott is able to elicit a higher degree of concreteness and specificity in his moral theory. 
And he can do so with a corresponding degree of credibility and consistency. As a result, 
Mott becomes more immediately relevant.
Because he is working within parameters defined more closely by the biblical 
materials, Mott is able to present a clearer picture of where he is going. Furthermore, he 
can demonstrate both theoretically and practically how the eschatological paradigm really 
looks in contemporary moral theory and social involvement. In other words, Mott’s 
methodological use of the eschatological paradigm in moral theory shows strong potential 
to work. The only cloud in all this is the risk Mott takes in harmonizing and 
homogenizing the rich complexity of the ethics of biblical materials under the rubric of 
“biblical justice,” and how his hermeneutic is governed by his purpose in finding 
mandates for social change in the texts.1 Any correction on Mott’s part here, though, 
would only strengthen the contributions I have just described.
Ogletree’s contributions in applying the eschatological paradigm emerge in his 
monumental attempt to bridge, via moral philosophy and phenomenology, the moral 
nuances o f the biblical materials and contemporary Christian ethics. It is striking to find 
such a readiness to see analogies with classical moral theories and the Bible. It is very 
rare to find any sustained attempt to relate biblical and philosophical ethics at all.2 While
‘Goldsmith, 520; Verhey, 26; Middleman, 39.
2Barton, 245, 246.
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this study has been critical of both his process and the degree of his success in all this, 
nevertheless, his very attempt to do so serves to sharpen, and actually demonstrate, the 
issues around which the application of the eschatological paradigm have revolved in this 
century. On the one hand, Ogletree shows how eschatology can provide a conceptual 
ingredient for merging what appears to be contrasting and diverse views o f reality and 
ways of approaching moral thinking. On the other hand, he shows how eschatology can 
bring some important critical distance needed for engaging what he terms as the 
contemporary “civilization ethic.” In fact, one could call his The Use of the Bible in 
Christian Ethics an example of what he means by critically engaging the reigning 
“civilization ethic.” Through moral philosophy and phenomenology, he articulates 
contemporary notions of reality, and then structures biblical notions within the same kind 
o f conceptual language, though with a different view of reality.
Ogletree is right in asserting that moral philosophy revolves largely around 
consequentialist/value, deontological/rule, and perfectionist/virtue conceptual 
frameworks, and that issues of intentionality, intersubjectivity, and self-formation are key 
concepts as well. His attempts to show the relevancy of the biblical materials through 
these categories are useful, though not necessarily accurate in terms of exegesis or 
theology.1 One only wonders how much different some of his conclusions might be if he 
tried to find analogies with classical moral theories and the Bible against a markedly 
different backdrop of presuppositions regarding the nature and authority o f Scripture.
'Keith Ward, review of The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, by Thomas W. 
Ogletree, Journal of Theological Studies 37 (April 1986): 296; Verhey, 26, 27; Hays, 23, 
24; Comstock, 214.
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Would he still argue that eschatology presents deontological themes without the category 
of law? Or for the predominance of freedom, open future, and relativity in moral 
thinking? Because philosophy, rather than Scripture, is his framework for developing 
theological ethics, Ogletree’s methodology presents a problem of distance and 
detachment from the message of the biblical materials. It expresses a degree of 
speculation and irresponsibility by way of relative relevance and abstraction. It is a risk 
that anyone dealing in philosophical categories opens oneself to.
Ogletree’s main contributions, however, are found (1) in the forceful way he 
articulates the eschatological paradigm as presenting the essential dialectical nature of 
Christian moral theory and method, and (2) in the strong way he essentially argues that 
there is no straight line between the ethics o f the eschatological community and the 
social/moral agenda of the larger society. His imagery of “eschatological communities” 
facilitates a  sharp case for defining the meaning and content of eschatological ethics. It 
also points to eschatological ethics as being expressly directed toward the eschatological 
community.1 His notion of an “ecclesial context” for approaching the moral witness of 
Scripture presents forceful argumentation for (1) the practical role the believing 
community actually plays in interpreting Scripture, (2) how the eschatological praxis of 
gospel living provides experiential points o f contact for comprehending what the biblical 
materials are saying, and (3) that only eschatologically oriented communities can really 
foster a fusion o f horizons between the biblical world and our own modem world. These
’Some would argue, however, that Ogletree does not adequately demonstrate why 
and in precisely what sense a contemporary Christian ethic must be eschatological 
(Attwood, 156).
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three points would be undoubtedly stronger if presented within the context of a higher 
view of the nature and authority of Scripture.
Why Diverse Applications of 
Eschatological Paradigm
The foregoing process o f (1) outlining this century’s re-interpretation of 
eschatology as paradigm for Christian ethics, (2) describing and analyzing Mott’s and 
Ogletree’s use o f this eschatological paradigm in their moral theory, and (3) this chapter’s 
comparison and evaluation of their respective application of the paradigm enable us now 
to better ascertain how and why the eschatological paradigm creates such diverse and 
often contradictory imagery for moral reflection. They also enable us to appraise the 
problems and issues so as to propose the implications that exist for using the 
eschatological paradigm more credibly and consistently in contemporary Christian moral 
theory.
This study’s outline o f the principal characteristics of twentieth-century re­
interpreted eschatology has provided the profile of a comprehensive paradigm for 
Christian moral theory. The contours o f this comprehensive paradigm include three 
conceptually interwoven and complementary component models {already/not yet, reign o f 
God, and horizon o f  the future). Together they embrace the range o f possible theological 
and moral conceptions of the Kingdom o f God.1 It has been shown that each of the 
paradigm’s components generates forceful and specific ethical nuances which are rich for
1 As indicated in the introduction, the “eschatological paradigm” is understood as 
being the overall integrating worldview generated by the New Testament Kingdom of 
God.
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application toward moral theory. It has been shown, too, that a challenge remains in 
determining just how these moral nuances are actually elicited and/or have themselves 
been cast with respect to moral theory. This has become evident when viewed against 
this study’s designated principles of verification and the varied ways we have seen that 
ethicists have perceived them in relation to the divergent moral nuances projected through 
the eschatological paradigm. The possible combinations o f implications for moral theory 
are subtle, numerous, and complex. It was further noted that adequately applying 
eschatology as paradigm toward moral theory demands an understanding o f the subtle 
dynamics of paradigm in relation to models, principles and laws, levels o f  operation, and 
the ingredients o f ethical structure. In short, we have a very complex situation with subtle 
nuances that demands thoughtful balance and a clear understanding of one’s own 
presuppositions and theological/moral agenda.
The fact o f the matter is that the eschatological paradigm can be taken in any 
number o f possible directions. If you nuance the horizon o f  the future with philosophical 
presuppositions and an existential view of the nature of Scripture, you will likely express 
affinities with theologies of the future. If you nuance the reign o f  God where the 
Christian community is viewed as only the initial field of moral operation, you will likely 
envision some form of Christianized society. And so on!1 The point here is that one 
needs to be aware of the complex and often subtle interplay that exists between these 
various ingredients, as well as one’s own presuppositions and agendas, if  the
lSee above discussion on the “Implications for Moral Theory,” 78-121; Snyder, 
Models o f the Kingdom.
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eschatological paradigm is to operate effectively and truly reflect the biblical materials.
Mott and Ogletree have served to more clearly define the nature of the complex 
and often subtle interplay that exists between the various ingredients involved in the 
question of the use of eschatology as paradigm in Christian ethics and the ever-present 
presuppositions or agendas we might have as we seek to apply the eschatological 
paradigm. Their very diversity suggests that the question of the use of eschatology in 
Christian moral theory remains an open one, even as the twentieth century draws to its 
close. They have, however, served to highlight the important role that Scripture 
ultimately plays in the whole equation. They graphically illustrate how the role o f 
Scripture continues to be the most critical issue in the eschatology/ethics discussion.
After all, the role of Scripture was at the very core o f their own question as to the use of 
eschatology in Christian moral theory. As we have observed, Mott’s and Ogletree’s 
contrasting orientation to this important question o f the nature and authority of Scripture 
has resulted in marked contrasts with respect to consistency, specificity, and relevancy of 
eschatological paradigm application. Their projects suggest that the question of the role 
o f Scripture alone gives promise of eventually bringing some degree of stability to the use 
of the eschatological paradigm in Christian moral theory.
Perspectives for Using Eschatology 
as Paradigm
In view of these observations, I would propose the following when applying the 
eschatological paradigm toward moral theory.
1. One must come to the eschatological paradigm with a view of the nature and
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authority of Scripture that allows for its primacy and authority to be functionally 
operative as normative content throughout the various ways the biblical materials present 
themselves (concrete injunctions, prevailing principles, mighty acts o f  God, theological 
affirmations, stories, etc.).
2. One needs to identify and nuance the eschatological paradigm exclusively 
within the purview of the conceptual imagery that Scripture provides with respect to it.
3. The three component models of the eschatological paradigm (already/not yet, 
reign o f  God, and horizon o f  the future) need to be kept within their proper biblically 
defined dynamic interplay in order for their combined imagery to bring the balancing 
control that is needed for credible, consistent biblical application toward moral theory.
4. One needs to be candid about one’s own presuppositions and theological/moral 
agenda (especially with regard to the role of Scripture, community, and the nature of 
social involvement) and how their biases might materially influence their effective use of 
the eschatological paradigm.
5. There needs to be sensitivity to the differing levels of moral reflection that 
paradigms elicit, and clearly defined principles for consistent, credible, and biblically 
congruous movement from one level to the other.
6. It needs to work! The end product must be successful in bringing Scripture 
functionally, concretely, and practically toward Christian ethics, and, in the end, keep 
eschatology what it is expected to be—an integrating worldview that brings gripping 
spiritual/moral formation, and provides sufficient concrete guidance to adequately meet 
the demands o f particular contemporary moral exigencies.
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Relation to Other Paradigms
The twentieth century has seen eschatology emerge as a “new paradigm” in 
contemporary Christian moral thought. And, not surprisingly, it has been indicating new 
directions for Christian ethics. But how does it relate to other paradigms being used in 
Christian moral theory? Is it complementary? Is it more comprehensive? Can it become, 
as some would suggest, the sole integrating paradigm through which all other paradigms 
find their meaning and ultimate contribution to Christian moral theory? Or does it make 
other paradigms obsolete? Now that I have identified the principal characteristics of the 
eschatological paradigm and have evaluated its effectiveness and usefulness for Christian 
moral theory, these kinds of questions seem appropriate and press us for answers. Here 
lie, no doubt, some considerations for further research into the viability of the 
eschatological paradigm for Christian moral theory. A further study could evaluate the 
eschatological paradigm against other paradigms being used in contemporary Christian 
ethics. One could compare their respective effectiveness and usefulness in developing 
Christian moral theory. One could also indicate and compare what possible aspects of 
moral theory may be articulated by each paradigm. Because not all paradigms may 
operate comprehensively across the full spectrum of paradigm operation, one could assess 
the possibility of prioritizing, complementing, and/or integrating paradigms. Likewise, 
because not all paradigms may correspond fully or directly with the different levels o f 
moral reflection which the biblical materials communicate, one could assess which 
paradigms open up the biblical materials more completely. Certainly, such comparison 
and evaluation of the eschatological paradigm against other paradigms assume that these
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other paradigms have, likewise, been clearly identified and evaluated.
For purposes of illustration, let us broadly lay the eschatological paradigm against 
just two other twentieth-century paradigms in Christian moral theory, i.e., “divine 
command” and “love.” The divine command paradigm would posit that we live 
worthwhile lives by following the divine will.1 What pleases God, what God 
commands—that is the definition of right. What displeases God, what He forbids—that 
is the definition of wrong. What God wills and what is right coincide. These commands 
may be in keeping with the moral laws discovered by reason or they may appear 
unreasonable and arbitrary. Whatever the case might be, Christian faith and moral 
responsibility require trusting obedience.
The divine command paradigm highlights several important issues for Christian 
ethics, i.e., the authority of God, the nature and authority of Scripture, the frame of 
reference in which we reflect morally, where the source of moral norms is located, the 
dynamic and importance of faith obedience, the nature and work of God, as well as 
motivation for moral action. It seems to me that this paradigm—while affirming the 
authority of Scripture, concrete commands, and an overarching frame of reference for 
moral reflection across the full spectrum of paradigm operation, etc.—operates primarily 
on a vertical level and does not adequately address horizontal questions of time and 
history as clearly as the eschatological paradigm does. Nor does it articulate clearly a
‘Porter, 320; Glenn C. Graber, “Divine Command Morality,” Westminster 
Dictionary o f Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 159-160. Emil 
Brunner and C. H. F. Henry provide examples of the divine command paradigm (Henry, 
Christian Personal Ethics. 209-218; Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative [Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1947], 114-459; White, 344-350).
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vision of the future or the responsibility o f the moral agent in complex moral dilemmas in 
a fallen world. In the context of a trusting relationship with God and a vision of His good 
action, it could, however, provide a motivating dynamic that grips the inner self with 
moral vision and purpose. It could thus answer issues of intentionality and motive, 
something which the eschatological paradigm does not address directly. The notion of 
divine command fits logically, it would appear, under the eschatological paradigm’s reign 
o f God component model.
Love in Christian ethics remains a pervasive subject in recent writing.1 As a 
paradigm for ethics it indicates both internal and external elements of Christian morality. 
It indicates a  particular kind of feeling. It is also a verb which emphasizes how we should 
behave. The internal aspect focuses on emotion, disposition, and motive. The external 
aspect focuses on volition, choices, action, and a way of life. The two must be present for 
biblical love to be complete. In Scripture, love is defined by description and by 
demonstration. The objects of love include God, others, one’s self, and things. The 
importance o f love is highlighted in the character of God, God’s image in man, and as the 
source and summary of all virtue. It is God’s revelation of what He wills us to be and do.
It would seem to me that, as a paradigm, love could function across the full 
spectrum o f paradigm operation and the ingredients in the structure o f ethics. In fact,
'Gene Outka, “Love,” Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1986), 354-359; Robertson McQuilkin, Biblical Ethics (Wheaton, IL: 
Tyndale House Publishers, 1989); Henry. Christian Personal Ethics. 219-236. Paul 
Ramsey provides an example of the love paradigm (Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950); James T. Johnson and David H. Smith, eds., 
Love and Society: Essavs in the Ethics o f Paul Ramsev (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 
1974).
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Scripture provides a broad spectrum of intersection on this subject with each o f these 
levels. But love is not so much a worldview as it is a way of living within a  worldview 
where love is integral to the total reality. While love expresses a reciprocal vertical 
dimension of the divine/human relationship, it deals primarily with the horizontal level of 
personal and social relationships. And like divine command, it does not deal so directly 
with horizontal flow in terms of time and history as the eschatological paradigm does. 
Like divine command, it seems to fit logically under the reign o f God component of the 
eschatological paradigm, although the “conflicts o f  love” present in this present age 
would serve to elucidate the moral dilemmas implied by the already not yet. Love also 
provides a vision of the future in keeping with the moral direction o f the eschatological 
paradigm.
These are the kind of comparisons that could be made between the eschatological 
paradigm and the other paradigms current in contemporary Christian moral theory. My 
observations here are only cursory, and yet the possibilities are significant for more in- 
depth study. Just these two brief comparisons highlight the significant role the 
eschatological paradigm plays in overall moral theory. But they enumerate, as well, the 
reality that moral theory is complex and that a lot o f issues need consideration and 
balance. A balanced comprehensive view of biblically informed Christian moral life 
reflects, no doubt, the moral imagery from several such paradigms. This is so, even if 
one, like eschatology, appears to be able to integrate and cohere the imagery of many 
others.
Besides comparing the eschatological paradigm against other moral paradigms,
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further useful studies could include (1) how the moral implications o f the eschatological 
paradigm fits with, obstructs, or is adjusted by unique sectarian eschatologies, and (2) 
how the eschatological paradigm is nuanced by or nuances the moral implications of 
biblical apocalyptic literature.1
Conclusion
This study has been about ethical method. Its purpose has been to explore and 
evaluate the implications of the methodological application of eschatology as paradigm 
for developing contemporary moral theory. It has focused on the interplay of eschatology 
as a methodological tool and the ethical system that results from it. More specifically, it 
has sought to demonstrate that “this is what happens if  you take the eschatological 
paradigm and apply it this way or that way.” These concerns were set in the context of 
the ongoing problem of significant and often contradictory divergence among Christian 
ethicists in the way the application of the eschatological paradigm influences moral 
theory and nuances ethical method. These considerable divergences imply that the issue 
of its methodological application still needs exploring. Mott and Ogletree were chosen as 
case studies for this endeavor because they belong to the eschatological movement in 
contemporary Christian ethics. They represent the latter, contemporary phase of 
twentieth-century re-interpreted eschatology and its application toward moral theory. The 
ultimate purpose of this study was to determine whether or not the eschatological 
paradigm, in spite o f the various ways in which it has been understood, still held promise
'It is significant that neither Mott nor Ogletree draw much from apocalyptic 
literature in their projects (a fact that Verhey notes about Ogletree [Verhey, 26]).
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as the starting point for a comprehensive approach to moral theory. Could the 
eschatological paradigm produce a methodological integration? Is it focused and 
coherent enough to produce an ethical system? Is it broad enough to include the 
significant contemporary issues in Christian moral life?
To explore these concerns and propose answers to these questions, I proposed a 
helpful set o f analytical distinctions that encompassed the significant issues that the 
application of the eschatological paradigm revolves around. These issues include: (1) the 
role and function o f paradigm, (2) the levels o f  paradigm operation (macro, meso, and 
micro), and (3) the levels in the ingredients in the structure o f ethics (philosophical/ 
theological bases, underlying principles, and area rules). In addition, there are (4) the 
three components o f the eschatological paradigm (already/not yet, reign o f  God, and 
horizon o f  the future),1 and (5) three principles o f verification (role of Scripture, role of 
community, and the nature of social involvement). I proposed that these three principles 
of verification would enable us to relate to issues o f authority and relevance which have 
been in considerable question in Christian ethics during this century.
A significant feature of my procedure was the suggestion that a correspondence 
exists between the levels of paradigm operation and the levels of ingredients in the 
structure of ethics. Another aspect o f this procedure was the suggestion that there is a 
complex interplay and nuancing between the paradigm’s components and the principles 
o f verification which highlight the methodological nuances that the paradigm
'As seen in relation to the eschatological paradigm’s primary model—the 
Kingdom of God.
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evokes/expresses with regard to the principles o f verification. The methodology I 
outlined thus proposed the presence of a complex set o f interacting variables in the 
application of the eschatological paradigm toward Christian moral theory. A 
diagrammatic overview of these interacting variables in figure 1 provide a visual and 
conceptual grasp of the subtle interplay that this study suggests exists between the 
eschatological paradigm and each of the areas impacting the question of its application to 
moral theory. Together, this set of analytical distinctions and procedural suggestions 
provided an extensive framework where we could see in a comparative fashion where an 
ethicist begins, where he moves, and where he ends in terms of using eschatology as 
paradigm in Christian moral theory. At the same time, we could observe where the real 
issues lie in trying to bring credible structure for applying the eschatological paradigm in 
Christian ethics.
This study has demonstrated the validity of this set of analytical distinctions by 
the concrete and insightful ways it has allowed us to focus on the question of eschatology 
and ethics.1 I believe it also contributes to the larger ethical method dialogue by outlining 
and demonstrating the correspondence that exists between the levels of paradigm 
operation and the ingredients in the structure o f ethics. It contributes, too, in outlining 
how the biblical materials can provide both the structure and example for credibly and 
consistently translating moral reflection between these differing levels of paradigm
‘Mott notes that these categories of analysis “produce a significant discussion” 
(Mott to Lichtenwalter, April 20,1996,1). While not addressing them directly, Ogletree 
nevertheless speaks o f “seeing the whole o f my writings in ways that surprised me” 
(Ogletree to Lichtenwalter, September 26, 1996,1).
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operation and their corresponding ingredients in ethical structure. Furthermore, it has 
contributed to the dialogue by suggesting how a paradigm created or composed of 
components will find its moral specificity or abstraction through or from the moral clarity 
o f its components—and by extension, how the moral specificity or abstraction of a given 
component part is likewise determined by the moral clarity of the biblical witness with 
which it is defined.
There are other paradigms that will come under consideration in moral theory. 
This study has produced a useful tool towards exploring their validity as well as 
methodological procedures and presuppositions with respect to them. In the context of 
most paradigms focused toward Christian moral theory, there will be in view, at the least, 
(1) the three principles of verification, (2) the levels of paradigm operation, and (3) the 
ingredients in the structure of ethics. New elements in the equation would be the 
conceptual imagery stemming from the paradigm’s supporting and primary models, and 
any other concerns pertinent to the subject at hand.
In conclusion, there is the question toward which this study has been moving. Do 
either Mott’s or Ogletree’s eschatologically defined moral theory suggest that the 
eschatological paradigm has become a more stable framework for doing Christian ethics? 
Given this study’s analysis and evaluation, I would say “yes!” I would say “yes!” if we 
have Mott’s application of eschatology as paradigm in view, but I would qualify my “yes” 
for Ogletree. Mott’s example of the prevailing role that Scripture must play in the 
application o f eschatology as paradigm in moral theory demonstrates where that stability 
is to be found. On the other hand, Ogletree’s example of the prevailing role that moral
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philosophy, phenomenology, and critical method can play in its application highlights 
where instability still resides.
This study would indicate that the eschatological paradigm functions well or best 
if it expresses biblical ethics. It becomes elusive, however, and open to speculation if it 
expresses philosophical ethics. Mott’s more direct link between the eschatological 
paradigm and the moral witness of the biblical materials provides a moral theory that is 
more “user friendly,” relevant, clear, concrete, and more immediately applicable. It also 
provides a responsible framework for credibly translating moral reflection across the 
differing levels of paradigm operation and the corresponding ingredients in ethical 
structure. Mott’s example of the use of eschatology provides a basis for measuring 
consistency in its application across the levels o f critical reflection because it highlights 
how the biblical materials present both the structure and example of doing so. He also 
delineates how the bridge between the differing levels of moral reflection (paradigm 
operation and ingredients in ethical structure) is the reality of their each yielding 
normative content of Scripture. In short, the eschatological paradigm becomes a stable 
framework for doing ethics in proportion to its correlation with the biblical witness and 
its affinity with the structure and examples within the biblical materials themselves. To 
step outside the realm of this clearly defined biblical framework is to render the 
eschatological paradigm a slippery tool open to any kind of nuancing which, in fact, we 
have seen throughout this century.
Ogletree’s use of the eschatological paradigm, while providing several positive 
and important contributions, nonetheless, merely reduplicates many of the weaknesses
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that rendered the eschatological paradigm fluid and unstable through the 1970s.
Mott’s use of the eschatological paradigm, while not the full answer and still open 
to considerable, valid criticism in several areas, nevertheless suggests the way towards 
assuring that the eschatological paradigm becomes more stable for Christian moral theory 
in the twenty-first century.
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